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Thesis summary: 
This thesis consists of a socio-psychological study of Greek European identity within the context of 
the Greek debt/Eurozone crisis. Drawing insights from Social Representations Theory (SRT) and 
Social Identity Theory (SIT), it approaches the question of identity in a dual manner, as a 
representation and a psychological experience. The motivation of the research is enacted through 
the questioning of whether economic crises can provoke crises of collective identities. Its 
contribution is both theoretical and empirical. The thesis argues that although the term ‘identity 
crisis’ is a frequently used one, especially in conditions of post-modernity, an analytical elucidation 
of the varied destabilising dynamics behind potential ‘identity crises’ is unclear within existing 
literature. Furthermore, it is postulated that as useful and enlightening a social psychological 
approach may be for the study of identities, and although SIT’s focus on identity threats as 
destabilising for group self-esteem can help us understand identity dynamics, the discipline still lacks 
a more systematic analytical framework of identity destabilisations. The thesis develops an elaborate 
typology and conceptualisation of identity destabilisations and operationalises it for the study of 
Greek European identity through a triangulated single case study research design, combining a 
variety of data sources, such as historiographical data, media texts, expert and elite interviews, and 
interviews with non-expert citizens. The typology includes the destabilisations of identity conflict, 
identity devaluation, identity overvaluation and identity deficit. The results of the study indicate that 
the public discourse of the debt/Eurozone crisis has been abundant in representations of all such 
identity destabilisations. The interviews with Greek experts and elites, called in this study ‘ideational 
leaders’, and with non-expert citizens, designate that the most prevalent forms of identity 
destabilisation, both at the level of representation and of psychological experience in Greek society 
are those of identity conflict and identity devaluation. The results show a distinct public 
preoccupation with ideas, such as national self-reflection and collective responsibility. The 
representations made by expert and non-expert citizens approximate each other quite closely, while 
comparisons across the data sources and across time bring to the fore continuities of narratives and 
identity representations, which are explained within SRT’s assumption of anchoring as a return to 
previously established knowledge for the comprehension of new phenomena, as well as within the 
constraints faced by discursive actors in their attempts to construct new realities. It is concluded that 
a new narrative is necessitated for Greek European identity. 
Keywords: identity conflict, identity deficit, identity destabilisation, identity devaluation, identity 
overvaluation, social psychology  
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Introduction 
 
 
‘Individuals and societies are looked at from the outside… if Britain went through such 
a crisis, we would have at least a thousand books with very deep analyses, here we 
only have a few that just try to blame somebody else… hence, our weakness to become 
the object of our observation’  
(Ramfos, 2014) 
 
‘I think the economic and political element, unfortunately… will always overwhelm the 
cultural and national identities… I don’t know who study these, if they do, and if you 
can study them beyond a few conferences at some universities, when on top of you 
there’s unemployment, wars […] closeby… so, all of these detract this process’  
(Panousis, 2014) 
 
‘The Greek who encounters the hostility and distrust of those, only those, Europeans 
who read the same tabloids that our people read here too, experiences a small shock… 
which comes to be added – you have to be a social psychologist to explain this! – and 
makes a mix of complexing elements of inferiority and superiority, which is explosive…’  
(Matsaganis, 2014) 1 
  
 
 
Economic crisis and collective identity 
 
World history, both modern and pre-modern, is full of financial and economic crises. From the 
Roman Imperial Crisis of the 3rd century and the Renaissance ‘manias’, such as the Dutch Tulip Mania 
of 1637, to the ‘panics’ of the 19th century and ‘crashes’ of the 20th, economic turmoil has evolved 
hand in hand with human societies (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011; Shah et al., 2013). Historical 
research reveals that economic crises often come in waves, during which an original crisis-inflicted 
                                                          
1 All three quotations on this page come from this study’s expert interviews. Expert participants agreed to be 
interviewed eponymously. A full list of interviewees is located in Appendix 1. Interviews were conducted in 
Greek. Translations were conducted by the author.  
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epicentre exhorts financial pressures transnationally, causing in its passage severe challenges on 
other national economies, particularly fragile developing ones (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). During 
these crisis waves, which may be more or less extensive in their international impact, some 
countries may enter into financial distress and even default on their external debts (Berkmen et al., 
2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). Debt itself has been demonstrated to be a rather perennial financial 
relationship, as various historians observe in their explorations of early agrarian empires or medieval 
city-states in Europe (Graeber, 2011; Stasavage, 2016). Under this light, sovereign debt defaults, ‘far 
from being exceptional’, are ‘in fact rather common’ (Oosterlinck, 2013: 698).  
Based on a ‘panoramic view of financial crises’ (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014), one might be tempted to 
believe that these are somehow banal or mundane, if only for their staggering frequency in time and 
space and recurring misconduct of financial actors (Askari et al., 2014). However, the social 
repercussions of financial crises are anything but trivial, since they can cause significant social 
dislocation and unexpected hardship (Hill & Chu, 2001). As an extension, we should anticipate that 
economic crises may have an impact on social identities (Norris, 2016). For example, during a world 
recession, millions of workers may lose their jobs (Ciro, 2016), while poverty and unemployment can 
dramatically impact on individuals’ sense of self (Norris, 2016). From mental illness, like depression 
and suicidal ideation (Economou et al., 2013a, 2013b), to the devastating loss of human capability 
(Blyth, 2013: Nussbaum, 2011), the impact on individual lives can be immense and even diachronic. 
Blyth (2013), for instance, in his critique of austerity, autobiographically unfolds his transition from a 
‘welfare kid’ to a university professor, pointing out that the demise of welfare states during 
recessions can deprive young generations of life opportunities and social mobility, therefore of 
desired future ‘possible selves’ (Oyserman & James, 2012).  
However, economic crises are not only experienced individually, but they are also experienced 
collectively by entire societies (Carrington, 2015), therefore they should have an impact not only on 
the personal identities of individuals, but also on their collective identities. In this sense, although 
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nationals of countries undergoing an economic crisis are differentially affected based on various 
demographic characteristics (Herrero, 2013), they share a collective experience to some degree, 
since they are subjected to the same macro-economic fluctuations. Furthermore, economic crises 
can turn into political ones, which hold the capacity to adversely influence entire national polities 
(Bosco & Verney, 2012). For example, during the Asian financial crisis of the nineties, Indonesia 
experienced a two-year leadership crisis and ethnic tensions that further obstructed its recovery (Hill 
& Chu, 2001). Moreover, defaults followed by necessitated bailouts by international creditors and 
the demands made in bailout agreements can exacerbate political crises by mobilising domestic 
resistance and adding further tensions on a country’s foreign relations (Hill & Chu, 2001).  
Collective identities have long been considered as capable of playing a pacifying and positive role in 
societies distressed by large-scale adverse phenomena, such as crises (Karolewski et al., 2016; 
Mitchell, 2016). Collective identities are defined as ‘an individual’s cognitive, moral and emotional 
connection with a broader community, category, practice, or institution’ (Polleta & Jasper, 2001: 
285). The more benevolent and constructive the connections made by individuals to their 
communities and institutions, the more peaceful, resilient and effective the latter are expected to be 
(Karolewski et al., 2016; Mitchell, 2016). Two distinct political and historical formations in search of a 
collective identity, and the unity this is charged with, are the modern nation-state and the 
transnational organisation of the European Union (EU) (Karolewski, 2006).  
Within the context of European integration and the establishment of the EU, after its previous 
historical formations, as a means for overcoming the consequences of the World War II (WWII) and 
unifying a broken continent (Garton Ash, 2012), national identities are not only meant to be 
national, but they are also hoped to become European, embracing the integrationist goal and 
overcoming their nationalist versions (Guibernau, 2011). Nevertheless, European identities come in 
national versions (Marcussen et al., 1999; Mummenday & Waldzus, 2004), because member-states 
hold their respective visions, memories and experiences of Europe (Katzenstein & Checkel, 2009). As 
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such, it is more accurate to refer to a Spanish European identity, a Slovenian European identity, a 
Swedish European identity, rather than simply, a Spanish, Slovenian or Swedish identity. The 
European addition to national identities has traditionally been conceptualised as the political and 
cultural ‘glue’ that would bind European nations together (Karolewski, 2011; Triandafyllidou & 
Gropas, 2015). This unifying element has been enacted to an important one, especially since the 
wake of the Euro crisis and the respective sovereign crises around Europe (Fligstein et al., 2012; 
Risse, 2014).  
The present thesis is a socio-psychological study of national European identities in Greece, ‘the 
Eurozone member most severely affected by the current economic crisis’ (Clements et al., 2014: 
247). Its central aim is to investigate whether Greece’s economic crisis, as this is experienced within 
the wider context of European integration during times of crisis, constitutes an identity crisis of 
Greek European identity. This aim is motivated by the wider problematisation regarding to what 
degree and in what ways economic crises may provoke collective identity destabilisatons, or even 
identity crises. As such, this thesis aims to explore an issue, such as a financial crisis, which is usually 
studied through an economic or political economy approach, through the different lenses of an 
identity perspective (Galpin, 2014; Norris, 2016). Furthermore, existing literature usually addresses 
the question of national identity crisis primarily with reference to post-conflict societies (i.e. Nodia, 
1996; Pheralia & Garratt, 2014) or post-colonial transitions (i.e. Antony, 2013; Mazrui, 2013) and 
rarely looks at it with reference to the aftermath of economic failure (i.e. Armony & Armony, 2005). 
Although economic crises are not as devastating as war and direct violence, the structural and 
cultural violence they may induce can be quite detrimental (Galtung, 1969, 1990). Finally, this thesis 
argues that existing theories of ‘identity crisis’ do not adequately or fittingly account for the diversity 
of collective identity phenomena under crisis conditions and as such, it aims to contribute to a more 
clarified classification of identity destabilisations during such times. 
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This introduction will continue by providing a presentation of the current historical interval of the 
Euro crisis, as well as an overview of national European identities in the context of European 
integration, before moving on to presenting the case of Greece and the Greek debt crisis. 
Subsequently, the research questions, aims, and rationale of this thesis will be outlined, followed by 
an exposition of the theoretical and empirical contributions of the study. Finally, a structure of the 
thesis will be offered.  
 
National European identities and the Euro crisis 
 
According to the diachronic perspective above, it would appear that we are now historically situated 
on one such crisis wave, in the form of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which emanated in 2007-
2008 with the bursting of the US housing bubble and the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Ciro, 2016; 
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014). This latest crisis wave has been described as the worst one since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, and was accordingly labelled the Great Recession (Ciro, 2016). After the 
original trigger, crisis symptoms first became evident in Europe with Britain’s ‘credit crunch’ in 2007-
2008 (Thain, 2009), Iceland’s banking crisis (2008-2011) (Boyes, 2009), and the early 2008-2009 
bailouts of Latvia, Hungary and Romania by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank 
(WB), and the European Union (EU) (Blyth, 2013). However, the most notable and enduring 
manifestation of what came to be known as the Euro crisis was the additional and more extended 
bailouts of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus, and Spain, by the EU and the IMF, after these Eurozone 
member-states experienced financial upheaval (Breuss, 2016; Zestos, 2016). This series of sovereign 
crises was crowned by the wider crisis of the Eurozone, which reanimated debates whether the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) is a sustainable ‘optimum currency area’ (Eichengreen, 2012; 
Mundell, 1961).   
The Euro currency was designed to be one of the greatest initiatives in the process of European 
integration, intimately related to a collective European identity (Kennedy, 2012). The relationship 
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between the currency and a common European identity was understood as a reciprocal one, 
whereby the currency was expected to help with the sense of belonging to a shared economic and 
political community, and simultaneously, a collective identity functioning as a empowering element 
for sustaining the monetary union by inspiring support for EU economic policies (Galpin, 2014; 
Kaelberer, 2004). Alas, the Euro crisis imposed grave challenges on European integration.   
Recent empirical research substantiates the increase of Euroscepticism, defined as negative 
attitudes towards European integration (Taggart, 1998), decline of support for the EU, and rise of 
nationalism within the continent (Karolewski et al., 2016; Mitchell, 2016; Serricchio et al., 2013). As 
indicated in the last Euroelections, Eurosceptic parties were enforced (Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; 
Treib, 2014). These developments directly affect the political legitimacy and democratic raison d'être 
of the EU, since political systems necessitate public support to be considered democratic (Galpin, 
2014; Mitchell, 2016). As such, many have argued recently that there should be an alarming 
problematisation with the state of European identities inside the Euro crisis, since this could become 
a profound and long-term turning point in public support for European integration (Kuhn, 2015; 
Risse, 2014). Decreasing popular support could make the EU vulnerable to deeper crisis, because it 
could obstruct collective decision-making and consensus-building for the purposes of resolving the 
economic crisis (Karolewski, 2011; Karolewski et al., 2016).  
To be sure, the idea of the EU being in a ‘state of crisis’ is anything but new (Hoffmann, 1964, 1994; 
Jenkins, 2008), especially since the post-Maastricht decline of the ‘permissive consensus’ and 
elevation of the ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Empirical research over time 
repeatedly indicates that most Europeans feel primarily attached to their national, rather than their 
European identities (Fligstein et al., 2012). Moreover, citizens who participate more in transnational 
European experiences are more likely to develop a European identity, while those whose economic 
and social horizons are more local are more likely to assert nationalist identities (Fligstein et al., 
2012; Kuhn, 2015). One of the dominant factors in facilitating transnational European lives, thus 
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identities, is a ‘country’s economic wealth’ with citizens of prosperous EU member-states having 
more access to the European experience (Kuhn, 2015: 145). Furthermore, past research indicates 
that as long as perceptions of the economy remain positive and the EU is viewed as beneficial, 
citizens tend to support the EU (Gabel & Whitten, 1997; Verhaegen et al., 2014). As such, there has 
been a wider relationship between economic factors and collective identities.  
However, in a time of increased politicisation of the EU, material interests are contested and 
perceptions of benefit become varied and intensely debated (de Wilde & Zurn, 2012). For example, 
in the recent Brexit referendum on EU membership, one could hear both Leavers and Remainers 
being motivated by concerns about improving British economy and living conditions (Goodwin & 
Milazzo, 2015). Ultimately, what appears to be crucial is how the relationship between national and 
European identities is mobilised in public debates to account for specific events, such as crises, since 
identities are highly situational, time and context specific (Chalaniova, 2014; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; 
Risse, 2010). As such, it is important and fruitful to explore identities with reference to specified 
events, situations and historical contexts and the Euro crisis offers itself for such an endeavour 
(Chalaniova, 2014). The next section will focus on the case study of this thesis.  
 
The case of Greece 
 
In the context of the Euro crisis, some have argued that the EU as an institution is going through an 
‘existential crisis’ (Giddens, 2012; Jones, 2012) or possibly even an ‘identity crisis’ (Galpin, 2014; 
Ntampoudi, 2015). However, countries experience financial crisis differently (Hill & Chu, 2001). The 
same has been the case for European countries troubled by this recent wave of crises, not only 
because the economic factors were different in each country (Zestos, 2016), but also because each 
country experienced the crisis through its respective national identity (Galpin, 2014). The new divide 
between debtors and creditors reanimates pre-existing redistributional conflicts within the EU, 
which encourage diverse national experiences, thus identities (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Karolewski et 
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al., 2016; Mitchell, 2016). As such, it is argued in this thesis that we need deep analyses of single 
cases within the EU to fully understand the respective identity experiences of member-states during 
the crisis. In this respect, it is estimated that Greece can offer an intriguing case study for multiple 
reasons, which are explained hereafter.  
Among the five bailout countries, Greece’s multiple bailouts were not only the largest in sum 
(Zahariadis, 2016), but also the most controversial (Bickes et al., 2014b; Tekin, 2014), while the 
Greek crisis has been more intractable compared to these other countries’ crises (Breuss, 2016). In 
late 2009, the newly elected Greek government of George Papandreou, leader of PASOK 
(Panhellenic Socialist Movement) announced that deficit and debt ratios were larger than previously 
estimated with a 12.5% deficit, instead of 3.7%, of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and public 
debt accounting for 115% of GDP (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). Moreover, it was revealed that 
statistics were systematically and deliberately misreported by Greek authorities, therefore Greece 
had essentially joined the EMU without meeting the criteria of the Maastricht Treaty (MT) and the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) (Mayer, 2012). In May 2010, Greece received an unprecedented 
bailout package in the form of a 110 billion loan, administered by what came to be known as the 
Troika, a crisis management formation consisting of the IMF, the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the European Commission (EC) (Karyotis & Gerodimos, 2015). In light of the deterioration of the 
Greek economy over the following years and fears over the endangerment of the EMU, two more 
Troika bailouts followed in 2011 and 2015 (Zahariadis, 2016).  
Each bailout was conditional upon the implementation of various policies, including austerity 
measures, salary cuts, tax increases, public spending decreases, privatisations and pension reforms, 
which were respectively specified within a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) (Hirsch, 2015). 
Every time a new Memorandum was ratified by a Greek government it was met with intense public 
resistance, protests and riots by newly impoverished populations (Diani & Kousis, 2014; Karyotis & 
Rüdig, 2015). The wider unrest led to the disintegration of the pre-existing two-party political system 
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with the demise of the previously popular PASOK, which was now blamed for the state of the 
economy (Sotiropoulos, 2013), and a sequence of governmental instability, marked by volatile 
elections (Teperoglu & Tsatsanis, 2014), non-elected interim governments, such as that of ex-banker 
Lucas Papademos (Pappas & Aslanidis, 2015), rise of new political forces, including the neo-Nazi 
extreme right-wing Golden Dawn (GD) (Georgiadou, 2013), and SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) 
(Katsabekis, 2015), culminating in the latter’s electoral victory in January 2015.  
Simultaneously, Greece’s EU relations became particularly strained during the crisis and some 
political actors, including key figure German Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, even stated that a 
Grexit, Greece’s departure from the Eurozone, would be a desirable outcome (Tsoukalis, 2013, 
Zestos, 2016). Moreover, media and academic accounts engaged with the question of Greece’s 
possible ‘expulsion’ or ‘compulsory withdrawal’ from the Eurozone/EU (Blocher et al., 2016; 
Schuster, 2015). The looming threat of Grexit, whether enforced, negotiated or accidental, became 
an ever-present feature of the public ‘crisis talk’ and was associated with a rather precarious default 
for Greece and possible repercussions for the EMU (McDonnell, 2014; Tsoukalis, 2013). 
Furthermore, it sparkled discussions regarding Greece’s political exclusion, which invited 
preoccupations with European solidarity and unity (Bickes et al., 2014b; Tsoukalis, 2013), the 
axiomatic pillars of common European identity, and placed a question mark on Greece’s European 
identity (Nixon, 2015).  
The specific focus of this thesis is whether the Greek debt crisis, as manifested within the wider Euro 
crisis, has constituted a collective identity crisis of Greek European identity. The case of Greece 
presents us with an interesting case study because Greece was the European country that was hit 
the worst by the crisis, both economically and politically (Pappas & Aslanidis, 2015). In terms of 
tangible effects in the real economy, annual growth rates began declining sharply in 2008, only to 
remain negative since then, while between 2008 and 2013 alone, Greece lost more than 25% of its 
GDP and investment fell by 58% (Cafruny, 2015; Pappas & Aslanidis, 2015). At the same time, the 
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debt to GDP ratio skyrocketed from a 109.4% in 2008 to a magnificent 180.1% in 2014 (Eurostat, 
2016), while exports experienced an ‘absolute decline’ (Cafruny, 2015). Unemployment increased 
from about 8% in 2007 to a stunning 27% in 2014, youth unemployment in particular reached a 
striking 60%, while material deprivation doubled between 2009 and 2014 (Cafruny, 2015; Maselli, 
2015; Pappas & Aslanidis, 2015). Cross-country studies across Europe indicated that Greece showed 
the highest increase in poverty between 2006 and 2012 (Alkire & Apablaza, 2016). 
In terms of the symbolic politics of the crisis, recent research has shown that media coverage of the 
Greek crisis was both quantitatively larger and qualitatively more negative than other sovereign 
crises’ coverage (Bickes et al., 2014a; Tzogopoulos, 2013). Although several commentators have 
frequently referred to issues of negative stereotyping of Greece and the European South, empirical 
studies remain scarce (i.e. Chalaniova, 2014; Mylonas, 2012). Moreover, there are several 
unexplored areas of interest, since most such studies focus solely on media coverage and fail to 
engage the wider civil society, therefore lack the responses of citizens. Furthermore, most of these 
studies on stereotypes do not use systematic and acknowledged theories of stereotyping, therefore 
cannot fully address societal effects and dynamics. Stereotypes can have adverse effects on 
collective identities and as such, may contribute to the development of identity destabilisation, or 
even crisis.  
Recent public opinion studies indicate that the crisis era has been a ‘game-changer’ in attitudes 
towards European integration in Greece, with the rising vote for Eurosceptic parties being not simply 
a side-effect of domestic protest, but rather targeted against the EU itself (Verney, 2015). 
Nonetheless, although Euroscepticism has risen (Freire et al., 2014), support for the Euro has 
paradoxically increased (Clements et al., 2014). However, the reasons behind such contradictory 
opinions and political choices are less than clear in the literature, because the limited number of 
existing studies are based exclusively on survey data, either from the Eurobarometer or national 
election studies, which leave various questions on the quality of public support unanswered or 
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exclude disaffected non-voters. As such, questions on the possible ‘identity crisis’ of Greek European 
identity remain largely unexplored. The purpose of this thesis is to gain insight into these 
problematisations, which will be further explained in the following sections.  
 
Research questions, aims and rationale  
 
The main problematisation of the present thesis is whether economic crises can transform into 
collective identity crises. How do such critical historical moments, marked by failure and dissolution, 
impact on communities? What happens to societies during ‘difficult times’? How does the collective 
sense of self react to such distressing conditions? To be sure, the notion of ‘identity crisis’ is not 
uncommon when theorising in conditions of ‘high modernity’ and globalisation (Bendle, 2002; Dunn, 
1998). Several postmodernist theorists speak of the fragmented character of the globalised 
individual in late modernity, deprived of universalities and stabilities (Giddens, 1991; Van Ham, 
2001), and conclude with the impossibility of identity coherence (Ziakas, 2016). As a consequence, in 
our ‘post-modern times’, we have become overtly accustomed to hear about ‘identity crises’ 
(Lawler, 2008; Van Ham, 2001). Yet, interestingly, clear analytical classifications of identity 
destabilisations that may promote ‘identity crises’ are not found in abundance. Furthermore, the 
term is often evoked loosely, without specified definitions. A mere exploration of the available 
literature exhibits the tendency: apparently most academic disciplines themselves or objects of their 
study suffer from an ‘identity crisis’ (i.e. Benbasat & Zmud, 2003; Crane & Small, 1992). 
Consequently, the term, as is used, appears to be more of a flashy punchline and a metaphor, rather 
than a systematic investigation of different destabilising identity phenomena.  
In this sense, one of the primary aims of this thesis is the crafting of a typology of identity 
destabilisations that may lead to a ‘crisis’ of identity. Post-modernism and post-structuralism, 
appeared to offer thin theorisations of identity, since they already assume its ‘eclipse’ (Ziakas, 2016). 
Psychoanalysis’s excessive use of metaphor (Wurmser, 1977) seemed to fail to account for the 
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politics of its own cultural constructs (i.e. gender equality as ‘penis envy’, Buhle, 1998), while its 
postulate of the ‘elusive and unlocatable’ unconscious (Ffytche, 2016: 14) could present 
epistemological problems, especially in participatory types of research that seek to engage the 
public. The only elaborate theoretical framework of ‘identity crisis’ as such, with clear postulates and 
terminologies, appeared to be that of Erik Erikson’s developmental psychology (1968, 1970), 
focusing on the crisis of transitioning from adolescence to adulthood. However, the focus on 
coming-of-age transitions was judged to be better suited for the study of personal identities, rather 
than collective identities, such as national European ones. As an extension, this thesis’s theoretical 
preoccupation centres on whether there are multiple identity crisis dynamics at play and how these 
could be conceptually elucidated.   
However, the rationale and aims of this thesis are not merely theoretical. Jaspal et al. (2014) argue 
that when confronted with major crises, we need to consider and successfully integrate three levels 
of analysis, namely 1) how knowledge about these events is constructed and circulated 
(representations), 2) the role of identity in relation to these representations, and 3) people’s 
responses to these representations (action). We can appreciate that in this nexus of representation-
identity-action there are no one-way currents and all three interact with each other. For example, 
identity mediates between the other two in the sense that ‘who we are’ is influenced by surrounding 
representations and is directly linked to the actions we choose to pursue (Jaspal et al., 2014). 
Similarly, our actions define our identity, which in turn plays a role in the kind of representations we 
embrace or reject, reproduce or forget. Ultimately, the projection of a chosen representation is in 
itself a choice of action.  
Drawing from all of the above, the research questions that guide this thesis are the following: 
 What kind of knowledge is produced about the Greek debt/Euro crisis (representations) and 
how is collective identity related to that knowledge?  
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 How do Greek citizens respond (action) to the knowledge (representation) that is produced 
about the Greek debt/Euro crisis and the role of Greek European identity in it? 
 
 Does the Greek debt/Euro crisis constitute an identity crisis of Greek European identity? 
 
The two first questions attempt to incorporate the three levels of analysis advocated by Jaspal and 
his colleagues, while the final question seeks to respond to the problematisation regarding the 
impact of major economic crises on collective identities. Having unpacked the research questions of 
this study, the following section will outline the theoretical and epistemological approach taken in 
this exploration.  
 
A social psychological approach: identity as representation and experience 
 
The theoretical approach of this thesis belongs to the field of social psychology, defined as ‘the 
scientific investigation of how the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of individuals are influenced by 
the actual, imagined or implied presence of others’ (Allport in Hogg & Vaughan, 2014: 4). It is 
accepted that a social psychological framework is fitting for the study of national European 
identities, which are collective identities (Karolewski, 2006), since these are shaped and enacted in 
the presence of other nationals and Europeans citizens, whether real or imagined (Anderson, 1991; 
Thiel & Friedman, 2012).  
As might be discernible from the analytical levels and questions above, identity is understood here in 
a twofold manner: as a form of knowledge about ourselves and others, the representation, and as an 
experience, an active reception and dynamic response to that knowledge, as well as participation in 
its creation and recreation. While the first necessitates the understanding of identity as a social 
construction that is shaped by the ideas circulating within societies (Berger & Luckmann, 2011; 
Rousseau, 2006), the second acknowledges identity as a psychological experience (Fogel, 2005). It is 
argued in this thesis that an adequate study of identity needs to engage with both of these 
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dimensions to fully account for the production, reception and reproduction of social identities (Hall, 
2000). As argued by Hall (2000), it is exactly at the intersection of the symbolic (representation) and 
psychic (psychological) dimensions of identity that research challenges arise, therefore we need 
both a theory of represenations and of identities to account for identity phenomena. 
In order to account for the two dimensions of identity phenomena, this research heavily draws from 
two social psychological theories, Serge Moscovici’s Social Representations Theory (SRT) (2001) and 
Henri Tajfel and John Turner’s Social Identity Theory (SIT) (2004). Both theories are cognitivist in 
nature, in line with social psychology’s traditional ontology (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014), in the sense 
that both elaborate on mental associations between different ideas and the perceptive ways that 
fluid social ideas become concrete ‘social objects’ and inform attitudes (Moscovici 1984; Tajfel, 
1969). Additionally, while SRT is social constructionist in character and concentrates on what 
Moscovici calls ‘the battle of ideas’ (Moscovici, 1998a: 403), thus the ideational aspect of social 
reality, SIT adds a social interactionist edge that accounts for intergroup relations and processes of 
stereotyping (Turner, 1996). This last focus of SIT is evaluated to be particularly useful, especially 
since as explained earlier, recent research has indicated that there were such processes involved in 
the Greek debt/Euro crisis (Tzogopoulos, 2013), albeit not adequately addressed with a systematic 
theory of stereotyping, such as SIT.  
Following the paradigm of a relatively small niche of social psychologists who demonstrate that the 
combination of the two theories for the study of identities can lead to fruitful inquiries (Elcheroth et 
al., 2011; Jaspal et al., 2014; Howarth, 2011), this thesis uses an integrated theoretical framework of 
SRT and SIT. This framework largely informs the ontological, epistemological and terminological 
positions of this thesis. For instance, SRT is a theory that seeks to understand where representations 
about complex and specialised issues come from and how they are further diffused within the wider 
society (Jaspal et al., 2014). In its inception, SRT meant to account for the ways ‘expert knowledge’ 
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was spread outside the narrow groups of scientists and became ‘common sense’ for people outside 
the field of science (Moscovici, 2008).  
Informed by this framework, this thesis argues that issues such as ‘financial crises’ and ‘national 
European identities’ are specialised terms that are primarily defined, framed and negotiated by 
expert professionals (de Rosa, 2013), such as politicians, academics, and journalists. These 
professional groups are labelled in this thesis ‘ideational leaders’ (Stiller, 2010), because such 
professionals exercise systematic expression of expert opinion and commentary, therefore have the 
power to influence social audiences through their ideas and lead public debates (de Rosa, 2013). At 
the same time, social audiences themselves adopt or reject the ideational objects of expert 
representations and variably incorporate them in their everyday discussions (Moscovici, 2008).  
However, although an SRT/SIT model comes close to better accounting for the phenomena at hand, 
some aspects are still not touched upon by their happy theoretical marriage. For example, although 
the focus of SIT on ‘identity threat’ based on stereotyping and strategies of ‘identity threat 
management’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014),  are especially informative in this exploration of collective 
identity destabilisations and crises, social psychology still misses an analytical framework of multiple 
and diverse identity destabilisations that can account for the varied dynamics of potential social 
identity crises. The development of such an analytical framework shall be the theoretical 
contribution of this thesis and will be outlined in the next section, along with the empirical one.  
 
Theoretical and empirical contribution 
 
The present thesis contributes both to theoretical and empirical knowledge in the wider areas of 
identity research, social psychology, national European identities research, and Modern Greek 
studies.  Beginning with the theoretical contribution, as was explained before, the central theoretical 
purpose of this thesis has been to contribute to an analytical framework of identity destabilisations, 
because such a framework was recognised as being developed insufficiently or not comprehensively 
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enough in the existing literature. As such, in order to formulate such a systematised framework, a 
typology of ‘identity destabilisations’ was created. The theorisation of these types drew heavily from 
SIT, but in order to fill in and enrich theoretical gaps, various other sources were consulted, such as 
Baumeister et al.’s (1985) appropriation of Habermas’s political theory, theories of collective 
narcissism (de Zavala et al., 2009), and Goffman’s sociology of stigma (1963). As such, a bricolage 
approach to theorising that eclectically combines insights from multiple theoretical sources 
(Kincheloe, 2001) was employed and the following typology of identity destabilisations, and their 
definitions, was created: 
 Identity conflict: an identity destabilisation induced when a social entity is torn between two 
or more commitments that are perceived as incompatible and can lead to identity confusion 
and inconsistency of action. 
 
 Identity devaluation: an identity destabilisation inflicted when a social entity’s sense of 
identity is distressed by negative representations, which can lead to diminished self-esteem 
and low social status. 
 
 Identity overvaluation: an identity destabilisation encouraged when a social entity’s sense of 
identity is evaluated in an overtly positive way, which can lead to the development of ‘great 
expectations’ and their frustration, or aggression towards outgroups.  
 
 Identity deficit: an identity destabilisation observed when a social entity’s sense of identity is 
perceived as missing or severely compromised, which can lead to a disorienting absence of 
motivation, values and goals.  
It is postulated in this thesis that this typology can account for the multiple dynamics of identity 
crisis phenomena and the complexities of their social dynamics, a claim that is substantiated in the 
subsequent empirical chapters.  
28 
 
Moving on to the empirical contribution, this thesis contributes by testing this typology by means of 
a triangulated research design employing the analysis of historiographical, media, and interview 
data. Furthermore, the production of original interview data with Greek ideational leaders and 
citizens enriches the existing pool of empirical data on Greek European identities, especially the 
much smaller pool of such data during the recently enacted economic crisis. Given that most prior 
investigations on national European identities, including the Greek one, have focused on statistical 
accounts and Eurobarometer survey data (Cram, 2011), this thesis’s highly participatory and 
qualitative approach provides a platform for the unheard voices of everyday citizens and their 
stories that remain obscure in survey research (Bruter, 2005). This type of research is argued to be 
more sensitive to identity processes and what people think is important, rather than what 
researchers themselves emphasise in their research designs (Thiel, 2016). Finally, since national 
identities travel in time and are revisited at given intervals, future researchers of longer term cultural 
changes in Greece related to the crisis may find an asset in this piece of research that tries to 
capture the state of Greek European identity at this historical moment, situated in a series of past 
and future such moments. The remaining section will summarise the structure of the thesis.  
 
Structure of thesis 
 
The journey this thesis attempts to take the reader on goes as follows: 
Chapter 1 explains the theoretical framework of the thesis. It starts by revisiting the vivid debate on 
the concept of identity and defends it against its critics. It continues by describing the theoretical 
‘state of the art’ in national and European identities research, and makes the case for social 
psychology, before moving on to outlining the main assumptions of SIT and SRT. It then elaborates 
on what is argued to be a ‘successful marriage’ between the two theories and finally, the chapter 
sets out this thesis’s main theoretical contribution, namely a theoretical framework of potential 
triggers of identity crisis, in the form of a typology of identity destabilisations. 
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Chapter 2 describes the research design of this thesis and its aim is to communicate the rationale 
and planning that was used to answer the research questions. The chapter begins by briefly referring 
to traditional research designs in social psychology and national and European identities research, 
and progresses by advocating the merits of a triangulated single case study research design. Data 
collection processes and fieldwork strategies are fully described and sections on research ethics and 
analytical approaches and techniques are included.  
Chapter 3 to chapter 6 constitute the main body of the thesis and the space where the results of the 
research are presented. The presentation follows the four types of identity destabilisations and as 
such, each chapter contains four corresponding sections on identity conflict, identity devaluation, 
identity overvaluation and identity deficit. Subsections are used to highlight and separate themes 
under these primary types of identity destabilisations. The chapters are organised on the basis of the 
data domains that were appropriated to answer the research questions: 1) historiography, 2) media 
3) experts, and 4) citizens.  
Consequently, chapter 3 explores past historiographical representations of modern Greece and its 
relation to Europe and the EU in order to elucidate the dominant narratives of Greek European 
identity over time. This initial exploration serves as a comparative point of reference to chapter 4 
which is based on emerging media research on the construction of the Euro crisis and Greece’s role 
within it, as well as analysis of selected media texts that illuminate the representational states of 
Greek European identities during the economic crisis.  
Chapter 5 and 6 takes us to the sphere of newly produced interview data and although they further 
analyse identity representations, they additionally moves us closer to the psychological experience 
of identity. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results of interviews held with Greek academics, 
politicians and journalists, the ‘ideational leaders’ of our study, while chapter 6 outlines the results 
of interviews conducted with various Greek citizens as representatives of the wider public that 
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receives and further constructs expert representations on Greek European identities and crisis 
events.  
Chapter 7 makes up the discussion of the thesis, which aims to deeply deliberate on the ways the 
research questions were answered. As such, three main sections corresponding to the three 
research questions pull together and interpret the main themes emanating from the previous 
chapters. The discussion analyses how this study’s empirical results reaffirm or newly inform existing 
knowledge of Greek European identities specifically, and more widely, collective identities during 
crisis phenomena.  
Finally, the Conclusion reminds the reader of all the destinations visited during the journey by 
concisely summarising the main features of the thesis. It further evaluates the theoretical and 
empirical contribution, provides overviews on this study’s implications and limitations, and makes 
some recommendations for future research and policy-making.  
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Chapter 1 
A Social Psychological Approach and a Typology of Identity 
Destabilisations 
 
 
 
‘One often hears that a good science should begin by proposing clear and carefully 
defined concepts. Actually no science, not even the most exact, proceeds in this way. 
It begins by assembling, ordering and distinguishing phenomena which surprise 
everyone, because they are disturbing, or exotic, or create a scandal’  
(Moscovici, 1998b: 209) 
 
 
Introduction: in defence of ‘troubling’ concepts 
 
Although preoccupations with the self and its relation to society have been with us as long as human 
communities existed and the study of identities has a long and extensive philosophical history 
(Alcoff, 2003), the term identity was consolidated in academic, journalistic and political vocabulary 
during the sixties with the identity politics and social movements of the time (Brubaker & Cooper, 
2000; Wetherell, 2010). Since then, studies on identities proliferated, producing countless texts and 
turning identity into one of the most commonly used theoretical constructs (Vignoles et al., 2012; 
Wetherell, 2010). As aptly put, ‘few concepts have been as generative’ (Wetherell, 2010: 3). 
However, paradoxically, the concept of identity may have become a victim of its own ‘success’, since 
it has been as contested as it has been privileged (Vignoles et al., 2012).  
Debates about identity as an analytic category have revolved around its validity and usefulness, as 
well as the question of whether other concepts, such as ‘identification’ could be used in its place to 
avoid essentialism (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Hall, 2000; Jenkins, 2014). However, the question of 
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essentialism concerns the utilisation of terms, since no term has essential characteristics as such 
(Jenkins, 2014). Brubaker and Cooper’s seminal essay against identity (2000) argues that social 
analysis needs ‘unambiguous terms’ and that the concept of identity cannot fulfil its analytical task 
‘for it is riddled with ambiguity, riven with contradictory meanings, and encumbered by reifying 
connotation’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 34). However, there is nothing unambiguous about social 
life to correspond to equally unambiguous concepts. Most importantly, the authors’ unhappiness 
with ‘identity’ appears to stem from what is seen as an over-expanded usage of the term that has 
rendered it meaningless by accounting for too many diverse phenomena. As stated, ‘if identity is 
everywhere, it is nowhere’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 1). 
However, does this mean that we should give up on concepts simply because they have been 
overused and perhaps even abused in previous research? Does that make the associated 
phenomena any less real, important or consequential? Identity, most simply defined as ‘people’s 
explicit or implicit responses’ to the question ‘who are you?’ (Vignoles et al., 2012: 2) is important 
for social life and research in various ways. First, we cannot avoid bringing ourselves and the sense 
of who we are in our everyday social life (Goffman, 1956), just like we cannot escape ourselves, even 
if we wanted to, because we possess self-awareness (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014). Second, both social 
action and interaction depend on people’s perception of who they are and who others are, 
therefore identities regulate the ways we interact with others, as well as how we act in general 
(Eccles, 2009; Hogg & Vaughan, 2014). Third, identities are considered beneficial for both personal 
well-being and collective action (Bendle, 2002; Chalaniova, 2014). Fourth, identity research becomes 
even more important when identities are found in conditions of crisis, or as if often put, ‘in trouble’ 2 
(Lawler, 2008). 
It is proposed here that the concept of identity is better understood as Gallie’s (1956: 169) 
‘essentially contested concepts… the proper use of which inevitably involves endless disputes about 
                                                          
2 See for example, Gender Trouble by Butler, 2006; Caldas-Coulthard & Iedema’s Identity Trouble, 2008; 
Ochsner’s Lad Trouble, 2009). 
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their proper uses on the part of their users’. This should not deter us from researching ‘troubling’ 
concepts, because as Hall (2000: 6) argues about such ‘irreducible’ concepts, although there are 
widely recognised issues of implied essentialism in any of their uses and we may feel that we can no 
longer think with them, at the same time key questions of politics and agency cannot be thought of 
at all without them. 
After defending the concept of identity against its critics, the present chapter will provide an 
overview of prior theoretical traditions in national and European identities research and shall justify 
the choice of a social psychological approach. It will then move on to present the two main theories 
that provide the ontological foundations of this thesis, namely Social Representations Theory (SRT) 
and Social Identity Theory (SIT), as well as elaborate on their integration and its resulting merits. It is 
thereby argued that the combination of the insights of these two theories can assist in addressing 
two fundamental dimensions of identity phenomena: identity as representation and identity as 
psychological experience. Ultimately, the final section will demonstrate the inadequacy of previous 
theories of identity crisis and shall present this study’s theoretical contribution towards a more 
systematic analytical framework in the form of a typology of identity destabilisations that may breed 
multiple dynamics of identity crises.   
 
National European identities: a social psychological approach 
 
The concept of ‘European identity’ is traced back to the EU’s official documents3. In 1973, the 
Declaration on European Identity (EC, 1973) emphasised the importance of internal European unity 
in establishing Europe’s global role as an agent of peace, democracy and economic development. 
European identity was next mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty (EC, 1992) in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy section (Article B, p. 5), indicating that in 1992 the focus was still on Europe’s 
international and institutional identity, rather than its citizens. In 1995, after the suggestion of 
                                                          
3 For extended analyses, see Ivic (2009, 2010); Ivic & Lakicevic (2011). 
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Vaclav Havel, Czech author and politician, that the EU should ‘com[e] up with a new and genuinely 
clear reflection on what might be called European identity’, the Charter of European Identity (EC, 
1995: 1) was drafted. The Charter moved beyond the previous focus on international identity and 
described Europe with reference to its destiny, values, living standards, economic and social policies 
and global responsibilities, aiming to stimulate public debate and to make its citizens ‘proud to be 
Europeans’ (EC, 1995: 8). Most importantly, the Charter argued for a federal structure and 
recognised the need for citizens’ support and participation as a legitimizing factor for the deepening 
process of European integration (EC, 1995: 5). After the great enlargements of the two-thousands, 
the Udine Declaration of 2007 addressed issues of regional and cultural identities, multiculturalism 
and increasing migration (AER, 2007).  
The construction of a commonly shared, transnational European identity has long been seen as the 
‘political glue’ that would legitimise and sustain the European project (Bruter, 2005; Hermann & 
Brewer, 2004; Kaina & Karolewski, 2009), by being an antidote to nationalism and Euroscepticism – 
the latter widely understood as lack of support for European integration (Boomgaarden et al., 2010; 
Toplak & Šumi, 2012) - and a remedy for a perceived ‘democratic deficit’ induced by the absence of 
an active ‘European demos’ (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006; Lord, 2007). As such, given the 
multidimensionality of social identities, according to which social entities occupy multiple social 
roles (Lawler, 2008; Vignoles et al., 2012), and the normative benefits that are commonly attributed 
to European identities, such as social cohesion and resilience (Karolewski et al., 2016; Mitchell, 
2016), member-states and their citizens are hoped to add an awareness of and attachment to a 
European dimension of their national identities (Cerutti, 2008; Risse, 2010). Instead of assuming that 
a European identity will subsume a national one, national and European identities are better 
understood as intertwined parts of a multidimensional whole, further including regional, local and 
other identities (Cerutti, 2008; Risse, 2010) 4. As such, it is more accurate to speak of a Norwegian 
                                                          
4 See for example various identity models like ‘marble cake’ (Risse, 2010) or ‘Russian dolls/nested identities’ 
(Díez Medrano & Gutiérrez, 2001; Guglielmi, 2016). 
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European identity, a French European identity or an Austrian European identity, rather than simply 
Norwegian, French or Austrian, respectively (Guglielmi, 2016; Mummendey & Waldzus, 2004). 
In light of the interaction between different identity dimensions, it follows that these are not 
experienced similarly by all people. For instance, being a ‘black woman’ does not constitute the 
same social experience and self-understanding as being a ‘white woman’ (Lawler, 2008). In this 
sense, being a Finnish or Polish European can be different from being a Portuguese or German 
European. As such, within a multicultural continental context such as Europe, European identities 
are plural and come in ‘national colours’ (Galpin, 2014; Marcussen et al., 1999). In this respect, there 
is not one European identity or one Europe, because member-states and their citizens have their 
own visions, memories, experiences and policies of Europe (Katzenstein & Checkel, 2009). For 
example, research has indicated that British Euroskepticism is entrenched in Britain’s history of 
empire, German Europeanism demonstrates WWII guilt and Spanish support for European 
integration acts as a proxy for modernisation and democratisation (Diez Medrano, 2003). As a result, 
this study’s object of inquiry is referred to as ‘Greek European identity’. 
Similarly to national identities, European identities contain both civic and cultural features, with the 
first corresponding to political institutions and citizenship and the second referring to a shared 
geographical area with common history, heritage, culture, memories and myths (Bruter, 2004; 
Camia, 2010; Vujadinović, 2011). In this regard, a past conceptual confusion has been the 
interchangeable use of the terms ‘Europe’ and the ‘EU’, and as an extension, the lack of separation 
between an EU-identity, connoting support for the transnational European political institution of the 
EU, and a cultural European identity that may or may not include EU support (Cram, 2011; Risse, 
2004; Sassatelli, 2002). Although the distinction is conceptually important and European identities 
should not be reduced to the question of support for European integration ‘EU-style’ (Fakiolas & 
Fakiolas, 2006; Ivic & Lakicevic, 2011), it is unavoidably recognisable that the EU has established 
considerable hegemony in defining what being European means (Laffan, 2004; Risse, 2004; 
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Sassatelli, 2002). As such, adequate theories of national European identities need to take both 
aspects into account.  
European identities research is as expansive as it is complex. We can largely differentiate between 
three main streams of research, based on their focus: a) European integration research, b) 
normative theorising, and c) citizens-driven empirical research. The first includes theories of 
European integration, which are not identity theories as such, but have informed the study of 
European identities in the past, like functionalism (Mitrany, 1933), neo-functionalism (Haas, 1958; 
Lindberg, 1963; Schmitter, 1969), federalism (Kull, 2014), inter-governmentalism (Hoffman, 1966; 
Moravcsik, 1998), transactionalism/communication theory (Deutsch, 1953), historical 
institutionalism (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2001; Pierson, 1996), multilevel governance (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2004) and Europeanisation theory (Flockhart, 2010; Olsen, 2002).  
The second theoretical area concerns normative theorising about European identities and what 
Europe/EU should be (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Eder, 2009). These theories include 
cosmopolitanism (Delanty, 2005), multiculturalism (Lucarelli, 2008), constitutional patriotism 
(Habermas, 2001), supranational citizenship (Weiler, 1998) and normative power Europe (Manners, 
2002). The third stream includes empirical research that is citizens-driven and explores social 
attitudes, public opinion and everyday practices through various methodological means, such as 
large-scale statistical, qualitative or experimental methods (Garib & Braun, 2003). This area 
incorporates a significant part of traditional research on European identities and EU support 
informed by Eurobarometer data (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Cram, 2011), the EU’s surveys 
conducted twice every year since 1973, but also emerging and intriguing approaches such as 
transnationalism (Kuhn, 2015; Thiel, 2011), banal Europeanism (Cram, 2001; Heinrich, 2016), and 
biographical approaches (Lazaroms & Gioielli, 2015; Miller & Day, 2012) that focus on the everyday 
experiences of European citizens. 
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All traditions are equally valuable and capable of contributing to the field, since each one focuses on 
different aspects of the wider identity phenomenon (Vignoles et al., 2012). As such, all three streams 
of research insightfully grasp diverse articulations of their shared object of national European 
identities. For instance, the first stream of research on processes of European integration 
successfully captures the elite-driven institutional and governmental character of European identities 
(Karolewski & Kaina, 2006; Katzenstein & Checkel, 2009). The second stream of theoretical research 
widely analyses the ideational nature of European identity in its multiple interpretations and 
meanings (Krzyżanowski, 2010; Schimmelfennig, 2012). Finally, the third stream recognises that 
identities are carried not only by institutions and political elites, but also by everyday citizens, 
therefore it acknowledges not only their collective and shared attributes, but also the experiential 
and lived character of European identities (Miller & Day, 2012). What we can gather from these 
perspectives is that European identities are elite projects and collective identities that are 
manifested ideationally and experientially.  
In this sense, it becomes apparent that an adequate theory of identity would need to address all 
these identity features, in which case the question becomes what kind of theoretical approach could 
accommodate this complex task. After an exploration of the available literature, it was established 
that the theoretical approach that could capitalise and expand on these prior insights could be 
located within the field of social psychology. Social psychology has been employed for the study of 
national European identities in the past with fruitful outcomes that add complexity to prior 
assumptions (i.e. Breakwell & Lyons, 1996; Castano, 2004; Cinnirella, 1997; Chryssochoou, 2013). For 
instance, social psychology indicates that sometimes the more people may identify with Europe, the 
more they may view it in their own national colours, leading to inter-group conflicts with other 
Europeans, rather than unification (Mummendey & Waldzus, 2004). The strengths of social 
psychology are situated in its recognition that communities can have a psychological existence for 
their members (Castano, 2004), while its collectivist focus can account for the dynamic formation of 
collective identities (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014), such as European identities.  
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The two staple theories within social psychology are the Social Identity Theory (SIT) of Henri Tajfel 
and John Turner (1979, 2004) and the Social Representations Theory (SRT), developed by Serge 
Moscovici (2001, 2008). Both theories are cognitivist in nature, in line with social psychology’s 
traditional ontology, whereby social cognition is defined as ‘the knowledge, beliefs, thoughts and 
ideas that people have about themselves and their environment’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014: 6). A 
relatively small niche of social psychologists employs varied integrative models of the two theories, 
demonstrating that their theoretical marriage can be a happy one (i.e. Chryssochoou, 2000a; 
Elcheroth et al., 2011; Howarth, 2002). While SIT provides a firm theoretical grounding on group 
identity processes, as well as intergroup relations, and illuminates psychological motivations and 
experiences (Huddy, 2001), SRT complements it by adding clarifications regarding the source 
domains of beliefs and knowledge regarding the ideational content of social identities (Höijer, 2011). 
As such, SIT can account for the aforementioned psychological experience of European identities 
and SRT appears fitting to address their ideational dimension. Furthermore, SRT’s focus on expert 
representations as an elite field of knowledge and influence can assist us in understanding the elite 
dynamics of European integration. These claims are analysed in more detail in the next section.  
 
An integrated model of Social Identity Theory and Social Representations Theory 
 
SIT was first formulated by Tajfel (1959, 1963, 1969) in the context of his research on stereotyping, 
prejudice and discrimination. According to SIT, humans have two fundamental psychological needs: 
certainty and positiveness (Hymans, 2002). In this respect, when it comes to identity formation, 
people need to define themselves and others through categorisation, and to enjoy positive self-
esteem through self-enhancement (Hogg et al., 1995; Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1985). As far as collective 
identities are concerned, individuals may derive positive self-esteem from formal membership or 
emotional attachment to various social groups and collectivities (Fowler & Kam, 2007). The belief 
that specific social qualities correlate to particular identity categories are stereotypes (Hogg & 
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Williams, 2000). Cognitively speaking, a stereotype can be understood as a social schema, that is, ‘a 
cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its 
attributes and the relations among those attributes’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014: 49).  
People have schemas about everything: persons, groups, roles, events (scripts), themselves (self-
schemas) (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014: 50-51). Such ideas have a normative character since they dictate 
appropriate rules of conduct depending on category membership, therefore people can have group 
self-stereotypes and collective self-schemas (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014; Stets & Burke, 2003). Some 
group members may be considered more of a prototype compared to other members because they 
are perceived to embody the group norms more successfully (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1985). 
This creates the possibility for the creation of ‘internal others’, liminal members that are part of the 
group, yet conceived as not fully deserving to belong or assigned a second-class status. Within the 
context of European integration and the existence of a superordinate European identity that acts as 
an umbrella identity comprising multiple subordinate national identities5, we may anticipate that 
European citizens have stereotypes of other Europeans and of themselves, as well as prototypes of 
the ideal European (Chryssochoou, 2000a).  
Tajfel (1981) argues that a full theory of identity should be contextualised in the social milieu that 
individuals occupy and their social interactions, and should address issues of justification, causal 
attribution and social differentiation. As such, SIT is a theory of intergroup relations and social 
conflict, since it postulates that individuals partition the world into ingroups and outgroups and 
struggle to achieve positive collective distinctiveness through social comparison with outgroups 
(Brewer & Brown, 1998; Fowler & Kam, 2007). Comparisons are psychologically encouraged by the 
drives of uncertainty due to of the lack of an objective measure of reality, and the quest for self-
evaluation which can be directed either upwards or downwards (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014). While 
                                                          
5 This is not to be confused with the meaning of the word ‘subordinate’ as inferior and disadvantaged. In this 
case the terms ‘superordinate’ and ‘subordinate’ are used to denote levels of order, rather than comment on 
the nature of the relationship, resembling the ‘nested identities’ model, i.e. smaller identities within larger 
ones.  
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upwards comparisons can be detrimental to the self-esteem, downwards comparisons can result in 
positive self-schemas (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014). Social comparison may sometimes lead to ingroup 
favouritism and outgroup derogation (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Fowler & Kam, 2007; Greene, 2004). 
This creates the possibility that intergroup relations may become antagonistic or acrimonious 
leading to social bias, prejudice, negative stereotyping and discrimination. But where do 
stereotypical conceptions of social groups come from, how are prototypes created? This is where 
SRT and its analysis of representational formations of identities and the ways they relate to human 
cognition can complement SIT in productive and meaningful ways.  
SRT was first elaborated by Serge Moscovici (2008) with his seminal work on the diffusion of 
psychoanalytical knowledge in Parisian society. SRT is a theory that belongs to a social 
constructionist ontology and the wider area of discursive psychology (Flick, 1998; Moscovici, 1998b; 
Potter & Edwards, 1999). Both social constructionism and discursive psychology have acted as 
critiques to traditional strictly cognitivist and positivist social psychology (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014; de 
Rosa, 2006). Discursive psychology is an approach to psychology that assumes the importance of the 
action-oriented and reality-constructing features of discourse and concentrates on how ‘reality’ is 
actively constructed by people conceptually in language (Potter & Edwards, 2001). Discourse is 
defined as ‘talk and texts studied as social practices’ (Potter & Edwards, 2001: 104). This focus is part 
of social psychology’s shift towards language, situated in the wider ‘linguistic turn’ in the social 
sciences, whereby language is understood as ‘the epitome of a social variable [because] it is socially 
constructed and internalised to govern individual social cognition and behaviour’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 
2014: 25). This constructionist focus of SRT can fill in the gaps of SIT by illuminating how 
stereotypical and prototypical ideas are formed (Chryssochoou, 2000a).   
In his seminal essay on the ‘need for identity’, Hall (2000) maintains that the link between the 
discursive/representational with the psychic/psychological is one of the fundamental and most 
difficult issues to understand in identity research. In his view, it is precisely in this intersection 
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between the symbolic order of representation and the formation of the social identity that 
conceptual challenges emerge because of the interaction of the individual psychic identity and the 
social order (Hall, 2000). Regardless, we need to attempt to answer these critical and ‘troubling’ 
questions of identity (Hall, 2000) and the combination of SRT and SIT can help us achieve this task, 
with the first addressing the discursive/representational and the second focusing on the 
psychic/psychological. This is how their theoretical integration can address the aforementioned dual 
character of identity as both an idea/representation and a psychological experience.  
In light of SRT’s insights, we can appreciate that national European identities are ‘shared 
representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, political symbols, collective 
memories, and elite competition for power’ (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009: 4). Simultaneously, the EU 
itself is a ‘social representation’ of a ‘relatively new and quite technical idea that has its roots in 
complex economic matters such as free trade and subsidies’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014: 104). In this 
respect, it has been argued that for the EU to achieve collective identifications, positive 
representations need to be established (Castano, 2004). In terms of crises, our age has been 
characterised as one that is always at the verge of upcoming catastrophes induced by either social, 
environmental or technological causes (see also Risk Society, Beck, 1992; O’Connor, 2012). However, 
in order for crises to be perceived as crises they need to be represented as such (Galpin, 2014), while 
their meaning is socially constructed, instead of a naturally given one (Clarke & Newman, 2010; 
Jaspal et al., 2014; O’Connor, 2012).  
Moscovici gives multiple definitions of ‘representation’ (i.e. 1973: xiii; 1988: 214), but the important 
thing to bear in mind is that, ontologically speaking, the term ‘representation’ is not meant to 
connote ‘Reality’ since this is directly impenetrable and debates on its status will always be ongoing, 
as they should be. Instead, as Pitkin (1967: 8) explains on her seminal work on the Concept of 
Representation, ‘representation… means the making present in some sense of something which is 
nevertheless not present literally or in fact’. In this sense, precisely because we cannot directly 
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observe social reality, due to its irreducible lack of closure, we constantly make multiple and diverse 
re-presentations of it, an endless mediation that constitutes the ‘paradoxical’ nature of 
representations of being and not being simultaneously (Judge, 1999; Näsström, 2006; Pitkin, 1967). 
Moscovici (2008) investigated how specialised, expert knowledge became ‘common-sense’, every 
day, and consensual beliefs through media communication. Such ideas make it possible for humans 
to classify, compare and explain individuals, groups and situations (Moscovici, 1988). As such, social 
representations concern the accumulated shared knowledge, the collection of floating discourses 
that circulate in a given social context, that provide a set of constructed ‘objects’ for interpretation, 
be it an identity category or a situation. For Moscovici (1984: 24), this process is psychologically 
prompted by the human need ‘to make something unfamiliar… familiar’, to arrest meaning and 
provide certainty, which is achieved by associating new phenomena with previous well-known 
phenomena, a process called anchoring, or solidifying their meaning by grounding it in specific 
objects, images or concepts, a function called objectification. 
In these processes, anchoring entails drawing ‘something’ out of its anonymity into the ‘identity 
matrix of our culture’ (Moscovici, 2000: 46) and providing it with a ‘name’, which is a highly political 
activity and may contain both positive and negative consequences. Additionally, anchoring to pre-
existing representations may explain the considerable stability of some identities that persist in time 
and in content (Huddy, 2001). In more detail, anchoring may entail any of the following mechanisms: 
naming, emotional anchoring, thematic anchoring, metaphoric anchoring or anchoring via basic 
antinomies (Höijer, 2011). Objectification concerns the ‘discovery’, the allocation of an ‘iconic 
quality’ to an otherwise imprecise or confusing idea (Moscovici, 1984: 38). There can be various sub-
processes associated with objectification, such as personification, figuration, and ontologisation 
(Jaspal et al., 2014). Personification relates the abstract object to a person, while figuration concerns 
the process whereby an abstract object is dominated by metaphorical imagery, which renders it 
more psychologically and culturally accessible (Jaspal et al., 2014). Finally, ontologisation refers to 
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the process of attributing physical characteristics to nonphysical entities, essentially ‘materialising 
the immaterial’ (Jaspal et al., 2014: 5). 
Moscovici (1988) further distinguished between three types of social representations: hegemonic, 
emancipated, and polemic. Hegemonic representations are shared consensually by members of a 
group and can be coercive, uniform and as a consequence, potentially more influential and difficult 
to reconstruct or reject (Breakwell, 2001). Emancipated representations are advanced by subgroups 
within a larger social collectivity as a result of outgrowths of information and distinctive knowledge 
within these subgroups (Jaspal et al., 2014). These representations are often minor amendments of 
overarching hegemonic representations. Finally, polemic representations are produced in the 
context of social conflict and are characterised by antagonistic relations between groups (Jaspal et 
al., 2014). This kind of representations relate to SIT’s postulate of intergroup conflict and mutual 
stereotyping.  
SRT complements SIT by providing a theorisation of the creation of representations of stereotypes 
and prototypes (Chryssochoou, 2000b), which is the fruitful link between the two theories. 
Additionally, SRT provides SIT with a critical edge, since as argued (Elcheroth et al., 2011: 730), SRT’s 
focus on language and meaning formation can address ‘the nature of power, and how it relates to 
political reasoning, communication and social influence, conformity and resistance, collective 
harmony and group conflict’. As Moscovici (1998a: 377) explains, in every representation there is 
both cooperation and conflict: cooperation because the representation itself gives us a common 
object and code to discuss social reality, conflict because we may disagree about this reality. As put, 
‘there is a kind of ideological battle, a battle of ideas’ (Moscovici, 1998a: 403). 
Moscovici’s interest was on specialised knowledge and the ways its terms and narratives 
disseminate in the wider society to become integral parts of the social realm. In the case of ‘national 
European identities’ and ‘economic crisis’, terms such as ‘nation’, ‘Europe’, ‘identity’, ‘economy’ and 
‘crisis’ are often specialised terms that are primarily and systematically framed, negotiated and 
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communicated by expert professionals. As argued (Mackridge, 2010: 9), identity is ‘an intellectual 
concept that is often expressed, analysed and debated chiefly by members of cultural and political 
elites’. Modernist and constructivist approaches do not view national identity as an archaic 
phenomenon or a natural human essence, but as socially constructed and often emphasise the role 
of political leaders and nationally enamoured ‘cultural activists’ who appropriate and invent identity 
narratives for nation state-building purposes and other political purposes (Blum, 2007; Smith, 2002). 
The historical production and continuous reproduction of national identities have long been 
understood as distinctly elite-driven projects, while the same has been said about European 
identities (Katzenstein & Checkel, 2009; Risse, 2004; Smith, 2002). As argued (Katzenstein & Checkel, 
2009), national and European identities need to be understood as top-down political projects 
developed by political elites and identity entrepreneurs in national governments and in Brussels. 
Although Moscovici in his original study looked at the influence of the scientific community, in this 
study a wider approach to the term ‘expert’ is followed. Instead of only focusing on social scientists 
that define the meanings of the aforementioned terms that are the focus of our study, professionals 
from various fields that systematically engage with the elucidation of these terms are incorporated 
in the category of the ‘experts’. As such, this group can open up to include not only social scientists, 
but also political elites, policy makers, journalists and authors. SRT’s ultimate goal is to compare the 
representations made by ‘experts’ and ‘non-experts’, a task often ignored in prior research that only 
looks at representations in one of these two domains (i.e. O’Connor, 2012). It is frequently the case 
that non-experts are called ‘lay people’ in studies (Jaspal et al., 2014; O’Connor, 2012), but in this 
study this term will be avoided due to its negative connotations that imply ignorance and lack of 
sophistication. Instead non-experts will simply be called ‘citizens’ because ordinary people can be 
said to be ‘experts’ of their own experience, which is accepted here as an equally valid and valuable 
‘form of knowledge’ to expert knowledge. Experts themselves are called in this study ‘ideational 
leaders’ (Stiller, 2010). Stiller’s use of the term stands for ‘leadership with the help of ideas’ (2010: 
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17) and as a consequence, for the ways political leaders are themselves influenced by ideas, while 
simultaneously being in a position to influence their construction.  
However, although this integrated theoretical model of SIT and SRT is evaluated to be useful for the 
study of identities, an elaborate and systematic analytical framework of identity destabilisations is 
not adequately found in their midst. As such, questions arise regarding what is an ‘identity crisis’, 
how does it function and whether there are multiple and complex dimensions of this phenomenon. 
Although SIT can illuminate some aspects of identities in crisis, such as threat resulting from 
stereotyping or intergroup conflict, and SRT can help us understand that identity crises are in 
themselves a matter of representations, it is argued here that a more systematised analytical 
framework of identity destabilisations, potentially leading to ‘crises’ of the identity, is needed. The 
following section outlines one such framework and constitutes the analytical contribution of this 
thesis.  
 
Theorising ‘identity crisis’  
 
Prior theories and their discontents 
 
It is argued in this thesis that although we have become accustomed to hearing about ‘identity 
crises’ in conditions of postmodernity and globalisation (Bendle, 2002; Dunn, 1998; Lawler, 2008), 
systematic analytical frameworks of identity destabilisations possibly promoting identity crises are 
rather scarce, and when found, they prove to be underdeveloped or one-dimensional (Baumeister et 
al., 1985). Furthermore, just like the term ‘identity’, ‘identity crisis’ appears to be used extensively, 
yet loosely and not always in line with a systematic analytical framework (Bendle, 2002; Brubaker & 
Cooper, 2000), which results in its status as a flashy punchline, rather than a theorisation of identity 
crisis phenomena. The most elaborate theoretical framework of ‘identity crisis’ as such, is found in 
Erik Erikson’s (1968, 1970) developmental psychology of ego-identity and identity statuses (Marcia, 
1966) that account for the passage of adolescents to adulthood and the clarification of social roles, 
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thus resolution of youth identity crises, especially of late adolescence which imposes life choices on 
individuals. 
However, a theory designed for the study of aging transitions of individuals does not appear fit to 
address collective identities, such as national European ones, since neither the nation, nor Europe or 
the EU are adolescents in transition. There is indeed a recognisable developmental narrative in the 
literature regarding ‘young nations’ that have failed to modernise (i.e. Sotiropoulos, 2010) and 
overcome what Landes in his seminal book on Western European industrialisation (2003: 357) calls 
‘the puberty of nations, the passage that separates the men from the boys’ marking the transition 
towards achieving industrialisation and economic and political development. These accounts are 
subject to the evolutionary and teleological understanding of history, economy and politics 
(Demertzis, 1997; Tsakalotos, 2008), and could find their theoretical and even terminological 
correspondence in identity research. However, an application of an Eriksonian evolutionary notion 
of ‘identity crisis’ for the study of nations would be highly metaphorical and ontologically, thus 
epistemologically, flawed, since individuals are distinct entities from collectivities, institutions and 
organisations.  
Erikson’s theory is derived by the wider theoretical tradition of psychoanalysis, an approach that 
more widely touches upon the question of ‘identity crisis’ through its assumption of eternal ‘lack’ of 
the self (the subject) and its endless struggle to fill in the emptiness of this psychic void (Lacan, 1994; 
Stavrakakis, 2002a). Although psychoanalysis offers remarkable and rich theoretical insights for the 
study of identity and its crisis (i.e. Horowitz, 2014; Strenger, 2005), it is argued in this thesis that its 
application in empirical and participatory research imposes significant ontological and 
epistemological issues.  
First, to begin with, psychoanalytical inquiry was originally and primarily designed for the 
therapeutic needs and clinical purposes of psychotherapy, not those of empirical social research 
(Mitchell & Black, 2016). As such, it was not originally ‘cut-out’ to fully facilitate the relationship 
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between researcher and researched. Second, the unavoidable implication of this relation assumes a 
dual role for the researcher, as psychotherapist and researcher, which risks pathologising research 
participants and disturbs the already fragile balance of power between researcher and researched 
(Aldridge, 2015). Third, the most intractable problem of applied psychoanalytical research resides in 
the question of the ‘unconscious’, the basis of all psychoanalysis (Fonagy, 2006), which can be a 
rather ‘elusive and unlocatable’ element (Ffytche, 2016: 14). Fourth, the very assumption of the 
researcher/psychoanalyst, hence occupier of the role of the ‘knower’ being more knowledgeable of 
another’s inner psyche and unconscious thoughts and desires further problematises the 
aforementioned power imbalance between researcher and researched because of the projections 
involved (Aldridge, 2015; Fonagy, 2006). Fifth, the extensive use of metaphor in psychoanalysis 
(Wurmser, 1977) sometimes fails to account for its own cultural constructs and their political 
implications (i.e. gender equality as ‘penis envy’, Buhle, 1998).  
Psychoanalysis is often part of two wider theoretical traditions that place ‘identity crisis’ in a central 
role, namely postmodernism and poststructuralism (Kuspit, 2002). As argued by postmodernists, we 
now live in ‘post-modern’ times, where the securities and certainties of the modern past with its 
consolidated social identities no longer apply and globalisation fragments the fragile ego of the post-
modern individual (Bendle, 2002; Dunn, 1998). Post-modern theorists have good reasons to assume 
that postmodernity fragments the sense of identity, if only for the expansion of possibility, choice 
and complexity (Andrews, 2016; Dunn, 1998). However, the question of identity is often consumed 
in an endless debate between essentialist notions and constructivist/constructionist versions, 
whether thin or thick ones (Bendle, 2002).  
Moreover, postmodernism often ends up recycling its own paradox of arguing that no identity exists, 
nor should it ever exist, yet at the same time, expressing deep nostalgia for that which never is 
(Kuspit, 2002). It is argued here that this approach to identity and theorising is less than fruitful, 
since it reproduces the same polarisations repeatedly, while postmodernism’s assumption of an 
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ever-present ‘crisis of identity’ deprives us of an object of observation. Similarly to the 
aforementioned ‘ubiquity of identity’ (Bendle, 2002: 2), if identity crisis itself is everywhere, then it is 
nowhere. Instead, it is suggested in this study that we should focus on a few minimal standards that 
can account for the existence of identity and its crises, so that an analytical framework of identity 
destabilisations, potentially triggering such crises, can be crafted more systematically.  
 
Defining identity and triggers of identity crisis  
 
In order to define ‘identity crisis’, we should first define ‘identity’ and then ‘crisis’, as well as 
potential triggers of crisis. In this thesis, it is accepted that identity is derived from two particular 
premises: 1) self-awareness and 2) sense of trajectory. These two are concisely captured by 
Giddens’s definition of identity as ‘the self as reflexively understood by the individual in terms of his 
or her biography’ (1991: 244). The first one refers to social psychology’s assumption that humans 
have an awareness of themselves, which constitutes their sense of self (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014; 
Pyszczynski et al., 2010). This sense of self may not always be clear or positive, hence its 
destabilisations, but it nevertheless always resides in a certain ‘reflexive consciousness’ (Pyszczynski 
et al., 2010: 737). This needs not be a core, Cartesian, inner self that is concretely fixed and 
consistently rational, neither an overtly fragmented and utterly indecisive self (Bendle, 2002). 
Instead, it merely refers to the fact that most people would be capable to state at least a few things 
about themselves with a relative degree of certainty, based on the perception of themselves 
(Giddens, 1991). Self-awareness, especially if understood as self-knowledge, has been criticised for 
assuming an overtly optimistic view of human reflexivity (Bendle, 2002), therefore it would be more 
accurate to specify that humans, at the very least, have ‘the capacity for awareness’ of self and 
others (Pyszczynski et al., 2010: 737). Just like the unfixed ‘self’, this capacity is similarly not fixed, 
since it can be highly malleable and trainable to allow for greater, or lesser thereof, ‘cognitive 
flexibility’ (Hirsh & Kang, 2016).  
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Second, humans’ sense of identity is derived from an awareness of their trajectory over time, which 
is based on memory and concerns the understanding of one’s biography (Giddens, 1991). In 
collective identities, such as national European ones, biography is substituted by history, or more 
accurately a historicizing representation of identity, defined as ‘stimulation of temporal thought’ 
(Knight & Steward, 2016: 2). Just like history and its writing (-graphy, γραφή) are always subject to 
representation-making and interpretation (Liakos & Kouki, 2015), similarly one’s biography is 
dependent on personal representations and interpretations of life events (Strauss, 1995). Sometimes 
collective historical representations may inform personal identities, and vice versa (Strauss, 1995). 
This awareness is empirically demonstrated by the fact that most people could readily speak about 
such experiences and attribute a degree of sequence and meaning to their biographical path or their 
group’s temporal trajectory. This path is not to be understood as ‘continuity of self’ (Bendle, 2002: 
7), or a linear and teleological progression to a fuller, more complete self (Leccardi, 2005), but rather 
as a kind of temporality, defined as ‘time as it manifests in human existence’ (Couzens in Hammer, 
2011: 2). This temporality concerns the ways humans project their social identities, whether 
individual biographies or collective histories, upon time as ‘past, present and future’ (Knight & 
Steward, 2016; Leccardi, 2005). As put by Said, ‘we read biography not to deconstruct, but to solidify 
identity, and where but in temporality does an identity unfold?’ (2000: 463). Similarly, history is read 
– and written – to shape collective memory, hence identity, over time.  
Subsequently, we need to consider the meaning of ‘crisis’ and its application to ‘identity’. 
Considering the etymology of the word ‘crisis’, its origins are found in the ancient Greek word 
krinein, meaning to decide, although its meanings are multiple (Agrafiadis, 2013; Bakar, 2015). First, 
‘crisis’ most often carries negative connotations and refers to a state of sudden disruption of what 
was, thus far, considered ‘normal’ and ‘functional’ (Agrafiadis, 2013), ‘exposure to a traumatic or 
dangerous event’ (Brown et al., 2003: 432) and subjection to conditions of confusion, uncertainty 
and disorientation (Colman, 2015; Stevenson, 2010). Due to these negative associations, crisis is 
often understood as highly dramatic, distressing and troubling (Bakar, 2015; Brown et al., 2003; 
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Kennedy, 2010). Second, ‘crisis’ often refers to ‘turning points’ or ‘critical junctures’ (Bakar, 2015; 
Galpin, 2014), understood as ‘change and transition’ (Dalakoglou & Vradis, 2011: 14) that can either 
lead to resolution or collapse (Baldick, 2015; Martin, 2015). The ensuing change is often understood 
to result from the inability of older coping strategies and paradigms to continue providing solutions 
(Brown et al., 2003; Martin & McFerran, 2014). Third, ‘crisis’ also means ‘judgement’ and ‘decision’ 
(Dalakoglou & Vradis, 2011), which relates to the ways critical moments may urgently need ‘good 
judgement’, defined as ‘the precise diagnosis of problems of personal or collective life, the 
assessment of alternative solutions, the selection of intelligent strategies to face a multiplicity of 
obstacles of organised action’ (Agrafiadis, 2013: v-vi).  
The common denominator of the above definitions appears to be the destabilising character of crisis 
as a product of either disruption, change or decision (Dunn, 1998). As such, in the case of identity, 
‘identity crisis’ can be defined as the potential product of the destabilisation, thus the state of 
psychological disequilibrium of a given identity (Brown et al. 2003; Martin & McFerran, 2014)6. Based 
on the two defining pillars of identity, self-awareness and sense of trajectory, an identity crisis would 
be defined by the destabilisation of this self-awareness and sense of trajectory. Since according to 
SIT, identity is derived by group membership and is forged in the preservation of collective self-
esteem, a destabilisation of membership or self-esteem could foster an identity crisis. Furthermore, 
a possible inability to employ successful strategies of self-esteem maintenance as SIT purports may 
indicate a deeper identity crisis. Going back to SRT and the ways identities are inaccessible, 
therefore are understood and experienced through representations, the same should apply to the 
crises of identities. In this sense, since the ‘identity crisis’ cannot be defined with absolute ‘objective 
criteria’, it is the ‘interpretations a society gives to its experiences that govern the extent to which it 
enters into an identity crisis’ (Pye in Waxman, 2006: 13). As put (Bakar, 2015: 281), an identity crisis 
is experienced as a ‘crisis of perceptions’ (cognition) and a ‘crisis of ideas’ (representations).  
                                                          
6 The term ‘identity destabilisation’ evokes similar terms, such as ‘identity dislocation or decentering’ (Hall, 
1996: 597; Laclau in ibid), or even ‘displacement’ or ‘disembedding’ (Hall, 1996: 597, 622). 
51 
 
 
Multiplicity of identity destabilisations: a typology 
 
It is well accepted today that identities are multiple, since individuals simultaneously hold multiple 
social roles (Hirsh & Kang, 2016; Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Vignoles et al., 2012). Although there is an 
ontological and terminological debate in the literature whether people have single identities with 
multiple domains and components, or multiple identities as such (Vignoles et al., 2012), it would be 
more accurate to say that people have one identity that is enriched and complexified by multiple 
identity dimensions that constantly and dynamically interact with each other to variably make up the 
totality of one’s identity at different temporal intervals (Ntampoudi, 2015). For example, within a SIT 
tradition, individuals can have multiple group identities (or group identity dimensions) that shift in 
salience depending on context (Vignoles et al., 2012). In light of this, it would be fair to assume that 
if identities are multiple, their ascents to crises may be multiple too (Ntampoudi, 2015). In this 
sense, assuming that identities are plural and multidimensional, it follows that this dynamism should 
equally be present in their destabilisation, in which case we would need a typology of multiple 
identity destabilisations to fully understand the phenomenon at hand.  
Although the theoretical combination of SRT/SIT successfully grasps some significant aspects of the 
phenomena of crisis and identity, such as ‘identity threat’ based on stereotyping and strategies of 
‘identity threat management’ (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014), social psychology still necessitates a 
systematic analytical framework of identity destabilisations that can account for multiple dynamics 
of entering, or not thereof, an identity crisis. Consequently, in order to formulate such a 
systematised framework of crisis triggers, a typology of identity destabilisations was created. 
Following a bricolage approach to theorisation, which allows for the combination of multiple sources 
(Kincheloe, 2001), this typology imports extensively from Tajfel and Turner’s SIT, but also fills in 
theoretical gaps and enriches the conceptual landscape with input from various other sources, such 
as Baumeister et al.’s (1985) appropriation of Habermas’s political theory, theories of collective 
52 
 
narcissism (de Zavala et al., 2009), and Goffman’s sociology of stigma (1963). The typology consists 
of four types of identity destabilisation, namely 1) identity conflict, 2) identity devaluation, 3) 
identity overvaluation, and 4) identity deficit. Their definitions are synthesised as follows:  
 
 Identity conflict: an identity destabilisation induced when a social entity is torn 
between two or more identity dimensions that are perceived as incompatible and 
can lead to identity confusion and inconsistency of action. 
 
 Identity devaluation: an identity destabilisation inflicted when a social entity’s 
identity is distressed by negative representations, which can lead to diminished 
self-esteem and low social status. 
 
 Identity overvaluation: an identity destabilisation manifested when a social entity’s 
identity is evaluated in an overtly positive way, which can lead to the development 
of unrealistic ingroup expectations and their frustration, or ingroup favouritism and 
aggression towards outgroups.  
 
 Identity deficit: an identity destabilisation observed when a social entity’s identity is 
perceived as missing or severely compromised, which can lead to absence of 
motivation, values and goals.  
 
The analytical framework of identity destabilisations in the form of the present typology was created 
in two main episodes during the research, before the analysis of media and interview data. During 
the first stages of this research project, the social psychological theories of SRT and SIT acted as the 
sole and central theoretical illumination and guidance, particularly their theoretical merging. The 
two theories offer rich and clear insights into the workings of social representations of social 
phenomena and the functions of social identity formation, as they are foundational and well-
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established traditions within European social psychology (Prislin & Crano, 2012). As a result, at first, 
the theoretical focus was on the integration of SRT and SIT. 
As a starting point, SIT explains in an elaborate manner the social conditions of stereotyping and 
prejudice and asserts that these are conditions under which ‘identity threats’ are constituted 
(Bilewicz & Kofta, 2011; Pagliaro et al., 2012). For the purposes of this research on ‘collective identity 
crisis’ during economic crises, these ‘identity threats’ were treated as potential triggers of ‘identity 
crises’ and as forms of identity destabilisation. During the literature review of SIT, it was felt that the 
social dynamics of identity destabilisation upon which SIT is most strongly focused are those of 
identity degradation through negative stereotyping and discrimination via ingroup favoratism and 
outgroup derogation. As such, it was concluded that SIT mostly contributes to the elucidation of 
what is called in this research ‘identity devaluation’. Consequently, at the start, the focus of this 
research revolved mainly around this particular identity dynamic.  
However, during the literature review on the historical construction of Greek European identity, as 
well as on its construction in media and political discourse during the economic crisis, it intuitively 
became apparent that there were multiple, distinct and complex dynamics involved in the wider 
phenomenon of identity destabilisation, besides the devaluing negative stereotyping emphasised in 
SIT. These included, for example, representations of identity hybridism and conflict, constructed 
clashes of different identity dimensions of the same identity (i.e. between the ‘Greek’ and the 
‘European’ components within the total ‘Greek European identity’), ideas of struggles over national 
self-affirmation and sovereignty, implying the loss of international identity, varied dynamics of 
defensive nationalisms and Europeanisms, coloured by overvaluing tendencies of the objects of 
‘nation’ and ‘Europe’, and so on.  
To be sure, SIT is not blind to these multiple social identity dynamics of conflict, overvaluation and 
deficit, since it does speak of intergroup relations, possibly even conflict, and assumes the existence 
of superordinate groups (Costarelli, 2009; Sapountzis & Condor, 2013) or addresses revaluating 
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strategies of ‘identity threat management’ (Pagliaro et al., 2012). However, the central axis around 
which SIT is formed is the question of group ‘self-esteem’, hence the overt focus on identity 
degradation/threat. This emphasis holds it back from expanding more thoroughly on the other types 
of identity destabilisations and potential crises, as well as from explicitly naming them and clarifying 
not only their distinct character, but also complex intersections. As a result, the second episode in 
the development of the present analytical and typological framework was the expansion of the 
theoretical review into additional sources that could complement and refine the original theoretical 
and terminological territory, through the bricolage approach.  
The literature was scouted for definitions of ‘identity crises’ and social psychologists Baumesteir et 
al.’s (1985) text on ‘two kinds of identity crisis’ assisted in understanding the potential existence of 
‘identity conflicts’ and ‘identity deficits’. For these authors, identity conflicts and identity deficits are 
two types of ‘identity crisis’, rather than ‘identity threats’, as termed by SIT. As becomes apparent, 
terminological issues arise when looking at diverse sources, but ultimately the terminological 
decision-making rests upon the researcher’s personal interpretation, subjective judgement and his 
or her research objectives, since terms themselves have no objective or essential meaning as such 
and are a matter of usage and operationalisation. In this research, these ‘threats’ or ‘crises’ are 
treated as identity destabilisations that could promote identity crisis. Baumesteir et al.’s 
theorisations expanded the analytical framework to include the types of identity conflict and deficit, 
on top of the devaluation already proclaimed by SIT. The final identity destabilisation that was added 
to the framework was that of overvaluation, which became particularly necessary as the historical 
review of Greek European identity was revealing constructions of Greek identity in idealising, 
overvaluing ways during, for instance, the age of Philhellenism.  
As an additional step within the development of the analytical framework, it was sensed that not 
only devaluation and overvaluation may be especially linked, as already implied by SIT’s assumption 
of identity threat management, but that there might be gradations and qualitative differences of 
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social devaluations and overvaluations. In order to elucidate this the literature was consulted again 
and the distinction between ‘stereotype threat’ and ‘stigma threat’ became useful (Biernat & 
Dovidio, 2003), at which point Goffman’s seminal theoretical work on stigma (1963) also became 
relevant. It was intuitively felt that overvaluation functions in a similar fashion, whereby the existing 
distinction within the literature between ‘self-protection’ and ‘self-advancement’ (Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2008) and theories of ‘collective narcissism’ (de Zavala et al., 2009) became the final touch of 
the analytical framework. Retrospectively, there might be gradations and qualitative differences of 
identity conflicts and deficits, but these were not clarified during this research and remain to be 
possibly developed in the future.  
After the full typology was developed on the basis of reviewing and expanding the net of literature 
sources, as well as refining concepts and terms, the four types were then used to examine the 
information coming out of the empirical data (texts and interviews). The empirical data rendered 
more specific the ways that these different destabilising identity dynamics operate within the 
context and special parameters of the case study of ‘Greek European identity’. These special 
parameters concern not only the case of Greece, but also the category case of ‘national European 
identity’ as a distinct compound social identity among multiple social identity categories. As such, 
the empirical data fleshed out and illustrated how the conceptual model resonated – or not thereof 
– with the opinions and experiences of social actors, whether experts or non-experts. This was not 
meant as a positivist strategy of theory-testing and falsification (Popper, 1959), but rather as a 
strategy of creating a dialogue between theoretical constructs and empirical ones.  
With reference to the continuum of inductive and deductive research (Rothchild, 2006), the present 
research may appear to be rather deductive as there was considerable theoretical input and 
analytical development prior to the empirical analysis of textual and interview material (Harding, 
2013). It is a common misconception in the literature that qualitative research can only be inductive 
(i.e. grounded theory approach), but it can also be deductively approached if research aims and 
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questions are specific enough (Harding, 2013). The theoretical specification within a particular 
identity research tradition - in this case, social psychology’s SIT/SRT and crafted typology of identity 
destabilisations – was necessary for shaping the terminological universe of the project and providing 
a vocabulary for the phenomena involved, a choice which contains the deductive elements of the 
research process.  
However, the distinction between the two logics of research-doing are more ideo-typical (Weber, 
1922) and schematic (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014), rather than an ‘either/or’ proposition, since in applied 
research the constant passage from induction to deduction, and vice versa, is not only the practiced, 
but also the desired norm. As aptly put, ‘ever since Aristotle it has been accepted that there exists a 
combination of inductive and deductive reasoning and a sort of unified inductive-deductive 
methodology’ (Stadler, 2004: 1).  
Accordingly, although the present research project was highly specified theoretically from its earlier 
stages, the original framing of the research topic as an ‘identity project’ - in itself a ‘research 
hypothesis’ and an ‘empirical question’ assuming the possible relevance of identity for the economic 
crisis - was specified through informal personal observations of the present researcher. These 
observations were influenced not only by the researcher’s social identity as a Greek European living 
abroad in another EU member-state, exposed to media representations, political discourse and 
social interactions, but also by the researcher’s prior training as a political sociologist. These are 
elements of inductive thinking, since induction begins with observation. As explained (Bendassoli, 
2013), it becomes difficult to differentiate clearly in practice between the two scientific reasonings 
and pin down where induction ends and deduction begins, since researchers are influenced by prior 
knowledge, expectations and experiences. In this sense, there is no such thing as ‘pure’ induction or 
‘pure’ deduction (Ormston et al., 2014: 6). Conclusively, both logics were followed during the 
research process to varying degrees. 
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The next sections will elaborate on the distinctions between the four types of identity 
destabilisations.  
 
Identity conflict  
 
Beginning with identity conflict, according to SIT, social identities are associated with normative 
standards for thought and action and individuals adhere to group social norms because they wish to 
be conceived as valued members of a group (Hirsh & Kang, 2016). However, given the increasing 
complexity of the social world, individuals occupy multiple social group identities simultaneously 
(Hirsh & Kang, 2016). Similarly, in the context of European integration, European citizens occupy 
both national and European identities. If these groups are perceived to provide divergent norms and 
values, individuals may experience social identity conflict (Baumeister et al., 1985; Hirsh & Kang, 
2016). Identity conflict is defined as ‘perceived incompatibilities between two or more of an 
individual’s identity domains’ (Hirsh & Kang, 2016: 223). The clash of two or more commitments that 
are seen as incompatible can entail inconsistent action, which may include the inability of the social 
entity to fulfil demands and expectations placed on itself or to justify actions that are called for 
(Baumeister et al., 1985).  
These identity conflicts may be due to transitional stages from one identity to another, whereby 
both identities coexist and their respective values clash with each other (Baumeister et al., 1985; 
Yoon, 2015). The degree to which an individual may experience identity conflict depends on the 
value placed on the respective identity dimensions and the depth of the perceived incompatibility 
between them (Hirsh & Kang, 2016). In the case of national European identities, identity conflict is 
dependent on the degree that these two identity dimensions, the national and the European, are 
understood as compatible (Fuchs et al., 2011; Grad, 2002). Identity conflict may be overcome 
through a variety of identity management strategies (Hirsh & Kang, 2016). Hirst and Kang (2016) 
propose four ways of identity conflict resolution: 1) suppressing a conflicting identity, 2) enhancing a 
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dominant identity, 3) avoiding or denying the identity conflict, and 4) integrating the conflicting 
identity. 
 
Identity devaluation  
 
Regarding the second type, identity devaluation can either refer to SIT’s stereotypes as ‘identity 
threat’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) or Goffman’s stigma as ‘spoiled identity’ (1963). In this way, we can 
differentiate between diverse gradations of identity devaluation, with SIT’s identity threat being 
operationalised for types of devaluations, such as negative stereotypes, whereby the identity is 
threatened and insecuritised, but perhaps not entirely damaged or severely ‘spoiled’. This distinction 
between ‘stereotype threat’ and ‘stigma threat’ may depend on people’s attitudes towards 
stereotypes in general, the particular stereotype content, and the ways cultural context defines that 
content to determine its psychological and social consequences (Hogg & Williams, 2000; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). Distinguishing between the interrelated terms ‘stereotype’ and ‘stigma’ is important 
(Biernat & Dovidio, 2003), not only because they are frequently used interchangeably in the 
literature, but also because stereotypes are complex representations. For example, stereotypes can 
also be positive, although their content can be equally patronising and their consequences similarly 
detrimental to those of negative stereotypes (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000; Czopp, 2008). As such, 
ironically, the ‘common-sense’ understanding of stereotypes as negative only, is in itself, 
stereotypical.  
Regarding SIT’s identity threat, the theory postulates that people derive parts of their self-concept 
and self-esteem by formal or informal membership in various groups (Pagliaro et al., 2012; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). When a group identity is credited a lower social status, group members may 
experience an identity threat, that is, the collective self-esteem founded in their group identity may 
become precarious and unstable (Costarelli, 2009; Martiny & Kessler, 2014). As explained by SRT, 
this identity threat may result from negative identity representations of this group, amounting to 
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negative stereotyping (Howarth, 2002; Staerklé et al., 2011; Wagner et al., 2009). Identity threats 
may not only lead to diminished self-esteem, but may additionally lead to lowered social status, 
defined as placement on a ‘ranking or hierarchy of perceived prestige’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 37). 
Subordinate groups often internalise their lower status and speak negatively of their own group, 
while displaying positive attitudes towards dominant outgroups (Biernat & Dovidio, 2003; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). This attitude, although not considered atypical in low status groups, is viewed as 
paradoxical by rational standards, since these would dictate strategic employments to change that 
status, instead of resorting to ‘consensual inferiority’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 37). This contributes to 
the understanding that restoration of positive views of one’s group constitutes ‘successful social 
identity management’, whereas remaining in negative emotional states regarding one’s group is 
indicative of ‘unsuccessful identity management’ (Martiny & Kessler, 2014: 748). 
In the second category, Goffman’s ‘spoiled identity’ (1963) should constitute forms of identity 
devaluation, such as stigmatisation, a more serious type of identity threat, potentially with more 
extensive social consequences for individuals and groups. In Goffman’s sociology of stigma and 
deviance, stigma is defined as ‘any physical or social attribute or sign’ that functions in such a way as 
to ‘devalue an actor’s social identity’, resulting to ‘disqualifying it from full social acceptance’ (Jary & 
Jary, 2000: 613). The term stigma, originating in the Greek word στίγμα, referred to ‘bodily signs 
designed to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier’ (Goffman, 
1963: 11), whereby these signs would be cut or burnt on the body of the ‘blemished person’, most 
often a slave, criminal, sinner or traitor. As such, the distinction of stigma comprises in it being a 
particular ascription placed upon social groups, functioning as an addition and deliberate ‘branding’ 
practice, in the sense of ‘being the target of stigma’ (Dovidio et al., 2003: 2). As Goffman explains, 
stigma is not necessarily a material attribute as such, but instead a ‘language of relationships’ (1963: 
13). As such, stigma is the ‘scarlet letter’ of social relations, expressed in both material and 
immaterial ways, ranging from textual representations to institutional practices (i.e. punishment of 
criminals or slave ownership). Goffman relates the theory of stigma to his sociology of deviance, 
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supporting that stigmatised identities define social notions of ‘normalcy’ and ‘deviance’, and as such, 
inclusion and acceptance or exclusion and rejection. 
 
Identity overvaluation 
 
In terms of the third type of destabilisation, identity overvaluation, similarly to identity devaluation, 
it draws mainly from SIT and is separated in a two-fold manner, namely identity revaluation and 
identity overvaluation proper, which are meant to connote different gradations of self-enhancement 
(Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). The first refers to SIT’s and Goffman’s assumptions that those whose 
identities are threatened by stereotypes and stigma, may attempt to manage them through a variety 
of strategies aiming to revaluate the devalued identity. Researchers propose a variety of strategies. 
Some suggest (Huddy, 2001; Martiny & Kessler, 2014; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) the strategies of social 
creativity, social change or social mobility. The first refers to cases of poorly valued groups that 
create or construct an alternative identity, the second concerns competitive struggles with 
outgroups to alter the devalued group’s negative image and the final implies the rejection of one’s 
membership for the sake of moving to a more highly valued group (Martiny & Kessler, 2014). 
Alternatively, Sedikides and Gregg (2008) speak of another self-enhancing triad, which includes 
overemphasising one’s good points, overestimating one’s control over events and being 
unrealistically optimistic about one’s future. It is important to bear in mind that strategies can be 
rather expansive and varied (Martiny & Kessler, 2014), allowing for personal agency, but they will 
always be dependent on people’s subjective ‘belief systems about the nature and the structure of 
the relations between social groups in their society’ (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 35). As exemplified by 
many (Bourdieu, 1977; Jessop, 2005), the resolution between agency and structure is strategy.  
The same strategies can be used for identity overvaluation, although the tendency to overvalue 
one’s identity may betray more deep-seated attitudes towards one’s identity in relation to others, 
such as narcissism. Collective narcissism is defined as ‘an emotional investment in an unrealistic 
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belief about the in group’s greatness’ (de Zavala et al., 2009: 1074). The lack of realism can lead to 
disappointment of ‘great expectations’. Prior research, for instance, has revealed that the ‘high 
expectations’ of positive stereotypes often results in underperformance and frustration of these 
expectations (Cheryan & Bodenhausen, 2000: 399). Identity overvaluation is quite often intimately 
related to identity devaluation. For example, collective narcissism is understood as a kind of high, yet 
ambivalent, group esteem related to sensitivity to threats to the ingroup’s image (Cichocka et al., 
2015; de Zavala et al., 2009). As such, it implicitly derives from low collective self-esteem and 
besides the increased perception of threat and ingroup favouritism, it can be further manifested as 
unwillingness to forgive outgroups, intergroup aggression, social dominance orientation, right-wing 
authoritarianism, conspiracy theorising, blind patriotism, and mistrust (Cichocka et al., 2015; de 
Zavala et al., 2009). The exaggeration of this collective self-image, hence its over-valuation, concerns 
the revaluation being ‘excessive and difficult to sustain’ which can often result in insatiable quests 
for ‘continual external validation’ by others (de Zavala et al., 2009: 1074).  
In the study of national identities, the equivalent of identity revaluation as self-protection and 
overvaluation as self-advancement (Sedikides & Gregg, 2008) appears to correspond to the 
distinction between patriotic and nationalist identities, as made by many (Poole, 2007; Vincent 
2002; Viroli, 1995), including George Orwell (1945), who argues that patriotism is defensive and 
seeks no power over other nations (group self-protection), while nationalism is offensive and power-
oriented (group self-advancement). Similarly, the wider cultural construction of these terms tends to 
positively evaluate patriotism as a benevolent concern with the wellbeing of one’s country and 
willingness to make sacrifices on its behalf, especially in times of crisis, and to negatively evaluate 
nationalism as a more bellicose, extreme, absolute and uncritical commitment to one’s ‘nation’ as 
situated against other nations (Honderich 2005; McLean & McMillan 2009; Poole, 2007). This 
cultural tendency needs to be acknowledged because its ingrained value judgement unavoidably 
spills over to the theorisation of the two concepts (i.e. Primoratz, 2007). Although the distinction is 
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contested by some (i.e. Brubaker, 2004), for the purposes of this thesis, they will be accepted as 
varying degrees of extremity and intensity in national identity evaluations and revaluations.  
 
Identity deficit 
 
Finally, the fourth destabilisation type, identity deficit concerns the inability of the social entity to 
construct ‘action-motivating meaning’ (Habermas, 1973: 49). This type of crisis is also called 
‘motivation crisis’ and is characterised by a lack of commitments, values and goals (Baumeister et al., 
1985; Habermas, 1973). This kind of destabilisation can lead to disorientation and inability of action 
due to the lack of consistent choices and decisions (Baumeister et al., 1985). Identity deficit may 
result from an inadequately defined identity or patterns of protracted questioning of the identity 
and the continuous seeking for new sources of meaning and fulfilment (Baumeister et al., 1985). In 
the case of national European identities, an inadequately defined European identity or its ongoing 
questioning may result in an identity deficit in this dimension. Identity deficit is distinct from an 
apathetic state of non-commitment, since it is characterised by a struggle for meaning (Baumeister 
et al., 1985). 
Just like multiple identity dimensions interact with each other on an ongoing and dynamic manner, 
the same should be expected from identity destabilisations themselves. As such, we should maintain 
that these types of identity destabilisations are not necessarily mutually exclusive and depending on 
the particular dynamics of a situation, they might coexist, thus potentially install or reinforce the 
potentiality of identity crisis. For example, as seen, an overvaluation destabilisation may succeed a 
destabilisation of identity devaluation (de Zavala et al., 2009) or an identity conflict may be resolved 
by either devaluing or overvaluing one identity dimension over another (Hirsh & Kang, 2016). An 
identity deficit may come about as a result of an unresolved identity conflict, while the latter may 
provoke a diminished belief in the given group’s capacity to resolve its conflicts. In a context of 
superordinate identities, like the European ones (Chryssochoou, 2000b), mutual identity 
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devaluations of multiple groups may lead to perceived intergroup conflicts, which may install a 
superordinate identity conflict (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As a conclusion, the combinations and 
dynamics between these types can be as expansive and complex as identities themselves.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter has exposed the theoretical compass of this thesis. It departed from making the case for 
the concept of identity against its critics, arguing that although it may be a challenging and 
perplexing one, it remains a significant conception for social and political reality, as well as for our 
self-understanding and that of our shared communities. Rejecting the notion that the term ‘identity’ 
constitutes an unavoidably essentialist concept that assumes innate and fixed characteristics, this 
thesis followed Jenkins’s (2014: 14) assertion that ‘what matters is how we write and talk about 
[identity]’, rather than concluding with its erasure in the hopes of resolving its persistently 
inconclusive ontological debate (Alcoff, 2003; Wetherell, 2010). Instead, it is accepted that it is 
precisely this debate that enriches the field of identity research and its outcomes (Wetherell, 2010).  
The chapter then proceeded to looking at national European identities and their origin in formal EU 
declarations, explaining their normative and desirable status. It was illustrated that national 
European identities are intertwined and shared, but at the same time separate and different for 
each country. In addition, the civic and cultural dimensions of European identities were exemplified 
and the connections between EU and European identities were pointed out. Subsequently, it was 
clarified that the field of European identities is separated in three main research streams, each of 
which contributes a unique understanding of different aspects of the social phenomenon in 
question. The field of European integration research exemplifies the elite and institutional version of 
European identities. Their normative theorising accounts for their ideational character and the 
empirical stream of research engages with the experiences of citizens. All three aspects were 
accepted as valuable and indispensable.  
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As a consequence, it was argued that an adequate approach to the study of national European 
identities would need to take into account all three levels of analysis. The theoretical model that 
appeared to be able to capitalise on all of these prior insights was found within a socio-psychological 
approach. More specifically, it was the integrated model of SIT and SRT that appeared capable of 
exploring the two fundamental features of identity, as both a representation and a psychological 
experience. Furthermore, SRT was additionally judged to be able to illuminate the elite-driven 
functions of phenomena like nation-building and European integration by focusing on culturally elite 
groups and their social influence. The main postulates of the two theories were described, as well as 
the points of merging between them.  
However, as illuminating and insightful as this integrated model was supported to be, it was further 
argued that it could not provide a comprehensively developed and systematic analytical framework 
of identity destabilisations, potentially leading to crises of the identity. Moreover, it was diagnosed 
that such an all-embracing conceptual tool was missing from the existing literature or was developed 
in a fragmented manner. As such, the chapter proceeded to construct an elaborate typology of 
identity destabilisations that can address the multiple and complex dynamics of such crisis 
phenomena. The typology contained four types of destabilisations, namely, identity conflict, identity 
devaluation, identity overvaluation and identity deficit. This conceptual and analytical clarification is 
claimed to be the central theoretical contribution of this thesis. Having outlined the theoretical 
assumptions of the present study, the next chapter will sketch out its research design, rationale and 
fieldwork details. 
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Chapter 2 
A Triangulated Single Case Study Research Design 
 
 
 
Introduction: moving away from traditional approaches 
 
Research design is defined as the sum of strategies and tactics that are selected by the researcher in 
the attempt to answer the research question (O’Leary, 2014; Robson, 2011). The function of the 
research design is to act as an operational work plan that will ensure that the evidence gathered 
allows us to answer the research question as unambiguously as possible (de Vaus, 2005; Kumar, 
2014). In this respect, research design is about attention to detail and about convincing the sceptical 
reader that the conclusions of the research are valid and reliable (Gorard, 2013; Kumar, 2014; 
O’Leary, 2014). Simultaneously, research design is concerned with transforming research questions 
into feasible research projects and the choices made depend heavily on the nature of the research 
question (Gorard, 2013; Robson, 2011). Several authors compare research design to architecture 
saying that the researcher is similar to the architect who first needs to know what kind of building 
will be built before moving on to making the design and ordering the materials for its construction 
(de Vaus, 2005; Gorard, 2013; Robson, 2011). Research design is distinct from methodology, a point 
that is often misunderstood in the literature, since designing research is only partly about methods 
and mostly concerns the rationale behind them (de Vaus, 2005; Gorard, 2013; Kumar, 2014; 
Marshall & Rossman, 2010). 
In terms of epistemological loyalties, social psychology has traditionally depended on experimental 
research designs and quantitative methods (Gough et al., 2013; Hogg & Vaughan, 2014; Stainton 
Rogers, 2011). Social psychology, like many other social sciences, has been marked by the positivism 
versus post-positivism debate with positivist social psychology advocating the idea of science as the 
primary paradigm of social inquiry and ‘critical social psychology’ supporting alternative ways of 
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knowledge (Gough et al., 2013; Stainton Rogers, 2011). In terms of our theoretical framework, SRT 
has been used in the past in combination with multiple designs and diverse methodologies and its 
spectrum appears to be pluralist enough. SIT’s record, however, exemplifies a more particular focus 
on the ‘minimal-group’ technique, a controlled laboratory experimental method, originally 
developed by Tajfel himself, during which small groups are assigned specific identity categories and 
are asked to perform various tasks (Jenkins, 2014; McDermott, 2009).  
However, there have been several criticisms against this methodology, such as the artificiality and 
social decontextualisation of experiments, as well as the suspicion that they actively produce the 
results they try to explore (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014; Jenkins, 2014; Smith et al., 2015). For instance, 
experiments can cause less than spontaneous ‘subject effects’ in participant behaviour either by 
appearing to demand specific responses (demand characteristics) or by participants wishing to 
please the researcher (social desirability) (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014: 11). As an extension, the 
relevance of laboratory conditions to the ‘less pure conditions that exist in the real world’ has been 
doubted, as well as their validity and generalising ability (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014: 11; Jenkins, 2014; 
Smith et al., 2015). Furthermore, experimental methods have been criticised more widely as 
unethical because of the manipulation and concealment of information they usually entail (Hogg & 
Vaughan, 2014; Smith et al., 2015).  
The calls of ‘critical social psychology’ for alternative ways of knowledge-making have demanded 
that SIT becomes pluralised too. For example, in a recent article Jackson and Sherriff (2013) argue 
that the dominance of positivist research methods in SIT limits the extent to which it enables an 
understanding of the complexities of identities and through the use of data derived by interviews 
they demonstrate the benefits that qualitative research can have for SIT and social psychology more 
widely. More precisely, the researchers highlight how qualitative data can add considerable richness 
to understandings of social relations and draw attention to inconsistencies and contradictions that 
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otherwise may go unnoticed. As Gough et al. (2013) explain, post-positivist critical social psychology 
remains still a minority.  
The field of European identities and EU studies is also marked by distinctions between neo-positivist 
and critical/discursive traditions, as well as between quantitative and qualitative methodologies 
(Bourne, 2015; Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2012; Manners et al., 2015), as is the field of social 
psychology. Although Eurobarometer inspired research reigned for a long time, the methodological 
universe of European identities research was increasingly pluralised during the nineties with 
alternative research designs that were better equipped to illuminate aspects of identification that 
had been hidden till then.  
Research on national European identities has largely been driven by the available data in the form of 
survey data produced by Eurobarometer (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Cram, 2011). Although the 
Eurobarometers are a valuable longitudinal archive of public opinion in the EU, they have been 
accused of many shortcomings and inconsistencies (Pichler et al., 2012). First, the wording of certain 
question items is problematic (Cram, 2011). For example, the question ‘how often do you think of 
yourself as a European, European and [nationality], nationality and [European]?’ fails to differentiate 
between EU and European identity (Cram, 2011). Another problem is the frequent change of 
wording in question-items, which can affect responses (Bruter, 2005). Most crucially, the majority of 
European identity research that uses Eurobarometer data actually uses the proxy of ‘support for EU 
membership’ because this is the question-item that has consistently been asked, while others 
question-items have been discontinued between years. This tendency overstates the relationship 
between support for European integration and identification as a European (Cram, 2011).  
Moreover, Eurobarometer data and surveys in general cannot illuminate the meanings that people 
ascribe to different categories (Bruter, 2003; Cram, 2011; White, 2010). For example, it can be 
difficult to detect whether respondents refer to a civic dimension of identity or a cultural one 
(Bruter, 2005). In addition, surveys risk imposing questions on people that they do not question 
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themselves and provoking answers that have never occupied their minds before (Favell, 2005; Eder, 
2009; Pilcher et al., 2012). Similarly to experimental research, survey research may create the 
attitudes it reports, since people are willing to provide an answer to questions that are posed (Favell, 
2005; Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). Another similarity to experiments is that surveys lack the ability 
to substantially contextualise questions and answers in the broader social environment of diverse 
human subjects (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Pilcher et al., 2012). As such, polls may risk imposing a 
conceptual unity on extremely diverse political processes failing to capture their plurality of 
meanings (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). 
The conclusions that we can draw from the above synopses of the methodological state of the art in 
our two fields is that singular methods of the past, like experiments and surveys, can only tell us this 
much about identity formation in Europe (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Fuchs et al., 2011). National 
European identities can only be understood by complex research designs with various analytical 
levels and various methodological approaches (Bourne, 2015; Fuchs et al., 2011). Examples of multi-
method projects are still limited (Bourne, 2015), but as Risse (2010: 34) reminds us, all methods are 
important because different methods focus on different aspects of the same phenomenon. For 
these reasons it was decided that a single case study design, sensitive to post-positivist sensibilities 
that addressed different levels of a single case with a triangulating multiplicity of qualitative 
methods would be the most suitable strategy for our research questions. The following section will 
elaborate on the design details of this study, including data collection, fieldwork management, 
research ethics and data analysis.   
 
A triangulated single case study research design 
 
Case studies are in-depth and detailed explorations of single cases (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). The 
case in case study research is the unit of analysis about which we collect information and that which 
we try to understand (Baxter & Jack, 2008; de Vaus, 2005). A case can be anything: an event, a 
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process, an organisation, an individual person, a household, a family, a group, a community, a 
region, a nation (de Vaus, 2005; Rossman & Rallis, 2003). Whatever the unit of analysis, case study 
research aims and offers the chance to examine the phenomenon in question within its context 
(Baxter & Jack, 2008; de Vaus, 2005). In this study, the unit of analysis is Greece and more precisely 
‘Greek European identity’. Since, as previously explained, national European identities come in 
‘national colours’ and each country experiences them differently, it is argued here that a case study 
design can explore this specificity.  
Researchers attribute various advantages to case study research, such as their ability to deliver fuller 
and more complicated accounts with detailed and rich descriptions, as well as their suitability to 
study complex phenomena and offer deeper understandings  (Bennett & Elman, 2007; de Vaus, 
2005; Mariotto et al., 2012; Rossman & Rallis, 2003). Moreover, case studying has been credited 
with having great heuristic value (Rossman & Rallis, 2003), extracting new ideas at close range, 
which can be used for conceptual innovation and development (Bennett & Elman, 2007) and being 
able to allow for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood (Baxter & Jack, 
2008). Finally, case studies are considered more sensitive to context, diversity of opinions, the 
complexities of social reality, and the passage of time (Rossman & Rallis, 2003) and overall, are 
evaluated as an ‘excellent opportunity to gain tremendous insight into a case’ (Baxter & Jack, 2008: 
556).  
Case study research does not aim to generalise to other cases and create universal laws in a 
positivist fashion, but rather it aims to understand in-depth specific cases (Mariotto et al., 2012; 
Rossman & Rallis, 2003). In this sense, case study research is rather idiographic as opposed to 
nomothetic (Mariotto et al., 2012). Some argue that case studies function on the basis of reasoning 
analogy which allows for lessons to be learnt by studying one case that can be applied as analogies 
for understanding other cases that exemplify similar dynamics (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). In case 
study research, generalisations occur to theoretical propositions, as opposed to populations, which is 
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called ‘analytical generalisation’ (Mariotto et al., 2012; Silverman, 2013). As such, this thesis does 
not claim to be applicable to the totality of the Greek population, but rather it aims to explore the 
diversity and variability of expert and citizen opinions and identifications.  
Case studies can be singular or multiple (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). In the latter type the researcher 
can conduct comparative cross-case analyses (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). In this study of identities 
during crises, it was decided to focus on a single national case, instead of comparing between two or 
more countries because it was felt that focusing on a single case would make better use of the 
strengths of this research design, such as depth, detail and rich descriptions. As such, it was 
preferred to study one case in a more elaborate manner, rather than studying more cases in 
shallower ways. Furthermore, since case studying can produce rich data, it was felt that multiple 
cases would be difficult to be reported adequately in the narrow space of a PhD thesis. Although 
comparative research has been very popular since the nineties, there is still room for national 
studies (Manners et al., 2015), while it has been argued that we need both country-specific and 
comparative studies of European identities (Fuchs et al., 2011).  
In terms of the choice of Greece, selection of single cases is often justified on the basis of the case 
being either critical, instrumental, intrinsic, rare, unusual, odd, deviant, unique or extreme 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006; Mariotto et al., 2012; Silverman, 2013; Yin, 2013). Although this is unavoidably a 
value judgement and such choices depend heavily on the researcher’s preferences or capabilities, it 
was initially hypothesised that Greece appeared to be such a case within the representational 
context of the Euro crisis, due to the larger attention and blaming the country seemed to have 
attracted compared to other countries (Tzogopoulos, 2013). These impressions were confirmed by 
the ongoing literature review and recent studies that empirically found that media coverage of 
Greece has been more extreme, while Greece has been particularly ‘othered’ in public 
representations of the Euro crisis (see relevant chapter four). Based on these newly emergent 
research insights by other colleagues, it was decided that Greece could yield a single case study on 
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its own that would create the opportunity to better understand the Greek case within the crisis and 
within the EU. As explained (O’Leary, 2014: 197), cases that become ‘politically hot’ and the ‘focus of 
media attention’ can have intrinsic interest for research.  
Finally, in order to exploit the full potential of case studies that unavoidably contain multiple 
elements, multiple methods need to be employed (de Vaus, 2005). As explained, case study research 
is complex and multi-layered and uses a variety of techniques (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Rossman & 
Rallis, 2003). Based on this, case study research needs to be paired with triangulated research 
designs. Since case study designs try to view social phenomena in a holistic way, the strategy of 
triangulation is suggested as an ideal companion (Baxter & Jack, 2008; Mariotto et al., 2012). 
Recently, several authors have advocated the use of a ‘triangular research designs’ that combine 
multiple research methods and types of data in order to analyse the same problem (Ayoub et al., 
2014). It has been suggested that designs that employ more than one method or dataset for 
measuring concepts can result in greater confidence in research findings (Bryman, 2008).  
Bryman (2008: 700) concisely defines triangulation as ‘the use of more than one method or source 
of data in the study of a social phenomenon so that findings may be cross-checked’. The purpose 
and usefulness of triangulation is the enhancing effect it can have on the validity and reliability of 
the findings and the overcoming of method bias, since the use of multiple methods can remedy the 
biases and weaknesses found in any single method by capitalizing on each method’s strengths 
(Ayoub et al., 2014; Blaikie, 1991; Bryman, 2008; Jick, 1979). Furthermore, it is believed that 
triangulated research designs can add rigor, breadth complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry 
(Denzin, 2012), as well as offer a more holistic approach to the object of the study and a deeper 
understanding that can be more sensitive to context (Ayoub et al., 2014; Jick, 1979). 
Ultimately, triangular designs can allow for touching upon different dimensions of the same 
question, which can reduce the distance between method and ontology as they reflect the world in 
its complexity (Ayoub et al., 2014). Since triangulation is believed to offer a more rounded and 
72 
 
trustworthy image of social reality (Bryman, 2008; Jick, 1979), the present study attempted to collect 
data from a variety of sources, such as historiographical data, media texts, emerging literature, 
expert interviews and interviews with Greek citizens. The next sections will provide details about the 
implementation of the design.  
 
Addressing the research questions  
 
As Breakwell (2004: 7) argues, the key to a good study is the systematic unpicking of each aspect of 
the research question. In the introduction, three research questions were outlined: 
 
 What kind of knowledge is produced about the Greek debt/Euro crisis (representations) and 
how is collective identity related to that knowledge?  
 
 How do Greek citizens respond (action) to the knowledge (representation) that is produced 
about the Greek debt/Euro crisis and the role of Greek European identity in it? 
 
 Does the Greek debt/Euro crisis constitute an identity crisis of Greek European identity? 
 
 
The three questions attempt to integrate Jaspal et al.’s (2014) three levels of analysis in face of crisis 
events, namely, representation, identity and action. The first question concerns the production of 
knowledge about the Greek/Euro crisis and the construction of Greek European identity within that 
knowledge. The second attempts to look at people’s responses to these representations and the 
psychological experiences of identities. The third question seeks to understand whether the Greek 
debt/Euro crisis was represented and experienced as an identity crisis. On the basis of our postulate 
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of identity as representation and experience the following sections will show how these two 
dimensions are methodologically addressed.  
 
Identity as representation 
 
As argued in the theoretical chapter, identities and crises are intellectual and specialised concepts 
that are primarily analysed by members of the cultural, scientific and political elites (Jaspal et al., 
2014; Mackridge, 2010). Therefore, professionals such as academics, journalists and politicians are 
the specified ideational leaders of knowledge of these issues, which is transferred to the wider 
public through the media (Mylonas, 2012). The media is where the voices of various specialists and 
experts are heard (Kutter, 2014; Mylonas, 2012). Within the context of increasingly multifaceted and 
complexified professional careers, these roles are often merged and difficult to disentangle. For 
example, academic scholars who are considered experts in politics or economics write 
commentaries in newspapers explaining to the world the ‘Greek problem’ (Tzogopoulos, 2013: 68), 
while several financial experts are also financial journalists.  
Simultaneously, many Greek academics have joined formal politics during the Euro crisis (i.e. Yanis 
Varoufakis, Eucleid Tsakalotos), while many Greek journalists are also politicians (i.e. Liana Kanelli, 
Terence Quick). More widely, scholars often use their intellectual influence to make political 
statements about various issues, as was the case with the ‘Save the Greeks from their Saviours’ 
initiative taken by a number of international scholars (Alvaro et al., 2012). As such, there appears to 
exist a triangle of influence comprised by academic, journalistic and political output. The 
contributions of these professionals were considered in this exploration in the following ways:  
 
Historical overview of Greek European identities: academic discourse as social representations 
 
This thesis tries to comprehend how public knowledge about Greek European identities has been 
shaped during the economic crisis. In order to answer this question we first need points of reference 
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to past social representations of Greek European identities, so that comparisons can be made with 
current representations within the crisis context. In order to capture prior expert-born social 
representations, an extensive and systematic literature review was conducted on historical and 
social scientific accounts of Greek European identities. This historiographical detour further serves to 
historically contextualise the research topic (Walsh, 2012).  
The peculiarity of this literature review, as compared to conventional literature reviews that 
summarise and critically analyse the field, is that it approaches the scientific literature as a social 
representation in itself. As such, academic accounts of Greek European identities of the past are 
understood through the theoretical prism of Moscovici’s SRT. This approach has implications on how 
the literature is treated, in the sense that academic texts are treated as data in their own right. The 
results of this enquiry are presented in chapter three. 
 
Emerging research as knowledge-builder and a political agent 
 
An extensive and systematic literature review was conducted on social representations of the Euro 
crisis and Greece’s role within it. During the past few years, a large number of academics have 
researched the social constructions of the Euro crisis (i.e. Joris et al., 2014; Murray-Leach et al., 
2014; Wodak & Angouri, 2014; Vaara, 2014), as well as of the wider global financial crisis (i.e. Baker 
& Underhill, 2015; Breitstein & Dini, 2011; Robertson, 2014). Since 2010, an increasing number of 
both Greek and non-Greek academics took interest in the case of Greece, solely or as part of 
comparative projects, and have explored social constructions of Greece/Greeks and the crisis in 
various international (i.e. Bickes et al., 2014a; Kutter, 2014; Mylonas, 2012; Touri & Rogers, 2013) 
and Greek newspapers and social media (i.e. Exadaktylos & Capelos, 2015; Georgakopoulou, 2014; 
Kaitatzi-Whitlock, 2014; Kalantzis, 2015).  
This stream of literature was first reviewed in terms of summarising emerging knowledge of Greek 
European identities as these were shaped within the crisis context and an elaborate coding system 
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was produced. As a second analytical layer, this newly emerging stream of research output was 
examined through Moscovici’s SRT to unveil expert social representations on the topic of Greece and 
the crisis. How does the scientific community represent Greece and its crisis? What kind of positions 
and arguments are projected by researchers who work on Greece and the Euro crisis? These are 
some of the questions that were asked of the literature.  
 
Eclectic selection of opinion pieces: explicit questions of identity 
 
While conducting the above literature analysis a saturation point was reached in terms of arising 
themes, therefore it was evaluated that constructions of the Euro crisis and of Greece within it had 
been researched by multiple researchers quite extensively. Consequently, it was decided not to 
conduct yet another analysis of media texts and/or political speeches about Greece and the crisis 
that would not add anything new to the existing literature. Instead it was preferred to assemble and 
analyse an eclectic collection of opinion pieces written by various intellectual and political elites that 
explicitly talk about identity issues as such with regards to Greece and the crisis.  
These were selected in both the English and the Greek language over a variety of online media 
sources, with particular criterion the overt reference to three main terms: Greece, crisis, and 
identity. It was decided to follow this strategy because as SRT postulates specialised terms 
generated and predominantly used by experts and elites are diffused in the wider society, therefore 
the particular interest of this study was on the ways that terms such as crisis, identity, identity crisis, 
national and European identity, are mobilised together in public discourse. Furthermore, this 
strategy was able to reveal new themes and to contribute new perspectives that had not been met 
in the extensive literature review, most notably on the European dimension of Greek identities. 
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Expert and elite interviews: talking social representations 
 
It was decided to enrich the data collection of expert discourse with semi-structured interviews with 
Greek cultural, scientific and political elites. Special efforts were made to compile a diverse sample 
that could account for the pluralist character of social reality. As such, varied social scientists were 
interviewed including historians, sociologists, political scientists and economists. Political elites were 
selected across the wider spectrum of Greek political parties, including traditionally dominant 
parties, such as New Democracy and PASOK, newly emerging powers, such as SYRIZA and To Potami, 
and smaller parties, such as ANTARSYA, the Communist Party (KKE), the Democratic Left, the 
Ecologist Greens (Ecologoi Prasinoi) and EPAM.  
A limitation of the sample compiled is the absence of political representatives of right and extreme 
right parties, such as ANEL and Golden Dawn. While the first was approached for data collection 
purposes, response was not prompt before the researcher needed to finalise fieldwork and return to 
her base. GD party members were not contacted for safety reasons, since by the time of fieldwork 
criminal dimensions of the party had already been made public. In retrospect, members of LAOS 
could had been contacted instead of ANEL, but the focus at the time was primarily on (Euro)-
parliamentarian parties.  
Most political elites interviewed were members of the Greek parliament or former members of the 
European parliament. Journalists and authors were also interviewed. Thirty three (33) interviews 
were completed. Eponymous consent forms were signed by the interviewees. Appendix 1 shows 
details of the participants, including name, professional identity and date of interview. The expert 
interviews were analysed following Moscovici’s SRT in order to understand how expert discourse in 
Greece shapes the form of social representations about identities and crisis, but also Tajfel’s theory 
of identity to uncover identity formations among elite groups. Ultimately, the aim was to compare 
and contrast elite/expert discourse to the discourse of ordinary citizens. The next section will 
illustrate how citizens’ identifications and representations were explored. 
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Identity as experience 
 
Prior empirical research on Greek European identities 
 
Our second research question seeks to understand how Greek European identities are experienced 
during the Euro crisis by Greek citizens. As such, prior research on Greek identifications with Europe 
and the EU needed to be explored so there could be a point of reference for comparative purposes 
before and after the start of the economic crisis. Data for this endeavour were retrieved from 
Eurobarometer-based studies and other publications derived from projects that used different data 
sources and methods. Findings of previous research projects on Greek European identities were 
reviewed and summarised in order to construct an overall understanding about the evolution of 
identities in Greece over time. In addition, the large-scale aspect of research findings based on 
survey data offered an aggregate dimension in our pool of information.  
Although at the beginning of the present research, a secondary analysis of Eurobarometer data from 
1981, the year of Greece’s accession to the EEC, to 2011, the year of available data at the time, was 
conducted, the results are not presented in this thesis, since new publications of the last few years 
have largely covered the same research results. As such, these results are only presented here 
bibliographically in chapter six.  
 
Interviews: talking psychological experiences 
 
Conversations between a researcher and a single participant can enhance the data collection 
process. In the literature, qualitative interviews have been understood as forms of dialogue that 
provide a warm and empathetic space for participants to talk (Kvale, 2008; Maso & Wester, 1996). In 
order to complement and enrich the data of this study and to understand how Greek citizens have 
experienced Greek European identities during the economic crisis, a series of qualitative interviews 
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were conducted with Greek citizens from various socio-economic categories. Efforts were made to 
incorporate in the sample citizens from diverse socio-economic groups, such as pensioners, 
students, unemployed, public servants, private sector employees and self-employed. While the first 
categories belong to the wider inactive force in the labour market, the last three belong to the active 
part of the labour force. The purpose of qualitative research is not to generalise to the whole 
population by using a representative sample, but to use a sample that holds a ‘relativeness’ that 
captures the characteristics of the wider population (O’Leary, 2014). The balancing strategy of socio-
economic groups was evaluated as capable of grasping the main economic categories of the Greek 
population.  
Thirty four (34) interviews were completed. Appendix 2 illustrates the demographic characteristics 
of all the citizen participants of this study. In both cases of expert and non-expert citizen interviews a 
minimum of thirty participants was judged to not be ‘too small to support claims of having achieved 
either informational redundancy or theoretical saturation, or too large to permit the deep, case-
oriented analysis that is the raison-d'etre of qualitative inquiry’ (Sandelowski, 1995: 179). 
As explained in the theoretical chapter, national and European identities are representations 
promoted by various elites and experts, which can imply ‘an engineering view of politics’ (Checkel & 
Katzenstein, 2009: 3) and can underplay the potential agency of the people. While social 
representations provide the backdrop against which people form their beliefs, the same people can 
function as co-constructors of social representations (Jaspal et al., 2014). These interviews were 
used to understand more fully this process of co-construction of identities and crises by the people 
themselves.  
 
Fieldwork: decisions and strategies 
 
This section will provide explanations about how various issues and processes during fieldwork were 
addressed.  
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The interview guide 
 
An interview guide was assembled based on the research questions. The same interview guide was 
used in both expert and non-expert participants. The interview guide was reflexively modified over 
time based on the new information that was coming out of the data collection. For example, a few 
new questions were added based on themes that were coming out of the data or were included to 
clarify answers more successfully. Altogether, however, these changes were minor and the guide 
remained similar to preserve consistency from internview to interview. The guide was organised in 
six parts, each characterised by a different theme. These thematic sections included the following: 
1. Introductory questions about the economic crisis 
2. The Greek national identity within the economic crisis 
3. European integration and the European Union  
4. The European Union as the Troika and the crisis management 
5. The European identity 
6. Closing questions 
 
Appendix 3 provides detailed descriptions of the conversations that took place between researcher 
and participants, as well as what kind of questions were asked within each of the six thematic 
sections.  
 
The pre-interview questionnaire 
 
Before the interview, the participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire that consisted of three 
sections with questions on demographic, biographical and political characteristics. This 
questionnaire was used in order to have a profile of the participants and to enhance the analysis and 
the descriptive statistics of the sample. The questionnaire contained questions of previous 
transnational experiences such as living abroad or travelling abroad inside and outside Europe, as 
well as foreign languages skills and friendships with other nationals, because according to the 
literature such characteristics may enhance one’s European or cosmopolitan identity (Kuhn, 2015). 
Other questions included issues of political participation activities, political ideology on the right to 
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left spectrum (with an extra choice to reject this particular spectrum as meaningless) and choice of 
vote in the Greek elections of 2012 and the Euroelections of 2014 with an open question for reasons 
for their choice. Finally, the demographic questions included age, gender, disability, educational 
level and field of knowledge. At the top of the questionnaire there was an ‘office-use’ field where 
the researcher assigned a code number for the participant so that the questionnaire sheet could 
remain anonymous. The results of these questionnaires can be seen in Appendix 2. 
 
Sampling and recruitment strategies 
 
The sampling strategy of this study can best be described as purposive (Silverman, 2013). Purposive 
sampling targets participants with specific characteristics (Silverman, 2013). Researchers suggest 
that a typology of participants or sample frame is established (O’Leary, 2014; Silverman, 2013). This 
strategy can help address the heterogeneity of large social groups, such as national ones, and can 
ensure that diversity is sufficient and balanced in the sample. As described above, participants for 
this study were chosen based on a typology of socio-economic distinctions. However, this does not 
answer the question of who the ‘Greek people’ of this study are. How was ‘national identity’ defined 
in this study, for the purposes of sampling research participants? 
As already mentioned in the theoretical chapter, national identities are theorised in both ethno-
cultural and civic/political terms. Consequently, national identity can be based on common 
language, religion, geography, history, descent, customs and citizenship (Mackridge, 2010). 
However, if the ‘Greek people’ of this study were defined by all of these criteria, many individuals 
would had been excluded because they were, for instance, atheist, lived abroad, had mixed 
historical experiences and cultural background, or lacked formal citizenship. As such, it was decided 
to settle for the minimum criterion of Greek language as a ‘mother tongue’. In this sense, it was 
decided to treat ‘speaking and writing Greek as an act of identity’, not as a ‘primordial constituent of 
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nationality’ but as a ‘chief medium through which speakers are acculturated into nationhood and 
one of their chief means by which they articulate their sense of it’ (Mackridge, 2010: 10-13).  
The recruiting strategy of this study can better be described as a snowballing one, whereby once a 
suitable participant was identified and recruited, a sample was built by referrals to other potential 
participants (O’Leary, 2014). At the beginning, participants were recruited by capitalising on the 
researcher’s own social network of friends and extended family, since as advised, researchers should 
be strategic and make use of pre-existing relationships (O’Leary, 2014). The researcher also 
attempted to pursue recruitment in a proactive manner and some participants were directly 
approached by the researcher, as was the case with students on campuses.  
 
Location: Athens 
 
The location chosen for the fieldwork of this study was Athens, the capital of Greece. This location 
was selected for a variety of reasons. First, Athens is the political centre of Greece where major 
political decisions are made and it represents this centrality both inside and outside Greece. Second, 
most expert and political elites reside in Athens, a feature which facilitated recruitment. Third, 
Athens experiences political developments with more intensity compared to other cities or rural 
areas because protests and demonstrations occur more systematically in the capital. In this sense, 
Athenians may often carry an increased awareness of political events. Fourth, practical reasons 
dictated that a single location, instead of multiple locations, would simplify the data collection 
process by avoiding time spent travelling and associated costs (O’Leary, 2014). The limitations 
include the inability to explore differences between different regions and to extract the possibly 
diverse views from rural Greece, such as those of farmers. The location also influenced the choice of 
socio-economic groups, since the ones that were chosen were characteristic of urban contexts.  
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Timeframe: 2014 
 
Fieldwork was initiated on March 1st, 2014 and completed on July, 24th, 2014 in Athens, Greece. This 
period of time was selected on the basis of practical considerations, such as time constraints and 
obligations to funders, rather than theoretical or epistemological grounds. Nevertheless, the data 
collection period coincided with the European Elections of May 2014, which was speculated to be an 
enhancing factor, since the EU was necessarily more salient in public debates and people may have 
had an increased awareness of European issues during that time.  
 
Funding: UACES 
 
When planning research, researchers need to estimate the availability of resources that will be 
necessary for the implementation of the research plan in order to safeguard the feasibility of the 
project (Rossman & Rallis, 2003). The fieldwork of this research was supported by the UACES 
Scholarship 2014. The UACES Scholarship scheme offers 1,500 pounds to successful applicants for 
the purpose of doing fieldwork in another country between 1st February and 31st July for the running 
year. Fieldwork was completed within these time limits and UACES was presented with all the 
necessary documents and evidence, as requested, in autumn 2014. The scholarship greatly 
facilitated the fieldwork process by covering international and local travelling expenses. 
 
Research ethics 
 
Until recently there were few worries regarding the ethics of research with human participants 
(Taylor et al., 2006). However, today research ethics has been elevated to an issue of primary 
importance and researchers need to be aware of, anticipate and address any ethical issues that may 
arise during their research (Buttolph Johnson et al., 2008; Cresswell, 2013). This increased focus on 
research ethics is exemplified in the numerous publications of funding and regulatory bodies that 
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outline ethical principles and codes of professional conduct. Some examples in the context of the UK 
include the British Sociological Association (BSA), the British Psychological Society (BPS), the 
Association of Social Anthropologists of the UK and the Commonwealth (ASA), the Social Research 
Association (SRA), and the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). For the purposes of this 
study, these official guidelines were consulted and followed to ensure the ethical and professional 
integrity of this research endeavour and the academic institutions that supported it. The following 
well-established ethical procedures were ensured. 
 
Anonymity and confidentiality 
 
While doing social research, researchers need to ensure the participants that their rights will be 
respected and protected (Cresswell, 2013). One of these fundamental rights is the right to 
anonymity and privacy (ASA, 1999; BSA, 2002). One of the ways anonymity can be safeguarded in 
qualitative research is by the use of pseudonyms (ASA, 1999; BSA, 2002; Cresswell, 2013), a tactic 
that is followed in this study in chapter six. Furthermore, appropriate measures should be taken to 
store research data in a secure way (BSA, 2002). Hard copies of questionnaires, forms or 
transcriptions were kept safely at the private residence of the researcher. The ideational leaders of 
this study were given the choice to participate eponymously or anonymously in the research and all 
chose to participate eponymously.  
 
Informed consent 
 
Today it is standard practice to obtain informed consent in writing by the research participants prior 
to their engagement in the study (Crisp & Turner, 2007). This ethical procedure involves the full 
identification of the researcher, including the institution, the explanation of the study’s purposes, 
the specification of sponsorship, and future use of the study’s findings (ASA, 1999; BSA, 2002; 
Cresswell, 2013). Additionally, participants need to be informed about the expected degree and type 
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of their participation, as well as the rationale for their selection (Cresswell, 2013). In this respect, full 
explanations were provided when participants asked questions about the study. A Participant’s 
Information Pack was put together in the Greek language that included the information sheet, the 
consent form, the questionnaire, and the discussion agenda (see Appendix 4). Signed consent forms 
were retrieved from all the participants of this study.  
 
Right to withdraw 
 
People approached for the purposes of social research have the right to refuse to participate (BSA, 
2002; Taylor et al., 2006). Following from this, participants who have given their consent maintain 
their right to depart from the research project (Buttolph-Johnson & Reynolds, 2008). The right to 
withdraw from the study at any point in time is considered to be an important feature of the ethical 
conduct of social research (Cresswell, 2013; Taylor et al., 2006). Participants were reassured that no 
harm or nuisance would come to them upon their voluntary and free departure. None of the 
participants withdrew their participation. No person was pressed to participate in this research.    
 
Data management and analysis 
 
Approach to qualitative data analysis: a thematic analysis 
 
There are many approaches to qualitative analysis, such as critical discourse analysis (CDA), 
interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), conversation analysis, grounded theory, narrative 
analysis, and many more (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi et al., 2016). In the context of a 
qualitative research project, researchers need to make explicit the ways they have approached the 
analysis of their qualitative data (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi et al., 2016). The approach taken 
in the present project can best be described as a thematic analysis approach. In terms of defining its 
meaning, as argued (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 77), thematic analysis is ‘a poorly demarcated, rarely-
acknowledged, yet widely-used qualitative analytic method’. There appears to be a debate in the 
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literature whether thematic analysis is a separate and distinct approach as such or rather a 
methodological tool for analysis across different approaches (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; 
Ryan & Bernard, 2000).  
Thematic analysis may appear as a methodological tool, rather than an approach, because it is does 
not adhere to strong philosophical underpinnings compared to other approaches that do so, such as 
CDA or IPA, respectively guided by the ontological premises of ‘power’ or ‘experience’ (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Given that in this project there was considerable theoretical input prior to the analysis 
of the data, namely the integrated model of SIT and SRT, as well as the typology of identity 
destabilisations, it was evaluated that the thin philosophical foundation of thematic analysis could 
assist in avoiding the pitfall of overcrowding the analysis with too many a priori theoretical 
categories. Notwithstanding the terminological debate, thematic analysis is accepted here as a 
distinct qualitative analytical approach in its own right, whose purpose is to ‘search for themes that 
emerge as being important to the description of the phenomenon’ (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 
82). In this context, a ‘theme is used as attribute, descriptor, element, and concept… an implicit topic 
that organises a group of repeating ideas… has a high degree of generality that unifies ideas 
regarding the subject of inquiry’ (Vaismoradi et al., 2016: 101). The theme represents a level of 
pattern within the data that captures something important in relation to the research question 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006). 
Researchers writing on epistemological and methodological issues have provided detailed and clear 
instructions on how to conduct thematic analysis (i.e. Braun & Clarke, 2006; Vaismoradi et al., 2016). 
Although the analytical process is often presented in a linear ‘step-by-step’ fashion, researchers do 
emphasise that the actual implementation has a more cyclical character and involves frequent 
revisions and reflective turns from later stages to earlier ones (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Feredey & 
Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Vaismoradi et al., 2016). This is largely due to the fact that qualitative analysis 
entails constant reading and rereading of data, so that researchers can substantially familiarise 
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themselves with the data and achieve what is called ‘immersion’ (Vaismoradi et al., 2016). 
Nevertheless, the analytic process includes recognisable stages that widely comprise of preparing 
the data for analysis, initial analysis and coding, revision and refinement, construction of storyline 
and writing-up. 
The first stage includes the preparation of the raw data for the analysis. For example, the interview 
recordings need to be transformed into transcripts. All the interviews of the present project were 
transcribed verbatim. Given that qualitative research produces large and rich data, some interviews 
may also need to be transformed into interview summaries for the purposes of better managing the 
volume of data (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). This tactic was used in this research by turning 
expert interviews into summaries since these interviews were larger and richer in content compared 
to the non-expert citizens’ interviews. In order to avoid drifting away from the original meaning of 
the participants, the original wording was maintained as much as possible during the summarising of 
their accounts.  
If the research design includes a large deductive component, as was the case with the present 
project that was making use of pre-existing theories and analytical frameworks, it is advised that the 
researcher develops a ‘code manual’ before initiating the analysis (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). 
This tactic ‘serves as a data management tool’ (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 84) that can assist 
in ‘threading together’ the theoretical framework to the product of the analysis (Grant & Osanloo, 
2010: 12). This tactic was followed by listing theoretical categories on a piece of paper and later 
inserting them in the N-Vivo software as nodes. Subsequently, passages of the transcriptions were 
coded underneath the prescribed categories accordingly. Analysis of interview transcripts were 
guided, but not confined, by a priori categories, since as advised by researchers (Feredey & Muir-
Cochrane, 2006), a hybrid approach between deductive and inductive analyses can allow researchers 
to see emerging themes, not prescribed in the theoretical pretext of the research.  
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During the analysis of empirical data it is important that researchers keep an eye out for moments of 
resonance between the pre-existing theory and the newly produced data, but also for possible new 
analytic categories coming out of the data (Bendassoli, 2013). The two techniques complement each 
other. Ultimately, what matters is that there are multiple reflective and engaged returns from 
deduction to induction, and back again, to allow for deeper analytical rigour and insight. As such, 
attempts were made to conduct the coding of the present databases by using both inductive and 
deductive categories, as advised by prior literature (see, for example, Glaser’s distinction between 
‘substantive/observational’ codes and ‘theoretical’ ones, 1978; or Fereday & Muir-Cochrane’s 
‘hybrid approach’ of ‘data-driven codes’ and ‘theory-driven’ ones, 2006).  
For example, this inductive approach was needed in this project because the analytic categories of 
each identity destabilisation were defined with a relatively high level of abstraction regarding 
various types of social identities, while the case study of the research focused on the specificities of 
national and European identities. Consequently, inductive reasoning was followed when interpreting 
what an identity conflict, devaluation, overvaluation or deficit could mean in the context of these 
two interconnected social identities. Although these codes were processed through N-Vivo, at many 
occasions pen and paper was used to create maps, lists and tables because these felt helpful for 
clarifying the researcher’s thinking and understanding. All codes, whether deductively or inductively 
generated, were recorded in the N-Vivo, making up the totality of nodes, which comprises the 
analytical codebook. 
Experienced researchers suggest that after reading and coding the totality of the datasets that are 
meant to be analysed, there should be a process of rereading and double-checking the developed 
analytical codes. This process is called ‘verification’ or ‘rectification’ (Vaismoradi et al., 2016: 106) 
and involves ‘testing the reliability of the codes and themes’ (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006: 85) 
and achieving the ‘refinement of the analysis’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006: 82). During this stage, codes 
are reassessed, similar and related codes are grouped under clusters, and relations are identified 
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between themes and the research questions (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Vaismoradi et al., 
2016). In other words, the resulting themes are managed and organised in such a way as to provide 
a meaningful, coherent and logical answer to the original research questions (Vaismoradi et al., 
2016). These tactics were followed to the best of the present researcher’s ability. 
At the final analytical stage of analysis, the researcher needs to put together a ‘storyline’ that shall 
give a holistic view of the study phenomenon (Vaismoradi et al., 2016: 107). This stage necessarily 
entails decisions regarding the presentation of results. For this project, it was chosen to present the 
results in accordance with the analytical framework of identity destabilisations in order to provide a 
sense of structure and facilitation of the organisation of the material. Correspondingly, each chapter 
contains four sections, each elaborating on one type of identity destabilisation as prescribed by the 
analytical framework.  
Researchers suggest that in order to increase the construct validity and establish a clear chain of 
evidence regarding how conclusions were drawn, the strategy of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973; 
Mariotto et al., 2012) should be followed. In this thesis, examples of ‘raw data’ are used extensively 
in order to achieve thicker descriptions and to punctuate the arguments and conclusions that are 
drawn. 
The challenge of crafting the storyline of the research project lies in the ‘researchers’ creativity to 
depict themes through the presentation of a story that is psychologically, culturally, and socially 
innovative’ (Vaismoradi et al., 2016: 107). Efforts were made to meet these challenges. 
Retrospectively, more time, effort and reassessment should had been devoted to the analytical 
stage and integration of theory and results, but as explained in the literature, novice researchers can 
be constrained by many different factors, such as timeframes, resources, capabilities, level of 
experience, or simply working as a single researcher (Feredey & Muir-Cochrane, 2006; Grant & 
Osanloo, 2010; Vaismoradi et al., 2016).  
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Finally, there are two more issues that would warrant further clarifications, such as the question of 
the quantification of data and that of interpretation. The first relates to the judgement of how many 
participants would have to refer to a particular theme in order to distinguish it as a noteworthy one. 
While N-Vivo can support recording of numbers, it was decided that the number of participants 
would not be an important factor in the presentation of results and both prevalent and less 
prevalent themes would be reported. Since thematic analysis is different to content analysis, 
researchers advise that themes are reported regardless of their quantifiable prevalence in the 
datasets (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Instead, what’s important is whether a theme captures something 
significant with regards to the research question (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Moreover, it was evident 
that some themes were prevalent in one dataset but not another, therefore both needed to be 
mentioned. Nevertheless, in the empirical chapters of this thesis, if a theme is shared by many 
participants, this is noted so that readers can have a fuller picture of the research findings.  
In terms of the question of interpretation, besides the issue of reflexivity in social research (May & 
Perry, 2010), this also links to the distinction between semantic and latent themes (Braun & Clarke, 
2006) or elsewise put, ‘latent and manifest content’ (Vaismoradi et al., 2016: 101). While the 
semantic/manifest content concerns what the participants are literally and expressively are saying, 
the latent content corresponds to what may be implying or paraphrased. The researcher’s subjective 
understanding was employed in allocating codes, selecting themes or clustering them. Explaining in 
detail one’s interpretative reasoning can be challenging, since the way to establishing themes and 
storylines based on emerging data patterns entail elements of ‘intuition’ and ‘creativity’ which are 
‘difficult to describe’ (Vaismoradi et al., 2016: 102, 105). Nevertheless, a researcher’s subjective 
perception unavoidably influences the analysis, since as explained, themes ‘reside in our heads’, 
within ‘our thinking about our data’ and the ‘creation of links’ between them as we attempt ‘to 
understand them’ (Ely et al. in Braun & Clarke, 2006: 80).  
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Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter begun by outlining the traditional research designs in social psychology and in national 
European identity research. It was argued that previous approaches were overtly positivist and 
dominated by particular methodologies, such as surveys and experiments. As such, it was argued 
that their methodological horizon needed to be pluralised with the additions of more qualitative and 
participatory methods. The research design of this research was described and it was demonstrated 
that a single case study triangulated approach was best suited to meet the needs of this study’s 
research questions. The research questions themselves were broken down to their individual parts 
in order to demonstrate how each aspect of the identity phenomenon would be addressed in terms 
of data sources and methods.  
It was explained that historiographical accounts of Greek European identity would provide not only 
historical contextualisation to the research topic, but also a point of reference for comparisons 
before and after the start of the economic crisis. Emerging expert knowledge on Greek identity and 
the crisis, as well as selected opinion pieces were added to the datasets in order to further inform 
the answering of questions on Greece’s identity representations during the economic crisis. Expert 
and non-expert interviews were chosen as the most adequate methods to explore the theoretical 
assumptions made by SRT, as well as the psychological experiences of research participants. 
Subsequently, detailed accounts of fieldwork proceedings and strategies were offered, from the 
choice of location to sampling strategies. A section on research ethics was also included, as well as 
an indication of the approach and techniques followed to analyse the empirical data.  
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Chapter 3 
Greek European Identity: A Historiography of Identity Crises 
 
 
‘The identity crisis is the central problem of the neo-Hellenic society, the 
constituent element of the contemporary Hellenism, and the axis around which 
our modern society revolves’  
(Tsaousis, 1998: 17) 
 
 
Introduction 
  
As postulated in chapter one, shared social reality depends on the indirect re-enactment of that 
which is directly inaccessible and mystifying, its re-presentation (Pitkin, 1967). It follows from this, 
that both identity and crisis are themselves representations that intimately relate to people’s social 
and psychological experiences of identity, while the ‘symptom’ of a collective identity crisis is subject 
to the interpretations humans give to their collective experience (Chryssochoou, 2000b; Waxman, 
2006). As argued, the experience of identity is founded on two premises: self-awareness and 
temporality (Hogg & Vaughan, 2014; Leccardi, 2005). This temporality encourages a linear, yet not 
necessarily evolutionary, perception of identity formation, articulated in past, present and future 
(Knight & Stewart, 2016). The narration and interpretation of the collective, historical past has been 
widely established as an instrumental resource upon which national identities are built (Beaton & 
Ricks, 2009). The past temporality of national identities is articulated within historiography, the 
‘writing of history’ (Cheng, 2012: 1), whereby the ‘historical event though unseen, is imaginable’ 
(Walsh, 2012: 22).  Historiography is inspired by events and facts, but is not entirely dependent on 
them since history-narrating is in itself a representation of this unseen and unlived distant past. As 
put, ‘history is not constructed of facts; it is constructed in the way we anticipate, perceive, interpret 
and narrate those facts in relation to our past and our future’ (Liakos & Kouki, 2015: 49). 
92 
 
This chapter aims to provide an overview of the historiography of Greek European identity as this 
has been represented in expert scholarly discourse, written by Greeks and non-Greeks alike. In this 
way the perspective of both ingroup and outgroup is included to address the internal and external, 
chosen and ascribed, construction of national identities (Phillips, 2007). Applying the typology of 
identity destabilisations that was presented in chapter one, academic discourse on Greek European 
identity is interrogated for destabilising ‘signs of crisis’. The elucidation of past representations of 
‘identity crises’ in ‘history-telling’ about Greece will assist in answering our research questions in a 
twofold manner. First, it will historically contextualise the formation of Greek European identity 
representations, a process utterly necessary for a deeper understanding and acquisition of a ‘fuller 
picture’. As Walsh (2012: 22) explains, ‘historical contextualisation’ is similar to the technique of 
painting restoration, named rigatino, of filling in the gaps of the historical canvas with ‘small flecks of 
paint’. Such a ‘rigatino approach’ is used here to provide small historical flecks. Second, this 
historiographical detour will facilitate addressing the research questions by offering a point of 
reference for the ‘temporal comparison of identities’ (Redersdorff & Guimond, 2006: 76) before and 
after the economic crisis.  
As it becomes apparent in this chapter, the historiography of Greece is a continuous representation 
of multiple identity ‘crises’. In other words, the very historical understanding of Greece has been 
anchored around the idea of crisis itself (i.e. Tsaousis, 1998). Various political and social tensions are 
presented as triggers of crisis. Since the very inception of the Modern Greek nation-state, Greek 
identity appears to be ‘in crisis’. Mackridge (2010), for example, refers to an ‘identity crisis’ provoked 
by the dispute over the civic rights of heterochthons (Greeks from outside the state borders) during 
the early years of state-building. In more recent years, Verney and Michalaki (2014: 145) mention 
that Greece during the post-Cold war era was ‘rapidly developing a new kind of identity crisis’ due to 
the effects of globalisation and mass immigration, while Molokotos-Liederman (2003) and Makrides 
(2005) use the term to refer to the debate regarding the erasure of religious affiliation from identity 
cards in the early two-thousands. Kalaitzidis (2010: 98) speaks of a ‘mini-identity crisis’ fuelled by the 
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changing geopolitical conditions in the Balkans, situated within the wider opposition between the 
‘western Europeanising elements of Greek society’ and its ‘Eastern more introspective elements’, 
while Stauning-Willert (2014: 91) argues that Greece’s ‘historical and traumatic relationship’ with 
Europe and the West is marked by a ‘chronic identity crisis’. Chronic crisis it must be, since it appears 
to exist since antiquity. Elsner (2004: 274), examining Pausanias’s pilgrimage in the Roman Empire, 
observes ‘an identity crisis of second-century Greece’ and Tinsley (2006: 132) calls the Persian Wars 
‘Classical Greece’s identity crisis’.  
However, although ‘identity crises’ are frequent constructs in Greek studies, little thought has been 
dedicated to the varied character of these ‘crises’. Calotychos (2013: 10), rightly recognises the 
‘multidimensionality of crises’ by stating that Greece’s ‘identity crisis’ in relation to the Balkans and 
Europe contains ‘linguistic, symbolic, metaphorical, narrativistic, rhetorical and tropological 
dimensions’, just like the Eurozone crisis can be understood not only as an economic crisis, but also a 
political, social and cultural one (Ntampoudi, 2015). However, although this recognition of multiple 
dimensions recognises the numerous domains within which identities and possible crises may occur, 
it still does not account for the varied and distinct socio-psychological functions of what is termed 
‘identity crisis’. Although different terms are used loosely to refer to the meaning of crisis, such as 
‘dispute’, ‘controversy’, ‘battle’, ‘exclusion’, ‘conflict’, ‘debate’, ‘dilemma’, ‘isolation’, ‘trauma’, 
‘obscurity’, ‘ambiguity’, ‘marginality’, ‘threat’, ‘survival’ and ‘challenge’ (Calotychos, 2013: 10; Lalioti, 
2009: 73; Mackridge, 2010: 175-176; Stauning-Willert, 2014: 91; Verney & Michalaki, 2014: 145), 
these notions are not systematically conceptualised, theorised and operationalised.  
The present chapter endeavours to make an initial step towards remedying this shortcoming. Its 
sections follow the typology of identity destabilisations developed, hence the first section addresses 
identity conflicts, the second concerns identity overvaluations, the third deals with identity 
devaluations, and the last discusses identity deficits. Each section is divided in subthemes, therefore 
the first section analyses variations of conflictual representations, or as Moscovici puts it, ‘polemic 
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representations’, such as the one between East and West and cultural dualism (Diamandouros, 
1994), diagnosing that these constitute ‘binary oppositions’ that eventually amount to the wider 
representation of ‘hybridity as a problem’. The second section analyses Hellenism and Philhellenism 
as identity overvaluations from within and from without Greek society, resulting in the creation of 
‘great expectations’. The third section transitions towards the discussion of their frustration, 
outlining forms of identity devaluation as these were framed with reference to the 19th century 
Philhellenic decline in Europe or Greece’s trajectory within the EU. Finally, the fourth section on 
identity deficits focuses on Greece’s Western belonging as an identity loss, narratives of expulsion 
and exclusion from the EU, and the idea of ‘national exceptionalism’ as belonging nowhere.  
 
Identity conflict: binary oppositions and the ‘problem’ of hybridity 
 
As already explained, identity conflict constitutes a type of identity destabilisation in the sense that a 
social entity is torn between two or more forces which can lead to conflictual dynamics within the 
entity (Baumeister et al., 1985). In a national society, this conflict and its potential violence can be 
direct, structural/systemic, or cultural/symbolic (Galtung, 1969, 1990; Žižek, 2009). Reviewing Greek 
historiography, it becomes apparent that representations of modern Greece are marked by various 
conflicts between different ideologies and social groups. Examples include the historical oppositions 
between the Royalists and the Venizelists, which constituted the National Schism (Εθνικός 
Διχασμός), or between the communists and the anti-communists, most notably exemplified in the 
Civil War that followed WWII (1945-1949) (Clogg, 2002: Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). These divisions 
are portrayed as long-term, recurring and profound cleavages within Greek society and as closely 
associated with the international developments of their time, i.e. the National Schism within the 
wider European alliances of the WWI and the Civil War within the wider Cold War context (Clogg, 
2002; Gerolymatos, 2004). Consequently, foreign relations are constructed as central to the 
domestic conflicts over the desired ‘friends of the nation’.  
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The peculiarity of these representations is that they are not anchored around multiple social forces, 
but instead exemplify a continuity of dualities, that is, battles between two forces. Pappas (2014: 
53), for example, calls this ‘bipolar hegemony’, strategically infused by political actors who use 
polarisation to divide society along single cleavages. Lipowatz (1994) coins the term ‘split Greek 
identity’, while Frary (2014: 123) refers to the ‘dialectical split of Greek society’ (see also Herzfeld’s 
disemia, 1989). As a result, binary oppositions become the predominant and repetitive anchoring of 
Greek identity, while the hybridity that is understood as the product of these dualist conflicts is 
projected as one of the main ‘problems’ of modern Greek identity. Although the representation of 
‘hybridity as a problem’ to be solved or eradicated is not the only representation of modern Greece 
and alternative readings are voiced in the historical and social scientific literature, it still remains the 
dominant one, creating the image of a national European identity always in conflict within itself, 
thus always in peril of ‘crisis’. The remaining section will elaborate on these points by looking at the 
divide between East and West, cultural dualism, binaries and hybridity.  
 
Eternally between East and West 
 
Beginning with dualist representations, perhaps the most dominant schema of Greek identity is the 
divide between East and West (Triandafyllidou et al., 2013; Tsoukalas, 1999). It is almost customary 
that every historical account of Greece begins by narrating the story of the small nation that resides 
at the edges of both Europe and Asia, and as such, the crossroads between East and West (i.e. 
Kolocotroni & Mitsi, 2008; Smith, 1986). In this storyline, Europe and Asia are represented as 
prototypes of the wider constructions of the West/Occident and the East/Orient, respectively (Lewis 
& Wigen, 1997). The main registers upon which these dichotomies are made are geographical and 
historical, but above all, cultural and civilisational (Katzenstein & Checkel 2009; Kokosalakis & 
Psimmenos, 2002; Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). For example, Greece is frequently represented in 
scholarly discourse as both Western and Eastern by simultaneously being the origin of Western 
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civilisation and foundation of the EU’s political canon, and an integral historical part of the Eastern 
Roman Empire after the divide of 364 BC, the Byzantine Empire after the fall of Rome in the 5th 
century, and the Ottoman Empire between the 15th and 19th centuries (Barker, 2008; Katzenstein & 
Checkel, 2009; Tsoukalas, 1999).  
To be sure, the split identity framework is not unique to Greece. For example, Frary (2014: 123) 
compares it to the Russian debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers in 1830-1840s, while 
AbdelRehim (2013) describes Egyptian identity as ‘split’ between religious Islam and Western 
secularism. Matsusima (2008) discusses the ‘split of Japanese identity in outward and inward 
identities’ after the impact of WWII defeat and Western occupation, while Staab (1998) talks about 
the resulting ‘split national identity’ of Eastern and Western Germany. In many respects, split 
identities indicate the impact of globalisation and modernisation, as well as the problems of 
conflictual international relations or interventionist global politics. 
 
Cultural dualism: the Diamandouros thesis 
 
It can reasonably be argued that in Greek studies the text that epitomises this pattern of dualist 
expert representations is the one by Nikiforos Diamandouros on cultural dualism (1994), which has 
been widely influential among scholars who study Greece. As explained (Triantafyllidou et al., 2013: 
3), the Diamandouros thesis has been ‘a reference point for understanding Modern Greece’. In SRT’s 
words, it has acted as a ‘hegemonic representation’. The cultural dualism schema has served as an 
explanatory background in various studies on diverse topics, ranging from the relationship between 
religion and politics (Anastassiadis, 2004; Chrysoloras, 2004; Stavrakakis, 2002b) to the politics of 
reproduction (Halkias, 2004; Paxson, 2004). However, most studies referring to cultural dualism have 
focused on Greece’s Europeanisation and reform policy (Featherstone et al., 2001; Featherstone, 
2005; Kazakos, 2004; Matsaganis, 2007; Monastiriotis & Antoniades, 2009; Spanou, 2008), most 
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notably foreign policy change (Kalpadakis & Sotiropoulos, 2007; Mavrogenis & Kelman, 2013; 
Stavridis, 2003; Stefanidis, 2001; Stephanidēs, 2007). 
According to Diamandouros (1994)7, the history of modern Greece can be understood as an 
antagonistic battle between two political cultures, namely the ‘underdogs’ and the ‘modernizers’. 
Within this dualist representation, the underdog culture is presented as the older of the two, rooted 
in the Byzantine, Balkan and Ottoman heritages of Greece, while the modernizing culture is the 
younger one, inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment and liberalism (ibid: 12, 22). In terms of 
political and economic attitudes, the underdog culture features as closer to what Weber calls a 
‘sultanistic regime’, having a strong statist orientation, favouring paternalism and protectionism, and 
being prone to familism, populism and clientelism (ibid: 12-20). In contrast, the modernizing culture 
is presented as encompassing none of the above, favouring reform and rationalisation along liberal 
and capitalist routes, the market mechanism and competitive international economy (ibid: 22-23). 
The underdog is said to express ambivalence towards capitalism, the market, the liberal Western 
socio-economic model and modernisation, to fear rationalisation and structural reforms, and to 
demand redistributive policies (ibid: 12-44). As such, the underdog is believed to be fond of pre-
capitalist practices and eager to experiment with alternative routes to modernity (ibid: 12-13, 21-
22). 
In terms of foreign relations, the modernizing culture is presented as extrovert and looking at the 
industrially advanced nations of the West for inspiration and support in an ‘imitative and eclectic’ 
way, while the underdog culture appears introvert and maintains militant anti-Western and anti-
American (sic)8 stances, has a defensive view of international affairs and tends to identify closely 
with collectivities ‘perceived to have suffered from western inequity’ (ibid: 19-26). Regarding the EU, 
the underdog culture is said to express intense affect regarding admission to the EEC, punctuated by 
                                                          
7 Diamandouros’s theory is presented here by following a precise reproduction of the original words and 
expressions to convey it as authentically as possible. 
8 ‘Anti-Americanism’ is used here by Diamandouros to connote opposition towards the United States’ foreign 
policy, but it should be argued that it is an inaccurate term that obliterates the existence of multiple Americas, 
i.e. Central America and Latin America, a common mistake in wider literature.  
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demonological beliefs about the project of European integration, while the modernizing culture 
embraces the process of European integration (ibid: 44). As far as national identity is concerned, 
while the underdog is presented as xenophobic and intolerant, dividing the world into ‘philhellenes’ 
and ‘mishellenes’ (‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ of the Greeks), suffering from primordial attachments and 
siege mentality regarding the ‘contraction of Hellenism’ (ibid: 13-38), the modernizing culture 
appears to have a cultural cosmopolitanism, a ‘milder and more sophisticated’ xenophobia, and a 
‘dynamic and more realistic’ nationalism grounded in the will for survival (ibid: 25-27). In terms of 
wider political values, the underdog seems to be characterised by a levelling egalitarianism and 
makes demands for compensatory justice, while the modernizers appear to support liberalism and 
democracy (ibid: 24). Finally, while the underdog is highly religious, the modernizing culture is 
secular (ibid: 12, 23).  
Although Diamandouros, contrary to what many of his critics argue (Demertzis, 1997; Stavrakakis, 
2002b; Xenakis, 2013) does make efforts to note the ideo-typical nature of these two cultural 
constructs (Weber, 1922) and emphasise their cross-sectional overlapping (Diamandouros, 1994: 12-
13), the dualistic structure of his thesis cannot avoid but reproducing additional dualisms, other than 
the original between ‘underdog’ and ‘moderniser’. Such is the danger of dualisms: once two poles 
are identified, one can always find a point on which new elements differ and situate them in ever 
more dualisms, permitting the classification of everything (Culler, 2002). Using SRT, we can detect at 
least four ways of objectifications through which these dualisms are formed. The first objectification 
joins together seemingly oppositional representations, the second functions by pairing a 
representational object with the lack of it, the third one by coupling it with its antithesis, and the 
fourth by contrasting different versions of the same object.  
Concerning the first objectification, representations of dichotomies can be identified between the 
past and the future, tradition and modernity, backwardness and progress, emotion and rationalism, 
redistribution and competition, Euroscepticism and Europeanism, nationalism and cosmopolitanism, 
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religiosity and secularism, and as expected, the East and the West. In terms of the second 
objectification, we can identify the various representations within the one culture and the lack of 
these in the other, such as protectionism, familism, populism and clientelism within the underdog 
but not within the modernizing culture, or will for reform and change, sophistication, and eclecticism 
within the modernizing culture but not within the underdog one. Regarding the third dualist 
objectification, antitheses can be recognised in the allusions to the representations of capitalism and 
anti-capitalism, liberalism and anti-liberalism, market and anti-market, globalisation and anti-
globalisation, modernisation and anti-modernisation. Finally, with reference to the fourth 
objectification, both cultures are represented as nationalist and cosmopolitan, but the character of 
their respective nationalisms and cosmopolitanisms differs. While the modernizer’s nationalism is 
more ‘sophisticated and milder’, pragmatic and able to exploit the opportunities in the international 
field, the underdog’s nationalism is a defensive and victimised one and as such, less flexible and 
more absolute. Furthermore, while the underdog’s cosmopolitanism is associated around the ‘less 
privileged’ of the earth and what is presented as ‘Third World solidarity’, the modernising 
cosmopolitanism is presented as more Eurocentric and West-centric.  
 
Binary oppositions and hybridity 
 
All of the above can be understood as binary oppositions. The notion of binary oppositions is argued 
to be an age-old one in human story-making and many theoretical traditions have engaged with it, 
from Hegelian dialectics and Nietzsche’s aphorisms to the structuralist theory of Saussure and Levi-
Strauss and their post-structuralist/deconstructivist critics, such as Derrida (Chueh, 2004; Egan, 
2007; Fourie, 2007). Summarising the debate of binary oppositions, while some argue that they are 
an integral and even useful part of human cognition and a structural feature of language, others 
argue that binary oppositions are not natural or beneficial, but rather dangerous constructions that 
collapse meaning into dualities that foster discrimination since the binary relationship tends to be 
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unequal 9 (Cheek, 1999). Both camps can be criticised for assuming an essential relationship exists 
between two entities (Chueh, 2004).  
The dualistic understanding of Greek identity appears intimately related to the question of hybridity, 
defined as ‘a mixture of cultures’ (Baumgartner & Zinggeler, 2010: 3). Demertzis (1997: 118), for 
example, argues that Greece exemplifies a ‘merging of modernisation processes and components’ 
and stands ‘in between’ the road to European modernity, while Herzfeld (1989: 20) notes that the 
Greeks are ‘neither dramatically exotic, nor yet unambiguously European’ (see also ‘inventive 
syncretism, Lianeri, 2014). Whether Greece’s hybridity is conceptualised as a cultural and 
civilisational hybridity or a political and normative one (Xenakis, 2013), the important question is the 
standpoint that is taken towards this hybridity, which is the point where Moscovici’s ‘battle of ideas’ 
seems to take place. In this respect, while some conceptualise this hybridity of identity as a problem 
to be overcome or eliminated, others do not share this view. Diamandouros (1994, 2013), for 
example, through a cultural conflict viewpoint and taking a clear stance in favour of modernisation, 
views the underdog culture as a social element that constitutes an obstacle to the progress and 
development of the country, and implies that the modernizing culture should dominate, which in 
effect would reduce the hybridity of Greek identity. As such, the main understanding of this 
hybridity is as a hindrance, rather than as a source of enrichment and diversity. 
Other authors offer alternative views. For example, Kokosalakis and Psimmenos (2002) argue that 
Greek identity flourishes with both tradition and modernity and the constituent parts of Greek 
culture are not incompatible with themselves, with Europe or with the outside world in general, but 
rather they can be understood as being ‘at home’ with post-modernity and globalisation. For the 
authors, this synthesis between tradition and modernity does not reject the values of either, while it 
is also sensitive to ‘the moral and cultural decay’ that exists in both of them (Kokosalakis & 
Psimmenos, 2002). Tsoukalas (1999: 13) voices the view that the hybridity may be ‘an unforeseen 
                                                          
9 See feminist theory, for example, where the male/female dichotomy serves to disadvantage the female 
counterpart (Egan, 2007). 
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blessing’ and that there is ‘pleasure in preserving [these] ambiguous identity links with both East and 
West’, albeit despite their ‘obvious social and political shortcomings’. Most remarkably, these 
authors refer to the works of poets and literary figures to support their claims, perhaps implicitly 
suggesting that such arguments can only be voiced within ‘forms of knowledge’, like the arts and the 
humanities, traditionally understood as ‘softer’ compared to the ‘harder’ fields of applied social 
sciences (Craig, 2012). A ‘poetic license’10, sort of speak, that is expressed outside the hegemonic 
representation of ‘hybridity as a problem’. These discourses can be understood as Moscovici’s 
‘emancipated representations’ emerging from social subgroups versed in different forms of 
knowledge.  
To be sure, the above dynamics are not peculiar to the Greek case as such ideological ‘pseudo-
dilemmas’ between cultural constructs are situated within wider debates over ‘civilisational 
identities’ and questions of European identity (Delanty, 2006; Huntington, 1993; Katzenstein &, 
Checkel, 2009; Said, 1978), within which binary schemas and essentialist stereotypes of the 
West/Europe as rational, secular, modern, progressive and individualistic and of the East/Asia as 
irrational, religious, traditional, backwards, and collectivist  are constantly constructed, 
reconstructed and deconstructed (Lewis & Wigen, 1997). Ultimately, just like the continuous 
objectification via dualisms outside Greek historiography, only leads to ‘an ever increasing pile of 
issues, which we weary of or become diverted from, but never really settle’ (Newell in Uleman, 
1999: 141), the same appears to be the case with the ‘insoluble conflict’ of Greek  identity (Lianeri, 
2014: 71). 
Nevertheless, this particular debate on Greece’s hybridity holds relevance to another hegemonic 
binary representation of Greek European identity, namely the one between idealisation and 
deprecation. This double tendency operates at both the external and internal registers of identity 
construction and is attached upon the contrast between the ‘glory of ancient Greece’ and the ‘decay 
                                                          
10 Defined as ‘license or liberty taken by a poet, prose writer, or other artist in deviating from rule, 
conventional form, logic, or fact, in order to produce a desired effect’ (Dictionary.com). 
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of modern Greece’. Within this framework of representation distinctions of East and West, tradition 
and modernity, re-emerge as dominant schemas of Greek historiography. While idealisation can lead 
to identity overvaluation, deprecation can end in identity devaluation. The uniting endpoint appears 
to return to the position of identity destabilisation. The following two sections will elaborate further 
on these points.  
 
Identity overvaluation: idealisation and great expectations  
 
The second kind of identity destabilisation that Greek European identity appears to have been 
experiencing is that of identity overvaluation. In social psychology, identity overvaluation stands for 
the favourable bias towards one’s social identity, quite often in comparison to other social groups’ 
identities, which can be a frequent feature of the national narratives that build nations (László, 
2013). Identity overvaluation can lead to great expectations, which if perceived as unmet, may lead 
to identity deprecation. Although some would argue that identity disappointment is the endpoint of 
all identity endeavours (Craib, 2002), suffice to say that the greater the perceived distance from the 
idealised representation, the greater the disappointment (i.e. Dimou, 2013). This section will focus 
on the overvaluation of Greek identity and its role in European identity formation, two facets that 
are represented as fundamental in Greek historiography, inside and outside Greece (Triandafyllidou 
et al., 2013).  
 
Philhellenism: ‘Cradle of civilisation’ and ‘seedbed of democracy’ 
 
Expert and political representations are often marked by the conventional wisdom that Western 
civilisation and European identity originated in the ancient Greek world (i.e. Coleman, 2001; 
Ossewaarde, 2013; Vujadinović, 2011), a narrative that constitutes the basis of Greece’s identity 
overvaluation. Within such ideational context, the dominant positive stereotypes of Greece are 
those of the ‘cradle of civilisation’ or the ‘seedbed society’ (Arnason et al., 2013; Kaika, 2005). For 
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instance, two conceptual examples ‘imbued with Hellenism’ that are frequently portrayed as pan-
European political values today are those of democracy and cosmopolitanism (Camia, 2010; Canfora, 
2006; Delanty, 2005; Ossewaarde, 2013). As stated (Canfora, 2006: 7), ‘the belief that democracy is a 
Greek invention is rather deeply rooted’, while the ancient Greek polis regularly features as the 
prototype of European democracy (Arnason et al., 2013; Tsoukalas, 1999). Cosmopolitanism, the 
feeling of responsibility and belonging to something wider than the polis, the cosmopolis, is situated 
within the ancient Greek philosophies of the Cynics and Stoics (Bowden, 2003; Camia, 2010). 
However, these representations do not stand unchallenged. For example, against any notion of 
national exceptionalism, it is often clarified that ancient Greek thought was only one of the main 
origins of European identity, the others being the Roman legal system and the Christian religion 
(Ossewaarde, 2013; Vujadinović, 2011). Furthermore, critiques of ancient democracy point out that 
ancient Greece was not a purely egalitarian place, due to the non-participation of women, children, 
disabled people, and non-citizens, and most importantly, the existence of slaves (Canfora, 2006; 
Roberts-Miller, 2002). In this sense, the demos of ancient democracy was more limited than 
imagined. Critiques of contemporary politics emphasise that the concept of democracy has changed 
meaning over time (Arnason et al., 2013) and current forms of democratic governance in large-scale 
representative democracies are significantly dissimilar to the workings of the small city-state. Finally, 
the argument that ancient Greek writings, including those of Aristotle and Plato, are highly critical of 
democracy is often voiced (Arnason et al., 2013; Canfora, 2006). Nevertheless, refuted or not, the 
representation of Greece as ‘eternal’, ‘universal’ and ‘original’ is still a persistent discursive presence 
(Lalaki, 2012; Lalioti, 2009).  
Although the attention paid to Greece varied across time (Canfora, 2006; Reynolds, 2013) and 
notions of Hellenism have been versatile over the years (Lalaki, 2012; Zacharia, 2008), the historical 
roots of phenomena such as Philhellenism and Hellenolatry, which have been at the core of the 
overvaluation of Greek identity, are situated in the revival of Classicism in the Europe of the 
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Renaissance, the Enlightenment and Romanticism (Kaika, 2005; Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002; 
Tsoukalas, 1999). While the focus of the Enlightenment on rationalism, empiricism and scientific 
inquiry was anchored to ancient Greek rationality (Vujadinović, 2011), Philhellenism was a romantic 
movement of Western Europeans, mostly British, French and German, who believed in the biological 
and cultural continuity of ancient and modern Greeks, as well as the direct link of ancient Greek and 
Western civilisations, two beliefs culminating in support for the Greek struggle for independence 
(Fleming, 2004; see volume by Beaton & Ricks, 2009). Although critics of the time, such as the 
Austrian historian Jacob Philipp Fallmerayer challenged this assumed racial and cultural continuity of 
the Greek nation (Beaton, 2009), it mattered little to the Romantic vision that revolved around the 
irresistible representation of the ‘noble but faded, glorious yet… reduced’ Greece in need of 
liberation, if it was to retrieve its former ‘splendour’ (Fleming, 2004; Roessel, 2001).  
In 1770, the Greeks revolted against the Ottoman rule and although they failed to liberate 
themselves, they attracted the interest of Western Europe due to the mix of idealisation of the 
Hellenic past and the revolutionary spirit of the time, marked by the French Revolution and the 
nationalism that followed it (Guibernau, 2004; Roessel, 2001). These historical conditions initiated a 
period of Philhellenism (1770-1830) during which images of the Greeks constructed by Europeans 
were positive and any ‘flaws’ or ‘misgivings’ were attributed to the effects of Ottoman despotism 
and Oriental culture (Reynolds, 2013). In practical terms, Philhellenism manifested in numerous 
cases of Western-Europeans contributing funds, materials and even manpower (i.e. the poet Lord 
Byron, Roessel, 2001) to the Greek cause (Fleming, 2004).  
 
Hellenism: nation-building 
 
The Greeks, on their part, are described as accepting the historical role that was assigned to them to 
restore the ‘glory of Hellenism’ in the form of a modern nation-state, regardless of the paradoxical 
task of joining antiquity and modernity (Clogg, 2002; Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). Authors tell us 
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that, since then, the Greeks took pride in this venerable heritage and felt that they were ‘unique’, 
‘special’ and valued by others (Sutton, 1997; Tsoukalas, 1999). As such, in SIT terms, they were 
enabled by the symbolic circumstances to achieve positive self-esteem, group distinction and inter-
group validation. Moreover, in terms of the European dimension of identity, it is mentioned that 
exactly because of the ancient tradition Greece has ‘the rightful claim to be and feel quintessentially 
European’ and holds the distinction of never having to ‘invent’ a European identity by having one ‘by 
default’ (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002; Mackridge, 2008). In the literature, it is often clarified that 
the social strata that have historically supported these views were the educated and more affluent 
intellectuals, commercial elites and the diaspora, who were also the social groups that played an 
important role in disseminating the ideas of modernity, Hellenism, and nationalism, thus stirring the 
revolution (Clogg, 2002; Mouzelis, 1978).  
In practice, the effects of the philhellenic internalisation manifested in the appropriation by the 
Greeks of the crucial Western support for the cause of liberation and in the pursuit of irredentist and 
Hellenising strategies throughout their nation-state building undertakings (Dimitras, 1992; 
Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). During the first century of its existence, Greek leadership and 
nationalist discourse focused on the expansion of Greece to include the Greek-speaking Christian 
populations that existed outside its borders, as Orthodox Christianity and Greek language were 
historically considered the other two pillars of Greek identity besides ancient Hellenism (Clogg, 2002; 
Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002). This goal was referred to as the ‘Great Idea’ and these claimed 
populations of the Balkan Peninsula were named the ‘unredeemed’ Greek siblings that needed to be 
‘redeemed’ through liberation (Aldcroft, 2006; Kalyvas, 2015).  
The Great Idea is presented as both ambitious and necessary, since the majority of this otherwise 
mixed and culturally complex population lived outside the Greek Kingdom (Aldcroft, 2006; 
Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). The end of the Greek irredentism came abruptly in 1922 with the 
Catastrophe of Asia Minor, but not before Greece succeeding in incorporating into its territory the 
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Ionian Islands (1864), Thessaly and Arta (1881), Greek Macedonia, Epirus, Crete and some Aegean 
Islands (1913), Thrace (1923), and the Dodecanese islands (1947), through various wars and treaties, 
and the instrumental role played by greater European powers, like Britain, France and Russia, 
(Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002; Triandafyllidou et al., 2013).  
Over time, the Hellenising ‘spirit’ was expressed in various governmental and grassroots initiatives, 
such as the persistent archaism of the Greek language until the mid-seventies, with the use of 
katharevousa, the ‘purified’ version of Greek, which was the formal language of the state but not of 
the people who spoke the demotiki idiom (Mouzelis, 1978; Tsoukalas, 1999). Hellenising and 
homogenising tactics were employed on the ethnically and linguistically diverse populations of the 
acquired lands of New Greece, while the Greek state was also determined to Hellenise names of 
locations in those areas, erasing Albanian, Slav and Turkish place-names (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 
2002). Moreover, during the 19th century it was fashionable for Greek people to name their children 
with ancient Greek names (Clogg, 2002; Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). In Athens, the Acropolis was 
re-hellenised by removing any architectural elements that were added during the Byzantine and 
Ottoman era (Mackridge, 2008; Makrides, 2009).  
Most importantly, education strived to establish not only what was considered the proper use of 
language, but also the properly Western/European and simultaneously ethnocentric understanding 
of national history, which strived to establish the endurance of the Greek nation from ancient to 
modern Greece (Faas, 2011; Zervas, 2012). Historians of the 19th century, such as Konstantinos 
Paparrigopoulos and Spyridon Zambelios, replaced an earlier rhetoric of revivalism with one of 
continuity (Beaton, 2009). In this effort, two chapters of Greek history were considered problematic 
due to their Eastern character, the era of the Byzantium, seen as obscurantist, dogmatic and 
corrupted, and Ottoman rule, seen through Orientalist eyes (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002; 
Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). In many respects, Greece followed the cause of nationalism and 
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Hellenism with more than adequate passion in the service of both Greek and European self-esteem 
(Tsoukalas, 1999). 
 
Identity idealisation and mutuality  
 
All of the above illustrate the degree to which Greek identity was subjected to processes of 
idealisation and overvaluation by both non-Greek Westerners and Greeks themselves. Identity 
overvaluation, like any other form of idealisation, can take the form of excess and fixation. In the 
literature, instances occur when the desire of Greeks to embody the ‘Hellenistic ideal’ is described as 
‘obsessive’, best illustrated by the Greek words of progonoplexia and archaiolatreia (meaning 
‘ancestor obsession’ and ‘antiquity worship’, respectively) (Clogg, 2002: 27). Roessel (2001: 3) makes 
the somewhat flamboyant claim that at moments in time foreigners have found it ‘almost impossible 
to think sanely about Greece’. However, what could be the outcome and effect of identity 
idealisation, and how does it work?  
According to psychology, the ‘adoration’ of others necessarily entails a parallel idealisation of the 
self, enabling those who idealise to introject themselves with positive self-reflections (Minsky, 1996). 
Under this light, the mutual idealisation between Greeks and Westerners appears like the reciprocal 
reinforcement of their respective collective self-esteems (Tsoukalas, 1999). Regarding the effect of 
overvaluation, the outcome can only be the creation and nurturing of ‘great expectations’. These 
expectations, in all their ambition and extravaganza, foster not only the crucial identity question of 
becoming, as the ultimate and never-ending effort of all identity endeavours, but also the possible 
frustration of these anticipations, resulting in disappointment and identity depreciation (see i.e. 
theories of ‘possible selves’, Markus & Nurius, 1986). As such, the intense ‘success’ of overvaluation 
is equally traumatic and crisis-breeding as any identity devaluation can be, since it catapults the 
social entity equally far away from what is understood as moderate and balanced, and eventually as 
‘normal’. The following section will move deeper into the theme of identity devaluation.  
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Identity devaluation: great expectations and disappointment 
 
Philhellenic fatigue and Hellenic disappointment 
 
As much as Greek European identity was revered in the past, the future held different dynamics. 
After the end of the War of Independence and the establishment of the Modern Greek state, 
Philhellenist enthusiasm decreased considerably (Reynolds, 2013). The philhellenes who had run to 
Greece’s liberating struggle dreaming of part-taking in the reconstitution of the Hellenic ‘grandeur’ 
are described as becoming disappointed with the reality in the newly born small kingdom of Greece 
(Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). As explained, besides a few notable elite families who were well-
educated and held high administrative posts, the majority of the people were poor, illiterate and 
landless peasants (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002; Tsoukalas, 1999).  
In western-European Philhellenes’ eyes, these rural people were tainted by religious and 
superstitious beliefs, untouched by Enlightened rationality, and appeared as a far cry from the 
‘civilised’ and ‘elegant’ Hellenistic prototype, the ghost of which they had encountered in their 
classical studies (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002; Fleming, 2004). In this encounter between the 
imagination of ancient Greece and the actual inhabitants, ‘the comparison was revealing, there was 
nothing left from that glorious past’ (Lalioti, 2009: 71). To be sure, such tendencies were not peculiar 
to the Greek case and as many critical theorists have argued all Balkan and Eastern-European 
countries have fallen under the orientalising gaze of Western-Europeans (for ‘Balkanism’ see 
Todorova, 2009; for ‘Euro-orientalism’ see Adamovsky, 2006). By SIT’s terms, these cultures were 
constructed as ‘internal others’, members of the ingroup of Europeans, but less than prototypical 
due to their ‘backwardness’ compared to the hierarchised Western-European prototype.  
The initial disillusionment is represented as only growing steadily over time, as Greece’s policies and 
agendas were met with disdain on behalf of its Western-European counterparts (Koliopoulos & 
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Veremis, 2002). The pursuit of the ‘Great Idea’ over the first century of state-building is anchored as 
a defining feature that played a role in this disenchantment, because although initially the Western 
powers aimed at creating a small Greek nation-state that would include Sterea Ellada, Peloponnisos 
and Cyclades, some of the regions of the ancient Greek world containing the epicentres of Athens 
and Sparta, Greeks aimed at a more extended Greek federation that would include the 
‘unredeemed’ (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). The image that is implicitly and explicitly expressed in 
historiography is that of a young and poor country, with limited military forces, that was exceedingly 
ambitious, and perhaps even too greedy for its weight (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002; Triandafyllidou 
& Paraskevopoulou, 2002). For instance, some observers of the time commented that ‘Greece 
combined the appetites of a Russia, with the resources of a Switzerland’ (Clogg, 2002: 69), while 
Venizelos’s claims in the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 were described as ‘extravagant’ and 
‘flamboyant’ and a source of exasperation (Aldcroft, 2006: 146-7).  
The Great Idea is also described as having been followed by the Greek leaders at every cost 
(Aldcroft, 2006). For instance, the use of brigands and released convicts for fighting over northern 
territories was viewed unfavourably by Western powers, hurting Greece’s external image 
(Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). Furthermore, expansionism is charged with depriving the country of 
important resources that could had been used for economic advancement and leading to chronic 
underdevelopment (Aldcroft, 2006; Mouzelis, 1978). After decades of wars, the end of the 19th 
century found Greece heavily indebted, bankrupt and under an international financial control regime 
that lasted for several decades (Aldcroft, 2006; Triandafyllidou & Paraskevopoulou, 2002). 
Simultaneously, social groups derived from the powerful strata of the Ottoman era are reported to 
have succeeded in regaining their clientelistic influence and power base and resources were wasted 
by servicing corrupt and inefficient administrations (Aldcroft, 2006; Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002). 
Other factors that are registered as contributing to underdevelopment were the defrayment of the 
cost of gaining independence, lasting political instability, lack of fuel material necessary for 
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industrialisation, and the absence of an entrepreneurial middle class that could lead an economic 
revolution (Aldcroft, 2006; Mouzelis, 1978).  
Another source of vivid bewilderment for Westerners is said to be the indifference and even 
unwillingness of Greeks towards modernising efforts. As described, Greeks seemed ‘unruly’ and 
unwilling to comply with a Western rationality and administration (Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). The 
image of ‘unruly Greece’ in binary opposition to ‘disciplined Europe’ has been argued to figure as a 
stereotypical one and used as a representational excuse not only for foreign interventionist 
monarchies or subversion, but also oppressive domestic regimes, such as the 1967-1974 dictatorship 
and its perpetrators who claimed that ‘Greeks needed a firm hand’ (Herzfeld, 1997: 185). In the 
Orient, Turkish historiography describes Greeks as the nation that needed to be ‘put in their place’ 
and ‘taught a lesson’ (Cicek, 2010: 83). Outside Europe, Henry Kissinger, US diplomat, appears to be 
claiming that Greeks are an ‘ungovernable people’ (as cited in Hirschon, 2001; also, in Xenakis, 
2013). In recent literature, the culture of protest, strikes and streets riots has been projected as part 
of Greece’s ‘anarchic’ character and an institutionalisation of ‘anti-systemic’ and ‘resistance politics’ 
(Andronikidou & Kovras, 2012; Hirschon, 2001). Greeks themselves are also commented as 
selectively evoking the value of ‘defiant independence’ as and when suited, increasing the 
impression (Herzfeld, 1992; Xenakis, 2013). 
Eventually, all these dynamics are represented as resulting in a parallel Greek frustration with the 
national self, anchored around the repeated failures of development and the paradoxically unmet 
potential of the nation’s long ‘apprenticeship in Europeanness’ (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002; 
Nicolaidis, 1997). This is described as leading to the creation of feelings of inferiority, humiliation 
over the county’s dependent and peripheral character, and the peculiar development of a love/hate 
relationship with the West (Diamandouros, 1994). The ‘loving’ part of this liaison is symbolically 
attributed to the idea of the West as a European prototype that Greece needed to reach, as well as a 
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stereotypical protecting figure for a small and weak country like Greece (Diamandouros, 1994; 
Ioakimidis, 2000a).  
The ‘hateful’ part of this relation refers to the ways in which philhellenism was perceived as being 
used as a pretext for Western intervention in Greek affairs and the long history of ‘conditional 
sovereignty’ (Fleming, 2004; Triandafyllidou & Paraskevopoulou, 2002), as well as traumatic events 
that were understood as ‘Western betrayal’, such as the withdrawal of support during the Asia 
Minor catastrophe and the role played in the Turkish invasion and subsequent division of Cyprus 
(Clogg, 2002). As put, ‘Western approval has always been eagerly sought by the Greeks, but their 
addiction to the philhellenic praise turned them sour when old friends turned into critics or even 
foes’ (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002: 271). 
Consequently, the image of Greece became that of the ‘wayward child’ and ‘spoiled kid of European 
history’ which implies ‘immaturity, undeserved-ness and abuse of position’, resulting in Greece 
being identified as a ‘fake-European’ (Herzfeld, 1989; Kostis, 2013; Rumelili, 2008). The notion of 
deservingness reappears repeatedly in both implicit and explicit ways in Greek historiography. Lalioti 
(2009) comments that, both inside and outside of Greece, criticisms for not being worthy of the past 
and not being equal to Europe proliferated. An observer of German philhellenism comments that 
there was a division between two camps, the somewhat apologetic inclusionary one placing Greeks 
in the European side, albeit recognizing a developmental gap, and the polemical exclusionary one 
locating Greeks in the Orient (Reynolds, 2013). The latter camp, ‘commonly associated the 
contemporary Greeks with Balkan peoples or Orientals, refuting their Hellenic tradition and claiming 
it as their own’ (Reynolds, 2013: 86). From a Turkish perspective (Cicek, 2010), Greeks were 
undeserving because they owed their existence not to heroic bravery but to naïve philhellenism and 
unjust wars and because they were nothing but a nation of lawless brigands and warlords (see also 
Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002: chapter 11 on brigandage).  
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The European Union as a ‘return to Europe’ 
 
The accession to the EEC historically features as an opportunity for Greece to be reintegrated in 
Europe and regain its ‘Europeaness’ (Clogg, 2002; Dimitras, 1992). However, Greece’s trajectory 
within it only exacerbated the negative external identity of the country. For Konstantinos 
Karamanlis, the pioneering politician who pushed Greece’s membership forward, entering the 
Community was seen as a vehicle of democratic consolidation after the Colonels’ regime ended in 
1974, as well as a chance for economic growth and a reassurance of territorial security in light of 
Greece’s tainted relations with Turkey (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002). There is a historical 
argument that security concerns overshadowed everything else, which reinforces the view that the 
West/Europe was always seen by Greece as a protecting option (Economides, 2005). Furthermore, 
EEC membership was thought of as a way for a small country like Greece to partake in transnational 
decision-making processes and play a role in regional and global affairs (Kranidiotis, 2000).  
However, only a few months after Greece formally entered the EEC in 1981, the PASOK  of Andreas 
Papandreou came to power and remained in charge for the next fifteen years, with an interruption 
between 1990 and 1993 (Lyrintzis, 2006). PASOK started as a radical leftist formation with anti-
Western, Third World and anti-EEC rhetorical elements, although its radicalism mellowed over time 
(Bideleux, 1996b; Lyrintzis, 2006).  Papandreou is often described as a charismatic and seductive 
leader whose rhetoric emphasised the rights of the ‘non-privileged’ and as a consequence, Greek 
citizens are correspondingly portrayed as prone to demagogy and addicted to such types of 
leadership, which implies lack of political maturity and sophistication (Bideleux, 1996b; 
Diamandouros, 1994; Lyrintzis, 2006). Overall, Papandreou is represented as a ‘destructive, 
destabilising force in Greek politics’ (Draenos, 2012: 166). Alternatively, PASOK is also represented as 
one of ‘the most politically successful social democratic parties in Europe’ (Tsakalotos, 1998: 114) 
and is credited as incorporating into the power system social groups that never before had any 
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significant power (Lyrintzis, 2006), which indicates the controversial and contested representations 
of both leader and party.  
The eighties under Papandreou became known as ‘the populist decade’ and have determined the 
image that Greece would occupy within the Community ever since (Clogg, 2002; Lyrintzis, 2006). 
Phrases that denote this image are the ‘black sheep’ (Economides, 2005: 471), the ‘odd one out’ 
(Mossialos & Mitsos, 2000: 4), the ‘incurable sick man of Europe’ (Ioakimidis in Koliopoulos & 
Veremis, 2002: 317), the ‘awkward and heretical EU partner’ (Ioakimidis, 2000a: 360), the ‘difficult 
partner’ (Eyal in Bideleux, 1996b: 138), the ‘inherently uncomfortable and truculent member’ 
(Bideleux, 1996b: 130), or simply ‘a lost cause’ (Featherstone, 2005: 224). The reasons behind these 
rather crystallised identity schemas are mostly anchored around economic performance and foreign 
policy (Economides, 2005). Within this identity representation rests the argument that Greece’s 
Europeanisation necessitates successful outcomes not only in processes of Westernisation and 
modernisation, two words that are often used interchangeably with ‘Europeanisation’, but also 
expressions such as ‘normalisation’, ‘rehabilitation’, ‘denationalisation’ and ‘multilateralisation’ (i.e. 
Economides, 2005; Kazamias, 1997). In this sense, becoming Europeanised and Westernised is 
presented as becoming more of a ‘normal’ country that has been rehabilitated from ‘non-
Europeanness’. 
In terms of economic performance, Greek economy was lagging behind other EEC economies and 
could not fully maximise the potential benefits of its membership because necessary reforms and 
adjustments were resisted or delayed (Bideleux, 1996b). During Papandreou’s administration public 
debt figures rose dramatically. While in 1970 public debt was 17.6% of GDP, it rose to 28.3% by 1981 
and took a wild leap to 112% by 1986, that is, during the first five years of PASOK’s administration 
(Ioakimidis, 2000b). Papandreou is reported to have pursued a wild expansionary fiscal policy to 
satisfy the pressing social demands, which increased public expenditure from 30% of GNP in 1980 to 
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42% in 1985 (Ioakimidis, 2000b). Furthermore, employment in the public sector is said to have risen 
dramatically as the clientilistic system took deep roots in Greek society.  
This set of expansionary policies were described as being at odds with the fiscal policies followed by 
the rest of Europe and with the macroeconomic policy guidelines that the European Commission 
recommended to EU member-states, framed as noticeably ignored by Greece at least until 1985 
(Ioakimidis, 2000b). The results of this disregard are said to be uncontrollable public deficits, 
combined with rising public debt and a bloated public sector (Ioakimidis, 2000b) and the Greek 
economy being characterised as ‘the most divergent in the EU’ based on the Maastricht criteria 
(Featherstone, 2005: 227). On the positive side, material prosperity is described as having increased 
(Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). The two main reasons that are mentioned for the delay of institutional 
reforms and economic adjustments are the political cost for the parties that would lose their chance 
to be re-elected and the socio-economic cost to the vulnerable strata (Arghyrou, 2000; 
Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). 
Foreign policy appears to have played an even more instrumental role in Greece’s external image, 
although some argue that external constructions were ‘partly justified and partly exaggerated’ 
(Ioakimidis, 2000a: 360). Papandreou is described as a particularly disagreeable and instrumentally 
oriented leader who pressurised the EEC on more than one occasions, aiming to increase the flow of 
funds towards Greece (Bideleux, 1996b). There has been a notion that Greece’s accession ‘made 
voting together more difficult because of the insistence of the Greeks in sticking to long-held 
national positions at the expense of Community solidarity’ (Nuttal in Ioakimidis, 2000a: 360). 
Furthermore, various Greek positions were perceived as particularly nationalist and anti-Western. 
For example, efforts to deny the right of the FYROM to choose for itself the name ‘Macedonia’ and 
the unilateral imposition of a trade boycott on the new nation-state isolated Greece from its 
European partners who tried to bring Greece to the European Court (Bideleux, 1996b; Sutton, 1997). 
Moreover, Greece’s reactions to external interventions in Yugoslavia and lack of cooperation on the 
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matter were interpreted as an ‘unholy alliance’ based on cultural and religious ties which 
additionally hurt the international identity of Greece (Economides, 2005: 481). 
After Papandreou’s death in 1996, Konstantinos Simitis, a proclaimed modernizer, substituted him 
as the leader of PASOK, and paved the way for EMU membership. The second half of the nineties is 
described as constituting a ‘massive transformation’ in Greek foreign policy and a ‘rehabilitation 
period from the Papandreou years’ (Economides, 2005: 471-472). Authors writing at the turn of the 
century were expressing the view that Greek society was ‘characterised by an all embracing trend 
for reform’ triggered by the ‘EMU factor’ (Mossialos & Mitsos, 2000: 3). The EMU membership was 
portrayed as a valuable step in belonging to the deeply integrated European core (Alogoskoufis, 
2000; Kranidiotis, 2000). While many expressed either reserved or open optimism regarding 
Greece’s ability to meet the EMU criteria and its wider prospects within it, others expressed 
reservations whether Greece could survive the EMU environment, absorb shocks and achieve 
growth without autonomous monetary policy (Alogoskoufis, 2000; Christodoulakis, 2000; Garganas, 
2000).  
However, many argue that Simitis’s reformist policy was not brave enough (Alogoskoufis, 2000), 
while the circumstances under which Greece entered the monetary union with the use of falsified 
economic data shed a particularly dark light upon his legacy (Knight, 2011). The two-thousands are 
represented as a period of EUphoria for Greece during which EMU membership enabled cheap and 
easy public and private borrowing, which created the illusion of growth and prosperity, concealing 
the country’s underlying economic problems (Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). Many credit the moment 
of the Olympics of 2004 in Athens as the peak of this period, a successfully organised event that was 
symbolically associated with the dual celebration of Hellenism and belongingness to the developed 
world (Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). However, the same year the scandal of the Greek ‘cooking of the 
financial books’ became publicly known and led to speculation regarding the possibility of expulsion 
from the Eurozone (Marconi, 2011). This was not the first, or last thereof, time that Greece’s 
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position within European institutions would be seen in a precarious manner and subject to possible 
loss, as will be shown next. 
 
Identity deficit: is there a Greek European identity after all? 
 
As indicated above, there has been a historical debate on Greece’s deservingness to be European 
with some arguing that Greece does not deserve to be called European. To the extent that such 
arguments become a matter of ideological closure or perhaps even nihilistic conclusions, Greece’s 
undeservingness and status as a ‘fake European’ becomes one of ‘lack of Europeanness’ in the sense 
that Greece is not European at all. Ultimately, following this logic, Greece is seen as suffering from 
an ‘absence of Europeanness’ and as such, a deficit of European identity (Clogg, 2002). In SIT terms, 
Greece is not only a less than prototypical ingroup member, but instead it is an outgroup member in 
disguise, a ‘Trojan Horse’. In other words, it does not belong.  
Lack of belongingness can function as a deficit of identity because all social identity, as already 
explained in the theoretical chapter, is relational. In this sense, the one who does not belong 
anywhere and is seen as unable to relate to anyone, becomes not only unrecognised, but also 
unrecognisable by others, resulting in the loss of identity. Although this particular point refers to 
Greece’s European identity dimension, the sense of loss and deficit as a distinct possibility is 
observable in Greek historiography, including the national dimension of Greece’s identity, anchored 
around the question ‘what is particularly Greek after all?’. This goes hand in hand with the identity 
question ‘where does Greece belong’, which is seen as never-ending in Greek studies 
(Triandafyllidou et al., 2013: 15). The remaining section will elaborate on all these different shades 
of absence.  
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Western belonging as a ‘loss’ 
 
As already mentioned above, Greece was once considered to be foundational of Western civilisation. 
However, this is merely conventional knowledge and an alternative representation in Greek studies 
is the idea that it was not Greece who was the producer of the West, but rather the other way 
around: the West was the producer of Greece (Mouzelis, 1978; Tsoukalas, 1999). From a Turkish 
perspective (Sarınay & Sünbül, 2000: 200), Greece was the ‘mutant product of the propagative 
politics of the imperialist powers in Europe’. While such views rely on the historical role of Western 
powers in the establishment of the Modern Greek state (Clogg, 2002), including material help and 
intervention in favour of Greece, there is an additional question of the symbolic production of the 
country’s identity (Lalioti, 2009). Some would argue that Greece was the mere by-product of the 
West’s attempt to invent its own identity (Castano, 2004; Fleming, 2004; Lalioti, 2009; Tsoukalas, 
1999). Within this view, it is argued that the idea of Greece was used to create the impression of a 
‘European soul’ that dated back to the era of Pericles (Castano, 2004; Fleming, 2004). As put, 
‘Europeans… tended to flatter themselves by discovering their own idealised cultural ancestors in 
ancient Greece’ (Tsoukalas, 1999: 8). Moreover, it has been argued that ‘European expansionism 
and domination was based on the construction and appropriation of the racist myth of an eternally 
superior and indigenous proto-European civilisation’ whereby 'Hellenolatry' served as a powerful 
ideological weapon for expanding European power (Tsoukalas, 1999: 8). 
The sense of loss and deficit is additionally exacerbated by the argument that Greece has lost more 
than it gained in its relation with the West, not only because of the way its identity may have been 
appropriated, but also the ways that Greece’s image was predominantly a matter of others, rather 
than an agency of its own (Lalioti, 2009). The sense of greater loss than gain was obvious, for 
instance, in the disappointment of a Western observer of the Greek-Turkish war of 1919-1922 who 
stated that the liberal vision of a ‘regenerated Hellas’ was one of the ‘extravagances of Western 
philhellenism’ and the attraction of the West to Greece was a ‘curse that the West ha[d] set upon 
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Greece’, which led to the country’s ‘spiritual pauperisation’ and was responsible for ‘what Greece 
ha[d] lost, or failed to win’ (as cited in Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002: 263).  
This representation additionally resonates with the frequent portrayal of Greece as a ‘haunted’ 
country, incapable of escaping its own image, living under ‘the burden of history’ and being unable 
to cope with it (Lalioti, 2009; Lianeri, 2014; Tsoukalas, 1999). For example, Lalioti (2009: 72) queries 
‘how do you handle being so exclusively universal?’. This ‘weight of history’ is often implicitly 
credited as the root of modern identity deficit in the sense that it complicated the already obscure 
issue of defining what Greek statehood and nationhood were (Tsoukalas, 1999: 7). Often the 
‘imported’ image of Greece is presented as guilty of eradicating Greek identity (Lalioti, 2009; 
Tsoukalas, 1999). As argued (Lalioti, 2009: 71), ‘what European travellers imagined to have found [in 
Greece] was a loss, which although a historical one, they perceived as a synchronic lack of culture… 
either in treating Greeks as living ancestors or as uncultured Orientals, they denied them having a 
culture’.  
Some have also implicitly or explicitly expressed the view that the original, chronic and excessive 
dependence of Greece to Western powers, who responded with what is described as interventionist 
or even imperialist attitudes, inhibited the self-understanding and indigenous development of the 
country’s identity (Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002; Mouzelis, 1978). Within this representation, 
incidents that are understood as doing so include the fact that Greece started as a dependent and 
indebted country, its first political parties were called the British, the French and the Russian, was 
ruled by foreign monarchies that were imposed from outside, such as the Bavarian King Otto and the 
Danish King George, and was intervened by various foreign powers on multiple occasions (Clogg, 
2002; Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002). In line with these, the representation holds that exactly 
because of repeated intervention on behalf of the West in Greek affairs, combined with Greek 
inability to escape its dependent status, led to identity deficit by eliminating the ways that Greece 
could develop not only a self-understanding of its own, but also an autonomous governance that 
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would allow for its empirical self-determination. As such, this particular deficit appears to be 
historically anchored not in a deficit of relationality and disassociation, but in a surplus of 
relationality that ends up obscuring any agency of the dependent party.  
 
Expulsion from the EU and exclusion from ‘Europe’ 
 
On more than one occasions, Greece was the EU member-state that some politicians, journalists and 
academics, the ideational leaders of our theory, would express the opinion that it should be 
excluded from the EC/EU/EMU on the basis of various misconducts. In SIT terms, Greece was on 
various occasions constructed as an outgroup member. Especially during the Macedonia debacle 
‘some unofficial voices… suggested that [it…] was an opportunity for the EU to get rid of one of its 
more irritating and economically unproductive members’ (Sutton, 1997: 417; see also Economides, 
2005). At another moment, a frustrated Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, said 
that he would be ‘happy to see Greece leave’ (as cited in Ioakimidis, 2000a: 360). A 1994 journalistic 
article called ‘Europe’s Trojan Horse’ concluded that: 
‘The Greeks in short, have found in the EC a new kind of decaying Ottoman empire and, at 
least in some sense a new kind of slavery. If Byron were alive today, and looking at the 
ruination caused by the EC-funded Athens metro, he might dream again that Greece might 
be free; and perhaps that we in the rest of the EC might be free of them.’ (as cited in 
Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002: 274) 
 
Political scientist, Robert Bideleux (1996b: 137-8), stated the following: 
‘The prevailing ‘ethnic’ conception of the Greek nation […] is profoundly at odds with the 
‘civic’ and multi-cultural conceptions of nationhood that prevail in Western Europe and is 
much closer to that of its Balkan neighbours. Just as this inherently exclusive and 
intolerant conception of nationhood could become the most fundamental long-term 
obstacle to the eventual inclusion of the post-communist Balkan states in the EU, so it 
should raise thorny questions as to whether Greece really deserves to be a full member of 
the EU.’ 
 
Many refer to the fact that Greece was neither economically, nor politically qualified to enter the EC, 
but was admitted regardless of reservations (Hibou, 2005; Kokosalakis & Psimmenos, 2002). More 
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precisely, Greece was fully admitted in the EEC without undergoing any institution-transforming 
conditionality, in contrast to Spain and Portugal that underwent at least some preparation (Copsey, 
2015). This led to a paradoxical, and quite unsuccessful, post-accession conditionality, whereby the 
EU needed to impose binding constraints on Greece, and the southern member-states, offering 
additional resources as an incentive (Copsey, 2015).  
As explained, Greece was included in the EEC on a purely political logic as a demonstration of 
support for the newly established democracies of Southern Europe, but Greece entered earlier than 
Portugal and Spain as a single entry (Hibou, 2005). Some argue that the issue was particularly 
symbolic and related to the civilisational overvaluation described in the previous section. As recalled 
(Fourest, 2010: see also, Marconi, 2011), ‘Europe opened its doors to Greece as a symbol: to have 
among its members the country where democracy was born’ and for ‘paying a historical debt to 
Greece as the foundation stone of European culture’ (Barber, 2011). Marconi (2011: 8) argues that’ 
it was the entry of Greece into the European Union that provided the occasion for the Brussels 
institutions to trumpet their claim to be uncompromisingly democratic’.  However, over time Greece 
appears to have became the indebted one, not only in the literal sense, but also symbolically as 
pending to deliver the potential of a ‘normalised’ member-state and to eradicate the disparity 
between ‘promise and performance, capability and expectations’ (Economides, 2005; Nicolaidis, 
1997).  
 
Belonging nowhere? 
 
If Greece was a mere by-product of the West, the possibility of answering what is a distinctly Greek 
identity becomes elusive. This becomes even more elusive if one considers the historical urge on the 
Greek side to eradicate its Oriental roots, found in the Byzantine and Ottoman traditions, a large 
part of its historical life, in the service of the acquisition of a ‘truly’ Western/European identity. For 
example, some historians note that the ‘archaeological cleansing’ of the Acropolis by various foreign 
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administrators of what was seen as ‘the remains of barbarity’ has impoverished its cultural heritage 
in a more devastating way than numerous sieges or Lord Elgin’s looting (Mackridge, 2008). To be 
sure, such attitudes are not entirely irrelevant to the ways that Europeans/Westerners have often 
downplayed their Eastern origins, historically and culturally (Hobson, 2004).  
Most importantly, at the symbolic level, if Greece abandoned its Oriental identity, making an 
overambitious, ambivalent and ultimately unsuccessful leap towards the West, perhaps the case is 
that standing in the middle, left Greece with nothing: not belonging to the West, or the East, thus 
nowhere. This becomes obvious in the way historians, depending on their inclination, treat the 
question of Greece with all fractions criticising and disqualifying Greece on different grounds. For 
example, Classicists look at Greece’s modern sequel with a ‘disapproving eye’, Byzantinologists 
‘ridicule the modern Greek efforts to Hellenise it’, and Orientalists ‘have never really forgiven the 
Greeks for turning their face away from Ottoman Orient’ (Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2002: 8).  
Furthermore, this deficit of belongingness, which operates as a deficit of identification with any 
other group identity, is observed in the discourse of Greek exceptionalism, according to which 
Greece is not only constructed as an atypical Western or Eastern country, but also as an atypical 
Mediterranean or Balkan country, the two European regions that could constitute its closest 
ingroups (Clogg, 2002). For instance, while frequently Greece may be described as part of a 
particular European area containing member-states like Spain and Portugal and similarities between 
them are often illustrated, the predominant representation differentiates them and emphasises the 
exceptionality of Greece compared to its Mediterranean counterparts. In this respect, while Greece 
and Portugal in particular are often grouped together because of comparable economic difficulties, 
peripheral status and small size, authors clarify that the defining difference between them is that 
while Portugal has been a EU-friendly nation-state and able to maintain ‘good housekeeping’, 
Greece has not succeeded in either (Bideleux, 1996b: 143). As such, the created schema illustrates 
that these two countries ‘perfectly epitomised the bad and good pupil of Europe’ (Hibou, 2005: 230).  
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Within the Balkans, Greece is argued to be ‘peculiar’ because all other Balkan countries were 
excluded from European history and scientific inquiry in contrast to Greece, while Greece was also 
constructed as a cultural threat for them due to the hegemony of Greek language and Orthodoxy 
(Mishkova, 2008: 244). As a result, it becomes apparent that exceptional entities are essentially 
lonely and excluded entities that exist outside the shared communion with others.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter used the ‘rigatino approach’ to brush through impressions of Greek historiography in an 
attempt to scan for ‘signs of crisis’. It begun by arguing that although in Greek studies ‘identity crisis’ 
is understood as an integral part of Greek history and society, little thought had been dedicated in 
the past on the diversity and multidimensionality of such recurring ‘identity crisis’. It then proceeded 
to remedy this shortcoming by applying this study’s theoretical contribution, namely, the typology of 
identity destabilisations, on Greek historiographical accounts. The exploration revealed traces of 
different destabilising dynamics at the multiple registers of conflict, overvaluation, devaluation and 
deficit.  
The first section focused on identity conflict, as this is objectified in Greek historiography in recurring 
dualities. Dualism appeared to be a continuous and dominant schema in the production of 
knowledge about Greece. This dualism first appeared to be manifested in the idea of a timeless 
identity divide between East and West, as two civilisational constructs. However, this pattern 
emerged as not peculiar to Greece alone, since several other national identities inside and outside 
Europe appeared to be experiencing the same historical chasm. As such, this duality could be 
understood as a dynamic arising from representations of large-scale forces, such as modernisation, 
global conflict, international interventions, and cultural and ideological conflicts. This initial 
separation appeared to crystallise in what was called here ‘the Diamandouros thesis’ of cultural 
dualism and the ideotypical constructs of modernizers and underdogs. Within this thesis, the original 
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duality of these two political cultures appears to reproduce itself upon ever-more dualities that 
operate through various schematisations, such as oppositions, presence-absence, antitheses and 
qualitative differences. It is then argued that all these patterns can be understood as ‘binary 
oppositions’ that further amount to the representation of ‘hybridity’. Moreover, this representation 
of hybridity is predominantly understood as a ‘problem’ to solve or eradicate, rather than embrace 
and encourage, allowing only narrow space for emancipated discourses from alternative views, such 
as poetry and literature.  
The second section looked at identity overvaluation, externally constructed through symbolic and 
applied Philhellenism and internally embraced through Hellenism and nation-building. Greece 
appeared to hold an influential and enchanting spectrum over Western Europeans who were said to 
idealise the ancient Greek past and seek its revival through liberation of Modern Greeks from the 
Ottoman rule and the formation of a Modern Greek nation-state. Greeks themselves are described 
as accepting this identity overvaluation and striving to create a modern nation-state by various 
Hellenising strategies. The identity destabilisation appeared to spring from the creation of ‘great 
expectations’ that necessarily distance a social entity from a balanced self-assessment, leading to 
overvaluation.  
The third section moved directly into the frustration of these ‘great expectations’ by means of the 
Philhellenist decline in Europe and what was described to be a similarly intense disappointment of 
Greeks with themselves, regarding what was perceived as a long and unsuccessful apprenticeship in 
Europeanness. On the part of external representations, the outcomes of these symbolic dynamics 
resulted in various historical stereotypes of Greece as ‘wayward’, ‘unruly’, ‘spoiled’ and 
‘undeserving’. On the part of Greece, they are described as creating a love/hate perception of 
Europe and of the West, whereby the stereotypical roles of ‘saviour’ and ‘abuser’ are dynamically 
interchanged with each other. Greece’s accession to the EEC is framed in scholarly discourse as a 
‘return to Europe’, hence a chance for the country to regain its European identity, and an 
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opportunity to achieve modernisation, development and security. However, this experience is 
described as only exacerbating Greece’s image, particularly because of economic administration and 
foreign policy. As a consequence, at two different episodes of Greece’s history Greek European 
identity is described as falling short of the prototypical understanding of what a European country 
should be.  
The final fourth section explored historiography for signs of identity deficits. Some of the primary 
deficits observed were the loss of Greece to the West by being designated as a ‘mere by-product’ of 
Western inventionism, becoming universalised or losing its sovereignty on various occasions. Within 
an EU context, an additional source of identity loss appeared to be arguments in favour of Greece’s 
expulsion or departure that would result in losing established parts of its European belonging, such 
as formal membership. Finally, there were historical representations presenting Greece as departing 
from both Western and Eastern prototypicality, leaving its identity in a ‘no man’s land’, while 
representations of it as either exceptional or atypical compared to its various cultural groupings, 
such as the Balkans or the Mediterranean countries, may have resulted in the country being 
depicted as belonging nowhere, hence experiencing an identification deficit.  
This chapter overviewed past representations of Greek identity and noted various intervals where 
conflicts, overvaluations, devaluations and deficits were present in them. As such, it concludes that 
representations of ‘identity crises’ can be found in Greek historiography, not only in abundance, but 
also in great diversity. This chapter further looked at historiographical representations of Greece and 
its identity in an effort to understand past identity formations and to allow for a point of departure, 
contextualisation and comparative potential of Greek European identity before and after the 
economic crisis. The next chapter will look at scholarly and media representations of Greece during 
the economic crisis to elucidate continuities and changes over time.  
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Chapter 4 
Greek European Identity and the Greek Debt/Eurozone Crisis 
 
 
 
‘…[c]rises are representations and hence ‘constructions’ of failure. A given 
constellation of contradictions and failures within the institutions […] can sustain a 
multiplicity of conflicting narratives of crisis. Such narratives compete in terms of 
their ability to find resonance with individuals’ and groups’ direct, lived 
experiences, and not in terms of their ‘scientific’ adequacy as explanations for the 
condition they diagnose’  
(Hay, 1996: 255) 
 
‘Representations sometimes call our very identities into question. We struggle over 
them because they matter – and these are contests from which serious 
consequences can flow. They define what is ‘normal’, who belongs, - and 
therefore, who is excluded’  
(Hall, 1997: 10)  
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
While the previous chapter focused on representations and stereotypes of Greek European identity 
before the economic crisis, as these were articulated in historiography, the present chapter looks at 
representations of the Euro crisis and Greece’s role within it. The economic crisis has triggered an 
enormous production of texts by multiple actors. A large part of recent research has focused on the 
social construction of the Euro crisis (Picard, 2015; also, Joris et al., 2014; Murray-Leach et al., 2014) 
and the Greek debt crisis more specifically (Bickes et al., 2014a; Kutter, 2014; Tzogopoulos, 2013) in 
the media, as this domain has been the primary context for the discussion of the Euro crisis and 
Greece within it (Joris et al., 2014). New research indicates that there have been ‘strikingly similar 
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[Euro] crisis narratives across the continent’ (Murray-Leach et al., 2014: 1). The social 
representations of Greece’s crisis have been explored in multiple national media of various 
European countries, including Germany, UK, France, Spain, Poland, Italy, Austria, Slovakia, Denmark, 
and Sweden, as well as international media from USA, China, India, Japan, Korea, and Singapore 
(Antoniades, 2012; Bickes et al., 2014a; Chalaniova, 2014; Kutter, 2014; Lampropoulou, 2014; 
Mitsikopoulou & Lykou, 2015; Mylonas, 2012; Touri & Rogers, 2013; Tracy, 2012; Tseronis, 2015; 
Tzogopoulos, 2013).  
Latest research widely agrees that there are two main metanarratives11 of the Euro crisis (Kutter, 
2014; Mitsikopoulou & Lykou, 2015; Ntampoudi, 2013; Touri & Rogers, 2013; Vasilopoulou et al., 
2013). Some have named these ‘the debt’ and ‘the EMU’ stories (Kutter, 2014), the ‘state debt’ and 
‘the Eurozone’ crises (Sommer, 2014), the ‘local financial’ and the ‘systemic’ crises (Mitsikopoulou & 
Lykou, 2015), the ‘economistic’ and the ‘political’ explanations (Touri & Rogers, 2013), the ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ explanations (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013), or the ‘the periphery’ and ‘the core’ 
narratives (Ntampoudi, 2013). For the purposes of this analysis they will be called ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’. We can understand the differing naming as an exhibition of the different objects 
around which the same metanarratives are objectified, i.e. debt, EMU, economy, politics. These 
objects crystallise as central master ideas that animate these metanarratives, transforming the 
abstract conception of the Euro crisis into a more concrete cognitive schema. These two central 
crisis metanarratives constitute an objectifying ontologisation of the crisis, in the sense of trying to 
decipher the ontology of the economic crisis and explain to the public its origins and causes. 
Furthermore, these two metanarratives provide the discursive context within which Greece and its 
national European identity is represented.  
                                                          
11 Metanarrative is defined here as ‘a set of more or less logically interconnected assumptions made in order 
to provide a coherent and comprehensive account of the underlying mechanisms that shape, or are supposed 
to shape, both the constitution and the development of human existence in a fundamental way’ (Susen, 2015: 
cxi). 
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The domestic metanarrative emphasises that the root causes of the Greek crisis are to be found 
predominantly in domestic dynamics that include excessive debt accumulation, misappropriation of 
public funds, overspending, corruption, clientelism, patronage, nepotism, tax-evasion, belated 
modernisation, chronic resistance to reforms, and lack of a productive base (Diamandouros, 2013; 
Touri & Rogers, 2013). At the government level, political elites are held responsible for over-
borrowing in order to sustain a bloated public sector for the purposes of re-election, stealing public 
funds, allowing tax-evasion, lacking the political will to implement reforms and capacity to create a 
sustainable self-sufficient economy (Featherstone, 2011; Kutter, 2014). At the grassroots level, 
citizens are held responsible for supporting the aforementioned governance, evading taxes, stealing 
public funds when possible, participating wilfully in the clientelistic system, blocking reforms by 
street protests and other means, living beyond their means, and being unproductive (Diamandouros, 
2013; Tekin, 2014). As other EU countries, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Cyprus, showed 
crisis symptoms (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013), and although the particular debt dynamics differed from 
country to country (Stein, 2011), this metanarrative constituted the domestically-oriented 
explanation of the wider Euro crisis which placed responsibility for the crisis within the political, 
economic and cultural conditions of domestic politics.  
The international metanarrative emphasises that the EMU was a flawed and risky currency area 
because it joined together diverse economies and political systems, while it was created without the 
necessary foundations that would sustain a monetary union, such as fiscal and political union, or any 
institutional design and contingency measures that could manage a potential crisis (Touri & Rogers, 
2013; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). Furthermore, this metanarrative stresses the systemic nature of the 
EMU, arguing that surpluses of trade in the European North necessarily translated into deficits in the 
South (Bickes et al., 2014a; Kotarski, 2012). In other words, the expansion of productivity and 
exports in highly industrialised and developed EU countries directly related to loss of productivity 
and growth of imports in the less developed member-states, creating ‘uneven development’ 
(Hadjimichalis, 2011). Moreover, German and French banks are seen as responsible for creating 
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large debts in the European South by ‘exporting credit dependence to others’ (Featherstone, 2011: 
200; Mylonas, 2015; Sommer, 2014). At the global level, the international metanarrative also 
includes the critique against the global financial system, especially the banks, and world capitalism, 
as well as the contemporary criticism against economic neo-liberalism (Mylonas, 2015; Vasilopoulou 
et al., 2013). The main argument of these critiques asserts that these overarching international 
structures and ideologies protect the capital and the market at the expense of protecting ordinary 
citizens’ livelihoods or human and labour rights (Mylonas, 2015). Within this metanarrative, the 
Greek crisis is understood as a symptom of a wider problem with international dimensions 
(Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). 
This chapter follows the guiding light of the four types of destabilisations to explore emerging 
research and media texts for representations of Greek European identity during the economic crisis, 
as well as to trace representations of identity destabilisations. As will become apparent, the two 
crisis metanarratives are often intertwined with the particular construction of Greece’s external 
identity in international media and political statements, while the public discourse is enriched by 
multiple representational features, such as objectifications of metaphors, dilemmas and 
stereotypes. Crisis ‘symptoms’ are traceable within all four registers of our typology. The remaining 
chapter will analyse them in detail.  
 
Identity conflict: dualist revivals and intensification 
 
Domestic conflicts 
 
Some of the main implications of Greece’s economic crisis have been social unrest and the 
representation of Greece as a country in conflict within itself (Andronikidou & Kovras, 2012; Psimitis, 
2011). This representation of conflict operates in multiple levels and we can identify three key 
domains: 1) between the political elites and the citizens, 2) between different political elites within 
the political system, and 3) between varied social groups of Greek citizens within the wider society.  
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Regarding the first dividing line between political elites and ‘the people’, which constitutes the 
defining storyline of the ideology of populism (Kaltwasser, 2012) and of the Greek ‘underdog’ 
political culture (Diamandouros, 1994), several researchers have observed that there has been an 
increase of pre-existing populist political discourse and public support for populist parties during the 
economic crisis (Pappas & Aslanidis, 2015; Doxiadis & Matsaganis, 2012). Additional empirical 
examples that indicate the chasm between elites and citizens include the numerous protests and sit-
ins that repeatedly took place in front of the Greek Parliament, especially during the parliamentary 
voting of reforms and austerity measures, as well as incidents of physical and verbal assaults against 
political personnel (Dinas & Rori, 2013). Politicians, such as PASOK ministers have openly blamed 
citizens for the causes of the crisis (Liakos & Kouki, 2015). In terms of metanarratives, studies have 
argued that domestic explanations have been promoted systematically, by both Greek politicians 
and media, in order to legitimise austerity policies (Doudaki, 2015; Liakos & Kouki, 2015; Mylonas, 
2014).  
As recent studies establish, ‘crisis populism’ in Greece appears on both the left and right wings of the 
political spectrum, as well as both fringe and mainstream political parties, which perpetuates the 
pre-established representation of  populism as a ubiquitous element in Greek politics (Pappas & 
Aslanidis, 2015; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). The dominant expert understanding of populism in 
Greece is that of an age-old and deeply-rooted phenomenon that has only come to intensify further 
during the crisis (Pappas & Aslanidis, 2015; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). For example, authors speak of 
‘Greece’s populist saga’ and its continuation during the economic crisis (Pappas & Aslanidis, 2015: 
181) or refer to populism as the recurring ‘bedrock of the Greek political system’ (Vasilopoulou et al., 
2013: 3). Simultaneously, media and political actors present populism as pervasive and dangerous 
for political life (Stavrakakis, 2014). For instance, a journalist went as far as spiritedly stating that ‘if 
populism was a religion, Greece would be Pakistan’ (as cited in Stavrakakis, 2014: 509). In this sense, 
representations of ideological conflict in Greece after the crisis were anchored to pre-existing 
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representations of pre-established social cleavages, creating an image of qualitative continuation, 
but change in degree and intensity.  
Moving on to the second conflict domain among political elites, we further need to differentiate it 
between a) interparty conflict and b) intraparty conflict. Regarding the first, interparty animosity and 
mutual blaming were prominent during the crisis (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). Political leaders are 
found to have engaged in blame-shifting strategies with the two dominant political parties of PASOK 
and ND attributing blame to each other for not being capable to implement reforms over the years 
(Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). SYRIZA was consistently the greatest critic of PASOK and ND within the 
parliament, blaming them for the crisis (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). 
In terms of internal party dynamics, political parties themselves suffered strong internal divisions 
due to heated disagreements on austerity and reform policy with several episodes of voluntary 
desertion or even enforced expelling of MPs (Dinas & Rori, 2013). In this respect, both political elites 
and journalists have often explicitly represented Greek parties as going through ‘identity crises’12. 
For example, journalist Antonis Panoutsos, writing for the Proto Thema (2014), comments that ‘we 
have two parties in identity crisis. ND trying to prove domestically that it is an anti-Memorandum 
party, and SYRIZA trying to prove abroad that it is a party friendly to foreign investors’.  
These occurrences and representations exemplify the depth of conflict, fragmentation and 
dispersion of the Greek representative system, which in effect destabilised governance and 
challenged Greece’s capability to project a united clear voice, thus a consistent external identity, to 
the outer world (Featherstone, 2012; Verney, 2014). Although there were some occasions of 
coalition governments for the sake of resolving governing dead-ends, including the establishment of 
a technocratic government led by Lucas Papademos, these initiatives were short-lived and led to 
public condemnation accompanied by the ‘political death’ of the smaller parties that agreed to these 
                                                          
12 For SYRIZA see Nikos Filis, Minister of Education, in Tribune, 2015; for PASOK see Terence Quick, member of 
ANEL, in Zougla, 2014; for ND see Mpregianni, 2015. 
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political syntheses, as was the case with LAOS and DIMAR (Dinas & Rori, 2013; Hindmoor & 
McConnell, 2015; Verney, 2014).  
These profound disagreements and lack of acceptance for political cooperation were largely and 
conventionally interpreted as symptoms of Greece’s political culture as one that primarily favours 
division and disagreement, rather than consensus and collaboration (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015). 
This resonates with pre-existing and wider examinations of political cultures that juxtapose 
‘coalitional’ or ‘consensus-building’ cultures, such as those of Germany and the Nordic countries and 
‘contradictive’ cultures, such as those of Greece, Italy or Poland (Getimis et al., 2014: 303; Ioannidis, 
2011). In the context of Greece within the economic crisis, this contrast is openly evoked (i.e. 
Katsounaki, 2016). As put, ‘politics is high-adrenaline stuff – Greece is not Scandinavia’ (Tsoukalis, 
2012: 33).  
Regarding divisions within the wider Greek society, it is worth noting that several protests were 
marked by violent encounters between demonstrators and the riot police (Vasilopoulou & 
Halikiopoulou, 2013). Immediately after the voting of the first Memorandum in 2010, three bank 
employees died, among them a pregnant woman, after protestors set a Marfin Bank branch on fire 
with Molotov cocktails (Psimitis, 2011). Moreover, such protests have most often been characterised 
by the destruction of public and private property, and the disruption of economic life (Doxiadis & 
Matsaganis, 2012), turning Greek citizens against each other. In addition, the rise of the Golden 
Dawn and the violent attacks on immigrants and Greek citizens who expressed anti-fascist opinions, 
such as the murder of musician Pavlos Fyssas by a Golden Dawn supporter or the assault of two 
female parliamentarians by a Golden Dawn parliamentarian on national television (Angouri & 
Wodak, 2014; Dinas & Rori, 2013), have also increased the image of a country in ideological and 
occasionally physical conflict. Finally, some social groups, such as public sector employees, unionists 
and pensioners have been prominent culprits in the blaming discourse of the economic crisis 
(Kotarski, 2012; Tracy, 2012), which may install further divisions within Greek society.  
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Revival of dualisms 
 
Nevertheless, as was illustrated in the previous chapter, the image of Greece as a country in conflict 
is not a new representation and narratives of national chasms have been diachronically dominant. 
Often in public discourses of the crisis (i.e. Chatzis, 2015), these antagonisms have been referred to 
as ‘the new national division’ evoking the historical National Schism between Royalists and 
Venizelists or the polarised disagreements between Deliyannis and Trikoupis (Clogg, 2002). 
According to SRT, anchoring of current phenomena to older historical ones assists with their 
comprehension by creating a familiar parallelism.  
All these dynamics of populism, subversive politics and radicalism have been understood as an 
expression of the aforementioned ‘underdog culture’ of Greece (Diamandouros, 1994). Many have 
argued that the theory of cultural dualism has been revitalised after the onset of the crisis to 
become the widely accepted explanatory framework (Triantafyllidou et al., 2013; Xenakis, 2013). As 
such, the economic crisis has often been represented as a failure of modernisation and reform and 
the populist underdog culture has been blamed for the malfunction of the country (Liakos & Kouki, 
2015; Triantafyllidou et al., 2013).  
Simultaneously, the underdog culture has not only been represented as the cause of the crisis, but 
also as its intensified outcome since the resulting impoverishment created more underprivileged 
populations, therefore it increased the feelings of victimhood that characterise the underdog 
experience (Diamandouros, 2013; Doxiadis & Matsaganis, 2012), while claims of loss of sovereignty 
due to the Memoranda validated the public sense of victimisation by what was described as a ‘quasi-
colonial EU’ (Featherstone, 2014: 9; Laliouti & Bithymitris, 2015). For instance, xenophobic and 
populist parties were voted mostly by the young, the unemployed, and those facing financial 
difficulties (Doxiadis & Matsaganis, 2012). 
Critical theorists have argued that in light of the intensification of populism, there has been a 
corresponding rise of ‘anti-populism’, defined as ‘discourses aiming at the ideological policing and 
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the political marginalisation of emerging protest movements against the anti-democratic politics of 
austerity’ (Katsambekis & Stavrakakis, 2015: 122). According to this argumentation, the backlash 
against populism exemplifies the suppression of people’s right to dignified jobs and political 
recognition by means of delegitimisation of popular demands (Kutter, 2014; Stavrakakis, 2014). This 
debate is situated in the wider controversy on populism whereby some view populism as a 
corrective to malfunctioning democracies and others understand populism as a politically 
destructive force as such (Abts & Rummens, 2007; Kaltwasser, 2012).  
 
To Memorandum or not to Memorandum? 
 
Although the revival of cultural dualism reproduced representations of old and familiar binary 
oppositions, the particular circumstances of the crisis enriched these dualities with new dualist 
objectifications (Laliouti & Bithymitris, 2015). While initially some diagnosed a re-emergence of left-
right cleavages (Boukala, 2014; Economides, 2012), the major fault line in Greece was said to 
crystallise around the question of the Memorandum and whether it should be supported or not 
(Dinas & Rori, 2013; Doxiadis & Matsaganis, 2012; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). For 
instance, political instability in Greece resulted in many elections and governments during the 
economic crisis and these electoral periods marked the times that most vividly illustrated the splits 
of Greek society. In both 2012 and 2015 election rounds, the pro-Memorandum and anti-
Memorandum camps imprinted on the process and became its central object of contestation (Dinas 
& Rori, 2013; Doxiadis & Matsaganis, 2012; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). Due to increased 
polarisation and ideological intensity, these two theses became objectified within particular 
schematic associations and created – to a certain degree - stereotypical formations of meaning, 
although elements of both stances often intersect and are not mutually exclusive, which indicates 
the complexity of public opinion.  
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One of the stereotypical ways that the pro-Memorandum camp has been interpreted is as standing 
for more Europe, support for the Euro, cooperation with the Troika, tolerance towards austerity and 
compliance with reforms (Pappas, 2014; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). In contrast, the anti-
Memorandum position has been associated with Euroscepticism, risking a potential Grexit, possible 
return to the Drachma currency, and resistance to reforms and austerity (Pappas, 2014; 
Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). These associations acquired the seemingly unquestionable 
status of ‘common sense’ through representations of the Memorandum as the defining vehicle for 
staying in the Eurozone aligned with austerity measures (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013).  
These links were facilitated by discourse stemming both from inside and outside Greece. For 
instance, EU partners repeatedly clarified that continuance of Greece within the Eurozone was 
conditional on the fiscal consolidation measures ingrained in the Memorandum without the option 
of renegotiation (Dinas & Rori, 2013; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013). In line with this, domestic 
elites emphasised the ‘need for a pro-European front and a functional pro-EU government’ that 
would ‘ensure that Greece would remain in the Eurozone’ (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013: 8). 
Whether explicitly stated or not, continued membership entailed implementing the Memorandum 
conditions (Sandbu, 2015; Tsoukalis, 2013).  
During the crisis years, the pro-Memorandum front was primarily represented by PASOK and ND, 
especially after the conversion of the latter when elected to govern, while the anti-Memorandum 
front was supported by SYRIZA, ANEL, GD, KKE, LAOS, and DIMAR until it joined the coalition 
government in 2012 (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013; Zartaloudis, 2013). Given the electoral 
marginalisation of PASOK and the limited appeal of the other parties, ND and SYRIZA became the 
party objects of the two ideological positions (Verney, 2014). The electoral campaigns were marked 
by additional binarisms. For example, ND leader, Antonis Samaras, during the 2012 election 
campaign, sketched out the following binaries framing the public debate in Greece: ‘the euro or the 
drachma’, ‘change of economic policy or disaster with worse bailout conditions’,  ‘jobs or 
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unemployment’, ‘security or fear’, ‘alliances abroad or isolation’, ‘government or anarchy’, and ‘past 
or future’ (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013: 10).  
Alternatively, and despite often criticising these as ‘fake dilemmas’ (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 
2013: 9), SYRIZA discursively instilled its own binaries, such as those of ‘homeland versus Merkel’, 
‘independence versus Memoranda’ and ‘independence versus subjection’ (Laliouti & Bithymitris, 
2015: 262), but also ‘hope versus fear’, ‘old elites versus the people’, ‘financial institutions versus the 
people’, ‘dignity versus austerity’, ‘renegotiation versus defeat’, ‘past versus future’ (Katsambekis, 
2015; Spourdalakis, 2013; Stavrakakis, 2015). As such, polarisation of ideas, or as Moscovici would 
term it, the ‘battle of ideas’ has been integral of the crisis experience in Greece, while old familiar 
representations of polarisation were re-enacted with increased intensity in the Greek political scene 
(Katsambekis, 2015; Pappas, 2014).  
 
Referendum 2015: Greece’s choice 
 
The contested dynamics of the Memorandum were even more concretised in the referendum of July 
2015 when the Greek citizens were invited to vote on whether Greece should accept a third 
Memorandum suggested by the EU or reject it (Askitas, 2015; Fabbrini, 2016). After the anti-
austerity and anti-Memorandum government of SYRIZA/ANEL was formed after the elections of 
January 2015, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras pledged to renegotiate the conditions of the 
Memoranda signed by the previous governments (Fabbrini, 2016). During the politically intense 
week that followed the fall-out of the negotiations between the Greek government and the Troika, 
and the announcement of the referendum by Tsipras, where he openly urged people to vote for No, 
the referendum was represented by European and Greek politicians, experts and media as a vote on 
Eurozone and EU membership, rather than the proposed agreement (Askitas, 2015; Fabbrini, 2016; 
Giurlando, 2016).  
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This dissonance between messages generated from Brussels that a rejection of the Memorandum 
would automatically lead to Grexit and the Greek government’s intention to vote on the character of 
the agreement, as well as all the diplomatic polemics that accompanied this wilful 
miscommunication (Giurlando, 2016), created the peculiar representation that the No vote appealed 
both to pro-EU and anti-EU Greeks for different reasons (Simms, 2015). As aptly put, ‘observers must 
deal with the paradox that some of the most pro-European Greeks, along with many extreme leftist 
and rightist anti-Europeans, voted against the bailout deal’ (Simms, 2015). As such, in many respects, 
the Euro crisis in Greece may have succeeded in creating the paradoxical political identities of 
‘Eurosceptic Europhiles’ and ‘Europhile Eurosceptics’, exemplifying the profoundly qualitative and 
thinly-grained nature of the debate, rather than its ‘either/or’ nature, albeit alongside its intense 
polarisation.  
According to the results, 61% of the voters voted against the Memorandum and 38% in favour of it, 
while Tsipras’s popularity increased because his initiative was publicly interpreted as ‘standing up to 
the EU leaders, especially against Germany’ (Zestos, 2016: 258). More precisely, voters were said to 
‘believe that […] Tsipras did the best he could to negotiate effectively with the creditors’ (Pelagidis & 
Mitsopoulos, 2016: 760). The 2015 referendum can be argued to have been the sharpest peak of a 
long process of polarisation primarily in Greece, and to a lesser extend in the EU, regarding the 
management of the crisis and the severity of its consequences. Furthermore, it is fair to say that it 
constituted the most intense period of diplomatic conflict between Greece and its European 
partners, especially between Greece and Germany. However, it was more than a mere public 
disagreement on technical issues of crisis management. The 2015 referendum was evidently 
coloured with identity considerations and questions regarding Greece’s future direction, inside or 
outside Europe. The Greek citizens who gathered around the Syntagma Square and the 
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Kallimarmaro Stadium to support the No and Yes vote respectively, spoke their minds on national TV 
and noticeably used identity terms not only about Greece and themselves, but also about Europe. 13 
Various Greek artists performed on the stage that was assembled at the No gathering, among them 
Alkinoos Ioannidis who stated, ‘I’ve never performed as a support band for a prime minister before, 
but I will do it tonight… this is not a No to Europe, this is a No to this kind of Europe’ (emphasis of 
the speaker). As shown, Ioannidis’s statement expresses one of the fundamental reasons behind the 
No vote in Greece which centred on what was perceived as an unrealistic and dysfunctional, as well 
as oppressive and undemocratic, form of crisis management. Another artist on the same stage, 
Sokratis Malamas, commented, ‘an experimentalist knows that if you do the same things, you will 
get the same results. We’ve said yes many times, it’s time to say no’, a comment that may evoke the 
metaphor of Greece as a guinea pig. A male citizen attending the No demonstration declared, ‘this is 
the first time in five years that anyone has bothered to ask me what I think’ indicating that there has 
been a public sense of suppression of political identities.  
In contrast, in the Yes demonstration, Nikos Aliagas, Greek TV star in France, said that Greeks should 
vote for Yes, because: ‘we will not be the ones to pay for the mistakes of other politicians and of 
other countries too, we must stay united’, a statement which shows the segments of populist 
critique towards the EU within the Yes camp that does not entail rejection of the EU. Aliagas went on 
to pose the question of identity unambiguously: ‘who are we? Are we Balkan? Are we 
Mediterranean? Are we Oriental? Are we Western? Who is the Greek today on the scale of Europe? 
We are Greek and European! [...] Europe is not only a Greek word, it is a way of thinking, it is a 
consciousness, it is identity’. A female farmer at the Yes gathering stated: ‘I never wanted to be 
forced into such dilemmas, whether I am Greek or European, I never wanted to be called 
Germanotsolias because I want to vote for Yes… I want to remain in Europe’. 
                                                          
13 The quotations that are presented here were gathered as notes while watching the events on national 
television, i.e. ERT 1, Mega, Ant1.  
138 
 
Germanotsolias (Γερμανοτσολιάς) is a compound word, made of the Greek word for ‘German’, 
Γερμανός, and the word ‘tsolias’, τσολιάς, which refers to the 19th century skirt-wearing Royal Guard, 
established by the Bavarian King Otto, a special army unit which can only be seen today in the 
Presidential Guard, performing exclusively ritualistic tasks, rather than actual combat. The word 
made its appearance during the last years in Greece to describe supporters of the EU in a rather 
derogatory manner, while at the same time criticising the EU for becoming overwhelmed by German 
dominance. This point additionally exhibits a distinct anti-German sentiment that was evident during 
the crisis in Greece (Droumpouki, 2013; Tsoukalis, 2012), which is even more apparent in the older 
use of the word Germanotsolias which was attributed to the Greek Security Battalions, Τάγματα 
Ασφαλείας that collaborated with the Germans during the WWII (Zafeiropoulou et al., 2015). Their 
members, called tagmatasfalites (ταγματασφαλίτες), were responsible for the death of many and 
are still bitterly remembered today as ‘traitors’, alongside the informers (called δωσίλογοι) of the 
time (Kalyvas, 2008; Mazower, 1993).  
These negative representations of Germans and EU-friendly Greeks are also indicative of a profound 
conflict in the domain not only of Greece’s national identity, but also its European identity by 
exemplifying a sense of disunity with Europe and traits of symbolic hostility towards other 
Europeans (Mazower, 2015; Ntampoudi, 2014a). Furthermore, it characteristically illustrates SRT’s 
assumption that metaphors like these can create particular social objects that anchor current events 
to prior historical ones, which illustrates the strong cognitive relations between history and memory 
in the context of the Euro crisis (Jovchelovitch, 2012; Kalantzis, 2014). Finally, this point illustrates 
the existence of a very European ‘politics of blaming’ and identity conflict. 
 
A very European identity conflict 
 
The two crisis metanarratives have often been misunderstood as ‘mutually exclusive’ (Vasilopoulou 
et al., 2013) and have led to recurring debates within the academic literature, public media 
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discussion and political elite rhetoric (i.e. Tekin, 2014). However, it is more accurate to assume that 
they only emphasise and illuminate different dimensions of the same phenomenon (Featherstone, 
2011; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013), since crises are ‘products of multiple causal factors’ (Hindmoor & 
McConnell, 2015: 25). Nevertheless, various researchers who work on the discourse of the Euro and 
the Greek crisis have empirically observed that these two metanarratives have been implicated into 
a ‘blame game’ (Chalaniova, 2014; Ntampoudi, 2014a; Tekin, 2014). Attribution of blaming only 
reflects the main public tendencies following crises (Hindmoor & McConnell, 2015). Within these 
particular dynamics there have been sharp distinctions between the European North and South or 
the economic core and periphery, with unfavourable representations of both regions/economic 
areas (Mylonas, 2012; Ntampoudi, 2014a; Tekin, 2014). It is important to clarify that this ‘politics of 
blaming’ has operated not only at the level of crisis causes, but also at the level of crisis 
management and response (Featherstone, 2011; Ntampoudi, 2014a). It would be useful here to 
compare Greece with a different case, i.e. Germany, in order to illustrate this point.  
According to the politics of blaming, Greece and Germany have been schematically constructed as 
prototypical cases of the economic areas they were made to represent with the first being the most 
graphic representation of the economically challenged periphery and the latter the representative 
pioneer of the economic core (Ntampoudi, 2014a). As the two metanarratives indicate, both 
prototypes and economic areas have been blamed for the origins of the crisis on the basis of 
overspending or overproducing. Within the ‘domestic’ metanarrative Greece is understood as the 
primary culprit who undermined the economic success of the euro, while in the ‘international’ 
metanarrative Greece is portrayed as revelatory of wider problems, which shifts the blame off its 
shoulders (Kutter, 2014; Marconi, 2011; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). Similarly, from a ‘domestic’ 
metanarrative perspective, Germany is only responsible for its own national economy, but from an 
‘international’ metanarrative perspective it is seen as a strong contributing factor to other countries’ 
crises (Mylonas, 2015). Alternatively, from an international point of view, neither Greece, nor 
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Germany are the problem, but rather the fault line falls on the system of the Euro itself (Milios & 
Sotiropoulos, 2010). 
At the level of crisis management, Greece has been blamed for delaying and resisting reforms and 
necessary measures requested by the EU institutions and the IMF (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013). 
Simultaneously, Germany and France, the stronger economies of the EU, have been similarly blamed 
for not responding adequately and appropriately to the crisis by delaying and providing superficial or 
wrong solutions (Featherstone, 2011; Mitsikopoulou & Lykou, 2015). More widely, the EU and the 
IMF have been accused of exacerbating the political crisis in Greece, especially after the IMF 
admitted to underestimating the effects that austerity would have on Greek economy (Vasilopoulou 
et al., 2013). The choice of austerity has often been juxtaposed with growth policies, presented as 
antithetical and more suitable for solving the crisis (Blyth, 2013). Depending on the metanarrative, 
Greece is viewed as more solely responsible and accountable for overcoming its crisis within a 
domestic metanarrative, and less so, within an international one that implies coordinated action by 
multiple actors and dependence on factors outside Greece’s influence. Both Greece and Germany, 
South and North, have additionally been blamed for lacking the solidarity and commitment that 
would be necessary to keep European integration from disintegrating (Bickes et al., 2014a; 
Ntampoudi, 2014a). Blaming as a strategy of representation is intrinsically linked to identity 
formation since representations of blame and wrong-doing are capable of constructing negative 
identity schemas and stereotypes and as an extension, negative public attitudes towards the ones 
who are constructed as the villains or wrong-doers.  
In this respect, the aforementioned ‘politics of blaming’ based on different metanarratives of the 
Euro/Greek crisis can be said to have additionally created a destabilisation for Greek European 
identity by placing Greece in antagonism with other Europeans and as such, fellow members of its 
superordinate ingroup (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Huo et al., 1996). In line with SIT, membership in 
ingroups provide social entities with their identity resources, therefore if a social entity is in a state 
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of conflict with its ingroup, it follows that it is in a state of conflict with itself, hence the experience 
of an identity destabilisation in the sense of identity conflict (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Huo et al., 
1996). Furthermore, representations of conflicting interests among different European countries and 
the context of Greek contestation of the directives coming from the EU reconstruct the 
understanding of European integration as antagonistic to national wellbeing, thus to national 
identity, creating an antagonistic relationship between the two identity dimensions (Fabbrini, 2013; 
Theodossopoulos, 2014). Finally, Greece’s conflictual representation with its European dimension 
was further complicated by the circulation of negative national stereotypes and particularised 
European prototypes that have led to representations of identity destabilisation in the form of 
identity devaluations and deficits, but also reactionary claims of identity overvaluations. These 
dynamics will be discussed in the next sections.  
 
Identity devaluation: national stereotypes and European prototypes  
 
Objectification through metaphor: Greece’s ‘villain’ roles 
 
During the Euro crisis, there were several metaphorical representations, within which Greece played 
various roles, mostly negatively valued ones. According to SRT, objectification of vague and 
confusing phenomena, like crises, crystallises through various cognitive mechanisms, one of which is 
metaphor-making (Arruda, 2015). In metaphor-making, the abstract discursive object acquires a 
meaningful concreteness that facilitates the sense of successful explanation and increased 
understanding (Arruda, 2015; Christidou et al., 2004). Metaphor-making is an ‘objectification device 
or tool’ that employs human cognition for the construction of comparable images and narratives 
(Christidou et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 1995). This process is achieved by drawing elements from the 
source domain which is the widely familiar mental schema, i.e. a storyline or an image, and ascribing 
them onto the target domain, which is the object that needs apprehension (Wagner et al., 1995). 
Nevertheless, metaphors have ontological limitations and thus cannot reproduce the totality of the 
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object itself. As put (Arruda, 2015: 131), ‘to produce a metaphor is an exercise of imagination 
which… highlights certain parts of the object and recombines them into an effective analogy’. In this 
sense, metaphors are not ‘accurate’ or ‘true’ but rather analogical and figurative (Byford, 2002; 
Christidou et al., 2004). The use of metaphors has been one of the primary ways of representing the 
Euro crisis to the wider public (Arrese & Vara-Miguel, 2015; Bickes et al., 2014a; Joris et al., 2015; 
Schäffner, 2012; Stavrakakis, 2013). Some of these metaphorical scripts concern the ontology of the 
Euro crisis and include metaphors of war, game, disease, natural disaster and zoomorphism. Others 
relate to the crisis management and represent it through scripts of rescuing, begging, teaching, and 
standing at the cross-roads.  
The war metaphor, one of the most commonly used inside and outside Europe (Bickes et al., 2014a; 
Joris et al., 2015; Kutter, 2014) represents the relations of European nations as being at war with 
each other (Joris et al., 2015). While some of them concern disagreements between Germany and 
France regarding crisis management issues, others focus on the threat that Greece poses to other 
European countries and/or European integration as a whole (Bohn & de Jong, 2011; Kutter, 2014; 
Touri & Rogers, 2013). Particularly with regards to the last point, researchers have argued that 
during the first years of the crisis Greece was persistently portrayed as ‘an enemy within Europe’s 
own ranks’ (Askanius & Mylonas, 2015: 63). Tekin (2014), for example, analyses the way that Greek 
elections in 2012 were represented by European political leaders as ‘blackmailing the EU’, a 
representation that enacts an image of Greece as an ‘economic terrorist’ and an adversary, rather 
than a participant in the EU.  
War metaphors operate within the ‘politics of blaming’ aforementioned in the previous section and 
imply that EU countries have opposing interests and interaction between them is belligerent and 
strategic, rather than that of solidly united community with common goals (Bickes et al., 2014a; Joris 
et al., 2015). Cross-country studies (Joris et al., 2015; see also, Bickes et al., 2014a) have shown that 
the war metaphor additionally articulates through the metaphorical frame of game, which ‘implies a 
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rather friendly struggle between players’ (Joris et al., 2014: 609). Nevertheless, we can appreciate 
that even games between friendly players still imply an antagonistic relationship, albeit not a 
‘bloody’ one (Bickes et al., 2014a). Within the game metaphor Greece is understood as the player 
that is either incapable, or simply unwilling, to play by the rules (Kutter, 2014; Tekin, 2014).  
The disease metaphor concerns the crisis being depicted as an epidemic or a virus, while the natural 
disaster metaphor employs words such as financial tsunami, hurricane, perfect storm, earthquake, 
fire, vortex or quagmire (Bickes et al., 2014a; Joris et al., 2015; Kutter, 2014). Both metaphors can be 
seen as naturalistic analogies, implying that the crisis is naturally caused and as such, not dependent 
on any given specific factor, such as financial or political institutions and actors (Bickes et al., 2014a). 
In this sense, these metaphors could be said to have the capacity to escape blaming propensity, as is 
the case with the disaster metaphor, whereby Greece ‘is no longer blamed for having triggered the 
crisis’ (Bickes et al., 2014a: 435). This can be explained by the rather eschatological and fatalistic 
meanings that disaster metaphors entail (Mylonas, 2012). Alternatively, the depictions of the Euro 
crisis as an outcome of a ‘superior power’ like fate (Bickes et al., 2014a: 441) can be seen as 
metaphysical metaphors, rather than natural and physical, representing the crisis as a ‘supernatural 
phenomenon’ (Murray-Leach et al., 2014: 1).  
Within this discursive context of fatalism, it could be argued that the most frequent and resonant 
representation of the Greek crisis is that of ‘Greek tragedy’, a term often used in academic and 
media discourse (i.e. Douzinas, 2010; also Tzogopoulos, 2013 on media). The term refers to the 
ancient Greek theatrical genre of tragedy within which the hero usually meets a disastrous ending 
due to the twists of fate or whimsies of the Gods that ultimately govern all human relations, some 
integral narrative elements of all tragedy, meant to punctuate the irony of personal agency that 
always meets the bitter end (Holland, 2000). Similarly, within this dramaturgical analogy, Greece’s 
struggle to overcome the crisis is implied to be futile and quite literarily, destined to fail.   
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However, within the disease metaphor, Greece has not been spared culpability since it has been 
represented as the ‘patient zero’ of the crisis and the original source from which crisis could spread 
not only to other EU countries, but also the world as a whole (Tracy, 2012; Wodak & Angouri, 2014). 
This pattern has been explicated most consistently by the term ‘contagion’ or ‘metastasis’ used in 
both media and expert discourse (Kutter, 2014; Tzogopoulos, 2013). This situates Greece as the 
cause of the problem, rather than the symptom and finds resonance with the domestic 
metanarrative that nationalises blaming (Bickes et al., 2014a). Nevertheless, the portrayal of Greece 
as the ‘sick man of Europe’ (Vasilopoulou et al., 2013: 2) predates the crisis and as such, it becomes 
plausible for commentators to state that the crisis signals the ‘return of the Greek patient’ 
(Pagoulatos & Triantopoulos, 2009: 35).  
Another crisis metaphor concerns zoomorphic analogies in both expert and media discourse. Media 
representations witnessed the sensationalist use of the acronym PIIGS, constructed by the initials of 
the countries that faced financial problems, such as Portugal, Ireland and/or Italy, Greece and Spain, 
and noticeably denoting the figure of the pig animal. Examples of titles include ‘Eurozone 'pigs' are 
leading us all to slaughter’ (Jeremy Warner for The Telegraph, 2010) or ‘While Greece flails, are the 
rest of the stricken Pigs taking off?’ (Alistair Dawber for The Independent, 2015). These two 
examples show that although the term was more extensively used during the first years of the 
economic crisis before it was banned by some institutions, in 2015 its usage could still be traced in 
public discourse. Academic discourse itself made use of terms such as ‘PIGS’ and ‘non-PIGS’ to speak 
of countries with or without financial difficulties, respectively (i.e. Fernandes & Mota, 2011; Lewis-
Beck & Nadeau, 2012).  
Alternatively, several researchers criticised the use of this acronym for its derogatory and 
dehumanizing connotations and the misleading grouping of these countries that obliterated their 
differences (Capucha et al., 2014; Nicholls, 2015). Others argued that this negative acronym 
adversely impacted the markets’ response to these countries (Brazys & Hardiman, 2014), while some 
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argued that such acronyms, consistent with the domestic metanarrative, were used to justify 
austerity policies (Capucha et al., 2014). Notably, the term PIGS is often used by authors who wish to 
speak in support of these countries (i.e. Gärtner et al., 2011), although even this favourable 
motivation can be said to reproduce the use of a negatively loaded term (Ntampoudi, 2013). 
Alternatively, another derogatory acronym was coined for the signification of the same national 
economies in the form of GIPSIs, resembling the word ‘gypsies’ which stands for the social group of 
the Roma people who are often subject to social discrimination, as shown in previous studies (Perez 
et al., 2007).  
Nevertheless, the PIIGS acronym was not the only schema of animalisation as indicated by recent 
research which found several animal images in political cartoons of the Euro/Greek crisis (see Bain et 
al., 2012; Elsayed, 2015; Talalay, 2013; Wilk, 2015). In terms of Greece’s case, Chalaniova’s (2014) 
examination, for example, indicated that compared to Europe/EU which was never pictured in 
animalistic ways, the Greeks were often depicted in animal form, such as pigs, donkeys, or bulls. 
Chalaniova (2014: 40) comments that although images of both Greece and Europe were comparable 
due to both incorporating symbols, such as flags, and personifications of mythical and actual figures, 
like ancient Athenians or current politicians, the issue of zoomorphism was the only point of 
‘differentiation through dehumanisation’.  
On another occasion, a researcher observes that the crisis was discursively labelled as the ‘Greek 
pest’ metaphorically referring to the source domain of insects or animals that destroy crops and 
representing Greece as ‘the primary trigger of calamities’ (Kutter, 2014: 456), which resonates with 
the domestic metanarrative that locates culpability within the national context. Alternatively, from 
an international metanarrative that shifts the weight to global accountabilities, Greece once again 
figures as another animal, namely, the ‘guinea pig’ (Marconi, 2011; Mylonas, 2012). Within this 
representation, Greece is understood as the object of a ‘laboratory’ experiment, designed to test the 
degree of neoliberal and post-democratic policies nations can uphold for the purposes of installing 
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these to ‘the whole of Europe’ (Mylonas, 2012: 647) or simply test ‘for the survival of the Eurozone’ 
(Marconi, 2011: 30).   
The remaining metaphors concern the response and management of the crisis and refer to widely 
known scripts of social practices, such as begging, rescuing, teaching and learning, and standing at 
the crossroads. Beginning with the first, Greece’s search for funds that would prevent its default has 
often been the topic of news media. These representations are directly denoted by expressions such 
as Greece ‘seeks’, ‘asks’, or ‘requests’ loans or meetings with EU leaders, which indirectly connote 
the image of a country as a beggar, while on other occasions, the beggar identity is explicitly stated, 
as is the case with titles such as ‘A poor nation, with a talent for begging’ (Marcello Simonetta for 
Politico, 2015) and ‘Chinese investors wary of filling Greece’s golden begging bowl’ (Tom Mitchell & 
Kerin Hope for the Financial Times, 2015). Begging scripts necessarily entail the dual relationship 
between beggar and philanthropist.  
A comparable representation that approximates this script is the representation of the Euro crisis 
management as a rescuing endeavour attempted by the EU and the IMF for the purposes of assisting 
insolvent economies, including Greece (Bickes et al., 2014a). Within this representation stronger 
economies are depicted as ‘heroic, good-natured, selfless and generous’ while the recipient 
countries are portrayed as ‘needy, poor and helpless’ (Bickes et al., 2014a: 433-434). Consistent with 
the international metanarrative, some academics have criticised this crisis representation as being 
hypocritical because they viewed the undertaking as a rescue of the banks, rather than of the 
countries in financial trouble, while they additionally argued that this script served to conceal the 
lack of solidarity within the EU and the culpability of creditor countries (Bickes et al., 2014a: 
Mylonas, 2012). 
Another argument projected against the rescuing script is what is viewed as harsh conditionality that 
is imposed on recipient countries according to which help is provided granted that structural reforms 
are made and austerity is followed (Bickes et al., 2014a). The issue of conditionality and reform has 
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additionally been implicated in the next representation of crisis management, namely the script of 
teaching and learning. Within this, creditor countries are represented as teachers who function as 
role models for the heavily indebted countries and dictate actions (Bickes et al., 2014a; Sommer, 
2014). Correspondingly, indebted countries are presented as pupils who need to learn from their 
teachers and do their homework (Bickes et al., 2014a; Sommer, 2014). While this representation has 
been attached to all the countries that faced financial turmoil and requested bailout funding, not all 
were pictured as good and obedient pupils, since Greece was differentiated and widely understood 
as the ‘bad pupil’ compared to the ‘good pupils’ of Ireland and Portugal (Bickes et al., 2014a; 
Magone, 2014). In tune with this representation, Greece’s resistance or inability to complete 
reforms was also described as childish and immature, projecting the image of a stubborn and 
disrespectful pupil, an impression that was particularly emphasised after SYRIZA’s rise to power by 
personifying representations of childishness on the person of Alexis Tsipras (see i.e. Larry Elliott for 
The Guardian, 2015 and Chris Giles for the Financial Times, 2015).  
Finally, there has been a widespread metaphor of the EU as ‘standing at the crossroads’ and having 
to choose between following an intergovernmental moderate integration pattern or moving 
forwards with further and deeper integration which follows a federalist model (Kutter, 2014). This 
point has been a controversial debate of the Euro crisis with multiple parameters that include 
conflicting national interests and sovereignty concerns, as well as the construction of political 
consensus and public support (Fabbrini, 2013). Although it is not in the scope of this thesis to 
conclude on what form European integration should take, suffice to say that one of the main 
assumptions of this metaphor of crossroads is that the EU has progressed as an uncertain hybrid 
between intergovernmentalism and federalism and this model has met its limits due to the 
intensified conditions of the Euro crisis, hence the urgency of making a decision at this particular 
historical interval (Ntampoudi, 2015; Schout & Wolff, 2012). In terms of Greece specifically, its role 
within this scenario has been that of the ‘critical juncture’ which features Greece as the acutely and 
often presented as uniquely problematic case that forced the EU to decide on its future 
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development (Kutter, 2014). And in this respect, it may be recognised as an irony in future 
historiography that it was Greece’s ambiguous, marginal and maladjusted case that propelled 
European integration forwards (Menz & Smith, 2013; Yiangou et al., 2013).  
 
Culturalisation: negative national stereotypes 
 
Representations of Greece during the economic crisis appear to have crystallised around negative 
national stereotypes that have operated within the three emblematic domains of European 
integration, namely, the economic, the political and the cultural, which in turn invited questions of 
European identity (Bickes et al., 2014b; Chalaniova, 2014; Mylonas, 2015; Tekin, 2014). As explained, 
the three pillars of European integration constitute distinct, but not separate, domains as they 
constantly interact with each other (Bideleux, 1996a; Hahn, 2009). In this sense, the economic 
complications of Greece were additionally represented as culturally and politically problematic. In all 
three domains, an overarching pattern has been the vivid normativity of the narratives which 
indicates that questions of values and ethics have played a central role in the crisis discourse 
(Lampropoulou, 2014; Schmidt, 2013). Values and identities are strongly associated because the 
values that social entities stand for or against, as well as the content they ascribe to them, ultimately 
form their identities (Hitlin, 2012; on the EU see the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ as an 
identity-builder, Hahn, 2009).  
Beginning with the relations between the economy and culture, empirical research has 
demonstrated that there has been a distinct process of culturalisation of the Euro/Greek crisis that 
explicitly argues or implies that economic problems are the product of specific cultural traits 
(Mylonas, 2012; Ntampoudi, 2014a; Tekin, 2014). These traits relate to the public discussion of the 
crisis origins and operate within the domestic crisis metanarrative that blames domestic factors. 
These devaluing patterns have progressed in two different ways: a) one that groups Greece with 
other economically challenged economies (i.e. the so-called PIGS), and b) another that singles 
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Greece out as an exceptionally problematic case (Bickes et al., 2014a; Mylonas, 2012). More 
specifically, these traits are objectified around three main representations, namely laziness, 
profligacy and corruption (Bickes et al., 2014a; Marconi, 2011; Mylonas, 2015).  
Although in public discourse it often becomes difficult to linguistically establish the grammatical 
object of these narratives because more often than not discursive actors refer to the object of 
‘Greece’ in abstraction, we can assume that they refer to either ‘the government’, ‘the citizens’ or 
simply, the totality of Greek society (Wodak & Angouri, 2014). It should be noted that culturalist 
interpretations facilitated by abstraction necessarily engage in errors of essentialisation of the 
cultures they describe because they construct the impression of uniformity and homogeneity, 
assuming that all governmental actors or all citizens are the same (Herzfeld, 2016a; Mylonas, 2012; 
Ntampoudi, 2014a), which is ontologically unsustainable given the pluralism of social reality (Arendt, 
1998).  
Regarding stereotyping processes, the links between economic failure and cultural character are not 
always made fully explicit, which creates the need for them to be analytically reconstructed in order 
to wholly explicate the implications of negative stereotyping (Wagner et al., 2009). For example, 
when Greeks are accused of laziness, the word ‘lazy’ is not necessarily used. Instead authors may say 
that Greeks retire too early. For example, Anders Borg, Swedish Finance Minister, stated that 
‘Obviously, Swedes and other taxpayers should not have to pay for Greeks who choose to retire in 
their 40s’ (in Coleman for BBC, 2015). Alternatively, actors may say that Greeks love to party and 
have too many holidays, as suggested in a Bild title, stating that 'We pay the bills while others party 
shamelessly' (Koch for Bild, 2010 as cited in Sommer, 2014). Politicians’ statements appear to imply 
similar notions. For instance, Angela Merkel commented that ‘We can't have a common currency 
where some get lots of vacation time and others very little’ (in Pop for euobserver, 2011).  
Similarly, the word ‘profligacy’ may not necessarily show up. Instead, authors may say that Greeks 
have oversized salaries, pensions or benefits. Another Bild title wonders, ‘Why do we have to pay 
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the Greek’s luxurious pensions?’ (as cited in Bickes et al., 2014b:  115). As put (Shore, 2012: 8), 
representations of Greece during the crisis have focused on ‘Greek cleaners who earn as much as 
ministers and the whole country working half a week’. In terms of government corruption, various 
scandals, clientelism and repeated incidents of falsified statistics, including for the purposes of 
joining the Eurozone, are often invoked as examples (Antoniades, 2012; Kutter, 2014; Mylonas, 
2015), while in terms of citizen corruption the issue of tax-evasion is a frequent reference. Similarly 
to representations of laziness, political figures appear to support such ideas, as in the case of 
Christine Largarde’s comment, ‘as far as Athens is concerned, I also think about all those people who 
are trying to escape tax all the time’ (in Elliott & Aitkenhead for The Guardian, 2012). As such, 
although negative stereotyping was not explicit during the economic crisis, there were several 
representations that were indirectly devaluating.  
 
Exceptionalisation: ‘Greece is a special case’ and nobody is Greece 
 
Comparative empirical studies of different national media’s coverage of the crisis have shown that 
Greece’s case was more salient and more negatively represented than other cases, such as those of 
Spain, Italy Ireland and Portugal (Bickes et al., 2014a; Tzogopoulos, 2013). Moreover, academic 
representations often begin by mentioning that Greece has been standing out in the context of the 
crisis, as is demonstrated by expressions such as ‘stood in the spotlight’ (Chalaniova, 2014: 19), being 
‘at the epicentre of attention’ (Tzogopoulos, 2013: chp.1) or ‘the ‘Greek case’… probably the most 
visible sovereign debt crisis in Europe and beyond’ (Wodak & Angouri, 2014: 417). In this sense, 
Greece went through a process of exceptionalisation, which was intensified by the argument of 
various EU leaders, such as Merkel, Sarkozy and Schauble, that ‘Greece is a special case’ (Mylonas, 
2012) 14. Kutter (2014: 455), for example, explains that Greece in the German media ‘stands out by 
amount, extent and gravity’, while Tekin (2014: 23) summarises that ‘out of these so-called PIGS, 
                                                          
14 See also, Angela Merkel in Reuters, 2015; Milne, 2012 for the Financial Times; Wolfgang Schäuble in Reuters, 
2012. 
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only the case of the Greek rescue programme became so problematic, with strong popular and elite 
reactions at EU level’.  
In addition, we can appreciate that the mere creation of media terms such as ‘Grexit’, ‘Graccident’, 
‘Grecovery’ and ‘Agreekment’ (Rose, 2015; Wodak & Angouri, 2014) indicates that coverage of 
Greece has been more particularised and expansively creative than in other cases which did not 
generate their own compound linguistic objects in the public sphere. Comparing to past 
representations, the ‘Greek problem’ (Tzogopoulos, 2013) within the EU resurfaces as a validated 
prophecy and is accompanied by pre-existing notions of Greece’s exceptionalism compared to its 
Southern-European and Irish counterparts. Paradoxically, Greece appears to have more in common 
with Germany (Herzfeld, 2016a) when it comes to symbolic degradation, than with any of the so-
called PIGS countries, mainly for two reasons: a) because both Greece and Germany occupied 
protagonistic and exceptionalised roles within the economic crisis, albeit for very different reasons, 
and b) because they were both extensively criticised and as such, subjected to harsher identity 
devaluation compared to other member-states. 15 
Another way that Greece has undergone exceptionalising representations was by being depicted and 
treated as increasingly isolated during the crisis. Although at the beginning of the Euro crisis, the 
parallel formation of ‘anti-austerity and pro-democracy’ social movements, such as the Indignados in 
Spain and the Aganaktismenoi in Greece, as well as comparable demonstrations in Portugal and 
Italy, created a base for ‘transnational activism’ and ‘cosmopolitan identities’ (della Porta & 
Andretta, 2013; della Porta & Mattoni, 2014), as well as representations of ‘Southern-European 
crisis-related contention’ and ‘transnational solidarity’ (Kousis, 2014: 142), as public mobilisation 
decreased over time and these movements faded, such sources of shared European identifications 
became less prominent. Furthermore, as other ‘programme countries’ started showing signs of 
                                                          
15 For an extensive comparison of the national European identities of the two countries during the crisis, see 
Ntampoudi (2013), as well as the collaborative research project on blame attribution GGCRISI – The Greeks, 
the Germans and the Crisis, led by Prof. Maria Kousis and Prof. Jochen Roose (http://www.ggcrisi.info/).  
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recovery, stabilisation and increased compliance with EU directives, Greece found itself increasingly 
isolated in its anti-austerity resistance.  
Over time, the representation of Greece as a ‘special case’ was complemented by the ‘We are not 
like Greece’ argument projected by various Southern-European political actors (for Spain see 
Antoniades, 2012; for Portugal see Magone, 2014), in their attempts to avoid symbolic 
contamination by distancing themselves from Greece. These tendencies were additionally facilitated 
by explicit comparisons between respective Southern member-states by EU leaders within the pre-
existing evaluative ‘good/bad pupil’ metaphor, as in the case of Wolfgang Schäuble, who stated that 
‘The Greeks are a special case...The Portuguese government is doing a decent job’ (in Reuters, 2012).  
Notably, these trends were presented as more prominent after SYRIZA’s electoral victory, whose 
policies were registered with bringing Greece to a state of international isolation16, especially since 
the No vote in the 2015 referendum was presented, both inside and outside Greece, as threatening 
to isolate the country from its European partners (i.e. Spiegel & Wagstyl, 2015; To Vima, 2015b). In 
terms of SYRIZA’s initial goal for political alliance across the European South and the misguided 
quest of Southern-European solidarity that could change what was presented as an austere and 
undemocratic Europe, suffice to say that even Pablo Iglesias, leader of the Spanish Podemos, has 
suggestively stated that ‘Spain is not Greece’ (see Ashifa Kassam for The Guardian, 2015). As such, 
we can evaluate that a strong tendency of distanciation occurred with various political actors across 
Europe wishing to distance themselves from Greece.  
While these distanciation tactics can be understood as reassuring both markets and national 
citizenries by means of isolating, thus containing, the ‘Greek problem’, the combined mix of Greece’s 
isolation, devaluation and exceptionalisation contributed to its objectification as an example of 
failure that needed to be avoided ‘at all cost’ (Antoniades, 2012; Pentaraki, 2013). For instance, in 
the run up to the Polish 2010 presidential elections, then prime-minister Donald Tusk stated: ‘We 
                                                          
16 See, for example, Mehreen Khan for the Telegraph, 2015; Cas Mudde for the Huffington Post, 2015b; also, 
To Vima, 2015a. 
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would have now become the Greece of Central Europe, if we had followed the advices of Jarosław 
Kaczyński’ (as cited in Antoniades, 2012). However, these tendencies were not only confined within 
Europe. Outside Europe, examples include Naoto Kan, the Japanese Prime Minister referencing 
Greece's fiscal crisis and asking his fellow politicians to commit to raising the consumption tax, 
concluding that ‘Japan must take action before it becomes like Greece’ (as cited in Antoniades, 
2012). Social entities that are used as ‘examples’ of ‘cautionary tales’ are commonly stripped, thus 
emptied, of any constituent identity elements, other than those that successfully serve the didactic 
function of the warning storyline, which in line with the moral message of the tale, aims at 
reinforcing conformity and discipline17. As such, moralising representations were also observable.  
 
Moralisation: the prototypical ‘good European’ 
 
However, these interrelated processes of culturalisation, essentialisation, exceptionalisation and 
stereotyping are not the most interesting aspects of the Euro/Greek crisis discourse, since these 
simplifying processes are integral and spontaneous facilitating aspects of human cognition (Hogg & 
Vaughan, 2014). In this respect, what is interesting is the ways these are implicated in normative 
debates and ‘values wars’ or in other words, the voluntary dimension of social evaluation and less 
behaviourist practice of judgement (Moscovici, 1998b). In this respect, the above cultural traits are 
additionally presented as signs of low moral character, which indicates the profound moralisation 
and normativity of the Euro crisis discourse (Antoniades, 2012; Kutter, 2014; Mylonas, 2012; Tracy, 
2012).  
At a first analytical level, it appears comprehensible enough how practices such as bribery, 
clientelism, nepotism, tax-evasion and misappropriation of funds can be understood as immoral, 
since they are widely associated with corruption, which is conventionally understood as ‘a bad thing 
that causes major harm to individuals and societies’ and ‘needs to be reduced’ (Heywood, 2014: 1). 
                                                          
17 See also ‘grasshopper and ant’ metaphor of the Euro crisis, Kitromilides, 2013; Tsoukala, 2013. 
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On the other hand, laziness and profligacy have been argued to be viewed as lacking in ethical 
content within ‘a liberal political ethos, which prioritises values such as merit, effort and work ethic, 
instead of traditional social and political practices’ that are considered a burden to modernisation 
(Andreotti et al., 2015). 
The normativity of the crisis discourse is most clearly demonstrated by the usage of terms that carry 
distinctly moral connotations, such as those of ‘moral hazard’, ‘deficit sinners’ and ‘Euro-deceivers’ 
(Bickes et al., 2014b; Kutter, 2014; Tekin, 2014). ‘Moral hazard’ is defined as ‘the possibility of 
encouraging risky behaviours by parties who view their contracts as protecting them from loss and 
risk’ (Hay, 2010: 384). It follows from this, that governments that know that another level of 
government will bail them out, run larger deﬁcits and create larger debts than states in systems 
where governments have no bailout guarantees (Guiso et al., 2013; Hallerberg, 2011). Within this 
representation, Greece was a country that posed a ‘moral hazard’ threat, because of its ‘free-riding’ 
behaviour and unreliability, which could lead to other countries’ dissent or equally immoral 
behaviour, if Greece was to be seen as receiving preferential treatment and unjustifiable bailout 
assistance (Antoniades, 2012; Guiso et al., 2013). As such, the question of strict conditionality before 
granting financial help became a dominant object of the crisis discourse, because of the need to 
convey the message that solidarity was by no means unconditional, but instead directly attached to 
increased EU supervision (Guiso et al., 2013). Within the binary opposition of ‘saints’ and ‘sinners’ 
exists the religious assumption that sinners can become saints by means of redemption (Mylonas, 
2012), or vice versa, saints may sin, possibly due to temptation imposed by surrounding sinners 
(Dyson, 2014; see also, religious analyses of the Euro crisis, Guiso et al., 2013).  
Within this religiously inspired metaphor-making, and to the degree that this prevails and reins as a 
dominant representation, the logical extreme or solution becomes the punishment of the member-
states that are seen as destabilising the economy (Mylonas, 2012), whether imposed by actual 
sanctions, such as legal exclusion, indirect pressure, such as the stop of financial assistance 
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(Sommer, 2014), or even symbolic tactics, such as public shaming (Petley, 2013). Necessarily, within 
an international context, such measures entail the degradation of a state’s national identity and 
international standing because states that are considered ‘norm violating are denounced as pariah 
states which do not belong to the community of civilised nations’ (Friman, 2015: 145).  
In terms of sanctions, for example, Greece has often been represented as being threatened by EU 
institutions with exclusion from the Eurozone, especially after SYRIZA/ANEL’s election and during the 
2015 referendum18, or from the Schengen Zone, during the ongoing refugee crisis (see i.e. Herzfeld, 
2016b; Hope for the Financial Times, 2016). Furthermore, within such a political climate, sactioning 
became reasonable for some politicians, such as Finland’s former foreign minister, Alex Stubb, who 
said that Darwinism should apply in the Eurozone  with the ‘fittest’ six (out of seventeen) triple-A 
rated Eurozone economies having the strongest say in the management of the crisis (in Baker for 
Reuters, 2011). Symbolically, others have focused on shaming tactics, like Germany's EU 
Commissioner, Günther Oettinger, who suggested that ‘deficit sinners’ should fly their EU flags at 
half-mast ‘in shame’ (Spiegel, 2011a). Oettinger added that EU officials should replace Greek officials 
so that they can ‘operate without concern for resistance [to] end [Greek] inefficiency’ because 
‘those who demand solidarity from the other countries must also be prepared to give up partial 
responsibility for a certain time’ (Spiegel, 2011a).  
At a deeper analytical level, what the moralising discourse based on the social objects of guilt and 
shame (Mylonas, 2012) relates to is the associated issues of entitlement and deservingness, as these 
are further associated and enriched with ideas of responsibility, trustworthiness, reliability and 
credibility (Antoniades, 2012; Galpin, 2014; Lampropoulou, 2014; Tekin, 2014; Tseronis, 2015). In 
this respect, Greece was portrayed as a culture that nurtures and validates feelings of entitlement 
(Konstandaras, 2012), while the implied message has been that Greek citizens are unworthy of such 
entitlements, because they have not worked hard enough to earn them, which creates a 
                                                          
18 See, for example, Evans-Pritchard’s article ‘US defends unruly Greece as Europe steps up Grexit threats’ for 
the Telegraph, 2015. 
156 
 
representation of dissonance between Greek entitled claims and their undeserving status (see also, 
deservingness theory, Feather, 2014). Greece’s lack of deservingness during the crisis was 
additionally represented by arguments that Greece should had never been admitted in the Eurozone 
(Antoniades, 2012) and limited and lukewarm expressions of solidarity and support by EU leaders, 
compared to the more pronounced and intense expositions of distrust, warnings, urges, 
unwillingness to negotiate and constructions of differences, rather than similarities (Bickes et al., 
2014b; Lampropoulou, 2014). 
In many respects, economic bankruptcy was represented as indicative of moral bankruptcy and a 
crisis of cultural values. As an extension, within this logic, it appeared easier to represent a ‘decadent 
culture’ as unworthy of its inherited possessions, even if these hold no relevance to prior economic 
management, but instead hold symbolic significance as signifiers of national identity (Talalay, 2013). 
For example, ideas such as those urging Greece to sell its islands and the Acropolis for the purpose 
of ‘debt redemption’ were voiced by German politicians, such as Josef Schlarmann, senior member 
of Merkel's Christian Democrats, and Frank Schaeffler, finance policy expert in the Free Democrats 
(Inman & Smith for The Guardian, 2010). Furthermore, researchers of political cartoons of the 
Euro/Greek crisis have argued that they depict Greece as having ‘disgraced its patrimony’ (Talalay, 
2013: 249). Most importantly, this ‘cultural decadence’ was represented as incurable and utterly 
hopeless, facilitated by representations of Greece as having a ‘bottomless pit’, an expression used by 
Wolfgang Schauble himself (see i.e. Ekathimerini, 2012), and media representations of Greeks as 
‘incorrigible’ (Tracy, 2012). For example, TIME magazine’s following comment illustrates the alleged 
Greek remorselessness: ‘Following years of free spending, Greeks find themselves in deep debt. That 
hasn’t stopped the party. Keeping the good times alive in Greece’s bouzouki clubs’ (as cited in Tracy, 
2012). 
Finally, this moralising discourse became more evident and vivid when presented through binary 
oppositions such as those of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ which were juxtaposed to each other (Lampropoulou, 
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2014; Sommer, 2014). Within this framework, contrasting representations intensify the cultural 
differences between the ‘hard-working North’ and the ‘lazy South’ or the ‘thrifty, honest Germany’ 
and the ‘profligate, dishonest Greece’ (Marconi, 2011; Tekin, 2014). Some have argued that there 
has been a shift from an image of the EU as a post-national and political entity to an overtly 
economic and technocratic one (Stavrakakis, 2014; Tekin, 2014). However, to be sure, the view of 
the EU as an apolitical ‘technocratic, managerial, top-down’ project (Shore 1998: 48) precedes the 
Euro crisis, especially in accounts of critical traditions, like post-democratic, post-colonial and 
Marxist theory (i.e. Douzinas, 2013; Mouffe et al., 2012; Žižek, 2014), or critically inclined disciplines, 
like anthropology (i.e. Knight, 2013; Herzfeld, 2016a; Shore, 1998). Within such traditions, and from 
an international and systemic metanarrative of the crisis, very often embracing anti-neoliberal 
criticism and structural analysis, some have additionally argued that this process of depoliticisation 
of the EU has encouraged the formation of prototyping processes that create the image of the ‘good 
European’ as anchored around economic values, rather than political (Mylonas, 2012; Selmic, 2013; 
Tekin, 2014). 19 
In this sense, representations of the economic crisis can be said to have intensified the meaning of 
‘good European citizenship’ as cognitively equated with that of the ‘good economic human subject’, 
or in other words, the ‘Homo Oeconomicus’, which is defined as follows: 
‘The homo oeconomicus is a point of intersection between political and economic 
citizenship, but [one] that is transacted across multiple techniques and technologies of 
government… As a subject whose interests intensify, the homo oeconomicus requires 
continual training and retraining to remain rational, effectively calculating, and well-
disciplined. The homo oeconomicus is thus the potential but never sufficiently polished 
material for “good citizenship,” as the principle element for “moral” 
economy/government. To recognise moral hazards, she or he must remain a prudential 
and accountable subject as interests and investments intensify’ (Hay, 2010: 391) 
 
                                                          
19 Although these two spheres have been seen in the past as containing two distinctly different philosophical 
ontologies (see Arendt’s distinction between the ‘social’ and the ‘political’, 1998), there is always the need to 
question what kind of philosophies of politics or of economics are involved in the debate and how they are 
represented as contradictory, since there are multiple political and economic philosophies.  
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As demonstrated, within the context of European integration and the Euro crisis, member-states 
have been presented as subjects of training and tutelage in teaching metaphors, along the formation 
of new conditionalities that could grant or withhold the title of ‘good pupil’ (Bickes et al., 2014a; 
Magone, 2014). Given that Greece was understood as a confirmed and continuous ‘bad pupil’ before 
and after the crisis and to the degree  that European identity and justified citizenship is understood 
as economic discipline and achievement, Greece was equally constructed as a ‘bad European’ due to 
its failure to successfully perform European economic morality (Kutter, 2014; Wodak & Angouri, 
2014).  
Within this stream of analytical representations, some have argued that these dynamics represent 
distinctly Western-centric understandings of the economic subjects as modern, rational and 
instrumental, which has led to accusations of the Euro crisis discourse as one that has orientalised 
Greece by presenting it as irrational, backwards and at odds to the western/European ethos 
(Antoniades, 2012; Mylonas, 2012; Selmic, 2013; Tekin, 2014). This placement of Greek problems in 
its Oriental ‘nature’ was evident for example in Euro Group President Jean-Claude Juncker’s 
statement, maintaining that ‘It's the truth: Their [the Greeks’] fiscal management is not working. 
There is no staff, no real trade history, which is the heritage of the Ottoman invasion’ and adding 
that Spain and Portugal had better chances of recovering than Greece (in Hurriyet Daily News, 2012). 
Comparing to past representations of Greece, we can note that this is a continuity of previous 
historical and ideological narratives of modernisation/Europeanisation and the ‘problem of 
hybridity’ between East and West (Triantafyllidou et al., 2013).  
As a result of the above, Greece was constructed during the crisis as member of the EU group, but a 
less than prototypical one, that is, as part of the ingroup but not fully acknowledged or accepted 
(Ntampoudi, 2014a; Tekin, 2014). Entities that are found between the intersection of belongingness 
and otherness acquire the borderline status of the ‘internal other’, as explained by SIT (Ntampoudi, 
2014a; Tekin, 2014). In line with SIT, social entities that are prescribed such status can experience 
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identity devaluation and identity threat (Pagliaro et al., 2012), which constitutes a form of identity 
destabilisation. However, these circumstances can provoke reactionary and strategic responses that 
aim to recontextualise and redefine the meanings of negative stereotypes into positive ones (Huddy, 
2001), which necessarily create identity overvaluations and different forms of identity 
destabilisations. Within the Euro crisis and the critique of economic rationality, representations of 
Germany and the EU waging an economic ‘war’ against Greece and other ‘programme countries’ 
have objectified around notions of the war between economy and politics upon the fertile ground of 
cultural differences (Tekin, 2014). Such representations relate to differentiated responses towards 
the case of Greece, anchored around support and solidarity. These complex dynamics are the focus 
of the next section.  
 
 
Identity overvaluation: solidarity and great expectations 
 
Although Greece underwent significant identity devaluation during the Euro crisis, it would be 
misleading to argue that all reactions towards Greece were negative. Several actors expressed 
positive feelings towards the crisis-ridden country and constructed it in favourable representations. 
As was explained in the previous chapter, Greece’s historical identity trajectory progressed from an 
overvalued identity as the ‘origin of Western civilisation and European identity’ to a devalued one as 
the ‘failure of modernity and European integration’ (Triantafyllidou et al., 2013). Within the crisis, 
however, there was an opposite movement, with Greece passing from the initial period of ‘Greek 
bashing’ to a period of positively inclined representations (see i.e. Bickes et al., 2014b; Mylonas, 
2015), albeit a positivity departing from a point of negativity and disadvantage. These validating 
representations can be argued to function through a process of romanticisation of Greece and they 
include equally stereotypical identity formations, even though these are positively disposed 
(Varoufakis, 2014). In research of social stereotypes it is often forgotten that stereotypes are not 
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only negative and degrading, but can also be positive and supportive, yet as patronising and 
problematic as the former (Czopp, 2008; Varoufakis, 2014).  
In the case of Greece within the Euro crisis, we can distinguish at least four positive attributions, 
namely the roles of the ‘victim’, the ‘rebel’, the ‘regime changer’, and the ‘underdog’. These 
particular roles are predominantly facilitated through the international metanarrative that places 
blame for the crisis on global institutions and dynamics, while they follow prior historical patterns of 
romanticist discourse (Haran, 2015; Varoufakis, 2014). Depending on the actors who project these 
representations, we can talk about different psychological dynamics. For instance, if the actor who 
redefines Greece in positive terms is Greek, based on the assumptions of SIT, we can talk about 
strategies of self-esteem enhancement or coping mechanisms towards the aforementioned identity 
devaluation (Huddy, 2001; Pagliaro et al., 2012). In the event that the actor is not Greek, we can still 
talk about self-esteem enhancement since the object of ‘Greece’ can be said to be used to validate 
the actor’s worldview and value system, thus identity (Huddy, 2001; Pagliaro et al., 2012). The 
remaining section will elaborate on these issues.  
 
Poor victim 
 
Beginning with the role of the ‘victim’, this constitutes a positive social identity in the sense that the 
representation of victimhood shifts the blame off a social entity, because weight is placed on its 
social misfortune, rather than its culpability, albeit in varying degrees and not always unconditionally 
(see i.e. rape victims in Du Mont et al., 2003). This strategic movement can have implications for the 
aforementioned morality issues of deservingness and entitlement in the form of support and 
solidarity. Researchers confirm that negative stereotypes of national identity as ‘lazy, profligate and 
with a rascal mentality’ (Kotarski, 2012: 15) between 2010 and 2012 gave their way to 
representations of Greece as being in a humanitarian crisis and needing assistance to survive (Bickes 
et al., 2014a). As such, the original stereotypes of the ‘no good European’ coexisted with the 
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stereotype of the ‘victim’ of a great catastrophe (Mylonas, 2012; Ntampoudi, 2013). During 2012, 
media representations turned their focus to ‘stories of individual fates and personal tales of woe’ 
anchored around issues of ‘poverty, unemployment, job hunting and desperation’ which 
represented a contrast with ‘the earlier picture of lazy, unproductive southern Europeans enjoying 
siestas and early retirement’ (Bickes et al., 2014a: 439).  
In SRT’s sense, these personalised stories functioned through a personification strategy of 
objectification, biographically relating the crisis to personal sorrow. As a result, the media tried to 
convey a message that Greek people were ‘suffering from politicians’ mistakes, the banking crisis 
and economic stagnation’, rather than their own fault (Bickes et al., 2014a: 439). We can comment 
here that these narratives operate within a sharp distinction between economic and political elites 
on the one side, and the ‘people’ on the other, an argument often accused as ‘populist rhetoric’ 
(Stavrakakis, 2014), as well as structural and systemic representations of the crisis (Kutter, 2014). 
Furthermore, Greece was represented as a victim of the crisis management itself, as this was 
handled by the EU/IMF, with many arguing that austerity and accumulation of additional debt 
weakened the Greek economy even more, rather than strengthened it (Mylonas, 2012).  
Within the war representation of Greece’s relation to the EU, the delegitimising representation of 
the latter functions in favour of Greece by portraying the EU as an equally ‘immoral’ entity due to 
insufficient supervision and pan-European fiscal rules transgression (see, i.e. Marconi, 2011 on 
Germany and France’s breaches), or even as a dangerous ‘debt Mafia’ (Mylonas, 2012). 
Schematically speaking, the guiltier ‘Greece’s opponents’, the less guilty and exceptional Greece 
appears. As put, ‘data […] prove the general character of the transgressions: almost all EU members 
violated the SGP and accumulated excessive debt… Through this comparison, the Greek sovereign 
debt problem is constructed as a mere symptom of a larger problem’ (Kutter, 2014: 457). As 
prescribed by SIT, social comparison is integral to the process of identity evaluation.  
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Following from the above, Greece was not only represented as victim of the crisis and its EU 
management, but also a victim of representations themselves, or in other words ‘a framed victim’ 
for political aims. This is most evident in the abundance of texts, expert or not, that statistically and 
methodologically aim to ‘deconstruct the profligacy myth’ (i.e. Kotarski, 2012; Maselli, 2015). Within 
these representations, authors set out to use factual data that can prove that Greeks work harder 
and longer hours, have fewer benefits, spend less on pensions, and retire no earlier than other 
Europeans, but have the highest rates of unemployment and poverty in Europe. Media 
presentations are plentiful with articles that explicitly and continuously ask the question ‘are Greeks 
truly lazy?’. The following titles, ranging from 2010 to 2015, demonstrate this point: 
‘The myth of the lazy Greek workers’ (Editorial Board of Marxistiki Foni, 2010) 
‘Are Greeks Lazy? Europe is a mess because Germans work hard and Greeks are 
shiftless. False!’ (Matthew Yglesias, 2011 for Slate) 
‘The Greeks are not lazy’ (Dave Seminara, 2012 for Gadling) 
‘Are Greeks the hardest workers in Europe?... the statistics tell a surprising story’ 
(Charlotte McDonald, 2012 for BBC News) 
‘Greek bailout talks: Are stereotypes of lazy Greeks true?’ (Jasmine Coleman, 2015 for 
BBC News) 
 
These representations of symbolic threat to the Greek identity and attempts of authors to ‘save 
face’ on behalf of Greece construct it as a victim of a symbolic ‘battle of ideas’ and can be said to be 
potentially consequential for social responses towards Greece around Europe (Bickes et al., 2014b;  
Chalaniova, 2014). For example, these positive ideas may have played a role in triggering initiatives 
of solidarity and support (Bickes et al., 2014b), as was the case with some short-lived campaigns 
called ‘We are all Greek’ (Hedges, 2015)20. These type of campaign slogans constitute identity 
statements not only because they explicitly use the identity phrase ‘we are’, but also because of 
declaring identification with a perceived as victimised collectivity, other than one’s own. Today they 
constitute a common solidarity practice and there are many examples from the ‘We are all Muslim’ 
                                                          
20  See also, ‘We are all PIGS’ in EUI, Collettivo Prezzemolo, 2012a, 2012b. 
163 
 
of Michael Moore (Tayyab, 2015) to the ‘We are all Charlie’ messages after the Paris attack (Mudde, 
2015a). At the same time, this slogan echoed Shelley’s declaration ‘We are all Greeks’ (Findlay, 
1993), which referred to ancient Greece’s cultural contribution of which everybody could be an 
inheritor since according to the romantic poet, Greece’s ‘eternal triumph’ resided in the realm of the 
mind and the spread of a timeless idea (Beaton, 2014: 54). As such, recent patterns of 
romanticisation of Greece exhibited continuity, albeit a qualitatively rather differentiated one, from 
previous historical patterns.  
 
Rebel rebel 
 
Negative stereotypes of the EU as oppressive and victimising, combined with the inability or 
unwillingness of Greek governments to fully follow the Troika’s reforming suggestions of austerity, 
privatisations and structural adjustments have formulated the next positively valued stereotype of 
Greece as the ‘rebel’ (i.e. Douzinas, 2013). As described (Murray-Leach et al., 2014: 3), for anti-
austerity actors ‘Europe as a political space was perceived as irrelevant at best; a bureaucratic 
servant of the neo-liberal market ethos at worst’. Picturing the EU as apolitical or as an overbearing 
political regime satisfies the narrative requirements not only of the ‘rebel’ but also of the justified 
‘rebel with a cause’ (i.e. Bieber, 2015). In this sense, the stereotype of the rebel was anchored 
around the qualitative notion of the ‘Eurosceptic rebel’ that resists a negatively defined EU (see i.e. 
‘Greek rebel with a Eurosceptic cause’ in EUbusiness, 2015). Within this context, the EU is seen as a 
socially disastrous agent of neoliberalism and austerity and Greece as a populist fighter against 
economic degradation (Mylonas, 2012; Stavrakakis, 2014), reinforcing binary oppositions and 
representations of war. News media, both mainstream (i.e. The Guardian) and self-described as 
‘progressive’ (i.e Common Dreams), as well as academic accounts, especially by self-proclaimed 
leftist analysts (i.e. Douzinas, 2013; Mouffe et al., 2012; Laskos & Tsakalotos, 2013) are rich in 
representations of ‘Greek resistance’.  
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These representations of ‘heroic resistance’ became even more salient during the 2015 referendum, 
although they preceded it. One example asserted that ‘Greek resistance has symbolised a show of 
strength and hope to those elsewhere in the world looking for an alternative model on behalf of 
those marginalised by the accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of the 1% elite’ (Rose, 
2015 for The Daily Blog). In these accounts, the ‘Greek people’ as a unified category are described as 
‘the most utterly fearless group of people’ (Galbraith in Parker, 2015 for the New Yorker), having 
‘stood up to the bully boys of the Troika’ (Dearden in Fulton, 2015 for Common Dreams), and 
‘show[ing] the way’ by ‘becom[ing] the embodiment, the symbol, the soul, the life itself of the most 
ferocious resistance against the politics of austerity’ (Chartist, 2014). Another commentator adds 
that ‘Greece is the latest battleground in the financial elite’s war on democracy… Greece may be 
financially bankrupt, but the troika is politically bankrupt. Those who persecute this nation wield 
illegitimate, undemocratic powers, powers of the kind now afflicting us all’ (George Monbiot for The 
Guardian, 2015). As shown, Greece is explicitly described as ‘bullied’ and ‘persecuted’, thus 
victimised by the Troika, but simultaneously, ‘heroic’ and ‘rebellious’, while Greece’s woes are 
presented as universal, catapulting Greek identity into universality once more.  
 
Regime changer 
 
Romanticising representations of Greece as a ‘rebel’ further constructed it as a Messiah-like game 
changer that holds the capacity to alter the political regime, especially as a democratic agent whose 
struggle was deemed universally relevant (Mylonas, 2012). This attribution of international flavour 
can be understood within the international crisis metanarrative which focuses on grand structures 
(i.e. capitalism), global institutions (i.e. the EU and IMF) and counter-ideologies (i.e. anti-capitalism). 
During the intensity of elections in 2012, for example, the Greek vote was represented as ‘decisive’ 
for the ‘future of Europe’ and Greek voters as ‘powerful, independent and capable’ enough to 
‘punish’ the international lenders and ‘reverse an existing social order’ (Lampropoulou, 2014: 474). 
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Examples of expert discourse include Douzinas’s (2011) argument that ‘In Greece, we see democracy 
in action. The public debates of the outraged in Athens are the closest we have come to democratic 
practice in recent European history’ where Syntagma Square is parallelised to the ‘classical Athenian 
agora’, as well as Žižek’s public statement, standing by SYRIZA’s electoral campaign, that ‘The heart 
of the people of Europe beats in Greece’ (Greek Left Review, 2012). Another example asserts that 
‘Greece teaches Europe about democracy again’ (Kosyrev, 2011), inverting the teaching metaphor of 
the Eurozone and transferring Greece from the position of the ‘bad pupil’ to that of the ‘teacher’21.  
We can evaluate that these representational patterns construct romanticised and universalised 
notions of Greece and reintroduce past trends of universality and political romanticism that create 
equally unrealistic ‘great expectations’ as their previous historical trends have done in the past. 
SYRIZA itself, during its Europhile conversion in 2012 and the abandonment of previous radical 
positions against the EU as a tactic for expanding its electoral base by employing moderation and 
simultaneously creating a diplomatic relation with the EU, made expansive symbolic use of this 
narrative that demands ‘an other, more democratic Europe’ (see i.e. Panagopoulos, 2015 for Avgi; 
also, TheTOC, 2014). Within this narrative, SYRIZA’s message was that Europe had lost its democratic 
credentials and had to regain them. Moreover, these dynamics can also be understood within a 
wider representation of Greece’s relation with the core of the EU as anchored around the axis of the 
economic and the cultural (Tekin, 2014), whereby Greece’s response overemphasises its cultural and 
political credentials as equally, if not more, prototypically defining features of European identity, 
compared to economic ones (Ntampoudi, 2014a).  
In this respect, the idea of Greece being a ‘bad European’ due to its failed economy and 
administration is answered by reclaiming the meaning of Europeanness as being about belief in the 
values of democracy and pluralism (Ntampoudi, 2014a). As such, the representation of ‘Europe’ 
waging an ‘economic war’ against Greece is juxtaposed by the representation of Greece answering 
                                                          
21 See also, Michta (2015) on Grexit as a ‘lesson’ for Europe’s democratic deficit. 
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with a ‘symbolic war’ based on political arguments about democracy, diversity and pluralism. These 
dynamics reaffirm SIT’s assumption that in the context of a superordinate identity like the European 
each member-state may project its national prototype onto the European one (Castano, 2004).  
Nevertheless, although Greece was extensively stereotyped and recreated as the game-changing 
‘democratic agent’, there were additional representations. Alternatively, albeit to a lesser extent, 
extreme right-wing groups in Europe (i.e. in Denmark and Sweden) found in Greece’s rise of the 
Golden Dawn a ‘nationalist star’ to identify with and draw inspiration from, as well as ‘a victim of the 
multiculturalist/Marxist project of the EU’ (Askanius & Mylonas, 2015: 65). In these right-wing 
representations, generated by European Northerners, Greeks are their ‘brothers and sisters’ who 
‘did not accept that the fruits of their hard labour were harvested by strangers’ and deserving of 
celebratory compliments, such as ‘Congratulations Greece! We are marching with you’ (examples as 
cited in Askanius & Mylonas, 2015). Additionally, admiration was expressed in statements such as 
‘although we are not as big as you yet, it is fantastic to see how the NS movement is growing 
stronger every week. Heil the North!’ (as cited in ibid).  
In many respects, the EU itself became a rather varied ‘victimiser’, ranging from the neoliberal to the 
Marxist, as well as a representation of the ‘common enemy’ of all the ‘peoples’ of Europe, north and 
south, left and right of the political spectrum, making nationalist Euroscepticism a common 
denominator (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). In this way, it appears comprehensible that the radical-left 
SYRIZA could form a coalition government with the nationalist ANEL, united in their opposition to 
the EU’s Memorandum. This can be seen in the historical precedent of the National Schism where as 
regards to the internationally-oriented Venizelos, 
‘There were Venizelist nationalists and anti-Venizelist nationalists, Venizelist Marxists and anti-
Venizelist Marxists. And it was a thousand times easier for a Venizelist nationalist to reach an 
understanding with a Venizelist Marxist, than with an anti-Venizelist nationalist’ (Theotokas in 
Clogg, 2002: 87) 
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Similarly, in Greece during the economic crisis, it was easier to unite a Marxist and a nationalist as a 
‘rebellious national front’ against the perceived enemy of the EU, rather than expect left wing 
parties to work with each other.  
  
Underdog Greece 
 
All these elements of victimhood, rebellion and democratic or nationalist struggle ultimately 
culminate in the stereotype of Greece during the crisis as the perfect ‘underdog’. This can be seen as 
a sign of resonance with expert representations of the past regarding the Greek underdog political 
culture.  Within a typical underdog storyline a small and weak entity fights against a much bigger and 
stronger one, and although the underdog is expected to lose, it ends up winning against all odds by 
exhibiting ‘evidence of heart and spirit’ and ‘heroism’ (McGinnis & Gentry, 2009: 195; Goethals & 
Allison, 2012).  
Underdog stories are considered to be archetypal and diachronic narrative structures, and for these 
reasons highly stereotypical and widely familiar (Goldschmied & Vandello, 2009; Kim et al., 2008). As 
such, they are publicly shared tales with the oldest and most known examples of the Bible story of 
David and Golliath or Leonidas’s 300 Spartans at the Thermopyles battle (Kim et al., 2008; Vandello 
et al., 2007). Underdog scripts are empirically known to invoke responses of identification and 
support as a result of the human abilities of empathy and identification with others, but also various 
psychological needs, such as those for justice and inspiration (Kim et al., 2008; McGinnis & Gentry, 
2009).  
Moreover, underdog identities can be a vehicle for the achievement of positive self-esteem, as 
prescribed by SIT, because of the heroism and romantic sensibility that is frequently associated with 
them, as well as their moralising character that assumes the necessary culpability of the powerful 
(Ntampoudi, 2014b). In this respect, we can appreciate that in the occasion that Greeks embrace this 
identity script for themselves, it establishes a self-enhancing tactic that creates a positive and moral 
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image of the collective self by means of social comparison and delegitimisation of the opponent 
(Ntampoudi, 2014b). In the case of non-Greeks who support the underdog representation of Greece 
during the crisis, this satisfies their personal self-constructions of their own political identities as 
revolutionary underdog defenders which appeal not only to personal self-esteem, but also the 
validation of these actors’ worldview of conflictual politics and grand malevolent structures 
(Ntampoudi, 2014b).  
Conclusively, although other ‘programme countries’22 such as Portugal and Ireland were positively 
represented as ‘good pupils’ of the EU and ‘poster-children’ of compliance and reform, Greece’s 
representational trajectory followed alternative routes of positive identity evaluations, often 
embracing its pre-existing and newly intensified stereotypes of the ‘disadvantaged victim’, ‘resistant 
rebel’, ‘democratic agent’, ‘nationalist star’ and ‘heroic underdog’. As was noted, these narratives 
found more resonance among social circles that are fonder of radical politics, such as self-identifying 
left-wing, post-colonialist, post-modernist and critical theorists, who repeatedly signed letters of 
solidarity to Greece, alliance to SYRIZA, and sharp criticism towards the EU (i.e. Badiou, 2012;  
Mouffe et al., 2012; Žižek, 2012) or extreme right-wing forces in Europe who saw in Greece’s right-
wing Eurosceptic resistance their own ‘nationalist hero’ and rebel against European multiculturalism 
and Marxism (Askanius & Mylonas, 2015). In this sense, Greece’s identity experienced episodes of 
overvaluation and objectifications as an object of solidarity and support. Ultimately, Greece became 
the ‘poster-child’ for political radicalism and Eurosceptic resistance, as well as an object of political 
affection and discursive exploitation for radicals and rebels on left, right and beyond of the political 
spectrum. As shall be illustrated, such identity overvaluations and overexpansions can lead to 
identity deficits, which is the focus of the next section. 
                                                          
22 Although the term ‘programme countries’ in the context of the Euro crisis literally refers to crisis 
management and adjustment programmes, a note may also be made for the metaphorical allusion of the term 
which is suggestive of ideas like ‘addiction’, ‘recovery’ or ‘rehabilitation’ (i.e. Alcoholics Anonymous’ ‘the 
programme’), additionally linking to the aforementioned disease metaphor of the economic crisis in Europe. 
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Identity deficit: exclusion through Grexit 
 
Sovereignty interrupted 
 
During the economic crisis, many public and expert representations claimed that Greece’s 
sovereignty had been severely compromised (Mitsikopoulou & Lykou, 2015; Mylonas, 2015; Tracy, 
2012). For example, former Italian finance minister, the late Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa stated that 
‘Greece is no longer the sole sovereign in its home; the European sovereign has entered its territory 
and will also rule’ (as cited in Marconi, 2011). Media (i.e. Cassidy for The New Yorker, 2015; Steel for 
The Independent, 2015; The Economist, 2015), but also academics (i.e. Herzfeld, 2016b; Smith, 
2014), dramatizing the crisis, have openly referred to this process and the wider EU crisis response 
towards Greece as ‘humiliating’, especially after the 2015 referendum and the agreement that 
followed it, which indicates the depth of national devaluation that Greece is presented to have 
endured, since terms like ‘humiliation’ connote a certain emotional intensity (Smith, 2014).  
Following from the above narratives of EU imposition and Greek resistance, the politically bitter 
issue of national sovereignty comes to the forth. Many have argued that the Memoranda necessarily 
imposed a significant degree of surveillance on Greece by the Troika (Dinas & Rori, 2013; Marconi, 
2011). This historically echoes the period of the International Financial Commission (IFC) that was 
established in Greece in 1898, after Greece had declared bankruptcy in 1893 (Clogg, 2002; Waibel, 
2014). The IFC was comprised of representatives of six European creditor countries until WWI and 
had substantial authorities of appointment, dismissal and revenues control (Dyson, 2014; Waibel, 
2014). However, this control was not as direct as was the case with Egypt, Serbia and the Ottoman 
Empire’s debt-serving commissions, a difference that was represented as ‘out of the question in a 
highly democratic country like Greece’ (Tunçer, 2015).  
Similar to contemporary circumstances of mutual credibility deficits, the IFC was then confronted 
with as much domestic distrust, resistance and sovereignty claims (Dyson, 2014; Tunçer, 2015; 
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Waibel, 2014) as the Troika is today, while correspondingly, during the thirties and after Greece’s 
default of 1932, many believed that the Greek government was more unwilling, rather than 
incapable, to cooperate with reforms or repay its debts (RIIA, 1937; Tunçer, 2015; Waibel, 2014). It 
would be fair to say that in the international arena, a country’s perceived or real loss of sovereignty 
is tantamount to losing its international identity since being unable to fully form one’s own foreign 
and domestic policy equals to losing one’s own voice in global affairs. As put, ‘sovereignty is a social 
identity… both a property of states and of international society’ (Wendt, 1994: 388). In this sense, 
we could say that Greece has experienced an identity destabilisation in the form of an identity loss, 
thus deficit, to the degree that Greece’s sovereignty is perceived as compromised.  
 
Grexit as European identity loss 
 
The issue of Greece’s identity loss, especially at the European dimension, becomes most apparent 
within the context of the Grexit possibility, which has been a continuous, yet contradictory, 
discussion throughout the crisis years (Koutsoukis & Roukanas, 2014). Questions of European 
identity have been presented as intimately related to Greece’s Eurozone membership (Giurlando, 
2016; Tekin, 2014). Two specific examples of articles that were published during the announcement 
of the 2011 and 2015 referenda respectively will be used here to illustrate this point because of the 
overt associations they make between Eurozone membership and European identity. Most 
interestingly, the articles share the identical title ‘Greece’s European Identity [Is] at Stake’ (Barber, 
2011 for the Financial Times; Nixon, 2015 for The Wall Street Journal). In the first article, before the 
exposition of a concise historical presentation of Greece’s ambivalent position in Europe and the EU, 
faithful to the dominant narratives that were analysed in the previous chapter, the author states:  
‘Aside from the existential question of the Eurozone’s survival, what is at stake in the debt 
crisis is nothing less than the European identity of contemporary Greek society. This would be 
put to a severe test if Greece were to tumble out of the Eurozone and suffer the mother of all 
economic and social implosions’ (Barber, 2011) 
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Nowhere in the article is it explained why this is so, although the implicit message lies in the 
symbolic linkage of the currency to the question of identity and belonging. The same is the case with 
the second article of 2015, where the author observes: 
‘It is Greece’s European identity that is at stake in the referendum that the government has 
decided to call for July 5. Although the question on the ballot will be whether voters want 
the government to accept or reject the terms of the bailout deal submitted by creditors, the 
real question is whether Greece wishes to remain a member of the Eurozone’ (Nixon, 2015) 
 
In this second article, the author justifies his claim by explaining that because there is no legal 
framework or precedent for a country leaving the Eurozone, as an extension, its EU membership 
could be jeopardised. Nevertheless, given that some countries are members of the EU, but not of 
the Eurozone (i.e. the UK, Sweden, Denmark) (Hobolt, 2015), while others are considered part of 
Europe, but neither of the EU or the Eurozone (i.e. Serbia, Albania, Switzerland) (Mau & Mewes, 
2013), the ways that EU/Eurozone memberships relate to European identity remain unclear in the 
texts, despite the claimed clarity of the conclusive intimacy between the two by the authors 
(Giurlando, 2016). In SRT’s terms, an implicit representation of the two articles is the objectification 
of the Euro currency as the criterion of European belongingness, functioning through the process of 
ontologisation which attributes a material characteristic to a non-material entity (Jaspal et al., 2014). 
In this case, the material object of the Euro currency becomes the ontological substance of the 
immaterial notion of European identity.  
This type of representation is not uncommon in the discursive history of European integration as 
prior research has indicated that the Euro has been portrayed as a powerful identity marker and 
indicator of European citizenship (Kaeble, 2009; Moro, 2013a). Within the Euro crisis, research has 
shown that EU leaders’ rhetoric has often equated the Euro with Europe itself (Tekin, 2014). For 
example, Merkel has stated that ‘if Euro fails, Europe fails’ (in Spiegel, 2011b). As explained, the Euro 
concerns ‘the content, the context, and the constraints of citizenship of the EU and of its constituent 
elements of rights, belonging and participation’, a ‘shaping effect’ of the currency that has ‘not been 
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contradicted, but on the contrary, made more visible by the present Eurozone crisis’ (Moro, 2013b: 
232). Following from this relation, and given the permanence of the Grexit probability, Greece has 
been repeatedly depicted as being at the edge of losing its Eurozone belonging and participation, 
thus experiencing the imminent threat of a European identity loss, hence an identity deficit 
(Giurlando, 2016).  
 
Pretty vacant 
 
Finally, as explained before, Greece’s public coverage was both quantitatively larger and 
qualitatively more negative and controversial than other countries’ coverage (Bickes et al., 2014a; 
Tzogopoulos, 2013; Tekin, 2014). This can be argued to have led to the misfortune of becoming not 
only a representational epicentre of the crisis, but also to being represented as ‘notoriously 
scandalous’ just like most ‘transgressive antitypes’ and ‘anti-ideals’ are constructed (Kittredge, 2003: 
1). In the era of the internet’s ‘global village’ (McLuhan, 2009) and all the expansive communicative 
possibilities that this unleashes, social entities are often subjected to excessive commentary and 
evaluation, both quantitatively and qualitatively (Solove, 2007). This becomes particularly acute 
when these social entities are perceived to have done something wrong. In such cases, they can 
become the objects of debates and controversies (Solove, 2007). The longer these dynamics last, the 
more notorious and scandalous the entity’s identity appears to be and the more expansive the 
identity projections upon it become. Once a state of notoriety is reached, the social entity can be 
anything from an abject perpetrator to a framed victim, a ‘persona-non-grata’ or a ‘public 
sweetheart’. As put by a Brussels correspondent,  
‘looking at what the European newspapers wrote in the wake of the Greek crisis, a 
reader might have the impression that everybody saw what he wanted to see in the 
Greek case: the failures of left-wing governments, the evil speculation on the 
markets, the resurgence of a German superpower, even US imperialism’ (Marconi, 
2011).  
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As demonstrated above, Greece has been portrayed by various discursive actors as many things: a 
guilty trickster, a decadent society, a poor victim of global capitalism, the target of the EU’s neo-
liberalism, a defiant underdog, an economic terrorist, a radical-left rebel, a nationalist star, a 
democratic agent, a European impostor, a European prototype, and more. Such is the fate of 
notorious entities: the more they are talked about, the more they cease to exist by becoming 
everything, therefore being nothing. As such, in this paradoxical sense, this overexpansion of identity 
may perhaps be the most vivid way in which Greece ‘lost its self’ within the crisis discourse and 
became a perfectly ‘empty signifier’.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
  
This chapter attempted to explore emerging knowledge on Greek European identity and the 
economic crisis, looking for significations of identity destabilisations. It begun by explaining that the 
public discourse of the Euro crisis is dominated by two main metanarratives of causation and 
ontology, with the one emphasising domestic factors and the other one focusing on systemic and 
international factors. As an extension, while the first primarily asserted accountability on sovereign 
governments for the crisis causes, the second affirmed the responsibility of structural and global 
conditions. Furthermore, it was evident that these two narratives were implicated within varied 
representations of the economic crisis.  
In terms of identity conflict, the first representation of social conflict was registered at the domestic 
level, whereby dynamics of social tension were noted between political elites and citizens, among 
elites, and among citizens. Cultural dualism was said to experience a revival as an explanatory 
framework of the economic crisis and the underdog culture appeared to have been blamed for the 
origins of the crisis. These dynamics spilt over to another dualist representation, albeit one 
concretised around a new point of reference, namely, the Memorandum, resulting in a pro-
Memorandum and an anti-Memorandum camp and political polarisation. The referendum of July 
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2015 appeared to be the peak of this polarisation as well as the lowest point of diplomacy between 
Greece and the EU, especially between Greece and Germany. Traces of anti-Germanism were 
observable, while the ‘politics of blaming’ between the two crisis metanarratives appeared to trigger 
an identity conflict at the European dimension of Greece’s identity.  
At the level of identity devaluation, the category of Greece appeared to have objectified in multiple 
metaphors and scripts that casted Greece in a variety of ‘villain’ roles, such as an ‘economic 
terrorist’, a ‘disease’ or a ‘bad pupil’, among others. Furthermore, there were indications that 
Greece’s identity underwent devaluating episodes, articulated by a process of culturalisation of the 
discussion of the crisis, and the creation of negative stereotypes. As was demonstrated, these 
stereotypes, which mainly revolved around the objects of laziness, profligacy and corruption, were 
not always overtly stated, but nevertheless circulated in indirect ways. Furthermore, various 
processes of exceptionalisation appeared to have taken place, which resulted in Greece’s isolation, 
particularly when member-states would choose to symbolically distance themselves from the case of 
Greece or make an example of it. As an extenstion of these two processes, representational 
dynamics of moralisation became prominent, whereby Greek European identity was constructed as 
undeserving of its national and European possessions, was deemed worthy of punishment and short 
of the emerging European prototype.  
Subsequently, it was argued that contrary to conventional thinking about stereotypes as solely 
negative, there were positive stereotypes about Greece created during the economic crisis. For 
example, it was demonstrated that Greece was represented not only as a subject for bashing, but 
also as a subject for solidarity and support on the basis of victimhood, either at the humanitarian or 
the political domain. In addition, Greek identity was represented as rebellious, while romanticising 
and universalising narratives of game-changing political capacity were attributed to Greece, as either 
a ‘democratic agent’ or a ‘nationalist star’. All these representations culminated in the underdog 
identity schema which resonated with prior expert understandings of Greece’s political culture.  
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Regarding identity deficits, national identity loss was identified at the register of national sovereignty 
to the degree that this was represented as compromised, since sovereignty can be understood as 
external and international identity. A vivid European identity loss as a precarious possibility was 
recognised at the public discussion of Grexit, whereby a potential exit from the currency was 
projected as an identity threat. Finally, it was argued that Greece’s identity underwent such great 
over-expansions that ended up becoming an ‘empty signifier’, hence acquired a symbolic status of 
identity deficit.  
Conclusively, we could say that the public realm of discourses and representations offered a rich and 
expanded field where ideas of conflict, devaluation, overvaluation and deficit existed in abundance. 
It remains to be seen how Greek experts themselves negotiate and mediate these representations in 
the Greek context, which is the focus of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5 
Greek Ideational Leaders on Identity and Crisis 
 
 
 
‘in the Northern countries we had the PIGS of the South… on the other side, we 
had Merkel with Hitler’s moustache in Athens… unfortunately, as is said, the 
victim of every war is the truth, and the first casualty of every crisis is rationality… 
[…] those of us who exercise public discourse have an obligation to calm this 
atmosphere down… we may lose our income, possibly even our jobs… but let us 
not lose our soul and our rationality. This would be the worst of all…’  
(Papakonstantinou, 2014) 
 
 
 
Introduction  
 
After having looked at historiographical representations of Greek European identity and 
constructions of it during the economic crisis, this chapter will move on with outlining the results of 
interviews held with Greek ideational leaders in Athens, including politicians, journalists and 
academics. As argued before, expert professionals are important ‘opinion-shapers’ and these three 
wide professional domains dynamically interact and influence with each other, not only because 
individuals often occupy multiple professional roles and engage with multiple activities, but also 
because they interact with other professionals (Stavridis, 2003: 5). For example, academics often 
appear in the media or participate in policy-making (Stavridis, 2003). Although there are various past 
studies on policy formation and Europeanisation (i.e. Featherstone & Papadimitriou, 2008) or 
analyses of the Greek media (i.e. Exadaktylos & Capelos, 2016; Mylonas, 2014) that can be used as 
proxies for understanding the stands of politicians, experts and journalists, it should be noted that 
these cannot offer a direct link to attitudes and justifications for choices in the same manner that 
elite and expert interviewing can do.  
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As a consequence, interview data on Greek ideational leaders and their opinions on matters related 
to EU/European identities are extremely scarce. The literature review only reveals a handful of 
studies (Esaiasson 1999; Nezi et al., 2009a, 2009b; Stavridis, 2003). Earlier studies of Greek MPs 
(Esaiasson, 1999) showed that compared to other European MPs, they had a rather instrumentalist 
view of the EU as a vehicle for economic development. Nezi et al.’s study (2009a) revealed that there 
were traditionalists, formalists, and liberals among the MPs, while their trust in EU institutions and 
their perceptions of EU policy areas and levels of policymaking were strongly influenced by political 
ideology and party affiliation. A traditionalist approach towards identity included facets such as 
religion, birthplace, and parents’ nationality, liberalism encompassed respect for laws and 
institutions, and formalism concerned conditional formal requirements for acquiring Greek 
citizenship. Left-leaning MPs showed little trust in EU institutions and did not welcome the prospect 
of the EU becoming more active in the formulation of policies. Centre-right and centre-left 
politicians had pro-European attitudes.  
Most importantly, Nezi et al.’s study (2009a) compares MPs’ opinions with public opinion and gives 
us an indication of the state of dissonance or resonance thereof between them. As revealed, there 
were differences of limited intensity in the way Greek MPs and public opinion understood the notion 
of European and national identity (Nezi et al., 2009a). Some differences though concerned the 
citizens trusting the European Parliament less than MPs did and thinking that decisions on key 
policies, such as immigration, the environment, organised crime, and health should be taken at the 
national level, rather than both national and European.   
Another study by Nezi et al. (2009b) compared Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian parliamentarians’ 
attitudes towards European integration and discovered that MPs of all countries had a positive view 
of EU institutions, while Greek MPs trusted them more than the other two countries’ MPs. MPs of 
parties of the extreme right or of nationalist parties trusted the institutions less than MPs of parties 
which were conservative, liberal or socialist and generally are closer to the centre of the party 
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system. Furthermore, Greek MPs believed in furthering the process of EU unification more than 
Bulgarian and Serbian MPs. Longer familiarity with EU institutions via membership and long-term 
economic benefits were cited as possible explanations for these differences.  
A study of Greek academics’ views on the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy (Stavridis, 2003) 
showed that academics could be separated into three groups: 1) the optimists who claimed that the 
Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy was a positive development and on its way to 
materialisation, 2) the sceptics who were circumspect generally about the Europeanisation of 
Greece or its foreign policy in particular, and 3) the critics who denied there was any 
Europeanisation of Greece’s foreign policy and instead talked about ‘Africanisation’, Sub-
Saharisation’ or ‘Balkanisation’. Divisions between East and West were mentioned in relation to 
Greece’s Europeanisation, while the latter was intertwined with questions of modernisation and 
democratisation. There was an overwhelming consensus on the positive side for Europeanisation, 
and only a few questioned whether other member-states want Greece to remain in the EU or gave 
negative views about Greece’s success in Europeanising itself.  
The results of the present study indicate that political ideology plays a part in attitudes towards the 
EU, allowing for greater criticism of European integration. This criticism is by no means a rejection of 
EU membership, but rather constitutes a ‘critical Europeanism’ that embraces the project of 
European unification, yet on different grounds to the existing. In many respects, EU membership was 
projected as a one-way street for Greece and was widely unchallenged, indicating what could be 
seen as a profound and long-term investment in perceived benefits gained by EU membership, even 
for the most critical leftists. Notions of Greece resembling other regions of the world, rather than 
Europe were similarly projected as in the past (i.e. in Stavridis, 2003), but in this case they did not 
only concern Greek policy failures, but also fears of Greece’s becoming in light of the economic 
crisis. These findings are enriched by multiple other representations, the details of which shall be 
presented hereafter.  
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Identity conflict: divisions of European identities 
 
In chapter three, it was explained that historiographical representations of Greece focused on the 
ideas of deep national divisions, i.e. nationalists and internationalists or traditionalists and 
modernizers, as well as the conflict between East and West, seen as constituting Greece’s ‘problem 
of hybridity’. Chapter four elaborated on representations of Greece during the Eurozone crisis and 
concentrated on narratives of blaming between North and South and divisions of European 
identities, as well as domestic schisms between citizens and elites, among elites and among citizens. 
Based on our ideational leaders’ interviews, the most dominant representation in terms of identity 
conflict was the schism between East and West, and between North and South at the European 
level. As such, we can comment that the most common cognitive schema was a rather geographical 
one, utilising the four corners of spatial orientation, a representation which could be called ‘geo-
schematic’. As a result, it is argued here that geo-schematic perceptions of identity crises were 
hegemonic representations in the interviews. The next most dominant representations of conflict 
were those of ‘Greek hybridity’, defined as Greece being ‘both European and non-European’, ‘lack of 
national consensus’, and ‘mutual stereotyping’ at the European context. The remaining section will 
elaborate on these themes in more detail.  
 
Still between East and West: a strategic hybridity? 
 
Beginning with the historical distinction between East and West, as explained, this featured as a 
dominant schema. At a first analytical level, there was the expected commonly shared narrative that 
Greece is a country that indeed resides between the East and West and has been historically torn 
between the two identity paradigms. As illustrated, 
‘in modern Greek history, since 1821, there is a huge conflict between what we’d call 
Occidentalists and Orientalists, that is, there are some who say that we belong to the 
East, and there are some who say that we belong to the West’ (Mandravelis) 
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‘[with] the entrance in the European family… a country that had always been between 
East and West was finally concretely hooked in the European structure…’ (Mitsotakis) 
 
‘Greece has always been at the borderline between East and West, there has always 
been since the birth of the Greek nation-state, and ever earlier than that, there was this 
[distinction], that is, many well-travelled Greeks said that Greece’s future is in the West, 
but also many well-travelled Greeks who said the opposite, that essentially we are the 
East…’ (Tsakloglou) 
 
Although most of the time, so-called Occidentalists and Orientalists were referred to in abstraction, 
as ‘those who said West’ or ‘those who said East’, few participants alluded to the schematic 
associations of Occidentalists being identified as elites, rational or educated, and Orientalists as 
radicals, religious or traditionalists (i.e. Giannakou, Pagoulatos, Sotiropoulos). We could comment 
that these allusions may be reproducing stereotypical ideas of the representations ‘West’ and ‘East’ 
as rational/progressive and irrational/backwards, respectively.  
This age-old identity conflict was confirmed to be intimately related with the question of Greece’s 
Europeanness and aforementioned ‘problem of hybridity’. The cognitive schema of hybridity was 
present even when participants did not use the poles of East/West as elements of cultural mixture 
and simply referred to being/not being European. Nevertheless, most respondents placed Greece’s 
hybridity within this geo-schematic spectrum to variable degrees. Hybridity was particularly 
apparent in the compound question-theme ‘What makes a country European? Is Greece a European 
country?’ that was discussed with the participants. In this instance, a clear majority responded that 
Greece is simultaneously European and non-European/Oriental. Some participants implied or clearly 
stated that Greece is largely not European, and only a very small minority said that Greece is 
European. However, these last few were sceptical of the term ‘European identity’ as such, and 
thought of it as either highly pluralist (Simiti), non-existent (Karathanasopoulos) or ideological 
(Kimpouropoulos). Overall, hybridity was widely accepted as a persistently dominant collective self-
schema and almost none of the participants firmly stated that Greece is unambiguously and 
unproblematically European.  
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Within these wider responses, there were four main narratives: 1) Greece is a European country, but 
with Oriental/non-European features, 2) Greece is an Oriental/Balkan country that tries to be 
European, 3) Greece is capable of becoming more European, if it tries, and 4) Greece is in danger of 
becoming an Oriental/Balkan/Global South country due to the crisis’s effects. While the first two 
narratives concern identity as being, what Greece is, the last two refer to identity as becoming, what 
Greece could become.  
Within the first narrative, the Western/European and Ottoman/Oriental past of Greece is 
acknowledged and Greece is identified as European at least to some degree, but is categorised as 
non-European due to a variety of cultural features. For example, ND politician, Marietta Giannakou 
commented,  
‘Greece is a European country, but it has peculiarities… because it resisted to issues related 
to rationalism, perhaps this is a civilisational issue, maybe the influence of the East, which 
some adore, but it is certainly a European country, not only because of its location here, 
but also because of the values and principles upon which Europe was based, the ancient 
Greek spirit… together with the Roman and Hebrew…’ (Giannakou) 
 
Within this narrative the prototype of European identity appears to be based on historical and 
civilisational criteria. In the second narrative, projected by respondents who thought that Greece is 
largely not European, a more expanded set of cultural features were discussed and enacted to 
shortages of European identity. For example, DIMAR MP and historian, Maria Repousi elaborated 
that Greece is not European because… 
‘…Greece is a European country à la carte, when it comes to accepting the other, the 
different, the minority… it is not a European country, it is Balkan, Oriental, I don’t what it is, 
but definitely not European… it is not a European country because it praises its own 
civilisation and thinks it is above all others, there are issues of Europeanisation of the 
country in terms of European principles… even in the notion of democracy… in Greece it is 
questionable, first of all, we have the phenomenon of the Golden Dawn… moreover, we 
have a very skewed perception of democracy, we think it is about everyone doing 
whatever they want, we have a disobedience and a non-respect for laws, which is 
considered tsampoukas23… so after all these, one has to wonder how European Greece is, 
and what a long way it has to go to become European…’ (Repousi) 
                                                          
23 ‘Tsampoukas’ is a slang Greek word standing for being ‘tough’ and ‘pushy’. 
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Within this example, the European identity prototype is defined by political, ethical and legal 
criteria. This quotation exemplifies not only the view that Greece is not European, which is equated 
to Balkan/Oriental, but also several other themes that were shared by many other respondents and 
were relevant to Greece’s hybridity. For example, the expression ‘a European country à la carte’ 
indicates the notion of selectivity, in the sense that Greece is a country that selects only some 
principles of European identity, but not all. Within the representation of selectivity, it is implied that 
Greece chooses the aspects that are convenient for it, but not those that are seen as inconvenient, 
i.e. going the way to become more inclusive and egalitarian. This self-serving social attitude then 
could be labelled as strategic hybridity, with Greece seen as strategically selecting which aspects of 
the European identity to follow or not. Several other interviewees referred to what they perceived 
as Greece’s selectivity. 
 
‘Greece is an Oriental country that wants to take from Europe whatever is beneficial for her’ 
(Ramfos) 
 
‘We never understood that the participation in the European family means not only rights, 
but also duties. We were doing well with the rights, but [not] with the duties’ (Mitsotakis)  
 
‘The Greek feels European without wanting to follow the European standards, in any field, 
from driving behaviour to cheating at exams’ (Panousis) 
 
‘You can’t be living with Western livings standards, and say that you are East’ (Mandravelis) 
 
As is apparent, within these representations Greece or Greek citizens are described as self-
interested and selective, therefore hybridity is understood as highly deliberate and self-serving. 
However, not all participants presented Greece’s strategic hybridity as specific to Greece alone. For 
example, former MEP, Nikos Chrysogelos commented that Greece only ever cared about extracting 
funds from the EU, without seeing it as a space where democracy could grow, which constitutes a 
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selective way of understanding EU participation, but then clarified that this was not peculiar to 
Greece alone. 
‘we haven’t achieved yet making countries feel that they are European, that is, to perceive 
their own interests as intimately related to the wellbeing of the whole of Europe… only 
then we could say that countries are European… Germany wants the EU to exist, but also 
wants to define it. Greece would like to be a European country as long as it always gets its 
way. Italy wants to be a European country as long as it is an Italian Europe… the 
perspective is still wired through our own being dominant in Europe’ (Chrysogelos) 
 
As shown, the European prototype is viewed here as defined nationally with each nation-state 
projecting their own prototype upon the European, which resonates with SIT’s assumptions.  
Nevertheless, there were alternative representations of selective hybridity that were presented as 
less selfish. For example, one of the reasons that many participants thought that Greece was not 
European was the view that rule-following behaviour is lacking in Greece, as seen in Repousi’s and 
Panousis’s quotations above (also, in Lyritzis, Pagoulatos, Ramfos), which was seen as a negative 
social attitude. Some participants mentioned that there were character features that were seen as 
Greek or Mediterranean, such as ‘warmth’, ‘emotionality’, ‘empathy’ and ‘expressivity’ which were 
evaluated positively, but their ‘excesses’ were argued to need to be ‘tamed’ by laws and norms, 
which were seen as European/Northern features (Giannakou, Mitsotakis, Panousis, Ramfos). Within 
this representation, which can be said to reproduce traditional positive stereotypes of the 
constructions of the European ‘South’ and ‘North’, there was an implicit narrative that a desirable 
balance could, and should, be achieved between the acclaimed ‘soulfulness’ of the European South 
and the ‘rule-following rationality’ of the European North.  
This happier resolution of the ‘problem of hybridity’, as a highly selective feature that could combine 
what could be seen as ‘the best of both worlds’, was explicitly evident in one participant’s self-
description. 
‘I want to be a European citizen as far as services I receive from the state are concerned, the 
airplanes  leaving on time, the trains arriving on time, the constitution being respected, 
democracy functioning well… but in other issues I want to be Oriental, issues like 
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entertainment for instance, or culinary matters… I am a contradiction just like many Greeks 
are, isn’t that so?’ (Pappas) 
 
These accounts exemplify a different view on the question of hybridity which is more charitable, 
compared to the representations of either ‘self-interested Greek selectivity’ or ‘positive European 
stereotypes versus negative Oriental stereotypes’.  
Participants who belonged to fringe left-wing parties, like Thanasis Kampagiannis from ANTARSYA 
(SEK fraction), and consequently held highly critical views towards the EU/Europe, was very sceptical 
of European identity and argued that it contained ‘a lot of racism within it’ which was ‘based on an 
exclusion of all that exists in the East and the South, but not what is in the North’, therefore a 
cosmopolitan identity rather than a European was highly preferable, by which token, Greece’s 
hybrid existence between ‘the European, Asian and African experiences’ was an asset, rather than a 
hindrance. Although this argument could be interpreted as attempting to strategically represent 
Greece through creating positive self-schemas, the participant added that this desired cosmopolitan 
identity was a choice, thus not necessarily a given characteristic of the whole of Greek society. As 
such, it was not enacted to a feature of Greek national identity as such, but rather it was projected 
as an argument in favour of diversity, a feature which was clearly not seen as a facet of European 
identity.  
Attempts were made to elucidate the reasons that participants gave for Greece’s Europeanness, or 
lack of it thereof, a task which produced interesting results. Looking at why Greece was thought to 
be European, there was a rather small number of factors that was offered as justification. These only 
included two factors, namely Greece being foundational of European identity due to the ancient 
Greek tradition, which was the primary schema, and second, geographical location. Few participants 
mentioned common history, even fewer referred to the lack of other options (‘what else could 
Greece be?’), and very few suggested adherence to political values, such as democracy and human 
rights. Since these last three justifications were not widely shared throughout the interviews or were 
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contested, they cannot be said to amount to concrete reasons for believing that Greece is indeed 
European. As such, it would be fair to say that expert participants were unable to offer multiple and 
concretely contemporary reasons for Greece being European.  
In contrast, all participants, including those who said that Greece is both European and non-
European, could readily identify multiple reasons as to why Greece was not European. These reasons 
included several features, such as the well-established Oriental character, but also not obeying laws, 
being selective, not having a European culture, feeling inferior to Europe, having a long way to go 
before becoming European, holding certain religious values, lacking support for the EU, lacking 
respect for human rights, lacking rationality, being anti-Western, having a party like Golden Dawn, 
becoming impoverished by the economic crisis, being located at the periphery of Europe, believing 
in Greek superiority, having no functioning democracy or institutions, being undisciplined, not being 
a ‘normal country’, having low credibility, and missing out on major European historical 
developments, like the Enlightenment.  
Correspondingly, it is not only the Greek prototype that becomes apparent, but also the European 
one, which is sketched out as the opposite of these features, i.e. not being Oriental, obeying laws, 
not being selective, and so on. We can conclude from the above that although there was a wealth of 
justifications for Greece not being European, the number of reasons as to why Greece was indeed 
European was significantly more limited, indicating that Greek ideational leaders have difficulties 
imagining Greece’s European belonging in expansive terms. As such, it can be argued that Greece’s 
European identity was not confidently or intensely claimed, but instead it was highly problematised 
and questioned.  
 
Possible identities at the border 
 
While within the above two narratives the question of Greece’s being was assessed, in the third and 
fourth narrative the question revolved around Greece’s becoming. The question of becoming is 
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crucial to hybridity because hybrid entities which are seen as being in vacillation between two or 
more forces, thus an identity conflict, are typically associated with ‘borderline identities’ 
(Rajasingham-Senanayake, 2001) that could slip towards the one or the other pole. As put by 
journalist, Tasos Pappas, because of Greece’s history, ‘Europe’ and ‘the Orient’ repeatedly collide 
with each other at different historical intervals and every time they do, the one or the other 
dominates. Some participants expressed the concern that Greece is in peril of choosing the non-
European side of its identity, indicating that in light of the economic crisis Greece’s European 
identity was seen as a rather precarious one, in danger of being minimised or even lost. For example, 
Mavrotas commented, ‘the European seed exists within the Greek, but… the great danger for Greece 
is to reject that and turn towards, not Europe, but the Orient, the South’. This last point illustrates 
that the crisis has brought to the fore questions of Greece’s ‘identity choice’. As put by Georgiadou, 
‘the European identity is also a choice, [but] this choice is not always strong [in Greece]’.  
In this respect, according to the third narrative, many participants alluded to the possibility of 
Greece becoming European or more European, if various features changed. This was not necessarily 
expressed as a certain or achievable possible outcome, mostly depending on the interviewee’s level 
of optimism as opposed to pessimism about the future. However, it was important to the degree 
that it clarified that the prototypical ontological assumption of European identity was that it is 
something to be learnt and achieved, rather than a given. For example, the question of possibility 
was seen in Repousi’s quotation above in the phrase ‘what a long way [Greece] has to go to become 
European’, which perhaps could be categorised as part of the less optimistic examples. Other 
participants proposed the following:  
‘the tendency… is to avoid… the image of the computer that is littered by the oily 
souvlaki… the prospects are good… it takes time and a lot of work to be able to say one 
day… that we are a European country that lives based on laws that we decide…’ (Lyritzis) 
 
‘I want to believe that slowly we start showing some credibility, I hope this stays, an 
effort of institutional Europeanisation’ (Panousis) 
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‘we should become more European in issues like… more organisation, discipline, that will 
come to tame the traditional Greek temperament’ (Mitsotakis) 
 
Once again, these comments exemplify the cognitive associations to the object of European identity, 
such as high technology (i.e. ‘computer’), clean (i.e. ‘not littered’), laws, credibility, organisation, 
discipline. Achieving these identity features is considered to transform Greece into a European 
country. The clarification of what is considered ‘European’ is explicitly stated in the following 
example that constructs specific associations.  
‘all these weaknesses… mean that the country [Greece] departs from the high standards 
that make a European country… this is good because, on the one side, we recognise that 
anything European is synonymous to quality and civilisation, and on the other side, we 
recognise that we have many weaknesses that need to be overcome’ (Kratsa) 
 
Although several participants associated Europeanness with various superior standards, whether 
cultural, institutional, or political, this tendency was not universal. As indicated above, critical fringe 
left-wing parties associate European identity with racism (Kampagiannis from ANTARSYA/SEK), or a 
vehicle of propaganda in the hands of capitalist elites aiming to disorient people from class struggles 
by orienting them towards ethnic divisions (Karathanasopoulos from KKE) and a form of imperialism 
and intervention (Kazakis from EPAM). These alternative representations shape the European 
prototype in radically different ways as non-egalitarian, controlling and intruding.  
In the fourth narrative, concerns were expressed that Greece may soon resemble Balkan, Latin 
American, African or Asian countries, rather than European, due to the effects of the economic 
crisis. At this instance, it became clearer that the European prototype was equated with developed 
economies and high living standards (Litsis), and the EU as the only factor keeping Greece intact 
from the crisis effects. For example, quite a few participants spiritedly commented on Greece’s 
feared possible identity. 
‘[without Europe]…with such crisis, Greece would become Bangladesh for the next 200 
years, let me not say forever!’ (Giannakou) 
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‘[without the Troika]… today we would not just become Argentina, but we’d be Senegal!’ 
(Matsaganis) 
 
‘[without the Troika]… with the alternative of Argentina, half the city of Athens would had 
been burnt by now…’ (Mandravelis) 
 
‘If we dispatch from Europe, the danger of becoming a sub-Saharan African country is very 
big…’ (Ramfos) 
 
As shown, the objects of ‘Europe’ and the ‘Troika’ are heavily invested with representations of safety 
and security, while the alternatives are considered disastrous and worrisome. The alternatives are 
anchored on prior historical examples of countries that have experienced bankruptcy, i.e. Argentina, 
or are simply seen as poor, i.e. Senegal or Bangladesh. Interestingly, the wider Balkans, which are 
situated within Europe and are the immediate geographical context of Greece, were said to be 
thought of as ‘less European’ or ‘non-European’, thus less prototypical compared to 
Western/Northern Europe, creating a hierarchy of Europeanness. For instance, some commented 
that: 
‘Think about it, the Bulgarian is a European citizen, and so is the German. But they are not 
treated the same when they come to work in Greece. Therefore, we don’t have a common 
identity, although we should’ (Lyritzis) 
 
‘For the Greeks, Europe starts from Italy… this is how the Greek understands it, he doesn’t 
see Bulgaria as Europe, he considers it Balkan, which is interesting, because he doesn’t quite 
think of the Balkans as Europe, but something in-between…’ (Tsoukalis) 
 
Furthermore, the ‘Balkans’ seemed to inspire the same fears as countries of the Global South did in 
the previous examples. Historian Despoina Papadimitriou, for instance, admitted that: 
‘me too, as a citizen, I share this agony… […] maybe there is this fear in many of us, that in 
terms of living standards we’ll resemble more our neighbouring Balkan countries, that got to 
know the communist experience, i.e. Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, and potentially this fear 
regarding wages, healthcare, corruption, all the problems of post-communist transitions, we 
will now have to deal with, and beyond the left/right divisions, or who we may have been, or 
whether we wanted this [Eastern/communist] experience or not, we’ve known mostly the 
western experience, the western bloc, and now we have to deal with [this]…’ 
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As such, Greece’s becoming was anchored on prior historical examples of other nations’ difficult 
times and created a base for ‘feared possible selves’, which departed from the prototypes of the 
European ‘desired possible selves’ (Barone et al., 1997).  
 
National dissensus and personal experiences 
 
Moving on from these geo-schematic narratives, the next dominant representation in the interviews 
in terms of identity conflict was that of ‘lack of national consensus’, whereby Greece was presented 
as a ‘divided nation’, both before and after the economic crisis. Many spoke of a political system 
where ‘the government says one thing, the opposition says another’ (Repousi), the citizens resist 
‘cooperation and understanding’ (Giannakou), therefore ‘consensus from below’ is missing, leading 
to ‘social explosions’ (Panousis), and a wider culture where ‘the Greek cannot communicate with the 
Greek’ (Mavrotas) in a climate of ‘too much division’ and polarisation between ‘good and evil’ 
(Ramfos). Within the context of the economic crisis, Triantafyllou summarises the climate as follows: 
‘a low tension civil war is going on. In Greece, we have a long Marxian tradition of class 
struggle, of holy battles against the bourgeoisie and the “damned” Right as most Greek 
leftists call the conservatives. However, the situation is more complex than a Marxian class 
struggle: social classes are not what they used to be[…] The Greek Left is conformist and 
vociferous; its models are Third World countries, it is anti-Western by definition. So we are 
all trying to come up for air in an atmosphere of intolerance and hatred. Fringe politics is on 
the rise both on the Right… and the Left… There is little room for moderates in Greece 
today’ (Triantafyllou) 
 
Many explain that the national division is obstructing the country’s passage from ‘crisis politics’ to 
‘normal politics’ because of the inability to agree on crisis policies, whether austerity options or 
Grexit itself (Koutsiaras, Ramfos, Trimis,). Others compare Greece to Germany and argue that 
Greece does not have the same consensus-driven political culture as Germany, a lack that is 
evaluated as a shortcoming for national policy planning and implementation (Andronopoulos, 
Chryssochoou). Few participants mentioned that governmental policies of unequal and unfair 
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distribution of taxation and cuts between public and private sector employees turn the two socio-
economic groups against each other (Litsis, Ramfos).  
Some participants argued that within the crisis there are two opposing social tendencies between 
those citizens who engage in national self-reflection and self-criticism and understand that the 
political system of the past needs to be discarded and changed, and those who do not look at their 
society critically and fail to understand the necessity of change.   
 
‘there are strata of the population that have started thinking differently… these can take us 
out of the crisis… simultaneously, there are all of those who express the old Greece… those 
forces that try to stop that change… try to turn us back to how we used to be before the 
crisis, take us out of the requirements of development and progress, so they can serve… 
their sponsored lives’ (Ramfos) 
 
‘it is obvious that the crisis had led parts of the society to… national self-awareness, that is, 
parts that understand what’s going on… assign political accountabilities and reposition 
themselves… politically. But there are big parts of the society that refuse to see the new 
situation, seek exit from the crisis with models of the past… this is a bet… regarding where 
the country will go, but both phenomena are very intense right now…’ (Lyritzis) 
 
As is apparent in these quotations, participants diagnosed a national struggle between these two 
segments of society of reflective and non-reflective citizens. Within this representation of social 
opposition, the ‘old Greece’ is represented by practices of clientelism and blindness to its own flaws, 
while the ‘new Greece’ is characterised by self-knowledge and desire for change. Furthermore, 
Greece is once again represented as floating between two forces as a vacillating borderline possible 
self.  
Interestingly, social oppositions became most vividly apparent in the interviewees’ descriptions of 
personal feelings and experiences. On the side of self-proclaimed Europeanists and ideational 
leaders who stated that they felt European, a MP asserted,  
‘Sometimes because I feel European, I feel lonely in my country… I’m surprised how lonely I 
feel in the Greek Parliament, you know the stereotype that when we were building the 
Parthenon, the rest of the world was living on trees, the typical… which, as you know, is 
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ahistorical, but if you say so, you are a national traitor… or if you say something in favour of 
Europe and against your country… by saying the truth, you become a traitor’ (Repousi)  
 
This example echoes that of the Greek farmer of the previous chapter who felt similarly 
discriminated when called ‘Germanotsolias’ for wanting to vote YES in the 2015 Referendum and 
amply exemplifies the polarised conflict of everyday political life in Greece during the economic 
crisis. Another ideational leader felt the need to address his fellow citizens, saying that:  
‘I feel European, and I would like to plea to my fellow citizens to allow me to continue to 
feel European, since many would like to see us dispatch from Europe’ (Sotiropoulos) 
 
As shown, some participants experience cognitive dissonance within their professional or social 
environments and feel either obstructed in their political desires, i.e. to continue being European, or 
feel stereotyped by colleagues, i.e. being a ‘traitor’. On the side of participants who were more 
critically inclined towards the EU, there were comparable complaints. For example: 
‘of course I am in favour of reforms, and revolutions too! I think this has falsely been 
established, on the one side, the reformist with the European face, and on the other side, 
the blood-covered supporter of North Korea, these are not serious distinctions… to put it 
simply, they accuse you that you don’t support the reforms, that is, the Troika’s policy, 
therefore you are a supporter of Albania, or North Korea… and the minute you propose a 
measure of direct democracy or economic protection for the vulnerable… you are accused 
of right-wing turn! By the same people who blamed you for being the supporter of 
totalitarian North Korea… it is paranoid’ (Trimis) 
 
‘in the nineties, if you expressed an opinion against the Euro, you’d be categorised - unless 
you were already within the traditional Left - as the headstuck traditional leftist, who fell 
from planet Mars, and this was happening even in 2010, 2011… I was just a journalist 
interviewing economists who doubted that we should stay in the Euro, I wasn’t [myself]… 
at work, this was seen with suspicion, almost like a crime…’ (Litsis) 
 
As shown, these participants felt similarly stereotyped by others, as ‘radicals’ or ‘irrationally’ critical 
of European integration. These divisions between assumed and mutually stereotyped ‘Europeanists’ 
and ‘Eurosceptics’ were additionally evident during brief discussions after the end of the interviews, 
when the researcher would ask participants for suggestions of key figures in the field that could be 
approached for interviewing. These findings will be presented here anonymously due to the ‘off-the-
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record’ character of the data and thus, the sensitive and ethical issues that are invoked. In this 
respect, few participants expressed stereotyping notions towards other colleagues. For example, 
one participant questioned, ‘who could you possibly talk to from the other side? They are all 
karagkiozides (clowns)’, referring to individuals who have Eurosceptic views and support Grexit. 
Another commented that ‘if you look at the candidates of SYRIZA, it is full of Greek academics and 
they are acting out like teenagers, they’ve gone wild!’. In these examples, Euroscepticism and 
critique towards the EU or the Euro currency are seen as less than serious or childish.  
Alternatively, another participant asserted that those who think that Greece is not a ‘normal 
country’ by European standards suffer from ‘small-town mentality’ and are ‘people who don’t even 
know who Ken Loach is’. In this example, a critical response is projected that strategically attempts 
to diminish the cultural capital of those deemed as ideological opponents.  This type of comments 
punctuated the existence of mutually articulated stereotyping tendencies between ‘Eurosceptics’ 
and ‘Euroenthusiasts’ and further reaffirmed the existence of a symbolic conflict within Greek 
society.  
However, the most interesting identity conflicts that became evident during ‘off-the-record’ 
discussions with ideational leaders were not the ones between individuals and social groups, but 
within single individuals themselves. In some interactions, few participants who clearly held 
Europeanist views admitted to feeling conflicted during the crisis. Two participants said that even 
though they knew so much about Europe and always supported it, they felt Eurosceptic thoughts 
going through their minds when they watched the Troika on Greek television. Another EU supporter 
commented with reference to a ‘Eurosceptic’ colleague that ‘he has arguments, you know, 
sometimes I’m afraid that he might be right’. These self-doubting moments regarding one’s personal 
political choices illustrated the contested and shaken character of EU support within the political 
hearts of individuals, or elsewise, the conflict within.  
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European divisions and exclusions 
 
At the European level, the predominant representation of identity conflict appeared to be that 
between North and South. A majority of participants referred to it as a European division, 
accompanied by mutual stereotyping that included hostility and conjoint devaluation. The division 
was often labelled in alternative ways, which punctuated the cognitive associations made with the 
respective schemas of ‘North’ and ‘South’, such as the ‘export/producer countries and the 
import/buyer countries’ (Repousi), the ‘surplus and the deficit countries’ (Mavrotas), ‘creditors and 
debtors’ (Mitsotakis), ‘the rich and the poor’ (Papadimitriou), the ‘protestants and the lazy’ 
(Mandravelis), and the ‘economic burden and the austerity countries’ (Pagoulatos). Several 
interviewees referred to ‘anti-Germanism’ becoming a feature of Greek European identity during the 
crisis, replacing ‘traditional Greek anti-Americanism’ (sic) (Chountis, Litsis). This identity change was 
located within what was described as Greek public opinion’s engagement in ‘politics of blaming’ 
against Germany and formation of negative views. These dynamics can be understood as 
representations of Greece’s European identity conflict.  
In terms of exclusion, the representation of Greece as being constructed as non-European during the 
economic crisis was not explicitly or extensively discussed by this study’s ideational leaders. Only 
one journalist mentioned that Greek identity is experienced as ‘an exclusion from European identity’ 
with reference to how Greeks see themselves during the crisis (Kimpouropoulos). However, some 
participants commented on the question of the European prototype and their comments implied a 
sense of exclusion from this prototype, as well as a preoccupation with what was perceived as a 
problematic narrowing or Germanification of European prototypicality. For example, Kampagiannis 
argued the following regarding the discourse of modernisation as Europeanisation. 
‘this narrative [of failed modernisation] exists in the whole of Europe, not just here, for 
sure around all the Southern countries, because they have particularities… but if you 
exclude them, what remains from Europe? If you exclude Greece, Spain, Italy… who are 
not European enough… you’re left with Germany and France, but neither France is 
European enough, the discussion is similar there too, that France refuses to modernise, 
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because it has too many leftists and unions, etc., so France is to blame too, so what 
remains? Germany!’ (Kampagiannis) 
 
As seen in this example, it is argued that the quest for the ‘perfect’ European prototype holds the 
danger of becoming elusive for most EU member-states, while it is implied that the standard of 
judgement and evaluation is set up by Germany. At another instance, MP Apostolos Kaklamanis 
commented that the ‘mould of the European’ is not owned by anyone in Europe and that if some 
nations think that other nations are ‘more backwards’, this needs to be reconsidered in the wider 
synthesis of European nations. These comments on European prototypicality might be understood 
as preoccupations with exclusion, mainly on the basis of comparison to countries that are 
categorised as ‘more modern and advanced’, and the association of this contrast to specific national 
objects, i.e. ‘Germany’.  
Finally, the data revealed another identity conflict which was objectified around the relational aspect 
of identity and concerned what was described by participants as a ‘superiority/inferiority complex’ 
(Matsaganis), or as our analytical framework would dictate, a devaluation/overvaluation vacillation. 
As Pappas summarised it, ‘Greece’ always viewed ‘foreigners’ in a double way: either by worshiping 
and imitating anything foreign, or by thinking that Greece is a ‘chosen nation’. The result of this 
schism, as put by Pappas, was a ‘combination that produced monsters, sometimes a submissive 
slave-like approach to foreigners, and sometimes a self-centred conspiracy-driven one’. This 
vacillation appeared to be relevant to Greece’s relation with the EU, with the latter being seen 
through a so-called ‘milking cow versus bamboulas’24 public perception (Mavrotas), extending after 
the economic crisis to the EU being seen as either a ‘saviour’ or an ‘oppressor’ (Panousis). These 
representations, which can be said to constitute continuations of the representations of a 
‘love/hate’ historical relationship of Greece with the West, will be analysed next.  
                                                          
24 The word ‘bamboulas’ (mpampoulas) is often used in Greek to connote someone who is scary, i.e. the 
‘boogie man’, or something that is scary, i.e. a ‘monster’. The etymological origin of the word might be 
situated in the African drum and dance called ‘bamboula’ and the outdated stereotype of African tribes as 
‘cannibals’ and African dances as ‘cannibalistic rituals’ or ‘voodoo ceremonies and incantations’ (Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/).  
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Identity devaluation: negotiations of collective responsibility and exceptionalism 
 
In the previous chapters, it was demonstrated that historiographical representations portrayed 
Greece as a ‘lesser European’ due to its Oriental identity, while various historical stereotypes 
included Greece being seen as over-ambitious, spoiled and wayward, amounting to representations 
of undeservingness. Within crisis representations, Greece was described by various negative 
metaphors, such as diseased, beggar or childish, while going through processes of culturalisation, 
moralisation and exceptionalisation, resulting to a status of ‘internal otherness’ within the EU. 
Within our ideational leaders’ interviews, it was largely accepted that Greece had been stereotyped, 
therefore the idea that the economic crisis had constituted an identity threat was not contradicted. 
Responses to stereotyping included two main patterns, one that emphasised that Greece is 
responsible for its economic downfall and one that argued that Greece was strategically framed in 
stereotypical ways. Nevertheless, these two camps did not share uniformly separate representations 
and there were several arguments that were shared by both, a facet of the data that indicated the 
complexity of expert opinion. The concept of ‘collective responsibility’ appeared to be a dominant 
one, whether this was expressed explicitly or implicitly, while questions of Greek exceptionalism 
were negotiated variably across the participants.   
 
Reflections on negative stereotypes  
 
In terms of identity threat as devaluation, several participants commented that Greece passed 
quickly and suddenly from an ‘era of Eudaimonia’25 or ‘euphoria’ to conditions of ‘decadence’, 
‘shame’ and ‘failure’ (Mavrotas, Papadimitriou, Papakonstantinou). Moreover, many observed that 
the economic crisis had led to lowered national ‘self-esteem’, ‘confidence’ and ‘pride’ 
                                                          
25 Eudaimonia (eu = good + daimon = spirit) translates as ‘the state of having a good indwelling spirit, a good 
genius’ (Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/eudaemonism#ref273308). More widely, 
it is seen as ‘a contented state of being happy and healthy and prosperous’ (Dictionary.com).  
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(Kimpouropoulos, Pagoulatos, Smyrlis). Kazakis went as far as stating that ‘the Greek is the European 
with the lowest self-esteem’. In terms of responses to stereotypes, the majority agreed that there 
had been stereotypes about Greece during the economic crisis and did not reject their existence.  
There were two distinct responses to stereotypes. The first emphasised Greece’s culpability within 
the crisis and the second argued that Greece’s stereotyping was strategic and deliberate. It appeared 
that the first camp was predominantly populated by academics and members of moderate political 
parties from the centre of the political spectrum who supported European integration, while the 
second included journalists and party representatives of the radical and fringe left-wing parties who 
were more sceptical towards European integration. Nevertheless, this was not an absolute 
separation and several common discursive subthemes existed in both groups’ representations. 
Although these group distinctions may be attributed to the effects of snowballing sampling, they 
may indicate professional or ideological leanings. However, given the small sample and qualitative 
nature of the research, such generalisations should not be made.  
Beginning with the first group, participants downplayed the importance of stereotypes and 
attempted to refocus the discussion at the national level. For example, respondents commented the 
following regarding stereotypes of laziness and profligacy. 
‘no, I don’t think that one should stay [there], there is a huge problem in our culture… over 
the centuries, human action and initiative were associated with sin, and salvation was 
associated with holy grace, which devalued our relation with action and facilitated an 
attitude that looked for easy solutions, like loans… [this] didn’t facilitate the organisation of 
labour…  and willingness for labour. We love miracle solutions more than we love solutions 
of agency, which is why it was always, and still is, easier to find conspirators than to look at 
ourselves’ (Ramfos) 
 
‘Many Greeks have started asking long forgotten questions: who are we?… What’s our 
position in Europe...? What’s happened to us and why? Is there some truth in the 
stereotypes against us?... Are we really lazybones and thriftless? … the recession can, and 
must, help us acquire some self-knowledge which, I think, is sadly lacking. We are awfully 
narcissistic: our nationalism and parochialism are proverbial. We - the political authorities 
and each one of us - have mismanaged our finances and our lives: we should agree on this. 
Instead of self-doubt and criticism, we always blame others: once upon a time the USA and 
the NATO, now the EU, the wicked, stingy and Protestant Germans, the corrupted local 
politicians. Whom we elected time and again’ (Triantafyllou) 
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As becomes apparent, this line of argumentation emphasises the need for Greek society to engage in 
a process of national self-reflection and acceptance of Greek responsibilities, while a major 
assumption is that Greek citizens blame others for the economic crisis, i.e. the EU or Germany, 
therefore fail to acknowledge their own accountability. This assumed construction of ‘conspirators’ 
and ‘parochial narcissism’ of Greek society can be understood as self-esteem mechanisms that seek 
to rebalance the threat posed by an identity devaluation by means of dispensing responsibility and 
blame-shifting to external objects. Within these representations there is an implicit acceptance of 
stereotypes as justifiable. Yannis Panousis, at the time MP with DIMAR, commented that the 
‘foreigners’ ask for ‘specifics’ and ‘rule-following’ from ‘us’ and ‘we’ don’t deliver them, which 
justifies exasperated European reactions. Kaklamanis observed that although European stereotypes 
of Greeks are ‘exaggerated’, it is easy to forget that they might be ‘justified’.  
Moreover, as indicated above, there was emphasis on the mutuality of stereotyping, with 
participants arguing that many Greeks themselves created several negative stereotypes of other 
Europeans, i.e. Northerners or Germans (also, Kaklamanis, Litsis, Tsoukalis). This was a dominant 
feature in this group of participants, but not solely, possibly as a strategy of relocating the 
problematisation within the national context and Greece’s own responsibilities and symbolic wrong-
doings during the crisis. 
‘us too, when we talk about the evil Germans, the cold Northerners, the anthellenic English, 
we should be very careful, just like we want others to be careful towards us’ (Kratsa) 
 
Nevertheless, within the wider representation of acceptance of Greek culpability, there were various 
critical counter-arguments and negotiations. For instance, representatives from the ND party felt 
that despite their acceptance of Greek flaws, they disagreed with the ways some stereotypes were 
expressed.  
‘we can’t say that Greeks are lazy, but we can say that the main goal was to be employed in 
the public sector, which doesn’t happen in European countries… there was of course 
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corruption, and it still exists, and you should know that corruption exists in all the world and 
all over Europe, but there are some inviolable rules in European countries. In Greece, 
unfortunately, there was impunity…’ (Giannakou) 
 
‘Many of the stereotypes that were attributed to the Greeks don’t correspond to reality… we 
do have a big problem of corruption in Greece, bigger compared to the rest of Europe, [but] 
we are not a corrupted nation. There is an important difference between saying that we have 
a big issue and saying that we are a corrupted nation, which places all Greeks within a 
stereotype’ (Mitsotakis) 
 
As such, although these participants accepted that the Greek crisis had domestic roots, they were 
disagreeable with the wording of stereotypical claims and their overgeneralising or exceptionalising 
effects. Within an SIT framework these tactics can be understood as restorative of the threatened 
collective self-esteem by means of negotiating the nature or extend of the problem. Nevertheless, 
the comparisons made between Greece and other European countries that do not exhibit as much 
corruption as Greece does, can be said to still place Greece in an exceptional position.  
Furthermore, it was evident that as much as some participants acknowledged Greek culpability as 
the primary cause of the Greek economic crisis and declared their support for the EU, or even 
described themselves as Europeans or Europeanists, this did not necessarily entail an absence of 
critique towards the EU. For example, some argued that there was mutual responsibility on behalf of 
the EU in the development of the economic crisis. For instance, some argued that the EU did not 
provide sufficient supervision of economic matters in the past, which resulted in allowing the crisis 
to happen.  
‘Greece’s political kakodaimonia 26 and the effects and political behaviour that it causes, 
seem to have been enabled by easy borrowing from Europe. It looks like the Greek political 
system, the Greek governments, acted like a moocher, a stowaway, while the inspector, the 
ticket collector, essentially let them unchecked, if not encouraged them in their 
freeloading…’ (Koutsiaras) 
 
‘there’s a whole story about the role of Eurostat. Ok, we ourselves were useless, but did 
they not see that all our numbers were flashing red? There is a serious problem of 
                                                          
26 Kakodaimonia (kakos = evil + daimon = spirit) translates as the opposite of ‘eudaimonia’, therefore it stands 
for having a ‘bad genius’ or ‘bad spirit’. 
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governance in the EU… of course, we are the last that can complain about this, but it is a 
serious issue from a European point of view… the economic governance, what existed 
before… the Commissioner scolding countries that had large deficits, but with very little 
surveillance of one country by another, which would be logical in an economic union, but 
that didn’t happen…’ (Matsaganis) 
 
In terms of the relationship between responsibility and identity, following SIT, this sharing of 
responsibility can be understood as a blame-shifting strategy that lifts full blaming, thus full identity 
devaluation, from one social entity by placing part of it on another.  
Various other interviewees commented critically on the crisis management, saying that the EU was 
unprepared to deal with the economic crisis and that there was insufficient solidarity towards 
Greece at the beginning of the crisis (Chryssochoou, Pagoulatos). The Troika was viewed negatively 
by some who claimed that the intervention was ‘unplanned, violent, painful, and longer than 
necessary’ (Sotiropoulos) and the Troika itself is ‘not interested in the wellbeing of Greeks, they just 
want their money back, which is understandable, but is not part of the initial European vision’ 
(Triantafyllou). It was also mentioned that the EU could play a role in repairing the damage caused 
by negative stereotypes, i.e. through youth exchange programmes, but was not taking a lead in this 
direction (Georgiadou). On some occasions, European governments were seen as responsible for 
encouraging the circulation of negative stereotypes towards Greeks (Chryssogelos, Kratsa). In many 
respects, it was apparent that Europeanism among ideational leaders was of a critical nature with 
participants criticising the EU or other governments on multiple grounds, but simultaneously 
declaring their support for European integration. As Tsoukalis put it, ‘I am proud to be a critical 
European’. Papadimitriou explained that ‘although it doesn’t fulfil the beautiful role of the Europe of 
the people, it is still a community that I want to belong to’. Consequently, there were several critical 
views among supporters of the EU, nevertheless none that would warrant a complete change of 
political heart.  
As was explained, a second group of participants emphasised that stereotypes against Greece were 
created strategically and were suspicious towards them. These participants were more inclined to 
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use heavier terms to describe these stereotyping phenomena, such as ‘victimisation’ 
(Kampagiannis), ‘stigmatisation’ (Andronopoulos) and ‘demonisation’ (Litsis). This may be attributed 
to greater feelings of identity threat, perceived as stigma, or it may be attributed to a strategic 
choice to safeguard collective self-esteem by dispensing responsibility and enacting representations 
of others’ wrongdoings. These participants were also more predisposed to identify large structures 
as responsible for the crisis, i.e. world capitalism, neoliberalism or globalisation. One of the primary 
reasons that was perceived to be responsible for such deliberate stereotyping was the facilitation of 
reforms and acceptance of austerity measures. Some believed that negative stereotypes aimed at 
cultivating feelings of guilt among the Greek public that would result in diminished resistance 
towards Memorandum policies.  
‘one of the reasons for the imposition of Memorandum policies in Greece was the claim 
that Greeks are a lazy nation, corrupted and profligate, this created a guilt syndrome…’ 
(Chountis) 
 
‘…a strategy of incrimination of society, so that you can pass certain measures, to make 
society accept them, at which point we have an intervention in the development of social 
attitudes themselves’ (Andronopoulos) 
 
Karathanasopoulos, MP with KKE, shared this view saying that if people think they partake in the 
responsibility of the corruption which led to the economic crisis, they will not fight for their rights 
and will endure all the consequences of austerity policies. Some interviewees held the belief that 
Greece was being ‘punished’, like a ‘bad child’ (Pappas) with a ‘teacher over its head’ (Chountis), and 
treated like a ‘guinea pig’ in order to set ‘an example’ for other countries who might wish to resist 
austerity policies (Andronopoulos, Trimis). As it appears, this group of participants, characterised by 
more polemical representations compared to the previous one, and populated by journalists and 
left-wing party members, made extensive use of the media metaphors that were identified in the 
international press in the previous chapter. However, these were not accepted by everybody, as 
Karathanasopoulos stated that his party disagrees with the guinea pig metaphor of Greece, because 
Greece is the last to implement neoliberal reforms which contradicts the guinea pig narrative.  
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Participants identified various strategic actors at various registers: a) the personal, b) the national, c) 
the European level, and d) the ideological. At the personal level, there was a process of 
personification that concerned George Papandreou, the Prime Minister during the beginning of the 
crisis in late 2009, who was viewed as responsible for conveying to the international community an 
image of Greece as lazy and corrupted (Papakonstantinou). This criticism was also projected by some 
of the more moderate and Euro-supportive participants. Papadimitriou, for instance, contested that 
‘Papandreou’s initiatives… gave the impression of a society that is rotten, which might be right to 
some part, but this is not something that one can claim and support as a leader of a nation-state’. 
Others also spoke of Greek ‘leadership’ or ‘ruling elites’ endorsing and becoming comfortable with 
these negative representations (Mavrotas, Pappas).  
Greek political elites were seen as enacting a double domestic campaign that placed blame on both 
Greek citizens and the EU, simultaneously (Kampagiannis, Pappas). For instance, Kampagianis argued 
that during the crisis it was ‘easier’ for Greek governments to implement reforms blaming ‘outer 
forces’ like the EU, an idea that was not contradicted by a representative of the ruling ND of the time 
of data collection, who argued that the Troika was ‘necessary, to share the political cost’ (Smyrlis). 
European governments and media were criticised for permitting and even promoting negative 
stereotypes (Kazakis, Kimpouropoulos). Finally, some participants mentioned the dominance of 
neoliberal economic ideology and what they viewed as neoliberalism’s negative effects on people’s 
lives (Andronopoulos, Mandravelis). Strategic stereotyping was seen as obscuring the responsibilities 
of European actors, i.e. the EU and Germany, or international ones, i.e. the banks and the market 
(Litsis, Trimis). For example, the EU was blamed for the inefficiencies of the Eurozone, for permitting 
excessive lending and providing insufficient economic supervision (Kazakis, Litsis, Pappas).  
Germany appeared to be a particular object at the national level. The German government and press 
were specifically identified as responsible for such stereotyping by some participants (Kazakis, Litsis). 
As a response, some insisted that Germany has its own corruption, i.e. being involved in 
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multinational company scandals, others argued that German export surpluses ‘presupposed a 
profligate South’, therefore contributed to the economic crisis (Kimpouropoulos), while some 
viewed German foreign policy as overtly ideological and attached to its own protestant values 
(Andronopoulos, Pappas). Critiques of Germany were not only present in this group. For instance, 
former MEP Rodi Kratsa stated that ‘one would expect more from a leading country like Germany’. 
Some went as far as saying that the stereotyping of Greeks by Germans was similar to that of the 
Jews during the thirties (Andronopoulos). Kazakis, leader of EPAM and proponent of Grexit, shared 
the following thoughts and personal experiences regarding this metaphor of ‘Greeks as Jews’.  
‘I think there was a systematic propaganda, which I personally witnessed every time I 
travelled abroad during these years, primarily against the Greeks, but also all the 
Southerners, where the governments were trying to cover up their responsibilities, as well 
as those of this formation called Eurozone, and as an extension, of the EU, they tried to 
teach their people to judge with terms of collective responsibility. Greece has corrupted 
politicians? Therefore, it’s the Greek’s fault because he is corrupted. With this logic of 
collective responsibility, we are back in the times of Nazism, where it was believed that the 
Jew was responsible for the economic crisis of Germany in the interwar… in the same way, 
just like the Jew was subjected to propaganda, I too faced the propaganda against the 
Greeks, especially during the first two or three years, in Germany itself, yes, yes, yes, every 
time I was there…’ (Kazakis) 
 
As illustrated, stereotypical identities of ‘Germans as Nazis’ were reproduced here, through the 
metaphor of ‘Greeks as Jews’ and anchoring of the Eurozone crisis to the economic crisis of the 
interwar years, while stereotyping against Greeks was viewed as highly deliberate and malevolent. 
The journalist Moysis Litsis explained that he felt particularly annoyed when a British taxi driver told 
him that ‘you Greeks don’t want to pay any taxes at all’, a comment that can be said to echo the 
aforementioned comment by Christine Lagarde in chapter four regarding Greeks evading taxes ‘all 
the time’. The participant further added that these stereotypes are ‘dangerous’ and ‘breed racism’, 
maintaining that Greece is responsible for such stereotypes too by ‘dishonouring the history of 
WWII’ when representing Merkel as a Nazi officer (Litsis).  
There was comparable evidence in accounts of self-proclaimed Europeanists who appeared to have 
been personally affected, albeit not to the same degree, by what Mandravelis called the ‘war of 
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stereotypes’ between Greeks and Germans. Repousi, for instance, expressed the awkwardness of 
‘being Greek’ and ‘visiting Germany’ during the crisis for a research seminar.  
‘I remember it was during the beginning of the crisis, when the German press was full of 
articles about the downfall of the Greeks, every single day… I went there and during the 
duration of my trip I was thinking about how the Germans might see me… the first day no 
one said anything to me… during the evening, when we went out for dinner and a glass of 
wine, I was so impressed with what sympathy they opened the discussion about Greece, to 
such a degree, that I was truly surprised that these people had not been influenced by the 
negative images of the Greeks that circulated daily in the German press... however, I must 
note here that these were not ordinary Germans, they were educated and taught at the 
university, predominantly social democrats, because political opinion matters too, and 
understand that Germany’s policy could lead to a breakup of Europe, and being profoundly 
Europeanists, they react to this policy. This was a very positive experience.’ 
 
As seen, experiences were not reported to be only negative, although we can still identify their 
impact not only in the awkward preoccupation of how others will see one’s identity due to a 
collective identity characteristic, but also in the assertion that the individuals of this story were 
‘special Germans’ based on their education, profession, and political ideology. Education appeared 
to be a key factor in Kazakis’s negative experience when he reflected that it is not the German 
peoples’ fault if they think in stereotypical ways, because news are communicated through 
newspapers like Build, a type of publication that in his view contributes to the ‘degradation of 
education across Europe’. As such, we can appreciate that ideational leaders negotiated these 
identity threats emanating from stereotypes in varying ways, making various balancing arguments, 
differentiations and specifications.  
 
Collective responsibility and other demons 
 
In any case, Kazakis’s extended quotation above explicitly brings to the fore one of the main 
preoccupations within the data, namely, that of collective responsibility. This question of Greek 
culpability was implicit or paraphrased repeatedly during the interviews, as was demonstrated by 
the first group of participants who emphasised Greece’s responsibility for its economic crisis. As 
previously seen, Triantafyllou stated ‘we - the political authorities and each one of us - have 
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mismanaged our finances’ which can be interpreted as a statement that hinges on the notion of 
collective responsibility. Ramfos was one of the few to refer to it explicitly, commenting that, given 
what he saw as weaknesses of Greek identity, ‘it is characteristic that during this critical period very 
few had the sense of responsibility, very few said that the responsibility is collective, some more 
responsible, some less, but there is a collective responsibility’.  
However, it did not follow that all individuals who accepted Greek culpability necessarily accepted 
that responsibility was collective. Giannakou, for instance, who described crisis causes as solely 
domestic (i.e. lack of productive base, limited tax revenue and tax evasion, lack of sense of 
responsibility, public demands for public expenses), commented the following:  
‘in order for a nation to do well, there needs to be a sense of individual responsibility, 
which transforms into collective action, this needs self-discipline… [here] there is no 
discipline. We used to hear theories, from politicians too, that there is such a thing as 
collective responsibility, I’m telling you that not even in the Nuremberg Trials was 
collective responsibility recognised, there is no collective responsibility, responsibility is 
personal’ (Giannakou) 
 
The choice of example here, i.e. Nuremberg Trials, may be read as an implicit juxtaposition of 
collective responsibilities, namely war crimes and debt/bankruptcy, perhaps aiming at minimising 
the responsibility of the latter by means of strategic comparison between what nevertheless needs 
to be understood as radically dissimilar historical circumstances. Nevertheless, as indicated, the 
interviews revealed that there were not only varied degrees of acceptance of responsibility, but also 
competing representations of responsibility, ranging from the ‘personal’ to the ‘collective’ and the 
‘shared/mutual’ type of responsibility with the EU or with ‘surplus countries’.  
An important point to convey is that although it could be assumed that there was a distinct 
dissonance between participants that insisted on domestic representations of the crisis and variably 
endorsed negative self-stereotypes of Greeks, and those who viewed them as strategic propaganda 
and stretched the importance of various large structures, i.e. the Eurozone or global capitalism, it 
would be misleading to do so. Endorsing Greek culpability, and stereotypes derived from it, was not 
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mutually exclusive to criticising extra-national structures, including the EU. Similarly, projecting 
polemical responses to claims of Greek responsibility, and stereotypes associated with it, did not 
exclude accepting Greek responsibility and political or financial ‘peculiarities’ or ‘pathologies’ 
(Kampagiannis, Papakonstantinou) as primary causes for the crisis. For example, although Kazakis 
rejected the notion of collective responsibility, he stated that ‘Greece has the most corrupted 
political system in Europe’. 
However, this comment appeared to be part of criticising Greek political elites, rather than the 
whole of Greek society, enacting the populist representation that separates ‘the elites’ from ‘the 
people’. As stated by Kazakis at another point, there is nothing that can be salvaged from the old 
corrupted system, ‘except the people’. This distinction appeared to be an important feature in the 
ways participants negotiated collective responsibility and blame attribution between those who 
were, as Ramfos put it above, ‘more responsible, or less responsible’. In this respect, some 
participants made differentiations between elites and citizens, attributing greater responsibility to 
the first.  
‘the citizens have a two-way relationship with the political leadership, they feed each 
other, the citizen votes to enjoy what is promised by [the politicians]… there is a 
responsibility, which is related to the political system, for the society that accepted this 
model… because it was convenient… on many occasions, tax evasion was convenient, 
relations to the parties were convenient… however, the political powers of the last thirty 
years never explained, or if they did, they weren’t heard, neither the model, its problems 
or their size, nor were there any policies for the management of these problems… so, the 
citizen has some responsibility, within a wider context of permissiveness, everybody was 
doing whatever they wanted without control from anybody, but the central role and main 
responsibility is with the political authorities, the power, every time…’ (Lyritzis) 
 
‘[the political elites] have a large part of responsibility, the parties that ruled the last 
thirty-forty years… because they could see the ship heading towards the iceberg and 
although there were some voices that gave warnings… they did nothing to turn the wheel, 
they just threw the hot potato to each other, and pushed problems under the rug, and 
thought that all that mattered was that the potato didn’t burst during their own office…’ 
(Mavrotas) 
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As illustrated, the ruling parties of the Metapolitefsi 27 era of the last thirty-forty years were 
categorised as the main culprits, which includes the PASOK and ND parties. Although political elites 
were primarily blamed for economic mismanagement, citizens were seen as sharing this 
responsibility by means of their voting participation and cooperation with the clientelistic and tax-
evading system. The same was argued by two representatives of the ND who argued that citizens 
understand their responsibilities. 
‘one tendency is that in a large part of the population, we recognised mistakes… many 
times we heard the phrase ‘but aren’t we to blame at all? Let’s think about our own 
mistakes, it is the political system’s fault, yes, but don’t we elect this system? Yes, don’t 
we want to get comfortable in the public sector? Didn’t we not learn to live with a system 
that was unproductive…?’ many times there was a sense of self-awareness and apology by 
the citizens…’ (Kratsa) 
 
‘the Greek decided that it is his fault too, not in the sense as said by Mr. Pangalos [that] 
‘we ate it together’, but in the sense that ‘even when I saw you eating it, I didn’t react, I 
didn’t do anything’, so now, [the Greek] says that he should make his sacrifices…’ (Smyrlis) 
 
The last quotation refers to Theodoros Pangalos’s well-known statement ‘we ate it together’ (Μαζί 
τα φάγαμε), which was provided by the PASOK politician as an answer to the public questioning 
regarding the ways public funds were spent. At the beginning of the economic crisis, various Greek 
citizens wondered how public funds were spent by the ruling parties as to lead to state bankruptcy 
and Pangalos famously declared that the money was gone, because his party had hired citizens in 
the public sector. Pangalos received widespread criticism for this statement on the basis of equating 
the degrees of responsibility between ruling elites and citizens. Within the interviews, 
Karathanasopoulos, contested this logic saying that ‘when someone eats all the bread, and another 
only eats the breadcrumbs, they do not share the same responsibility’. In any case, Smyrlis’s 
quotation additionally highlights the question of ‘bystander’s responsibility’ when saying that people 
did not react or do anything to stop politicians from appropriating public funds for their personal 
and party interests, which adds another version of responsibility.  
                                                          
27 Metapolitefsi, meaning ‘regime change’, is the historical period in Greece following the end of the 
dictatorship in 1974. 
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Negotiations of national exceptionalism 
 
Beyond the question of responsibility, in all its forms, the question of Greek exceptionalism was 
discussed with the participants. The interviews revealed that most participants problematised the 
notion of Greece’s exceptionality and shared a variety of arguments. Several interviewees 
maintained that Greece was not exceptional in general or in the Euro crisis, either because ‘all 
countries are special cases’ in general (Mandravelis, Panousis, Tsoukalis) or because ‘no country is 
special’ as such (Georgiadou, Papadimitriou). Some contested Greek exceptionality particularly 
‘within the EU’ which they viewed as ‘full of special cases’ and as having failed to deliver ‘real 
convergence’ (Papakonstantinou, Kimpouropoulos). Some supported that Greece was possibly an 
‘extreme case’ instead of an ‘exceptional case’ (Pagoulatos, Triantafyllou, Tsoukalis). Others 
supported that since various other countries had economic problems, it was evident that Greece’s 
issues were not unique (Lyritzis, Repousi, Tsoukalis). However, Sotiropoulos disagreed with this view 
saying that Greece was the ‘only case’ where there was collapse, which situates it within a 
representation of exceptionality.  
Nevertheless, many participants accepted that Greece had various peculiarities, which included its 
clientelistic system (Pappas, Ramfos, Repousi), analogy of debt and deficits (Mavrotas, 
Papakonstantinou), limited productivity and investments (Pappas), variety of capitalism (Chountis, 
Pappas), tax evasion (Chountis), social policies and delays of reforms (Chountis), corruption and 
permissiveness (Giannakou), financial mismanagement (Smyrlis), security issues and extensive sea 
borders (Panousis), and way of entering the Eurozone, based only on political criteria (Litsis). Some 
situated representations of Greek exceptionalism within the wider stream of strategic stereotyping 
during the economic crisis (Lyritzis, Mandravelis, Trimis, Kampagiannis). Finally, Panousis 
commented that it is not helpful to think of Greece as ‘special’ and that sometimes it might be 
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Greeks themselves who promote this representation as an ‘alibi’ for ‘failing to progress’.  As such, 
projecting negative exceptionalism was understood in this case as an excuse for inability.  
 
Identity overvaluation: ‘chosen peoples’ and ‘heroic victims’ 
 
In chapter three it was discussed that Greece was overvalued during its history for being presented 
as the ‘cradle of civilisation’ and ‘seedbed of democracy’ through the processes of Hellenism and 
Philhellenism. In chapter four, it was explained that in light of negative representations of Greece 
during the crisis, the country was additionally represented in positive stereotypes, such as that of 
the ‘victim’ of the economic crisis and of its management, the ‘rebel’ against the EU, world 
capitalism or neoliberalism, the ‘regime changer’ that would deliver democracy or nationalism, and 
finally, the ‘underdog’ that fights against odds. Within our ideational leaders’ interviews, explicit 
overvaluing strategies were rather scarce and only very few participants engaged in such 
representations. There were, however, several assumptions and criticisms of Greek society as one 
that believes in the superiority of the Greek nation as a kind of ‘chosen people’ (περιούσιος λαός). 
Furthermore, we can argue that projections of negative stereotyping as strategic and deliberate 
represent Greece as a ‘victim’ and an ‘underdog’ and constructs positive identity stereotypes. 
Representations of Greece as a ‘rebel’ or ‘regime changer’ were present, but ultimately quite 
marginal. All these representations can be understood as defence mechanisms of a perceived as 
devalued social identity, albeit used in a limited extent. The remaining section will elaborate on 
these themes.  
 
Some overvaluing strategies: the stuff myths are made of 
 
Beginning with overvaluing strategies, there were only few occasions where participants projected 
arguments of Greek superiority. Nevertheless, the few that were observable occurred during 
discussions of negative stereotyping and Greek exceptionalism. Based on SIT, this indicates that 
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overvaluing tactics are used as a counter-balancing act in the service of group self-esteem by means 
of identity re-evaluation and management of the inflicted identity threat that derives from negative 
stereotyping and exceptionalisation. The tactics that were observed in the data included claiming 
that a) Greece is superior to other Balkan countries, b) Greece is indeed special, but in positive ways, 
c) Greeks are admired by foreigners because they have innate positive characteristics, and d) Greece 
has a characteristic that is ‘the best in the world’. As becomes apparent, and as SIT proclaims, 
positive distinctiveness is claimed by means of group comparison and identity is enacted relationally. 
The above tactics can be labelled a) hierarchisation, b) positive exceptionalisation, c) relational 
narcissism, and d) antagonistic narcissism. All strategies can be understood within the wider context 
of mythologisation of national identity and motives of defensive nationalism.  
In the first instance, it was claimed that Greece is superior among Balkan countries, which reaffirmed 
empirically the claims made in the previous section by other participants who thought that Greeks 
may not always view the Balkans as fully European. For example, during a discussion about Greek 
exceptionalism and after accepting that Greece had several specifically Greek social and economic 
problems, a participant explained that rule-following is not followed in Greece as it is followed in 
‘the rest of Europe’ and moved on to clarify that:  
‘when I say the rest of Europe, I mean the old countries of the EU, because this is where 
we belong, I can’t compare Greece with Albania that just started the negotiations, or 
Serbia that wants to enter, or Croatia that entered yesterday, neither Bulgaria, nor 
Romania, because this comparison will only degrade my country, I can’t compare with 
them, because I am a member since 1979 [sic]… so I had the time and the resources to 
compare to Italy, I wouldn’t say Germany, but the other Southern countries, because we 
have common characteristics… and just for this, I can’t accept that the Greek will have the 
same wages as the Bulgarian, Bulgaria entered the EU on different grounds’ (Smyrlis) 
 
As can be seen, this representation of Greek and other European identities implicitly creates a 
hierarchisation of Europeanness, on the basis of timeframe and conditions of EU accession. 
Interestingly, EU accession is presented as the measure of belongingness to Europe, while geo-
schematic groupings of countries are hierarchised in ‘degrees of Europeanness’, with Germany at a 
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higher level, Greece placed at a middle ground with other Southern-Mediterranean member-states, 
although notably Croatia, an equally Southern-Mediterranean (but Balkan) country is not included in 
this grouping, and finally, at a lower level the Balkan countries, where Greece is said to not belong. 
This representation can also be said to be indicative of the superiority/inferiority complex as an 
overvaluation/devaluation vacillation across a constructed Europeanness spectrum, whereby Greece 
is presented as superior to the Balkans, but inferior to Germany.  
Moving on, the tactic of positive exceptionalisation was used by the same participant as a response 
to Greece’s negative exceptionalisation during the economic crisis.  
‘when Greece entered [the EC]… there was a distinct attitude… both [Europeans and 
Greeks] understood that the future of Europe and Greece was joint. We are talking about 
a completely different country, this is not a country that was admitted in the EU for its 
technology and industry… or agricultural production, but because of its civilisation, history 
and strategic location. These three things. This should not be forgotten, when we entered 
there were the rich countries and Greece. Why was there no other country admitted [like 
that]? Because there was none in that place’ (Smyrlis) 
 
As seen, Greek positive distinctiveness is associated here with the exclusively political criteria upon 
which Greece was admitted in the EC, rather than the fulfilment of economic criteria. This strategy 
attempts to achieve positive identity status by constructing positive representations of Greek 
uniqueness and indispensability of Greece for Europe. Furthermore, it attempts to transform a 
feature of weakness, i.e. bad economy, into a feature of strength, by replacing it with another, i.e. 
political indispensability. Few other participants also used this narrative emphasising that ancient 
Greece is ‘a symbol for Europe’ because the ‘ancient Greek spirit… is the greatest strength of 
humanity’, while Greece was ‘the only country that was admitted to the EEC contributing less than it 
gained’ (Giannakou). This narrative strategy can be understood as negotiating the devaluing effects 
produced by the chronic shortcomings of national economy by substituting them with overvaluing 
strategies of enhanced self-esteem on the basis of claims of historical uniqueness, universality, and 
European identity prototypicality. It should be noted that both these respondents belong to the ND 
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party which was the one to achieve EEC accession, hence party pride may be at work here, indicating 
group esteem at the party level.  
However, most of the participants did not seek national distinction in the ancient Greek tradition 
and some argued that identity overvaluations based on this particular feature ‘should not be 
emphasised’ (Kaklamanis). Others even censored themselves, as in the case of MEP Chountis who 
critically commented on himself as ‘playing smart’ when talking to EU Commissioners about Greece’s 
historical contribution (also, Karathanasopoulos). These can be understood as self-presentation 
tactics that try to avoid conveying the impression of nationalism or collective self-importance, but 
also as part of the recommended ‘national self-reflection’. Furthermore, this attitude might also be 
attributed to the implicit belief projected by Matsaganis that the national features Greeks are 
usually proud of, i.e. cultural heritage and natural beauty, they ‘never actually had to work for them’.  
Moving on, attempts for positive group status were made within the third strategy of relational 
narcissism. For instance, responding to stereotypes of laziness, a respondent argued that:  
‘laziness was proven wrong, statistics[…] proved that we are much more hard-working 
than everybody. And we are the most productive… I remember, as an old economic 
correspondent, foreign investors who used to come to Greece and talked about the 
intelligence of the Greek worker, his adaptability, productiveness… we have very bad 
systems… when the Greek finds himself within good systems abroad, he excels…’ 
(Andronopoulos) 
 
As illustrated, responses to stereotypes of laziness were answered with assertions of being the 
‘opposite of lazy’, i.e. ‘hard-working’, accompanied by exaggerations of being ‘more hard-working 
than everybody’ else or ‘the most productive’. Furthermore, positive characteristics were ascribed to 
Greek identity, i.e. intelligence and adaptability, as well as allusions to admiration by others. Both 
tactics are highly relational, since they include group comparison and validation by others. 
Simultaneously, they can be understood as forms of collective narcissism in the sense of claiming to 
be superior to ‘everybody else’ or being ‘admirable’ as such. The representation of statistics as a 
means of proof of Greek work ethic was also projected by several other participants who claimed 
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that Greece was strategically framed. Another representation that was projected as proof of Greek 
work ethic and further alleged positive Greek features was this differentiation between ‘good and 
bad systems’ and assumption of ‘Greek excellence within good systems’.  
This last assumption of ‘indigenous charisma’ and the role of ‘(dys)functional context’ was 
encountered several times within the data and appeared to be one of the strongest national myths, 
namely, the ‘diaspora myth’. This myth was always accompanied by the ‘underdog narrative’ of the 
talented, hard-working and driven, yet socially disadvantaged in Greece, Greek individual who 
emigrates and finds professional and social success in another country where the social context is 
more egalitarian, meritocratic, thus less corrupted and dysfunctional. This particular myth was 
frequently projected by several participants as an overvaluing strategy of ‘Greekness’ in the service 
of collective self-esteem, regardless of the imaginary or elitist features of the narrative. 
Papakonstantinou, for example, argued that Greeks have positive features like ‘adaptability, open-
mindedness and inventiveness’, which is proven by the fact that ‘all of you who study abroad and do 
well, but not so well in Greece’. Mavrotas agreed saying that when ‘the Greek goes abroad, he 
shows his good face and succeeds because he is in a different environment’ and added that Greeks 
leave their country, not because of economic reasons, but because of the lack of meritocracy, 
therefore the ones that are ‘capable’ and ‘don’t want to play the game of rousfeti 28 and nepotism’ 
necessarily depart, a representation which further attributes morally superior features to the 
imagined diasporic minority. Furthermore, this narrative appears to assume that other countries 
have idealised societies with no such social problems like nepotism and corruption.  
The fourth self-enhancing strategy, antagonistic narcissism, concerned a more polemical collective 
narcissistic representation. Responding to stereotypes of profligacy, the same participant explained 
that the waste of EU funds by the Greek clientelistic system led to unproductive economic practices 
that left no structures behind with unfortunate results for Greek products.  
                                                          
28 ‘Rousfeti’ is a political favour dispensed by an influential and powerful political figure to a citizen, which 
could be anything from a transfer, promotion, appointment or exemption.  
213 
 
‘it cannot be that the Greek olive oil which is the best in the world, and should be sold in 
perfume bottles, is bought by the Italian mafia to be mixed and raise the quality of [their oil]…’  
 
In this strategy, it is supported that Greece has a feature that is the ‘best in the world’, i.e. olive oil, 
and is exploited by others, i.e. the oil being used for mixing and quality improvement. The olive oil is 
objectified as an iconic feature of national identity, while antagonistic relationships are assumed 
between Greece and Italy, within a framework of competition for quality. This strategy can 
additionally be understood as substituting the feelings of Greek lack of productive and commercial 
success with feelings of quality greatness and positive distinction, which aim to play a self-enhancing 
function for economic collective self-esteem. Finally, the conspirational elements of this narrative 
further seek to present Greece in positive terms by stressing desirability, assuming possession of 
that which is aimed to be taken, hence desired by others.  
 
Criticising the ‘chosen people syndrome’ and conspiracy theories 
 
Although some strategies of self-esteem enhancement were encountered, identity devaluation was 
a more prominent feature within the data compared to overvaluation patterns. Furthermore, 
several ideational leaders assumed that Greek society is prone to identity overvaluation and 
criticised it for believing that Greeks belong to a kind of ‘chosen people’ (Litsis, Pagoulatos, 
Panousis). The following extended quotation exemplifies many of these themes.  
‘Our misery is that we have glorious ancestors… this has cultivated an attitude that the 
rest of the world owes us… and that we are supposed to live from this, that we’ve done 
enough, we don’t need to do anything else… it’s a kind of moral hazard… it’s difficult to 
become a normal country that lives of its own effort, its own failures and successes, we 
are the spoiled kids of history… we have a huge problem of national identity… the average 
Greek thinks that[…] Europeans live in grey cities and work all day, while we lay under the 
sun… and we attribute this to being so cool… you could go on for hours about this complex 
versions of this aggressive belief that we are the chosen people… all we achieved is ours, 
all hardships we’ve been through is somebody else’s fault… the national identity needs a 
lot of work…’ (Matsaganis) 
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As exemplified, identity overvaluation is seen as a significant feature of Greek society, while 
historical stereotypes of Greece as a ‘spoiled child’ are reproduced as solidified collective self-
schemas. Furthermore, the narrative of the ‘historical burden’ of the ‘glorious past’ is another 
reproduction of past narratives that were discussed in previous chapters, although in this passage 
these are additionally associated with the crisis metaphor of ‘moral hazard’. Group comparison 
between Greeks and Europeans reappears as a vehicle of identity formation that weighs towards the 
overvaluing side of the inferiority/superiority spectrum, in the service of collective self-esteem. 
Finally, blaming others and dispensing responsibility are seen as symptoms of the overvalued 
identity. As put, the overvalued national identity is ‘an excuse for not assuming responsibility’ 
(Ramfos). 
Blaming others for one’s misfortune was seen by many as a recurrent behavioural pattern of Greek 
society in the particular form of ‘conspiracy theories’ and was highly criticised (Kratsa, Mandravelis, 
Pagoulatos). Moreover, some implied that the belief in the ‘chosen people’ and the self-schema of 
the ‘victim of conspiracies’ were intimately related social attitudes, before and after the crisis.  
‘the crisis has produced a crisis of national confidence that empowers various negative 
stereotypes regarding the role of the Greeks, there is a retrogression between the 
syndrome of the chosen nation and the syndrome of the victimised nation… within the 
crisis this is intensified, you can see an inability to keep in touch with the European reality 
which has identity features’ (Pagoulatos) 
 
‘there is a perception that we are a chosen people, others hate us, they are to blame for 
everything, they exploit us… a feeling of a chosen people… [people think] there is a crisis, 
but that’s OK because God will protect us…’ (Panousis) 
 
Although the identity of the ‘chosen’ and that of the ‘victim’ may appear as antithetical at first, 
assuming that the latter belongs to another ‘syndrome’, they are better understood as belonging to 
the same area of identity overvaluation, not only because the ‘victim’ is socially associated with 
moral superiority and blissful irresponsibility, as explained in the previous chapter, but also because 
of its romanticising attributes. Simply put, the victimised identity functions as a self-valuing one 
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because the narcissist needs a ‘villain’, that is, a victimiser, in order to be a ‘hero’ within related 
narratives, such as the ‘underdog’ or the ‘rebel’.  
 
Positive crisis stereotypes: victims, rebels, game-changers, underdogs? 
 
As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, positive stereotypes of Greece during the crisis 
included not only those of the ‘victim’, but also the ‘rebel’, the ‘regime changer’ and the ‘underdog’. 
Within these ideational leaders’ interviews, the most prominent positive representation was that of 
the victim, especially if the aforementioned representations of Greece as strategically framed in 
stereotypical ways are understood as a form of ‘victimisation’ and ‘conspiracy theorising’. Some 
participants mentioned that Greece was not portrayed only in negative stereotypes during the crisis 
and that there were more positively inclined European responses, such as support and solidarity for 
the ‘victims’ of humanitarian crisis (Panousis, Repousi). However, some felt unconvinced by such 
supportive expressions.  
‘the foreigners see two things, all these about the thieves and the lazy, but now there is 
a wave of sympathy too, because they perceive the extremity [of budget cuts] and fear 
that it is coming for them too…’ (Andronopoulos) 
 
‘we know that in the public opinion of other European countries stereotypes of lazy, 
profligate and corrupted Greeks are well-established, accompanied by pseudo-scientific 
arguments regarding the idiosyncrasy of the Southerners and their ‘limitations’, which 
lately are accompanied by expressions of ‘pity’ and ‘compassion’ for the ‘sacrifices of the 
Greek people’, which nevertheless were the only choice…’ (Kimpouropoulos) 
 
As exemplified, the victimised identity is negotiated in complex ways. While victimhood of the crisis 
and its management is accepted, responses of support or solidarity by others are perceived as either 
self-interested or sentimental, thus inauthentic and dishonest. As such, these might be experienced 
as another layer of victimisation.  
In terms of the other identity narrations, some interviewees appeared to understand Greek identity 
as ‘rebellious’ within the context of the Euro crisis. For example, Andronopoulos, within a ‘guinea 
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pig’ metaphor, argued that the Memoranda were tested on the Greek people first, because they are 
‘rebels, so if they are implemented here, they will easily be implemented elsewhere too’. Other 
representations of ‘rebelliousness’ were not as explicit or self-overvaluing. Some participants who 
held highly critical views of the EU supported that Greece should ‘stand up to the EU’, that is, ‘rebel 
against it’ (Litsis, Papakonstantinou, Pappas). This narrative appeared to be intimately associated 
with the narrative of ‘regime changer’ in the sense that Greece could be the political actor that could 
instigate changes within the EU towards a more democratic regime. There was some awareness that 
such narratives were part of the wider and diversified international responses towards Greece 
during the crisis (Chountis, Pappas). Chountis, for example, mentioned that some view Greece as the 
actor that will question the EU and promote alternative politics.  
Simultaneously, this was seen as unlikely or difficult (Chountis, Litsis, Pappas), which placed Greece 
within the representation of the ‘underdog’ that is fighting against a player who is more powerful, 
i.e. the EU, thus against the odds. This was additionally placed within the context of the international 
metanarrative of systemic EU crisis and its critique against global capitalism and neoliberalism.  
‘it is difficult, I cannot imagine [change], I can only imagine it if there is a full-blown 
rebellious change, which, however, will be confronted not only with the hot problems of 
tomorrow, but also the reality that countries outside the EU don’t actually follow that 
much different economic policy… it is a question today, around the world, to find this new 
economic paradigm, but we know that whoever initiates this, it will not be easy, they’ll be 
confronted with disagreements and conflicts domestically and internationally, whether 
they’re in the EU, whether they’re out…’ (Litsis) 
 
This passage exemplifies all the characteristics of revolt, regime change and waging ‘underdog’ 
struggles. Sometimes domestic actors, such as the ruling party or the ‘inadequate Left’ were viewed 
as powerless to instigate change (Chountis, Litsis). In some cases, what was perceived as one of the 
main obstacles of democratic and economic change was nationalised on the case of Germany, with 
some arguing that ‘Germany would never allow it’ (Chountis, Papakonstantinou). Chountis further 
argued that developments of radical changes within the EU, whether towards further unification, 
paradigm change or dissolution, are not dependent on Greece, but on ‘the powerful’ countries, 
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especially Germany. As such, it can be observed that representations of Greece as an actor of change 
through the narratives of rebellion, democratisation and uneven power struggle, were variably 
negotiated by being features of awareness, yet not strongly supported, mainly due to what was 
perceived as the limits of reality and possibility. This falls in line with SIT’s assumptions that 
strategies of identity representation and re-evaluation are heavily dependent on the perception of 
what is realistically plausible and achievable.  
This section summarised occurrences of identity overvaluation and concluded that although there 
were various observable such patterns which corresponded with past identity representations and 
international ones during the economic crisis, these were not as prominent and widespread as the 
representations of identity devaluation described in the previous section. As such, it appeared to be 
the case that in the spectrum of ‘superiority and inferiority complex’, supported by some 
participants, or identity overvaluation and devaluation vacillation of our analytical framework, 
devaluation was a distinctly more dominant representation, most often facilitated through processes 
of national critique. Nevertheless, this political critique was by no means directed only to the 
domestic context, but consistently coexisted with criticisms against the EU and its identity. This 
tendency sketched out the vivid existence of ‘critical Europeanism’ which at some instances was also 
experienced as an absence of identity choices. This pattern of identity deficit will be the focus of the 
next section. 
 
Identity deficit: European identity as an absence of identity choice 
 
In chapter three, identity deficit was discussed as a result of Greece being a mere Western invention, 
being represented as a disqualifiable EU member-state that could be formally excluded, or as a 
product of its hybrid identity, resulting in belonging neither in the West, nor in the East, thus 
nowhere. In chapter four, the representation of sovereignty loss appeared to be a vehicle for 
international identity loss within the crisis context, Grexit was represented as a European identity 
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loss, and status of notoriety was interpreted as an emptying of identity. Within the present 
interviews, these past representations were only marginally discussed, while sovereignty was a 
contested issue. The most significant feature of identity deficit appeared to be the choice of EU 
participation and European identity projected as an absence of choice. This choice appeared to be 
predominantly based on matters of insecurity and dependence, which can be said to increase the 
feeling of lack of alternative identities. The remaining section will elaborate on these 
problematisations.  
 
There is No Identity Alternative 
 
Greece’s hybrid identity was often decisively resolved by the argument that Greece had no other 
choice but to be European through its participation in the EU and the Eurozone. The representation 
of absence of alternative identity choices was projected by a clear majority of participants and was 
one of the most prevalent features within the data. Some ideational leaders argued that wondering 
about Greece’s identity has been a chronic preoccupation that needed to be abandoned and 
conclusively finalised. 
‘Greece has been trying to become an equal partner to Europe for the last 200 years… 
every once in a while there’s this fairytale, this is not the first time, what are we doing 
in Europe, etc. And where are we supposed to be?’ (Mandravelis) 
 
‘First of all… this problematisation, discussion, questioning of the country’s European 
orientation needs to stop… just like we don’t wonder whether we should have a 
parliament and elections, the same should go for Europe…’ (Georgiadou) 
 
Many other participants argued that economic dependence and security challenges, related to 
Greece’s location, eliminated alternative options. As expressed,  
‘it depends on us to be in the EU… we need to try very hard… we haven’t fully 
Europeanised… right now we are in the Eurozone and there is no way to exit… it would 
be disastrous… Greece struggles, it’s obvious, but there’s no other way, this is the only 
way…’ (Giannakou) 
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‘Grexit is a disastrous scenario, there is no other prospect for Greece but to be in the 
European family… there is no other future’ (Repousi) 
 
‘at this corner of the earth where Greece is, I don’t think there’s another ship to board 
on, this is the one that offers the most guarantees, we are in an area where we see 
what happens in Syria, in Ukraine, Iraq, Egypt, all these create high entropy around us, 
and being in a wider family, I think, is a one-way street…’ (Mavrotas) 
 
‘[Greece] essentially has no other choice, what is the choice of Greece? To be partners 
with Syria or Egypt?’ (Tsoukalis) 
 
‘there were always forces that viewed the country’s orientation towards Europe… if 
we look around us, there is no other attractive choice… our surroundings suffer from 
civil wars, instability, insecurity and big economic crisis, we don’t have the scope to 
make another choice, it’s not an ideal choice, but we have no other choice…’ (Pappas) 
 
These security concerns additionally relate to the aforementioned representations of ‘Europe’ and 
the ‘Troika’ as vehicles of security and safety, and preoccupations with Greece’s feared becoming in 
their absence, which can be said to increase the sense of dependence on the EU for national 
survival. Many participants justified the absence of alternatives based on the representation of 
Greece as a ‘small country’ (Georgiadou, Papakonstantinou, Sotiropoulos). Being a ‘small country’ 
clearly entailed being dependent on a larger national or transnational entity for survival. Some 
speculated that if Greece left the EU, attachment to another international power would be a 
possible outcome or necessity (Andronopoulos, Lyritzis).  
The absence of choice appeared to be shared even by individuals who were profoundly disappointed 
by the EU, criticised the Troika and were not self-proclaimed Europeanists. For example, journalist 
Petros Papakonstantinou explained that he was ‘never a warm supporter of the EU’ and that if he 
was told years ago that the Troika would impose such harsh programmes ‘with such inflexibility’, he 
‘would not believe it’. As put, ‘even for us who were predisposed to disappointment, the 
disappointment was greater than anticipated’ (Papakonstantinou). Regardless though, it was 
admitted that ‘no serious person would consider Greece in isolation’, while EU and EMU 
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memberships were described as similar to ‘marriage… much more difficult to separate once you’re 
in it, especially if there are children involved’ (Papakonstantinou). Litsis explained that he ‘used to 
think that there was no other way, no matter how imperfect the EU was’, but the experience of the 
crisis and the management by the Troika ‘demystified the EU… for what it truly was’, an organisation 
characterised by national interests, lack of solidarity and inequality between states. Nevertheless, it 
was admitted that it was ‘difficult to imagine something new and different’ and that ‘feeling 
European’ was an ‘issue that the Left cannot deal with, since some things enjoyed as European 
citizens, like free movement and trade, we can’t imagine them going back’ (Litsis).  
There is a question regarding the prevalent ‘dead-end’ character of this European identity choice, 
especially since most participants had difficulties defining Greece as European. In this sense, it can 
be argued that belonging to Europe, as justified, rationalised and preferred as it is presented to be, is 
partly experienced as an absence of identity, because of the co-existence of lack of legitimate 
alternatives and the simultaneous prevailing inability to categorise Greece as fully or unambiguously 
European. This results in the paradoxical condition of ‘being without being’ and ‘belonging without 
belonging’. The defining difference between this identity deficit and the previously described 
identity conflict is that it can be interpreted to be experienced as a rather compulsory and obligatory 
identity choice, while the conflict was characterised by the vacillation of different identity 
movements.  
 
Still lost to the West? 
 
A similar identity estrangement was observed at the national identity dimension, which partly 
corresponded to prior representations of Greece as a mere Western invention, therefore empty in 
itself. Papadimitriou, for instance, reflecting on Greece’s choices, argued that: 
‘the European identity is part of our history, we can’t erase it so easily and go back where? 
To the heroic ancient past, which does not exactly belong to us, as such? OK, there are 
continuities, but it doesn’t belong to us…. that too belongs mostly to Europe! We may be 
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speaking the Greek language which shares continuities to the ancient Greek language, we 
live in the same space, see the Acropolis, move among monuments, but others have taken 
part of this heritage too…’ (Papadimitriou) 
 
At another instance, Papadimitriou used the word ‘heterophobia’ and explained how it constitutes a 
linguistic re-borrowing which travelled from the Greek language to the English and back to the 
Greek. This implied sense of loss of the ancient Greek tradition to its universalisation may invoke 
questions of identity deficit, particularly since some participants felt that this tradition was alien to 
contemporary Greek society, either due to lack of education (Smyrlis), view of it as a mere museum 
object (Litsis) and commodification (Karathanasopoulos), or estrangement from its values 
(Giannakou). In some cases, it was additionally felt that foreigners may value or know this tradition 
better than Greeks themselves do (Giannakou, Smyrlis). 
The relationship of Greece with the West was also touched upon by the question of sovereignty, 
which was discussed by several participants, revealing various themes. Some participants argued 
that the peculiarity of Greece concentrated on its chronic dependence on foreign powers and 
compromise of its sovereignty by these powers (Andronopoulos, Kazakis), which in effect was 
perceived as eradicating the Greek voice in foreign, as well as domestic affairs, possibly creating an 
identity deficit. Others maintained that Greece was greatly assisted by Western allies and grew 
through these relationships (Pagoulatos), implying that sovereignty was not breached. The same 
patterns were observed in representations regarding Greece’s sovereignty during the crisis. While 
some participants argued, either polemically or mildly, that sovereignty was compromised by the 
Troika crisis management and the Memoranda (Kimpouropoulos, Tsoukalis), others accepted that 
being indebted necessarily entailed some loss of sovereignty (Lyritzis, Tsakloglou) and acknowledged 
that it was the EU that actually helped Greece ‘in the hour of need’ (Chryssochoou, Matsaganis). 
However, these two perspectives were not necessarily mutually exclusive at all times, as several 
participants appeared to share features of both narratives, which complexifies the image of the 
Troika. In addition, the role of Greece was similarly problematised by many participants who argued 
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that Greek governments during the crisis chose to play a passive role (Koutsiaras) and failed to 
negotiate (Georgiadou, Lyritzis, Matsaganis), therefore implying that sovereignty was not taken, but 
given up. Many asserted that the Greek government did not appear to have a ‘plan of its own’ which 
increased the impression of surrendering (Lyritzis, Kampagiannis, Panousis). Some went as far as 
saying that the Greek government should had been more polemical in its negotiations with the EU 
during the crisis and even used words, such as ‘blackmail’ (Andronopoulos, Pappas). Simultaneously, 
the role of the EU was seen as ‘blackmailing’ Greece, with Litsis arguing that George Papandreou was 
blackmailed by EU leaders into abandoning the referendum in 2011. The representation of 
sovereignty loss was specifically objectified around the wider representation of the EU becoming 
less democratic (Chrysogelos, Litsis, Tsoukalis). These representations of highly antagonistic relations 
add to the understanding of Greece’s European identity being in conflict.  
Alternatively, many argued that creditors were reasonable in their efforts to retrieve loaned funds 
(Ramfos, Triantafyllou). Moreover, there was a widespread view that the Troika was not only 
harmful, but also beneficial for implementing long-overdue reforms (Georgiadou, Mavrotas, 
Ramfos), while it additionally offered much needed technocratic knowledge (Smyrlis, Tsoukalis). 
While the question of sovereignty, crisis management and resulting identity loss was a contested 
one, it appeared to be the case that the one thing that most participants seemed to agree on was 
the assumption that the Troika experience had diminished the positive image of the EU in Greece, 
and even described the public sentiment as believing Greece to be under ‘submission’ 
(Kampagiannis, Litsis). As such, we could not talk of an identity deficit derived by a loss of 
sovereignty, since this was not a representation embraced by the participants.  
 
Europe’s identity loss 
 
Although representations of Greece experiencing identity loss during the economic crisis were not 
absent from these ideational leaders’ interviews, they were limited compared to other forms of 
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identity destabilisation, i.e. devaluation or conflict. Alternatively, within the wider climate of critical 
Europeanism, there were several representations of ‘Europe’ losing its distinction, thus its particular 
identity by losing or endangering its own principles, such as solidarity, pluralism, democracy, and 
protection of human rights (Chountis, Mavrotas, Pappas). Many participants argued that Europe had 
lost the advantage of ‘social democratic Europe’ it used to have against the ‘overtly capitalist USA’ 
(Litsis) or ‘less anthropocentric China’ (Marvotas).  
Others maintained that Europe’s international role was severely diminished not only because of the 
economic crisis and the rise of other major economic actors (Giannakou, Lyritzis, Mitsotakis), but 
also due to the EU’s inability to play an active and decisive role in significant world problems, such as 
refugee crises and conflict (Chryssogelos, Kampagiannis, Panousis). The invitation of the IMF to 
participate in the Eurozone crisis resolution was seen by some as a sign of weakness (Chryssochou, 
Kratsa). Finally, many maintained that contemporary EU leadership was inferior and less visionary to 
that of the past (Andronopoulos, Repousi, Triantafyllou), while others explained that Europe was 
dominated by different visions, promoted by different actors (Lyritzis, Pappas), such as 
‘social/democratic Europe’ versus ‘technocratic/neoliberal Europe’ (Chountis, Panousis) or ‘mere 
common market Europe’ versus ‘politically visionary Europe’ (Chryssogelos, Koutsiaras), which 
hindered its progression forwards.  
Most interestingly, some participants appeared to project upon the object of ‘Europe’ the same 
problems they diagnosed for the case of Greece, such as Greece’s merely cultural role and 
overdependence for self-esteem on long-gone historical glories, as well as economic dependence. 
For example, Mandravelis argued that Europe is in danger of becoming the ‘Disneyland of the world’ 
where millions of Asians visit to look at monuments of past achievements, just like tourists visit 
Greece to admire ancient ruins (also, Lyritzsis). As Mandravelis concluded, while Asia produces 
products and wealth, Europe produces aging populations (also, Mitsotakis). ‘You can’t live on the 
kindness of strangers’ (Mandravelis). As such, it seems that European nations do not only project 
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upon European identity their own positive prototypal qualities (i.e. past glory), but they also project 
their less positive attributes (i.e. current decay), which might be understood as part of a profoundly 
unbroken and invertedly vicarious identification.  
Nevertheless, despite the darkly clouded predictions regarding the state of Greece or Europe, at the 
end of the interview with Papakonstantinou, a silver lining was retrieved: 
Papakonstantinou: ‘we have to compromise with being the second economy in the 
world, soon maybe even the third… ok, we have our role, but we are no longer the 
bellybutton of the earth, neither Greece, nor Europe itself… we shall live more…’ 
Researcher: ‘…modestly!’ 
Papakonstantinou: ‘yes! More modestly! But also with fewer insecurities if you will, 
because it’s lonely at the top, and the higher you go, the stronger the winds, and the 
danger to fall… so in a sense, this downgrading has its positive sides…’ 
 
Conclusively, a strange kind of liberation can be said to exist within the peaceful acceptance of the 
decays and splendours of human history, and all their cyclical whimsies.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter begun by displaying the shortage of past research on attitudes and identifications of 
Greek ideational leaders and outlined the results of the limited existing literature on the topic. A 
wider positive view towards European integration was recognised, as well as some reservations 
regarding Greece’s Europeanisation. It was observed that the results of the present study show 
continuities with past findings, but at the same time exhibit an enrichment with newly formed 
dynamics and concerns emanating from the economic crisis.  
In terms of identity conflicts, ideational leaders widely referred to Greece’s split between East and 
West, as well as Greece’s hybridity as both European and non-European. This hybridity was 
presented in both negative and positive terms, as anticipated on the basis of previous 
representations in historiography. In this study’s expert interviews, hybridity was seen negatively 
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when defined as strategic and self-interested, but positively when viewed as a way to combine the 
‘best of both worlds’ and being cosmopolitan. Looking at the reasons that participants gave for 
Greece’s Europeanness, it was interestingly noted that ideational leaders could not identify multiple 
and concretely contemporary reasons for Greece being European, in direct contrast to providing 
many reasons for Greece not being European. Furthermore, desired and feared possible future 
identities were explored by ideational leaders who either asserted that Greece could become more 
European if it tried, or might resemble poorer and more troublesome regions of the world. Conflicts 
and divisions were acknowledged at the domestic and the European level with notions of mutual 
stereotyping between Eurosceptics and Europeanists in Greece and Southerners and Northerners in 
Europe. Anti-Germanism was occasionally expressed as critique towards Germany, or mentioned as 
a rising force in Greece, replacing what was seen as its traditional anti-Americanism.  
Regarding identity devaluation, ideational leaders widely accepted the idea that Greece was 
stereotyped during the crisis, therefore the existence of an identity threat was not rejected. There 
were two main types of responses to the formation of negative stereotypes, one that refocused the 
discussion on Greece’s accountability and called for a national self-reflection and another that 
claimed that negative stereotypes were strategically enacted in order to ‘frame Greece’ for political 
purposes. Although these two responses were distinct, they were not mutually exclusive, as some 
arguments and views were shared by representatives of both camps. While the first group 
downplayed the importance of being stereotyped, the second was more inclined to view it as a 
process of ‘stigmatisation’. A vivid feature of the data appeared to be the various negotiations of 
versions of responsibility, ranging from the collective to the individual, to the shared/mutual and the 
bystander’s type of responsibility. Representations of devaluating Greek exceptionalism were 
variably negotiated by the respondents.  
As far as identity overvaluation was concerned, there were very few strategies of overvaluation, 
although the ones that were observed included hierarchisation of Europeanness, positive 
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exceptionalisation, relational and antagonistic narcissism. Most ideational leaders assumed that 
Greeks overvalue their national identity and criticised this social attitude as morally questionable 
and socially irresponsible. Conspiracy theories were also viewed as an integral part of Greek society 
and were criticised. Positive stereotypes that were recorded in chapter four and were projected by 
international media, such as those of the victim, rebel, regime changer or underdog were not widely 
shared by the ideational leader of this study, particularly because they were not seen as realistic and 
plausible identity possibilities for Greece.  
Finally, with reference to identity deficits, it was argued that the projection by many that there was 
no other identity choice for Greece but to be European, could be interpreted as an identity void, not 
only because it was represented as an absence of choice, but also in light of Greece being seen as 
not fully European which constitutes a paradoxical kind of belonging. The question of sovereignty 
loss was a contested one, but was not viewed by participants as a loss of identity, therefore it did 
not constitute an identity crisis on the basis of deficit. Interestingly, ideational leaders argued that 
Europe was losing its own identity and projected the ‘decaying’ Greek prototype upon it.  
As this chapter shows, Greek ideational leaders make several representations of identity 
destabilisation that were observable in previous chapters. However, they paint a different picture 
and enrich the pool of representations with new narratives and ideas. At the same time, they 
downplay or reject some of the representations projected in the international media, such as the 
positive stereotypes or the notions of identity losses through sovereignty compromise or Grexit. As 
such, identity conflict and devaluation appear to be much more prominent in their accounts. The 
next step in this exploration will be to see if citizens’ perceptions and representations resonate with 
those found in historiography, international media and expert discourse.  
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Chapter 6 
Greek Citizens on Identity and Crisis 
 
 
‘Here in Greece everybody speaks their own mind. The Greeks think they know 
everything. And I’m one of them too, one of those who think they know it all! So I 
answer your questions! […] Now, everybody… thinks what they will, I always think 
of the positive. If the worse is to come, let it come. At my age, I’m not afraid of 
anything, I am free, I say what I want, and let them come and ask me why I say 
it!’ 
(Leonidas, pensioner) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter looked at representations of identities, destabilisations and crises made by 
Greek ideational leaders. This chapter will move on to explore non-expert citizens’ views on the 
Greek debt/Eurozone crisis and their experiences of Greek European identities. Before the crisis, 
research of Greek attitudes towards the EU and European identities was rather scarce and episodic 
(i.e. Dimitras, 1992) and only appeared in the two-thousands (i.e. Chryssochoou, 2000a, 2000b; 
Kokosalakis, 2003; Sereti & Kokosalakis, 2003). For instance, it is only in 2011 that ‘the first 
diachronic study of Greek opposition to European integration’ (Verney, 2011a: 51) emerges. After 
the crisis, in the context of rising Euroscepticism across Europe, there has been a rising movement 
towards the study of public attitudes towards the EU, although focused research on European 
identities as such (i.e. Galpin, 2014) is still rare and in need of catching up. Before moving on to the 
results of this study, a brief overview of Greek attitudes towards the EU will be offered in order to 
provide a wider view at the national level and contextualise Greek shifts in attitudes within wider 
European public opinion.  
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Looking at past public opinion in Greece, although Greece is often grouped with other Southern-
European EU member-states that have been understood as traditionally Euro-friendly (i.e. 
Llamazares & Gramacho, 2007), Greek citizens’ relationship with European integration was rather 
ambivalent at first. Just before EEC accession, Greece was consistently above the EEC average with 
Eurosceptics accounting for 20% of the population, compared to Italy’s 5%, Spain’s 5% and 
Portugal’s 6%. Dimitras comments (1992) that ‘opinion polls indicated that were a referendum held 
at the time, membership would have been rejected, as the [ND] government had lost its popular 
support’. In 1981, the year of Greece’s accession, ‘a Eurosceptic high point occurred… with 60% of 
Greek voters support[ing] Eurosceptic parties’ and the ‘openly Eurosceptic’ PASOK being elected to 
govern (Verney, 2011a: 51-52). Compared to other Southern-European counties, Greece is the only 
example where a Eurosceptic party was elected (Verney, 2011b). Dimitras’s study (1987) in the 
eighties establishes that citizens who were under 30 before the 1967-1974 dictatorship, the 
Generation of Polytechneio (Γενιά του Πολυτεχνείου), were predominantly anti-Western, which 
facilitated Euroscepticism (Verney, 2011a).  
PASOK remained in power for almost a full decade, throughout the eighties. Over time, PASOK’s 
contestation against the EEC mellowed down (Verney, 1993), especially after the 1985 EEC loan and 
other capital flows from the EEC (Bourantonis et al., 1998; Verney, 2011a), but never fully 
abandoned its critical stance. Greek public opinion followed the same trend of post-1985 declining 
Euroscepticism (Verney, 2011a). As put by Dimitras (1992: 37), this was a ‘learning experience’ for 
Greeks who ‘discovered that the benefits from this international commitment far outweighed the 
costs’. The continuous support for PASOK, however, perhaps indicates a degree of public 
endorsement of its critical acceptance of the EEC.  
By the nineties, ‘Greek public opinion appeared amongst the most pro-integrationist in the EC’ with 
Euroscepticism as low as single figure percentages (Verney, 2011a: 52; also, Dimitras, 1992). The 
‘post-Maastricht blues’ (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007), appeared to have limited impact on Greece, 
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where support for European integration remained above the EU average throughout the decade. 
Views on the Euro were positive in the early two-thousands, as indicated by Kokosalakis’s study 
(2003) with Greeks thinking that the currency would be more secure for Greece and would offer 
greater opportunities for economic development. However, after the mid-two-thousands, 
Euroscepticism showed an upwards trend, with scepticism over EU benefits reaching one-third (33%) 
of the population by mid-2009 (Verney, 2011a).  
After the economic crisis, Eurobarometer-based research reveals that negative sentiments towards 
the EU increased across all social groups and support for the EU declined, although support for the 
Euro rose (Clements et al., 2014; Freire et al., 2014). As put (Clements et al., 2014: 247), ‘Greek 
public opinion has fallen out of love with the EU, but it clearly does not want to leave the Eurozone 
or renounce membership altogether’. Comparative research has indicated that economically healthy 
member states are afraid that European economic governance may harm their economy, while 
people in crisis-ridden countries welcome it (Kuhn & Stoeckel, 2014). As explained, ‘the better a 
country’s economy, the less inclined are its citizens to endorse economic governance’ (Kuhn & 
Stoeckel, 2014: 637). 
Compared to other member-states, Greece was the country with the highest increase in negative 
attitudes towards EU membership and greatest loss of support (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; 
Clements et al., 2014; Serricchio et al., 2013). More specifically, between 2008 and 2011, the 
percentage of Greek citizens who thought that EU membership was ‘a bad thing’ almost tripled, 
rising from 12% to 33%, compared to an increase from 15% to 18% across the EU as a whole 
(Verney, 2015). Those who believed that Greece had ‘no benefit’ from EU membership almost 
doubled from 27% in 2008 to 50% in 2011, while the EU average only rose from 31% to 37% (Verney, 
2015). All and all, levels of Euroscepticism in Greece have been said to experience a ‘return to the 
eighties’ (Freire et al., 2014), placing Greek public sentiment towards the EU back where it started. 
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The 2014 Euroelections illustrated how the crisis has been a ‘game-changer in attitudes towards 
European integration’ in Greece, with a ‘Eurosceptic triumph [that] would have seemed unthinkable 
at the time of the previous Euroelection [i]n 2009’ (Verney, 2015: 279). Following the trend of 
domestic elections, both SYRIZA and Golden Dawn, were moved from the margins of Euroelection 
candidacy to centre stage (Verney, 2015), which indicated that the ‘rising vote for Eurosceptic 
parties [was] not simply a side-effect of domestic protest’, but a result of the EU becoming ‘a 
significant electoral target’ (Verney, 2015: 279).  
As such, it appears to be the case that political disaffection with the EU has been on the rise in 
Greece. Nevertheless, we still cannot fathom the particularities, subtleties and complexities of public 
opinion, based on these survey-based studies. Although they are especially useful in showing overall 
trends over time and aggregate patterns, the original voices of citizens themselves seem to be 
missing. This chapter offers a window to the views, experiences, arguments and justifications of 
citizens and attempts to understand the effects of the economic crisis on people’s national and 
European identities.    
 
Identity conflict: national and European identity conflicts 
 
In the previous chapter, ideational leaders focused on representations of Greece as torn between 
East and West, as well as between its European and non-European identities. Noticeably, it was 
largely argued that Greece was mostly non-European and to the degree that it was believed to be 
partly European, few reasons could be retrieved for its Europeanness, as compared to its non-
Europeanness. The representation of hybridity was presented as a problem to the degree that 
Greece was perceived as needing to become more European, while the representation of strategic 
hybridity as a form of selectivity was also projected. Furthermore, positively valued representations 
of hybridity were also promoted as either a form of cosmopolitanism or a combination of ‘the best 
of both worlds’. In addition, Greece was represented as a divided nation, lacking in national 
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consensus. At the European level, two themes were prominent, namely, the division between North 
and South, which reproduced another geo-schematic distinction, and the acknowledgement of 
mutual stereotyping between European countries.  
 
Still between East and West? 
 
Similarly to the ideational leaders’ interviews, within the citizens’ interviews, geo-schematic 
references of East and West, or North and South, were present, although to a lesser degree. 
Nevertheless, the chasm between the Occident and the Orient was mentioned by one third of 
participants. Some spoke of the ‘crossroads’ (Aris, self-employed; Grigoris, private sector employee) 
and ‘borderline’ character of Greece, ‘at the limits’ (Gerasimos: public servant; Kalliopi, 
unemployed). One participant commented on this condition of ‘mixture’, saying that ‘Greece suffers 
from a personality disorder’ (Kalliopi, unemployed), which signifies a perception of identity 
destabilisation. In a similar fashion, another participant argued that: 
‘to some degree [national and European identity] come into conflict. On the one side, 
you can’t be screaming that we have the absolute free movement of ideas, there’s no 
censorship and people can express themselves as they wish, there’s tolerance, and on 
the other hand, all these coming into antithesis with what the average Greek believes, 
influenced by an oversized past from 2,000 years ago, combined with the Orthodox 
Church… which itself is completely antithetical with the ancient past… regardless, the 
Golden Dawn is Helleno-Orthodox and adores the ancient past… what I mean is this is a 
huge conflict… and at least clinically, wherever we have conflict, we have a problem. All 
human problems are created by the conflicts that exist’ (Dionysis, public servant) 
 
As illustrated, both the Greek and European identity dimensions appear to experience conflict, as 
well as different dimensions of Greek identity as such are said to be conflictual, i.e. the ancient past 
and the Orthodox Church. Furthermore, this is represented as a ‘clinical problem’, adding another 
pathologising metaphor, i.e the clinical patient. This example further reinstates not only the question 
of hybridity as a ‘problem’, which was prevalent in previous chapters, but also the question of 
Greece’s selectivity as ‘strategic hybridity’. As seen, the participant suggests that Greece is being 
selective in claiming to embrace democratic values, i.e. freedom of speech, implied to be European, 
232 
 
while simultaneously embracing nationalist signifiers, i.e. an ‘oversized’ self-esteem, attributed to 
incompatible national elements, i.e. the ancient and Christian traditions.  
A few more participants referred to such dynamics of selectivity. Chrysanthos (private sector 
employee), for instance, commented ‘when we want to, we are European; when we don’t want to, 
we are Greek’. Some criticised what they saw as a Greek attitude of being European during ‘good 
times’ and non-European during ‘hard times’.  
‘[Greece] says yes to Europe to receive funds, but when it comes to being ok with its 
responsibilities it goes back to the attitude which existed before joining the EU, which is a 
double standard, very contentious…’ (Stavros, self-employed) 
 
‘First of all, a country needs to want to be European… and to accept certain things in 
order to be European. What I mean is that declaring that you want to be European when 
there’s money flowing, but talking about the English or the Germans, and that we were 
building Parthenons when they were still eating acorns, you understand that this is clearly 
not… being able to acknowledge the diversity of the other, to accept it - ok, to be 
frustrated with it when there’s something clearly wrong with it, yes - but not just because 
it is unfamiliar to you… in this respect, I feel that many Greeks are not European, they 
didn’t have this acceptance…’ (Neophytos, self-employed) 
 
As can be seen, some citizens were agreeable with the view that Greece is selective and strategically 
self-hybridised due to self-interest and instrumentality, as was proclaimed by some ideational 
leaders. Nevertheless, in a similar way to MEP Chrysogelos’s comment that such matters are not 
peculiar to Greece alone, Neophytos added that ‘many Europeans are not European either, only 
those who had their minds open enough to embrace the different, while preserving their own 
identity… this is what I think Europe is’. As pointed out, acceptance of diversity was enacted by this 
participant to the defining feature of Europeanness, constructing the European prototype, as well as 
its lack of fulfilment by most Europeans. Interestingly, the same participant was particularly selective 
himself regarding Europe by his explicit identification with it, explaining that he was a ‘traditional 
federalist, devotee of the European project and the EU’, yet repeated attempts to define Europe on 
political grounds solely, rather than economic. ‘You see, I don’t speak about economics at all’, 
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implying that the political vision of Europe is what matters. Nevertheless, economics is undeniably a 
primary feature of European integration and cannot be ignored.  
Although ideational leaders discussing selective hybridism concentrated on how this is directed 
towards Europe or the West, some participants suggested that this selectivity is also directed 
towards the East. For instance, Kalliopi, who had lived in several countries in the past and was in a 
position to compare, referred to the East and the particular features she felt she shared, or wished 
to share, as a Greek. 
‘when you live together with other ethnicities abroad, you realise that you have many 
common features with the East… with Turkey, Asia, they themselves also view us Greeks 
as more of their own people, compared to, let’s say, the Italians… this is where I feel, 
many Greeks must feel it, that we have many commonalities with the East… even the 
corruption, we share that, random? I don’t think so… yes, we are [mixed], but it also 
depends… if you meet someone who tells you that ‘women who smoke, we’d kill them in 
my country’, you say, ‘I am in Europe, we don’t do these things’. Right there, you feel 
European. But when you go out together for entertainment, to dine, there you see many 
commonalities with the East, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan… yeah, it depends…’ (Kalliopi, 
unemployed) 
 
As can be seen, identification with the East is claimed here selectively, being rejected on the basis of 
social practices regarding gender roles, the use of violence and political values, such as gender 
equality and personal freedom, but endorsed on more aesthetic and lifestyle grounds, like food and 
entertainment. This echoes Pappas’s commentary on ‘culinary matters’ in the previous chapter, 
perhaps indicating a compartmentalisation of the East on ‘entertainment’ practices only. In terms of 
government organisation and political culture, corruption is understood to be common between 
Greece and the East, therefore some political aspects are understood as shared.  
Echoing Kampagiannis’s comment from the previous chapter on Greece’s hybridity being an 
opportunity for a cosmopolitan identity, one participant argued in favour of cosmopolitanism, but an 
implied selectivity undermined this choice.  
‘Greece… should be a country with many influences. It’d be interesting to see this 
expressed in many things, in music, art, film, food… right there we got it because we are 
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kalofagades 29, we have a Mediterranean cuisine, influenced by the East… I’d love 
Greece to be like the good side of Istanbul, multidimensional… but not like today, having 
the immigrants who pass through on their way to Denmark and get stuck here, because 
truth be told, we don’t have good immigrants, we don’t…’ (Grigoris, private sector 
employee) 
 
In this less egalitarian representation of ‘good and bad immigrants’ and the ‘good and bad side of 
Istanbul’, cosmopolitanism is only embraced selectively, on mere aesthetic criteria (i.e. music, art), 
rather than political ones, such as inclusion of all people and equality. The same participant 
appeared to argue at another point that ‘the East doesn’t have much to show for itself’, reproducing 
negative Orientalist stereotypes. The reference to Istanbul might be understood as an attempt to 
recreate the age-old and mythologised representation of the City, as many Greeks simply call 
Istanbul, as the ‘eternal jewel of Bosporus’ with its former glory as a ‘melting pot’ of many cultures 
at the legendary urban sea-port between East and West (Lawrence, 2012). This evocation of the 
‘cosmopolitan meta-city’ (Lawrence, 2012) as a desired model for Greece might also be a somehow 
nationalist allusion to Istanbul by its Greek name as Constantinople, which was once upon a time 
considered the epicentre of Hellenism within the Byzantine Empire (Dimaras, 1972) and then lost to 
the Ottoman Empire.  
Comparable Orientalist/Balkanist representations appeared to be shared by another participant who 
argued that ‘without the EU, we’d still be Tourkalvanoi’ (Aphrodite, public servant). The use of the 
term ‘Tourkalvanoi’, literally meaning ‘Turkish-Albanian’, can be said to be peculiar here, not as 
much in its historical implication or inaccuracy, but rather in its symbolic usage and possible 
derogatory tone. While it brings to the fore the issue of ethnic diversity which formed the 
demographic base of the modern Greek state, within which various Albanophone ethnic groups, 
such as Arvanites and Tsamides existed, among Vlachs, Slavs, Sephardic Jews (Karakasidou, 2011) 
and various Muslims (Turks, Pomaks or Roma, Yakoumaki, 2007), it might be understood to be used 
here to connote ‘Muslim-Albanians’. In this case it can be said to carry Orientalising connotations 
                                                          
29 ‘We are kalofagades’ translates as ‘we know how to eat well’. 
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due to the predominant, yet imprecise, stereotypical association of Islam with the Orient, as well as 
the historical discrimination of Muslim Albanians by Greek governments and society. This perhaps 
becomes more salient in the cognitive associations made by the same participant, saying that: 
‘I think that the Greek national identity has been influenced in its conservative, provincial 
Tourkalvanitiki identity, not in the Greek identity of philosophy, democracy, etc., that is, 
the conservative part of the Greeks has been increased, not the patriotic one that says 
that Greeks will make it, they have roots[…] As some say… Greece is the cradle of 
civilisation, which is true, with the difference that the modern Greeks are not the ancient 
Greeks… after Byzantium the Greeks didn’t exist, there were Turks and Albanians, this is 
who we are. I personally am one of the ancient Greeks of course…!’ (Aphrodite, public 
servant) 
 
A representation of dual Greek identity is formed here, split between the ancient Greek and the so-
called ‘Tourkalvanitiki’, which can be said to be reproducing Orientalist/Balkanist notions to the 
degree that it associates the latter with negative stereotypes, such as being conservative, provincial, 
weak-spirited and unpatriotic, while the former appears as philosophical, democratic, strong-spirited 
and patriotic. Moreover, the representation appears to be contradictory in itself, claiming (ancient) 
Greeks as non-existent, yet possible to be claimed as a current identity, differentiating the self from 
others. In this perplexed manner, although this representation rightly abandons the continuity of 
Greek identity from ancient times to modernity, as prescribed by expert knowledge, it reproduces 
the basic Orientalist postulate that Greece was made by ‘good’ Hellenistic elements and ‘lesser’ 
Oriental/post-Ottoman ones.  
At another instance, the same participant distinguished between Balkan and Mediterranean 
identities, but rejected the Turkish Mediterranean, which might be attributed to the influence of 
historical hostility between the two countries or a pattern of hierarchisation of European 
prototypicality, as was exhibited in the previous chapter.  
‘I feel I share many commonalities with people from the Mediterranean, including North 
Africa, the Italians, the Spanish, the Portuguese… unfortunately with the Turkish too, 
which I can’t stand! In no way I feel Balkan, I feel Mediterranean. Now, European, I don’t 
know if I feel…’ (Aphrodite, public servant) 
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Informal ethnographic participant observations during fieldwork indicated that Balkanism, defined 
as negative imagery of the Balkans (Todorova, 2009), was indeed a contemporary internal feature of 
Greek society. For example, it was discovered during informal discussions with social acquaintances 
that some Southern-Greek Athenian citizens think of Northern-Greek Thessalonikians as ‘too Balkan’ 
and ascribe negative values to the object of ‘Balkans’, like being ‘brutal’ or ‘crude’. As such, in this 
sense, past patterns of discrimination of ‘new Greeks’ from Northern Greece or Greek Macedonia, as 
well as refugees from Asia Minor and Pontiacs from the Black Sea who fled Turkey and immigrated 
to Greece, may still be evident today in Greek society. These representations might be resting on 
age-old historical patterns, such as the later acquisition of these populations and their ethnic or 
linguistic heterogeneity, and may relate to the persistent identity conflict of East and West of Greek 
European identity, as well as misguided quest for Europeanisation defined as Westernisation.  
A sharp contrast was observed in another participant’s account of the East/West divide, who argued 
that Greece must accept its Oriental characteristics, rather than wish to discard or hide them. In his 
words,  
‘…whether Greece is a European country, I have reservations, we have many features, and 
we like having them, Oriental features. This is part of us and we shouldn’t throw it away… 
it’s like someone acquiring a culture, by going to the university, conversing with people of a 
higher social status, but forgetting that his grandfather came from a small village... he 
shouldn’t forget that. He should go back to that village, listen to the language his 
grandfather once spoke, because whether he wishes it or not, he carries that with him… us 
Greeks are sort of like that.’ (Gerasimos, public servant) 
 
Within this metaphor, although Eastern features are similarly represented negatively as ‘provincial’, 
(i.e. ‘small village’) and European identity is reproduced once again as one of a ‘higher status’, these 
are not seen as something one ‘cannot stand’ as in the previous example, but as something to 
accept and preserve. The same participant added that ‘Europe needs to accept that Greece is 
special, not because Greeks are lazy, but because it is the South-Eastern edge, which enriches it with 
Oriental elements’. Similarly, another participant agreed that Europe needs to accept all European 
identities, including the Balkans (Kyveli, unemployed). In this sense, it was implied that Europe itself 
237 
 
is not accepting of the Orient and the Balkans, constructing the European prototype as less than 
inclusive and egalitarian.  
Beyond the distinction between East and West, most participants thought that Greece was 
simultaneously both European and non-European, some respondents thought Greece was largely 
not European, and few participants responded that Greece was European without placing a question 
mark on its Europeanness. These results approximate the results of the ideational leaders’ 
interviews. In terms of reasons given for Greece being European, fewer reasons were given 
compared to reasons for not being European, which agreed with the views of ideational leaders. 
Although the two dominant reasons for being European in the ideational leaders’ interviews were 
the ancient Greek tradition and geographical location, in the citizens’ interviews only the latter was a 
dominant justification. This signposts that the narrative of Greece being foundational of European 
identity was not widely shared by this study’s participants, as only a few citizens mentioned it. This 
may indicate a reluctance to make positive usage of an identity feature that has been criticised as an 
indication of nationalism and identity overvaluation, as was seen in the ideational leaders’ critical 
opinions. As such, participants in this study did not use this facet to position Greece within the 
European prototype. Other reasons that were given for Greece’s European belonging was sharing 
political values, such as democracy, receiving funds, having relations with other countries, being a 
member of the EU or EMU, common history, and random luck/coincidence.  
 
Similarly to the ideational leaders’ views, citizens were able to present many more reasons as to why 
Greece was not European. The primary reasons included being disorganised and lacking the 
structures, having a different culture to other Europeans, widespread corruption, lower living 
standards and quality of life, and a wider feeling of ‘being behind’ or ‘backwards’. Other reasons 
included being Oriental/Balkan or similar to an African/Third World country, insufficient health 
services, inadequate education, culture of entertainment, low credibility, being racist, overvaluing 
Greek identity, underdeveloped institutions and laws, being selective, lacking European political 
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values, being too religious or having strong relations between Church and state, and having wrong 
priorities, such as money over knowledge. Inadvertently, the content of the European prototype is 
sketched out as the opposite of the above: organised, not corrupted, high livings standards, 
advanced, and so on. As it becomes apparent, several justifications were common between citizens 
and ideational leaders, exemplifying remarkable correspondence. A difference between citizens and 
leaders’ representations perhaps was that the first were more vocal and specific about corruption 
and provision of services, while the latter were more abstract regarding these issues and used more 
generalised terms such as ‘institutional shortcomings’ or the ‘rule of law’.  
 
In terms of narratives coming out of citizens’ responses, there were no grand narratives as such, as 
was the case with the ideational leaders’, most probably due to the more limited character of 
anchoring around the East/West schema, which provided the main axis of narration in the previous 
chapters. Nevertheless, some similar arguments were shared by some citizens and formed looser 
narrative lines, which dictated that a) Greek culture is not compatible with the European culture, b) 
Greece tries to be European, or others try to make it more European, but this does not seem to be 
working, c) it is adhered democratic values that make Greece European, and d) Greece’s situation is 
so negative that it should be located in Africa, not in Europe.  
 
Beginning with the first and second narratives, some young and unemployed participants argued 
that Greek culture is in dissonance with the European, while there was a sense that political 
attempts to remedy this discord are, thus far, insoluble.  
 
‘I don’t think that us Greeks could ever adjust with their [the Europeans’] attitude… we have 
a different culture, we are not as organised as they are, I don’t know… a different way of 
life, I mean, we want to go out at night, have fun… above all, good times is what our lives 
are about, on Sundays the family gets together and enjoys… they [the Europeans] don’t 
understand that, they think why would you do that?... maybe our children will learn to be 
different through education… learn a different culture’ (Aggeliki, unemployed) 
 
 
‘[Greece is] not so much [European], because there’s a lot of corruption with our politicians, 
so no… even if we wanted to, we don’t know how to be a European country, with a good 
economy, no chaos, health services, no way… there are many negatives, so I don’t think 
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Greece is a European country. I suppose the Troika tries to make Greece more European, 
which will never happen, it’s like trying to teach an old man a new game, he will insist on his 
own ways…’ (Charalampos, unemployed) 
 
 
Similarly to the ideational leaders, participants projected more or less optimistic views regarding 
Greece’s future convergence to a European prototype, while the latter was implicitly or explicitly 
seen as desirable.  
 
In contrast, some participants thought that Greece’s political culture made it sufficiently European. 
For example,  
 
‘yes we are European, we have democracy, freedom, we even have every lunatic telling us 
what he will… and we let him be outside, while he probably should be in a mental 
institution, that much democratic… we are a democratic country and we should be in 
Europe. Most European countries are democratic’ (Leonidas, pensioner) 
 
 
‘what makes a country European… respect for what’s human, its uniqueness, particularity, 
individuality, dignity… respect for freedom, independence, democracy, these are the 
elements of a European country. I think Greece is a European country, we have these, we 
even had them before! Even if we suppose that some people are a bit more conservative, 
they’d still let you be, they wouldn’t restrict you, you have your own space to move, as far 
as you don’t overstep on somebody else’s space… I believe this is true in Greece’ (Rodanthi, 
student) 
 
 
Within these examples, political elements, such as democracy and freedom, are interpreted as 
characteristics of European identity and the categorisation of Greece as an owner of these 
characteristics situates it within the European prototype. We may add that this allusion to the high 
tolerance of Greek society, i.e. ‘everybody letting everybody be’ constitutes the other side of what 
was negatively constructed by some ideational leaders (i.e. Panousis, Repousi) as excessive Greek 
permissiveness, i.e. ‘everybody doing whatever they want’.  
 
In the previous chapter ideational leaders expressed concern that Greece might become an 
Oriental/Balkan/Global South country in the future. Some citizens focused on Greece’s past 
trajectory instead and situated Greece in the Global South, objectified around the particular example 
of ‘Africa’.  
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‘as far as I can remember, there were many times in the past that I thought that we 
were on the wrong continent... there were such tragic incidents happening, incoherent 
things compared to the location we are situated on, I thought that we should had been 
in Africa, in the sense that we are boorish sometimes, kaffirs, disorganised and mean, 
but now I don’t think that, I’m over it…’ (Aristeidis, pensioner) 
 
 
‘sometimes I say that we shouldn’t be attached to the EU, we should probably be in the 
African continent, and perhaps I am insulting Africa right now, because some African 
countries may have better structures than we do, their governments better structured 
than ours…’ (Eleftheria, private sector employee) 
 
 
Similarly to the Orientalist representations above, there was negative imagery constructed regarding 
Africa and comparisons were made to Greece with reference to its European identity. While in the 
first example, the object of ‘Africa’ is attributed negative values, i.e. boorish, and even the 
derogatory word ‘kaffirs’ 30 is used, in the second representation negative stereotyping is counter-
balanced by criticising one’s own choice to make such comparison in the first place. These 
representations resonate with an ideational leader’s observation that ‘we often love to say that we 
are an African country with white people’ (Lyrintzis).  
 
 
National divisions during the crisis 
 
 
Citizens and political elites: a bridgeless divide 
 
 
Moving on to wider divisions within Greek society, ideational leaders in the previous chapter spoke 
about the lack of national consensus. Within citizens’ interviews, various representations of national 
conflicts were present. For instance, some participants commented that there is a conflictual 
relationship between citizenry and government, which was specifically objectified around the 
question of trust.  
 
‘in Greece, the relationship between the citizen and the government is at a point zero; the 
                                                          
30 The word ‘kaffir’ originates in the Arabic language and used to mean ‘infidel and non-Muslim’. A more 
recent usage is found in South Africa, where it was used to refer to ‘any black African person’ in a 
discriminatory manner. The term is now legally banned and its use punishable (Dictionary.com).  
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citizen doesn’t trust it, he never did…’ (Gerasimos, public servant) 
 
 
‘Nobody trusts anyone. The government doesn’t trust the citizens, the citizens don’t trust 
the government, so everyone tries to operate without taking each other into account … the 
government doesn’t care how the taxes will be paid, on the other hand, the citizen doesn’t 
care to pay taxes to such a government… now if the government owes you money, you’ll 
get it, if you do, after decades… if you owe the government 150 euros and can’t pay, it will 
hunt you down till the end… therefore, there’s no relation whatsoever between citizen and 
government, they are two completely different things, where the one sees the other in a 
hostile way’ (Dionysis, public servant) 
 
 
 
When participants were asked if, and how, they were politically influenced by the economic crisis, 
quite a few mentioned that they did not trust the government before, and continued to feel the 
same after the crisis, because the crisis reaffirmed their beliefs (Kalliopi, unemployed; Rodanthi, 
student; Tasoula, private sector employee). For others, the crisis directly contributed to losing their 
sense of trust, as was the case with Martha, a public servant, who had lost more than 40% of her 
income.  
 
‘Politically, yes, in the sense that once upon a time we used to believe, we held some 
ideologies and we thought that there were some people who could represent us… now, I 
don’t believe these people exist, now I think they are all the same, and they all want to 
seize the power… so yes, politically I lost the trust towards the people who govern us…’ 
(Martha, public servant) 
 
 
As exemplified, several citizens view the relationship between political elites and citizens as either 
conflictual or non-existent, and construct the image of a society that lacks social capital, mutual trust 
and will for reciprocity, features that are understood as important for a well-functioning democracy 
(Putnam, 2001). As was seen above, the lack of trust is understood as a psychological motivation for 
non-cooperation between government and citizens on the matter of tax-collection and its result in a 
malfunctioning taxing and revenue system. 
 
 
‘Two categories of citizens’: public and private sector employees 
 
 
In terms of social divisions between public and private sector employees, although these were only 
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marginally mentioned by a few ideational leaders, they were discussed more extensively by citizens. 
Some openly blamed public servants for the economic fallout of the country and made comparisons 
between public servants and the private sector employees or the unemployed, in terms of sharing 
the consequences of the economic crisis.  
 
‘the private sector has ended, it doesn’t exist anymore, there’s no dignity for the worker, 
they took everything from us… the public servants, because they were hired by the political 
parties themselves, are still holding on[…] right now, those who are not to blame for the 
crisis are the ones who pay for it, while those who are implicated within the parties don’t 
have a care, because they are protected… millions of unemployed, and only a few 
thousands fired from the public sector…’ (Nestoras, pensioner)  
 
 
‘what’s to blame is that the public sector didn’t work[…] and the politicians only cared to be 
re-elected for another four years… now that we’ve come here, many need to leave from the 
public sector, so that it  can stand on its feet again, because the private sector cannot keep 
on paying for the public servants who only sit down… the private sector works hard, sweats, 
suffers, because they are not permanent… it is only the public sector’s fault for where we 
are now’ (Leonidas, pensioner) 
 
 
These two pensioners were very critical of public servants, most probably because they had been 
private sector employees in the past and felt that they did not enjoy the same privileges. As one of 
them added, ‘I never knew anyone who could grant me any special favours’ (Nestoras, pensioner). 
Another pensioner made the same argument stating that ‘none of my kids worked in the public 
sector… I never had any political acquaintances, so I never went to anyone to ask for anything’ 
(Alkiviadis, pensioner). These distanciation strategies might be attributed as strategies aiming to 
manage a possible identity threat induced to the group of pensioners, which was one of those that 
were most intensely blamed for the crisis, along with the public sector, since they were considered 
politically and economically active during the Metapolitefsi era. In this sense, these statements 
might be understood as attempts to declare one’s ethical conduct, thus ethical identity.  
 
However, participants from other socio-economic groups, who were never public servants or 
pensioners, and were too young to be considered active within the same period, also tried to 
differentiate themselves from the public sector and expressed criticism towards it.  
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‘I think we deserve what’s happening to us now. I’m very aware about this, and I’ve 
never been on the side of those who benefitted, I don’t mean this in a vengeful way, I 
never wanted to benefit, I never thought about entering the public sector, I never ratted 
on nobody to get a post, I never voted for PASOK… I’ve been fired many times from the 
private sector, was left unpaid several times, even without Memoranda, I’ve seen this 
movie many times, so now the rest get to see it too…’ (Grigoris, private sector employee) 
 
 
‘regarding being tough on the public servants, on how they entered, how they 
progressed, the salaries they received compared to the private sector, yes, it might 
sound bad, but I think this is done for the better… it will balance out this disparity… The 
public servants have many privileges, they always did… maybe it sounds like punishing, 
because they’re not used to such measures… I don’t come from a family of public 
servants myself, maybe it feels sad… or extreme for them, but I think it will install some 
order in the public sector’ (Kalliopi, unemployed) 
 
 
Within these examples, participants appear to be conscious that their representations might be 
perceived as conflictual and hostile against public servants. This self-awareness is exemplified in self-
clarifying expressions, such as ‘I don’t mean this in a vengeful way’ and negotiations, such as ‘it 
might sound bad, but I think…’. While the first example may appear more unforgiving and critical 
(i.e. ‘the rest get to see it too’), the second attempts to employ an empathetic attitude (i.e. ‘maybe it 
feels sad, but…’). Nevertheless, they both indicate that the object of ‘public servants’ has acquired a 
negative cognitive association and was accompanied by variably conflictual attitudes towards them, 
illustrating the existence of intensified social divisions within Greek society during the crisis.  
 
Public servants who participated in this study were asked to comment on being blamed for the crisis. 
While one participant felt misjudged and being in conflict with other fellow citizens, another felt that 
blaming against public servants was justified.  
 
‘I have personally come into opposition with friends and relatives who agree with the [crisis] 
measures, and blame us, because they say that we waste the money, and they are the ones 
to pay for us, the classic line… as if the public servants don’t pay taxes, in fact the public 
servants are the only ones who can’t hide their income… [the public sector] has been hit, 
and has received all the blaming too, all the name-calling… even arguments like if you get 
pregnant, you’ll stand down for eighteen months, while I’ll have only five… instead of all of 
us trying to move towards the better, you want to pull me down, just because you don’t 
have the same? And besides, in the private sector you can evolve professionally, in the 
public this is very difficult…’ (Martha, public servant) 
 
 
‘I’ve worked in the private sector for many years before I became a public [servant], I’ve 
changed many occupations, from factories to construction, and my family members are all 
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in the private sector… I believe the accusations against public servants are not right, but 
they have some foundation. The public servant in Greece has been extremely protected for 
the last fifty, sixty years, in everything, vacations, privileges, so many privileges they had… 
with the result that there were two citizen categories in Greece, the public and the private 
sector employees… I have personally experienced this, truly, since I was hired, I have been 
protected… while in the private sector I was up in the air[…] it was preferred to hit the 
private sector and protect the public, which brings society to a division, a justified division…’ 
(Gerasimos, public servant) 
 
 
As exemplified by the examples above, negative social attitudes against public servants are anchored 
on the question of privileges and social comparisons with socio-economic groups that are perceived 
to have fewer such privileges. As a result, chronic perceived inequality between these groups 
amounts to feelings of relative deprivation and perception of justified crisis measures against public 
servants. As appears, public servants variably accept the superiority of these privileges and while 
some project defensive arguments, others accept the indictments.  
 
 
Cultures of conflict and of solidarity 
 
 
Participants additionally talked about the existence of a wider conflictual culture in Greece. Some of 
these divisions were described as long-term and others were presented as crisis specific. Gerasimos 
(public servant), for instance, talked about Greeks being ‘obsessed with suing each other’. As put, 
‘our neighbour is basically our enemy’ (Gerasimos, public servant). Neophytos (self-employed) 
argued the following, while discussing what is good or bad about Greek society. 
 
‘Paradoxically, I won’t say solidarity, because as a peoples we’ve always been cannibalising 
each other[…] our worst vice is our discord, for everything, historically proven… our 
endless cannibalism, endless… this is the human species… here, perhaps for social and 
historical reasons, it is more intense. All of these [crisis] measures that passed were 
founded on this social automatism that asked why. All this dismantling of social welfare 
was based on why should the teachers rest for three months? Which they don’t do. Why 
should the public servants stand down? Which they don’t do. Why should the private 
sector employees take these wages? Which they don’t take… he has more, so we’re going 
to eat him up, what can you call this? Jealousy? Sometimes it’s not even that, sometimes 
you want to eat up someone who doesn’t even have more than you, just has something 
different… people who just wish the destruction of others, this is what you see right now, 
people just want to witness, and be happy with, the downfall of another… the neighbour’s 
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goat must die 31…’ (Neophytos, self-employed) 
 
 
As shown, this participant presented Greek society, and as an extension Greek social identity, as 
particularly divisive and lacking in attributes that contribute to social capital, such as solidarity. This 
discord is presented both as a long-term historical phenomenon, reproducing representations of 
Greece as a ‘divided nation’, and as a crisis-specific phenomenon (i.e. ‘this is what you see right 
now’). The psychological phenomenon of experiencing joy with the pain of others is a well-known 
one in social psychology, called schadenfreude and defined as ‘malicious pleasure at the suffering of 
another’ (Leach et al. 2003: 932). In the Greek language, the compound word chairekakia 
(χαιρεκακία) from the chaire (χαιρε), meaning ‘to feel joy’, and kakia (κακία) meaning ‘malice’ would 
be the equivalent of the German word ‘schadenfreude’.  
 
Regarding dynamics of social conflict during the crisis, Paulos (unemployed) commented that the 
economic crisis ‘has created a negative aggressive attitude in everybody, simultaneously defensive, 
which tests their limits, as well as your own’ in everyday life, combined with ‘a chasm of our [Greek] 
unity, since everybody cares only about themselves now’. Eleftheria (private sector employee) 
agreed that social solidarity was lacking during the crisis.  
 
‘it is very difficult to talk to the person next to you… this shows in strikes too, the private 
sector employees go on strike… and there is no support from ADEDY… every sector, the 
teachers go on strike, they are not supported by other public servants, the co-workers from 
other subsectors… they say they rest for three months, we have a vengeful behaviour 
towards our fellow citizens, our fellow people… if I am threatened, I’ll go on strike, if I’m not, 
I’ll let others go, I won’t participate, as if the misfortune will never come to me…’ (Eleftheria, 
private sector employee) 
 
 
In this representation, the schema of ‘schadenfreude’ as characteristic of Greek identity within the 
crisis is reaffirmed, i.e. ‘vengeful’ attitude towards others. Furthermore, there are additional 
allusions to individuality and self-interest, representations often made by other participants too, 
which complement the image of a society and a social identity that falls short of social cohesion and 
                                                          
31 The reference to the ‘neighbour’s goat’ is related to a well-known joke around Greece and the wider Eastern 
Europe which aptly describes this psychological phenomenon, since according to the scenario, when one’s 
goat dies, he prefers to see the neighbour’s goat die too, rather than receive a new goat for free. 
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mutual support. Very few participants referred to initiatives of solidarity and voluntarism during the 
crisis, which indicates that the outlook towards the evaluation of Greek society was negative, rather 
than positive.  
 
 
Left and right: radicalisations and internal contradictions 
 
 
Regarding ideological distinctions, Triantafyllou argued in the previous chapter that there is a 
radicalisation of the Left and Right in Greece during the economic crisis, as well as an age-old 
historical divide between the two. Within citizens’ interviews, these claims were affirmed when 
several participants observed that Greek society is ‘radicalised’ and ‘polarised’ (i.e. Aggelos, student; 
Kyriaki, student; Laurentis, self-employed). Furthermore, some participants who self-identified as 
‘leftists’ described the political impact of the crisis upon them as one that made them more ‘radical’ 
and ‘extreme’.  
 
‘I’ve always been in the area of the left, but now I think that my positions are more 
extreme than they used to be before... In the past, I used to water my wine a bit, now I 
think these times are over, I hope that my fellow citizens realise this too… if we don’t 
make claims with valence, with force, with perseverance, with endurance, with our 
struggle lasting in time, we will not have any results… (Eleftheria, private sector 
employee) 
 
 
‘[although I was] a child that grew up in a radical left family, I had the opportunity to 
study, I don’t belong to those older generations when the child of the poor could not 
study, and when someone studies… as you can understand, they move their views and 
cannot be extreme anymore, not because of the studies as such, but because they can 
recognise many perspectives, right? But for now, I have a very specific position… the exit 
from the Euro is a leftist position, ok, right now, I am extremely leftist, that is, I want exit 
from Europe, the monetary union, NATO, from everywhere… you can’t have mobilisation 
of the right, the extreme right, and you, me, and whoever, who is educated and leftist 
being flexible, this cannot be… when the Golden Dawner comes to smash your head 
because you are leftist, you can’t sit around theorising, you must defend yourself… so to 
answer your question, of course I’ve changed, because in the old days, I used to be a 
progressed centrist citizen…’ (Grigoris, private sector employee) 
 
 
As illustrated, these citizens engage in self-reflection and openly explain how the crisis changed their 
political views. In the second example, it becomes apparent that the crisis has affected this 
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participant’s support for the EU, as well as the NATO, contributing to the formation of a more anti-
European and anti-Western political identity. Furthermore, a direct opposition is constructed 
between the extreme Left, Akroaristeroi, and the extreme Right, i.e. the Golden Dawners, 
Chrysavgites.  
 
A participant who voted for the GD in the national elections of 2012, and was planning to vote for it 
again in the European elections, reaffirmed this dislike towards the Left and related protesters, 
when he commented ‘this ridicule of the Indignants, the Leftists, of SYRIZA and all the youngsters 
doing their thing in Syntagma…’ (Dimosthenis, private sector employee). In terms of ideology, the 
same participant added the following, when asked what should change in Greece in order to move 
towards better times.   
 
‘to come a step closer to utopia, that is, to initiate a herdism, to have unified principles, 
unified parts in order for it to work, to not have free will in the way it exists today, since 
after all it is our decisions and choices that led us here… so if you remove this element, 
what results? Besides the equality, happiness, no wars, no hunger, no conflicts, there 
will not be any different ideology, which ultimately has nothing to offer anyways, if you 
think about it…’ (Dimosthenis, private sector employee) 
 
 
As exemplified, in this representation, the solution to the crisis, as well as to Greece’s identity 
conflict, appears to be the eradication of all ideologies and free will, combined with a docile, herd-
like, unified society. In the questionnaire, this GD supporter justified his voting choice saying that 
‘the instability and cannibalism of GD would force the family business of Greece into thinking’ 
(Dimosthenis, private sector employee). In this sense, a paradoxically conflicted representation is 
projected here by simultaneously promoting ‘cannibalism’, thus conflict, nevertheless in the name of 
future peace, under the disappearance of all ideas, hence of all thinking, resulting by the ‘force’ of 
the very same process. i.e. ‘thinking’.  
 
Another participant who had voted for the right-wing, nationalist political party ANEL and was now 
planning to vote for GD in the European elections, therefore had moved closer to the extreme right 
edge, expressed internal conflict after the interview in an off-the-record conversation. As indicated 
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in the previous chapter, it is sometimes after the turning off of the recorder that participants feel the 
urge to express internal contradictions. On this occasion, the participant although not prompted or 
asked directly to justify his choice, he expressed problematisation about his electoral choice and in 
an almost apologetic tone said that he didn’t know if he ‘would go through with it’. In any case, in 
the questionnaire, his justification for voting for the GD concerned ‘attempts to remove GD MPs 
from the Parliament with imprisonments and unsubstantiated accusations’ which mobilised him to 
‘support them’.  
 
Internal conflict appeared to problematise another participant who expressed intense feelings 
related to the inability to find crisis solutions and be optimistic about the future. Outlining and 
subsequently rejecting a series of proposals, such as ‘becoming a German protectorate’, ‘changing 
the government’, ‘finding an enlightened new leader’ or ‘massive executions and gallows’ poles at 
the square’, the participant questioned ‘within the unavoidable context of democracy, what can be 
done?’. Unable to find answers, the participant concluded that the pessimism is so grave that ‘only 
extreme ideas come to your head, and exactly because you understand that they are extreme, you 
swallow your tongue…’ (Neophytos, self-employed). In this respect, radicalisation and individual 
internal conflicts, further extending towards wider social conflicts, can be understood as an outcome 
of becoming unable within the political crisis, which resulted from the economic one, to imagine 
alternatives and change.  
 
 
European conflicts: anti-Germanism and economic wars 
 
 
Radicalising effects appeared to be spilling over to the European dimension of Greek identity. For 
example, the same participants who self-identified as ‘extreme’ left or right, expressed ideas of anti-
Germanism, anti-Europeanism, and perceptions of European conflict. Grigoris (private sector 
employee), self-proclaimed ‘extreme leftist’, who voted for KKE and SYRIZA, and wanted exit from 
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EU, EMU and NATO, for instance, argued that within the world, ‘Europe is the worst, because it has 
the Germans… Germany should be a plain field, this is my opinion of Europe, without Germany, 
Europe would be fine’. Grigoris concluded that Germans ‘should either perish or do something about 
their politics’. When asked if he had the same views before the crisis, he responded that ‘no, I didn’t 
have the same views… my father used to tell me that I don’t know the Germans. I’m beginning to 
learn them now, I hope I don’t get to know them the way my father did’ (Grigoris, private sector 
employee), implicitly referring to WWII and German occupation. The same participant stated that he 
was not European, because ‘right now, Europe is Germany, and I’m not German. Clearly’.  
 
Dimosthenis, who self-identified as ‘extreme right’ and voted for GD, shared the following regarding 
the compatibility between national and European identities.  
 
‘these will co-exist peacefully when the last German forgets about 1940 and the last 
Greek grandpa says ‘Heil Hitler’...  since there’s blood between peoples, conflict, war, 
hatred… this cannot exist… you can’t be brothers… and now you ended up at a point 
where it doesn’t benefit any of you two, because you both believe that the other one has 
stolen from you… how can you be grouped under a united identity… while thinking what 
the Germans did to us during the war?’[…] it is the discord, the human nature, from the 
moment you hold on, bite, grab and breath through your conflicts, this is where it ends… 
basically, history is a vendetta, if you think about it. Have you ever heard about changes 
that didn’t have the requirement of war, bloodshed and social outcry? The progress of 
humans is based on blood and bones… so let’s face it, war takes us forward… as a species’ 
(Dimosthenis, private sector employee) 
 
 
In both these examples, references are made to WWII and the occupation of Greece by Germany 
and historical, as well as family, experiences are enacted to concrete dividing lines between the two 
countries. According to SRT, these negative associations and sentiments can be understood as part 
of the process of anchoring which ascribes meaning to new phenomena by cognitively linking them 
to existing knowledge and prior attitudes, or in other words, what individuals feel they already 
know. In this sense, for some citizens, the experience of the Euro crisis and Germany’s leading role in 
its management, is associated with what one remembers to ‘know’ about Germans from his parents 
or history. Simultaneously, easily accessible and time defying derogatory national stereotypes 
regarding Germans appear to operate as a cognitive pool of information and attitude building 
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towards additional social objects, such as those of ‘European identity’ (i.e. ‘Europe is Germany’) or 
‘humanity’ (i.e. ‘the human nature’). As put by another participant, who did not endorse such 
stereotypes, yet recognised that European identities are currently going through the ‘era of conflict’, 
it is ‘impressive’ that ‘after seventy years the stereotype of Germans is still the Nazis’ (Gerasimos, 
public servant).  
 
Although it would be logically plausible to assume that such negative associations were only made 
by participants who belonged to the fringes of the political spectrum, it would be erroneous. For 
instance, another participant with much more moderate political views similarly questioned ‘how 
can we co-exist with the Germans, after everything they did all over Europe?’ (Marina, public 
servant). This participant further explained that ‘even if you don’t think about this consciously, it 
exists in your subconscious… maybe this is me being narrow-minded, but I think it always exists in 
the subconscious, we can’t be one because of history’. Most impressively, even a self-proclaimed 
federalist, expressed anti-German feelings. Neophytos (self-employed), for instance, explained that 
he still supports the EU, despite its ‘monstrous flaws’ because it has structures that Greece lacks and 
are necessary for future change, but then added ‘not like this though, Troika-style, with our head 
under the boot of the German’. The emphasis of these participants on the role of Germany indicates 
the perception of it as dominant within the EU, while the qualitative character of these comments 
illustrates the depth of conflict in Greek citizens’ European identity, whereby other Europeans are 
perceived in hostile and threatening ways.  
 
In terms of other references to ‘war’ and ‘conflict’, besides the overt references to WWII, some 
participants used metaphors of war to speak about EU relations, resembling media representations 
described in previous chapters. For example, the metaphor of ‘economic war’ was used to describe 
current EU affairs. An unemployed young woman, Aggeliki, while discussing the crisis management 
by the Troika, stated that ‘it is like an underground economic war, where they are winning’. Paulos 
(unemployed) observed that ‘we’ve left the times of swords and bows and we’ve come to the times 
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of economic dominance, I control your liquidity, therefore I can do whatever I want with you’. Paulos 
further elaborated that there is no democracy within this condition which constitutes ‘a form of 
violence’ not in the sense of ‘shooting an unarmed’ but ‘practically controlling if one will work or 
feed his child milk three times a week or not at all’. These participants were both made unemployed 
during the crisis, thus were highly affected by it, had never lived abroad, and expressed various self-
described ‘nationalist’ views, such as ‘we’re not good nationalists anymore, to resist the fact that 
they subjugate us’ (Aggeliki, unemployed). These features may explain their negative attitudes 
towards Europe.  
 
However, interestingly, another participant who openly criticised ‘nationalist’ or ‘patriotic’ attitudes, 
was a diasporic returnee, and had found employment in Greece during the economic crisis, thus was 
not as affected as other citizens, similarly made use of the ‘economic war’ metaphor.  
 
‘it is known that Europe moves slowly with negotiations, but I would have expected greater 
speed in the decision-making and no half measures, they were very late with 
recapitalisation, they were late with the restructuring too, things were done, but at the 
beginning there was a murderous period for the Greek economy of grave uncertainty, 
where others didn’t even want to come here as tourists, let alone invest in the country, 
this was very bad, the country found itself in a state of economic war, as they say…’ 
(Laurentis, self-employed) 
 
 
Although the EU/Europe is not directly blamed for the ‘state of economic war’, it is indirectly linked 
as a key factor in facilitating it and allusions are made to delayed and insufficient solidarity.  
 
Other participants used the word ‘threat’ to describe Greece’s relations to Europe. A young student 
who stated that she ‘really like[d] the idea of European identity’ and ‘dreamed’ of going abroad to  
Europe for further studies, could not tell ‘if Greece should be in the EU anymore’ and described the 
Troika’s visitations as a time when ‘the whole climate in Athens changes, they are here, they come 
from Europe, even this, that we are afraid that they come from Europe (speaker’s emphasis), 
becomes negative for us, there are some people from the EU that threaten us…’ (Kyriaki, student). 
The participant further added that ‘I don’t want them to come here, all this surveillance, this 
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controlling, seems to me somehow, like fascism’. The metaphor of ‘fascism’ here adds another 
representation of political violence, enacting conflict in a frequently used cognitive schema for the 
description of European affairs and Greece’s relation with Europe.  
 
 
Support for the EU: united in dependency 
 
 
Besides representations of ‘conflict’, the greatest contradiction in terms of identifications was 
encountered in citizens’ EU identities, expressed as overwhelmingly negative associations with the 
EU, yet a simultaneous overwhelming majority in favour of EU membership. In other words, 
although most participants did not feel represented or happy with the EU, most of them were not 
willing to leave it. In light of representations of European conflict, participants were asked to reflect 
on the process of European integration, which revealed a number of dominant narratives. These 
narratives dictated that European integration was ‘a good idea in theory, but not in practice’, or that 
it used to be ‘positive before, but not anymore’. In many respects, participants expressed cognitive 
dissonance regarding what the EU used to mean before and what it meant to them after the 
economic crisis, or what they felt it was supposed to be, but was not, indicating a decline of positive 
attitudes and rise of negative ones. This appeared to be the case in citizens who used to be 
positively, neutrally and negatively inclined towards the EU before the crisis, affecting the whole 
spectrum of support. The particular object of contestation appeared to be that of the ‘Troika’.  
 
Neophytos (self-employed), for example, who repeatedly described himself as a ‘federalist’ 
commented ‘what happens today has come out of our worst nightmares, any old federalist’s worst 
nightmares’. Another self-proclaimed ‘federalist’ argued that she had not been affected in her views, 
however this only appeared possible based on a selective refusal to reflect on the Troika. As stated, 
‘this is indifferent to me, I have not concerned myself with this at all, I have no opinion’ (Aphrodite, 
public servant). Nevertheless, as discussions progressed negative representations were indeed 
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expressed not only about the Troika itself, but also about Angela Merkel, negatively personifying 
European crisis responses.  
 
Young citizens who ‘didn’t know about the EU before’ (Aggelos, student), thus had no particular 
predisposition in advance, had formed ‘negative views’. For example, Kyriaki (student) commented 
that ‘all these with the EU were presented so beautifully at school, this vision of the EU’, and added 
that this did not resonate with the experience of the Troika. Some participants who had been 
negative in the past, were ‘even more [negative] now’ (Krystallia, private sector employee). 
Altogether, there appeared to be a unified movement of all predispositions towards the negative 
side of the perceptive spectrum, with several participants thinking that current EU affairs were not 
characterised by support and solidarity, relations between member-states were unequal and based 
on national, rather than common interests, and unity between different countries was impossible 
due to insuperable differences.  
 
At the same time, the overwhelming majority of participants did not wish to leave the EU. It was 
evident that there were four types of answers to the question of EU membership. These included a) 
unconditional support to remain, b) compromised support to remain, c) conditional support to 
remain, otherwise leave, and d) clear willingness to leave. The first type of response asserted that 
Greece had to stay inside the EU and leaving should not even be discussed as an option. The second 
argued that Greece should stay in the EU, despite the EU not being what citizens would like it to be. 
The third, reckoned that Greece should leave the EU, unless the EU changes, and the fourth declared 
that there was no reason to stay in the EU, because it does not serve Greece’s interests.  
 
The majority of this study’s participants resided in the second type of response, while few 
participants populated the other response types. The key factors that seemed to inspire 
‘compromised remainers’ were fear of the unknown, insecurity about further impoverishment, and 
sense of dependency on the EU. Arguments behind ‘conditional remainers’ included the EU 
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becoming more democratic, egalitarian and beneficial for ordinary people, rather than political and 
economic elites only. ‘Unconditional leavers’ talked about autonomy and independence, while 
‘unconditional remainers’ referred to the mere impossibility of leaving the EU. The overall 
conclusion appeared to be that identification with the EU was founded on a profound conflict 
between what felt desirable, i.e. the EU being different, and what was deemed plausible, or not 
thereof, i.e. leaving it.  
 
 
  Identity devaluation: negotiations of stereotypes and collective responsibility 
 
In previous chapters, it was explained that historiographical accounts of Greek European identities 
were marked by narratives and stereotypes that contributed to identity devaluation. These features 
included being presented as a non-prototypical European, thus a lesser ingroup member, and being 
undeserving. During the economic crisis, media representations constructed various negative 
metaphors and stereotypes of Greece, adding continuity to Greece’s title of the ‘black sheep’ within 
the EU. Processes of culturalisation, moralisation and exceptionalisation were detected and 
amounted to Greece being presented as a ‘bad European’. Demands for exclusion from the EU were 
present both before and after the crisis. Ideational leaders acknowledged that Greece had been 
stereotyped during the crisis, thus Greek European identity had experienced identity threats. While 
some emphasised the need to engage in a process of national reflection and acknowledgement of 
Greece’s responsibility in creating its crisis, others focused on the framing purposes of these 
stereotypes and role in imposing austerity measures. The concept of collective responsibility, as well 
as other forms of responsibility, such as individual or bystander, were enacted into a dominant 
implicit or explicit representation, and were variably negotiated by participants, either as endorsed 
or allocated differentially between different political actors. This section will focus on the ways 
citizens responded to stereotypes and types of crisis responsibility.  
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Responses to stereotypes: emotions and rationalisations 
 
Responses to stereotypes by citizens included two types: a) moderate and neutralising attitudes, 
aiming at pacifying the aforementioned European conflict and managing the inflicted identity threat, 
and b) more emotional and heated ones, leaving the representation of European conflict 
unchallenged and expressing the effects of identity threat.  
In the first case, several participants commented that social characteristics, such as laziness, ‘exist 
everywhere’ (Aggelos, student; Charis, unemployed; Eleftheria, private sector employee), and 
stereotypes are wrong because they ‘overgeneralise’ (Kyriaki, student; Laurentis, self-employed; 
Vaggelis, self-employed) or ‘exaggerate’ (Rodanthi, student) and ‘not all Greeks are like this’ 
(Marina, public servant; Paulos, unemployed). These arguments can be understood as attempting to 
rebalance both the implied hostility among European nations and the threat posed on national self-
esteem, by denationalising the associated social features. This psychological and argumentative 
tactic distanciates the threat from the collective identity, de-exceptionalises the nation, and 
depersonalises the debate. As such, neutralising representations contribute to the resolution of 
cognitive threats.  
Others rationalised the situation arguing that ‘all people engage in stereotyping’ and further 
mentioned that ‘Greeks stereotype other nationals too’ (Aris, self-employed; Dionysis, public 
servant). While the first argument seeks to present stereotyping as a normal human behaviour, thus 
de-exceptionalises the reactions of other Europeans, the second argument emphasises mutuality 
and Greek participation, which further creates a representation of shared experience. In both cases, 
the debate is neutralised and pacified.  
Many participants attempted to compartmentalise the creation of stereotypes by identifying the 
media as the primary actor (Kyveli, unemployed; Rodanthi, student; Vasiliki, public servant), a 
strategy which shifted responsibility from European societies as a whole. This tactic acted in a peace 
enhancing manner and transformed the impression of hostility emanating from Europe by situating 
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the conflict within a particular and separate social realm, perceived as traditionally operating in 
conflictual ways. Sometimes participants would further situate the problem of stereotyping in a 
segment of the media, i.e. tabloid newspapers (Dionysis, public servant), therefore further 
minimising the extent of the issue, which can be understood as an additional peace-making and 
identity threat management strategy.  
Many talked about the ways that media representations have the power to shape people’s 
perceptions of political issues and justified European citizens for believing in negative stereotypes by 
means of empathy, i.e. placing themselves in their places.  
‘…some [Europeans] had a negative image, and good for them. I would have too, if I 
was told that Bulgaria owed money because its politicians… got EU funds and did no 
development, or the farmers took funding to develop the asparagus, but ate all the 
money with Russian girls and whiskey, I too would say no to helping Bulgaria…’ 
(Aphrodite, public servant) 
 
‘it is absolutely justified, because when you live in a world where the media can shape 
your mind, I can’t judge… it is the same as someone trying to persuade me that 
Albanians are animals, this can be done very easily… why should I characterise 
negatively the Swedish if his television tells him that the Greeks are unworthy? I won’t, 
because just as easily I could do the same, there’s a mechanism that accomplishes 
that, so I can’t judge him’ (Grigoris, private sector employee) 
 
On the other side of the spectrum, the second type of responses included several emotional 
expressions, such as anger, sadness, shame, distrust, pride, indifference, and guilt. Beginning with 
anger, some participants explicitly stated that they felt angry at the formation of such stereotypes.  
‘the characterisation lazy caused me, causes me and will continue to cause me spleen, 
always, because many years before the crisis, me and my own field worked like crazy, 
and most of the Greeks I know work like crazy’ (Neophytos, self-employed) 
 
‘in the media, many times I watched interviews and speeches, or saw titles in the 
international press, and I felt great anger and fury about the way they presented things, 
because this is not the way things are… it’s not possible for someone who has never lived 
in Greece to know how everyday life is here. And then to go out like that and speak with 
such pomposity and certainty that things are a certain way, which is offensive’ (Paulos, 
unemployed) 
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The feeling of anger was evident in both self-proclaimed ‘nationalists’ (i.e. Paulos) and ‘Europeanists’ 
(i.e. Neophytos).  
Others felt sad and disappointed regarding the state of Greek European identity during the crisis and 
variably negotiated the identity threat resulting from stereotyping.  
‘I go crazy! Especially since it’s not true… it affects you, because you know others, who 
are like you, who haven’t done something stupid… and you feel bad, not guilty, maybe 
done wrong… no, you know what, I don’t feel done wrong, because if anyone told me 
anything, like ‘you are Greek’, etc., I’d be able to answer them… it’s just that you can’t, 
no, it’s not injustice, it is, I don’t know how to characterise it, it’s bad, it makes you feel 
sad…’ (Kalliopi, unemployed) 
 
‘Personally, it makes me sad, it doesn’t offend me, the fact that I am from this country, 
it just makes me sad, that’s all, nothing else’ (Krystallia, private sector employee) 
 
Some participants openly declared that they experienced feelings of shame, and others observed 
that Greek society was collectively feeling ashamed or humiliated. 
‘I travel a lot for business and leisure, there were many times that I felt ashamed to say 
that I’m Greek, I didn’t want to get into the whole procedure to have to explain why we are 
where we are, because this makes you feel ashamed somehow…’ (Krystallia, private sector 
employee) 
 
‘the Greeks, we are not some different peoples, we’re just a peoples that lives on earth. All 
peoples have their culture. What can I say? That I’m Greek and I’m proud? I want you to 
say it. Right now, I feel ashamed to be Greek, the way I’ve become, I would like to be 
something else, I don’t know… what can I tell you, what could I be, I don’t know, something 
else, not Greek’ (Nestoras, pensioner) 
 
Other participants expressed distrust towards these stereotypes and said that they were used for 
the service of various ‘national interests’ or ‘political agendas’, like imposing austerity (Aris, self-
employed; Eleftheria, private sector employee; Kyriakos, student), an argument which closely 
resembled some ideational leaders’ narrative of ‘strategic framing’. In this sense, distrust was 
expressed for both Greek and European governments and media. However, the representation of 
strategic framing was less prominent in citizens’ interviews.  
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Some respondents felt the need to state that they felt ‘untouched’ by such stereotypes and that 
they still felt proud to be Greek or confident in themselves.  
‘I think I’m saddened somehow, for sure a little bit, but beyond that, I think that everyone 
should know what they are and move forwards according to it, we don’t have to prove 
anything to anybody’ (Kyveli, unemployed) 
 
‘this doen’t touch me, I know how I am…’ (Marina, public servant) 
 
‘Personally, I have not been affected to feel ashamed to be Greek, quite the contrary, I am 
always proud…’ (Martha, public servant) 
 
In these examples, self-awareness and pride are employed as mechanisms that safeguard personal 
self-esteem and restore the sovereignty of the individual self, distanciated from the threat. 
Finally, other participants projected the argument that they did ‘not care’ about ‘such things’, 
implying that they were unaffected by them. ‘They came in one ear, and came out the other’ (Aris, 
self-employed). However, during the interviews it would sometimes become apparent that some of 
these participants were affected at least to a degree, as was the case with Martha (public servant) 
who later during the interview admitted that stereotypes make her ‘very sad’, or Vaggelis (self-
employed) who eventually commented that the stereotype of being lazy was ‘so unacceptable, like a 
bad joke’. As such, the claim of indifference may better be understood as a psychological mechanism 
of ‘saving face’ and minimising the effect of identity threat, rather than eluding its experience 
altogether.  
Some participants could recall personal experiences of having felt offended by other Europeans on 
the basis of such stereotypes or could remember hearing from friends that Greeks were treated with 
prejudice abroad. For example, a participant who had lived in another European country explained 
that he had an unpleasant experience when a Northern-European colleague sent an email to all staff 
members using the term PIGS to refer to Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain, in order to 
communicate on an otherwise irrelevant matter to the economic crisis. As narrated by the 
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participant, the email was soon followed by a complaint, made by an Irish colleague, as well as by 
the participant himself who stated that ‘in Europe we are all together, there are businesses, 
employees and unemployed who suffer all over Europe, sticking a label on some and isolating them 
or viewing them as a joke does not help European progress or the peace and cooperation between 
the people of Europe’ (Laurentis, self-employed).  
The same participant explained that on other occasions, such as dining out with friends, some 
people had made jokes about Greeks, like ‘we [Europeans] should pay for your meal’ or ‘bring us 
back our money’. The participant stated that he ‘didn’t like that at all’ and that he always tried to 
‘explain that it is better to joke about less painful matters’ because ‘fat jokes’ could lead to 
unnecessary ‘misunderstandings’.   
Another participant who had been on a seminar in a Northern-European country shared the 
following.  
‘they were quite ironic about Greece and what they expected to hear from us, while we 
were absolutely, you know, we were trying to keep to the schedule, to be there for the 
common hours, to do the specifics we needed to do, because, you know, that’s what 
happens, it wasn’t as if we were doing it on purpose because we were in a foreign 
country… other than that, yes, I’d say they were negative, ironic, they thought that we 
wouldn’t stick to the programme… after a few days they told us how come we arrive on 
time, at nine, instead of eleven, because we’re Greek. While in truth the opposite was 
happening, they were the ones who didn’t respect the programme, while we were trying 
to be typical’ (Kyveli, unemployed) 
 
Krystallia (private sector employee) also observed that she had received ‘a lot of irony and derision 
by foreign colleagues’ about what was phrased as ‘you Greeks’.  
Simultaneously, several participants recalled stories of friends who had been confronted with what 
was perceived as ‘racism’ (Charalampos, unemployed) or ‘uneasiness’ (Stavros, self-employed). With 
reference to regions outside Europe, a participant with a global experience noted that older forms of 
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discrimination against Greeks and other Southern Europeans, such as the derogatory term ‘wogs’ 32, 
had been revitalised in Australia (Kalliopi, unemployed).  
Others emphasised that not all relations between Greeks and Europeans were negatively 
experienced, an argument that was sometimes illustrated by personal experiences and references to 
the participants’ own friendships or acquaintances (Aphodite, public servant; Neophytos, self-
employed). Several participants who were asked about personal experiences stated that they had 
not experienced any negative or positive encounters with other Europeans/non-Greeks and 
attributed this to not living or working abroad. As put, ‘here in Greece, I am a Greek among Greeks’ 
(Leonidas, pensioner). Absence of contact with other Europeans may have acted as a protective 
factor against the possibility of identity threat. 
Moving on, some participants made strategic attempts to manage the particular identity threat 
objectified on the issue of ‘laziness’ by trying to rationalise and justify differences between what was 
perceived Northern and Southern ‘ways of life’ and ‘work ethic’, particularly specified as the 
relationship between the two objects of ‘life’ and ‘work’. Two arguments that were projected here 
were that Greeks may work differently than others and have a culture of leisure which 
counterbalances the life/work relationship. For example, Charalampos (unemployed), argued that 
Greece has a better balance of work and life because ‘people will go out in the night’ while the 
‘Northerners think it’s all about work’. Other participants justified this as a result of the ‘good 
weather’ which encourages leisure and sociability, as well as redistributes working hours outside the 
expected ‘nine to five schedule’ (Aristeidis, pensioner; Kalliopi, unemployed). Some defensively 
explained that environmental conditions, such as heat, can influence adversely one’s productivity. 
‘At ten in the morning, we have forty degrees in Athens, the whole neurophysiology changes’ (Kyveli, 
unemployed). Some concluded that Europeans should understand that life is different in the South.  
                                                          
32 Defined as a non-Anglo-Celtic European, esp. from Southern or Eastern Europe (e.g. Greek, Italian, Balkan, 
Slavic, etc.). Also, extended to include an Asian, esp. a West Asian (e.g. Lebanese, Turkish, Armenian, Iranian, 
etc.), but now also inclusive of South Asians and Pacific Islanders (Urbandictionary.com).  
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‘if the German or the Swedish, whoever, cannot understand that in a country with nine 
months of summer the employee will go to work in the morning, work, come back, have 
a nap, and then go out, or the self-employed will get up at twelve in the afternoon, have 
coffee and work till four in the morning… if they can’t understand this, they should try, I 
don’t know how else to put it… (Neophytos, self-employed). 
 
Another participant argued that there is no such thing as a lazy person and explained that people 
who may appear lazy may be people who are doing jobs they do not like, therefore experience a lack 
of interest, rather than laziness (Gerasimos, public servant), or are underpaid (Charalampos, 
unemployed).  
The meaning to gather from the above arguments is clearly not whether Greeks work enough or in 
the correct manner, but rather the notion that the perceived ‘culture of leisure and sociability’, 
suggested to be a national characteristic was associated with feelings of guilt, hence the projection 
of various defensive rationalisations and justifications, as well as strategic comparisons between 
North and South. Some participants contested these public feelings of guilt arguing that these 
feelings were deliberately cultivated by Greek leadership in order to curtail public resistance. For 
example, Eleftheria (private sector employee), referring to Pangalos’s statement ‘we ate it together’ 
stated the following: 
‘this infuriated me, the same goes when I hear a fellow citizen supporting such opinions, I 
get angry, because I’m afraid that these views are domino… it’s easier to convince 
someone to be pessimistic, depressed and guilty, than to convince him to come with you 
and fight for something… collectively… even if they’re right, what am I going to do to prove 
them wrong? To prove that I’m not lazy or corrupted as they say? […] I’m trying to allocate 
responsibility to each actor properly, because Pangalos was not blackmailed by anyone to 
make all these rousfetia… the citizens didn’t threaten politicians, like unless you give me a 
job, or hire me, or give me a rousfeti, I’ll kill you, nobody said that, the doors were wide 
open… the governing elites want to attribute the same amount of responsibility to the 
citizens, but for me this is not right. As much as I disagree with someone begging for a job 
and becoming slavish like that, I don’t think they share the same responsibility… all these 
accusations talk to our emotions, and we forget to use our rationality’ (Eleftheria, private 
sector employee) 
 
As becomes apparent, the question of guilt inevitably invites the question of responsibility in its 
various types, as was discussed by ideational leaders. This example closely resembles 
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Karathanasopoulos’s comments regarding the distribution of blame between citizens and elites. It 
further illustrates the degree of conflict between the two, whereby the creation of negative 
stereotypes, such as laziness and corruption, is situated within Greek society, rather than in Europe. 
This is most obvious in the following example by a citizen who specifically personified this practice of 
blaming on George Papandreou, previous PM, as was done by some ideational leaders who argued 
that Papandreou’s representation abroad gave negative impressions and license for such claims 
(Papadimitriou, Papakonstantinou).  
‘the same people who are supposed to be there to support me, to look after my well-
being, are the same people who accuse me. My own people, the Greek politicians. They 
accuse me, they told me that I am a thief, Mr. Georgakis Papandreou, he told me that I’m 
disreputable, he told me that I’m… he killed me… and the foreigners came out and said 
that these are lies, Georgakis doesn’t speak the truth… this person is allowed to be in 
politics, this person is free, if I said such things about politicians, I’d be in court… he told 
me I’m disreputable, that man who has destroyed Greece… what can I say, I’m just a 
family man… I have no laws, I have no doctor, I have nothing, we have nothing…’ 
(Nestoras, pensioner) 
 
As is exemplified, feelings of anger are met with feelings of betrayal and injustice, which can be said 
to lead to feelings of bitterness, even resentment. The ultimate conclusion appears to be a profound 
sense of misrepresentation on behalf of the citizens, both politically, in policy-making, and 
symbolically, in terms of identity representation, domestically and abroad. These representations of 
guilt and blame relate to the next question of responsibility. 
 
 
The question of collective responsibility 
 
Several ideational leaders argued that in light of the economic crisis, Greek people needed to engage 
in national self-reflection and consider the ways Greek society contributed to the crisis. A dominant 
assumption appeared to be that Greek people do not reflect on this matter and blame external 
factors for the crisis, such as the EU, the Germans or the global capitalist system. The implicit or 
explicit assumption behind this was that Greek citizens avoid assuming responsibility in any form. 
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Similar assumptions and claims were made by some citizens too, across the spectrum of age,  
occupation, or ideology. For example, a pensioner, echoing Ramfos’s comment that ‘we need to be 
saved by our bad self’, stated that ‘I don’t know how many can coolly see that there was uncovered 
this bad self that brought things where they are now’ (Aristeidis, pensioner). A young self-employed 
citizen commented that ‘even within the crisis, we didn’t have the strength to acknowledge that we 
were wrong… and blame the Germans’ (Nikiforos, self-employed), resounding Tsoukalis’s comment 
‘how many Greeks accept that we suffer because our country was a mess, and not because of 
Merkel’s fault?’.  
Contrary to this view, it was revealed that Greek citizens in this study intensely engaged in processes 
of national self-reflection regarding identity, responsibility and crisis and largely accepted that the 
roots for the economic crisis were located within Greek society.  
‘Us Greeks are responsible [for the crisis], who else could it be? […] our attitude needs to 
change, I’m a bit harsh on that, but I have thought about this a lot [emphasis], and have 
discussed it with many people’ (Kyveli, unemployed) 
 
‘I’m very touched by European identity, I studied it at university, I have an interest… 
national identity as well… I’m stunned [by] what’s happening in Greece… there are people 
who, within the crisis, instead of thinking what us Greeks have done, instead of lowering 
this [national identity], they have raised it… what it means to be Greek after all, gets 
confused…’ (Kyriaki, student) 
 
As indicated, citizens expressed acceptance of Greek responsibility, as well as concern regarding the 
state of national reflection across society. Traces of personal and collective self-reflection were 
present within participants’ recollection of how their views changed over the course of the economic 
crisis. This profound influence appeared to be present both within individuals who belonged to 
highly blamed social groups, such as older generations and public servants, as well as those who did 
not belong to these groups, such as the young and unemployed.  
‘Few people could realise… me, for instance, I only now learn about many things, I 
thought I lived in a dream! Back then, they’d talk about many things, salaries, etc., I must 
have lived in a dream, I didn’t see, or maybe I did, but my mind never related, I never 
thought that we’d get to that point… the unionists who made demands… how did it all 
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go down like that? Were we that stupid? But everybody was on the same trip… or  the 
teachers who made demands, everybody was in the same climate… what did you ask 
me, I forgot the question…’ (Aphrodite, public servant) 
 
‘At the beginning, as a Greek, because I didn’t want to accept these [stereotypes], I took 
it very patriotically. I didn’t want to accept that this is the case. But as time went by, I 
observed that people don’t stand up, to prove that we are not what they say. I saw this 
happening, so there’s nothing you can say, there’s no riposte, you have no evidence to 
prove that this is not the case…’ (Aggeliki, unemployed) 
 
As illustrated, citizens from diverse generations and socio-economic backgrounds are joined 
together within the paradoxical social cohesion of national reflection and responsibility bearing. 
Several participants additionally appeared to promote the argument that the economic crisis should 
constitute an opportunity for national self-reflection, as was projected by ideational leaders. 
‘maybe this political sepsis is something that will awaken people and make new 
generations act more vigorously and meritocratically in the future, so that this regime 
can change for good…’ (Paulos, unemployed) 
 
‘I want to believe that the crisis may lead to a degree of self-knowledge, especially for 
those who think more diaplekomena 33… I want to believe that the new generation is 
more aware than the ones before, view things on the proper basis, don’t think about the 
volema 34…’ (Rodanthi, student) 
 
‘this is a good chance, this thing we live through, to make some people think about some 
things…’ (Grigoris, private sector employee) 
 
As it becomes observable, these representations further relate the question of responsibility to that 
of gradual cultural change and the ‘new generation’ is identified as the primary intermediary of 
social change.  
As explained in the previous chapter, some ideational leaders differentiated between those who 
reflect and those who do not. The same dual distinction was made by citizens themselves, implying 
                                                          
33 Diaplekomena can be translated as ‘intertwined interests’, in this context i.e. between politicians and 
citizens or between business and politics.  
34 Volema translates as ‘getting comfortable’, in this conversation i.e. comfortable working in the public 
service.  
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that more segments of the society should engage in reflection or that reflection is currently 
insufficient, therefore should be increased.  
‘some of us recognise our flaws… our part of responsibility, but there are some who 
don’t recognise any part of responsibility for themselves, and always blame the 
governments or the Europeans… we’re divided in two categories…’ (Marina, public 
servant) 
 
‘Some intensified their national identity… [but] some were able to look beyond 
exaggerations and see what it means to be Greek… what is our position within the 
world and within Europe? What can we contribute?’ (Neophytos, self-employed) 
 
In these respects, collective responsibility was largely accepted by citizens, which contradicts 
ideational leaders’ assumptions that national self-reflection is missing and people avoid it. As such, 
ideational leaders and citizens appear to agree on the necessity of national self-reflection and 
acknowledgement of Greek culpability in the economic crisis.  
Furthermore, citizens appear to engage with the different types of responsibility described by 
ideational leaders, including the collective, which was illustrated extensively by the above examples, 
but also individual, bystander’s and shared/mutual with the EU. Individual responsibility was 
emphasised by some participants who thought that citizens should focus on what they do or can do 
as individuals (Dionysis, public servant; Gerasimos, public servant; Paulos, unemployed). Bystander’s 
responsibility was discussed by some participants who thought that citizens in the past understood 
that there were issues of corruption in Greek society, but did nothing to stop them (Kyriakos, 
student), for example, by reporting wrongdoers (Paulos, unemployed), or others who argued that in 
the context of the crisis, citizens should be politically more active (Eleftheria, private sector 
employee; Gerasimos, public servant). To some degree, the EU was attributed some part of shared 
responsibility for not exercising sufficient economic control prior to the crisis (Charalampos, 
unemployed; Eleftheria, private sector employee), an argument which was made by some ideational 
leaders too. A few young participants wondered why the EU had authorised the accession of a 
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country that had well-known problems and could not fulfil various criteria, including those for 
Eurozone membership.  
Overall, the dominant outlook of citizens was national and responsibility was discussed in national 
terms. This was exemplified by the small number of participants who referred to the global financial 
crisis as a factor in the Greek crisis. Surprisingly, only one individual (Kyriakos, student) referred to 
factors of the systemic metanarrative, such as Eurozone membership and extended imports. As 
such, this crisis metanarrative projected by media and scholarly discourse was not particularly used 
by this study’s participants. The main emphasis appeared to be citizens’ focus on the degrees of 
responsibility distributed between Greek elites and Greek citizens. In this respect, while participants 
largely accepted that fault for the economic crisis was located in Greek society, the majority argued 
that the primary fault belonged to Greek politicians and to a secondary degree to Greek citizens 
themselves. Although this was mentioned by some of the ideational leaders, it was a more 
prominent feature in citizens’ interviews. In terms of gradation of blame attribution, some 
participants did not specify degrees between citizens and elites, implying that responsibility may be 
equally distributed, while others speculated that it may be the citizens who are mostly responsible. 
The following examples, derived from conversations regarding the crisis causes, illustrate these 
claims.  
‘Mismanagement, primarily by the political leadership, and then by the Greek people’ 
(Rodanthi, student) 
 
‘First of all, I believe that it is both the citizens’ and the politicians’ fault… the politicians 
because they generously gave wealth to the people, and the people because they were 
greedy, they accepted that wealth, and didn’t handle it well…’ (Charis, unemployed) 
 
‘I will not blame our politicians only, and the way they governed the country, who share 
large part of the responsibility, but our own selves too, who, yes, we had gotten out of 
control a little bit, our budget, of all of us, was beyond, what we spent was beyond the 
real budget… we had a false impression of capabilities, economic capabilities, us, the 
citizens, and as an extension our country…’ (Martha, public servant) 
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‘[politicians] are a miniature of the society, aren’t they?... it is our fault mostly, mostly the 
citizens’ fault, if we didn’t vote for them, they wouldn’t do these things, although I guess 
they would discover ways…’ (Stavros, self-employed) 
 
Politicians were held responsible for acting on the basis of private interests (Aggelos, student), 
having the wrong attitude (Aphrodite, public servant), appropriating or stealing public funds 
(Charalampos, unemployed; Dionysis, public servant; Krystallia, private sector employee), practicing 
clientelistic relations (Eleftheria, private sector employee; Kyveli, unemployed; Laurentis, self-
employed), failing to explain problems to the people (Gerasimos, public servant), misguiding the 
public (Kyriaki, student; Laurentis, self-employed), designing ineffective economic policy (Kyriakos, 
student), failing to investigate the practices of farmers, funded by the EU (Eleftheria, private sector 
employee; Nestoras, pensioner), being corrupted (Marina, public servant; Neophytos, self-
employed; Rodanthi, student), and mismanaging economic and political governance (Martha, public 
servant; Vaggelis, self-employed). The most prominent indictments were corruption, clientelism and 
embezzlement of public funds.  
In correspondence, citizens were attributed responsibility for voting for these politicians (Alkiviadis, 
pensioner; Eleftheria, private sector employee; Kyriaki, student), having the wrong attitude/values 
(Aphrodite, public servant; Marina, public servant; Nikiforos, self-employed), misappropriating EU 
funds, especially the farmers (Charalampos, unemployed; Krystallia, private sector employee), 
stealing public funds (Dionysis, public servant), tax-evading (Nikiforos, self-employed), choosing to 
work in the public sector (Gerasimos, public servant), failing to suggest solutions (Gerasimos, public 
servant), having insufficient education (Gerasimos, public servant; Marina, public servant), aiming to 
become comfortable (Krystallia, private sector employee), being docile/inactive (Eleftheria, private 
sector employee; Krystallia, private sector employee; Marina, public servant), being easily 
manipulated (Kyriaki, student; Laurentis, self-employed; Vaggelis, self-employed), accepting 
clientelistic relations (Kyveli, unemployed; Nestoras; pensioner; Stavros, self-employed), 
overspending (Martha, public servant; Paulos, unemployed), being unrealistic (Laurentis, self-
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employed; Martha, public servant), borrowing (Martha, public servant), and acting lawlessly 
(Nikiforos, self-employed). The primary arraignment was by far voting, followed by wrong 
attitude/values, insufficient education, being docile, being easily manipulated, and accepting 
clientelistic relations. As shown, compared to the number of accusations against politicians, 
dominant accusations against citizens were more plentiful.  
 
Exceptional Greece? 
 
While culturalisation was discussed with reference to negative cultural stereotypes and moralisation 
with regards to questions of responsibility, exceptionalisation appeared to be more puzzling for 
participants. As put by Nikiforos (self-employed), ‘what could we have that makes us exceptional?’. 
Compared to ideational leaders’ interviews, there appeared to be much less awareness of such 
representational patterns in citizens’ interviews, and only one participant mentioned that Greece 
was presented as an ‘exceptional case’ by other Southern-European governments and media, which 
he attributed to them trying to avoid implementing policy reforms in their own countries (Laurentis, 
self-employed). Upon speculation, some were undecided on this matter of exceptionalism (i.e. 
Aprhodite, public servant; Vasiliki, public servant), others mentioned that they were not 
knowledgeable enough of other countries to make comparisons (i.e. Aggeliki, unemployed; Kyveli, 
unemployed), and some suggested that all countries are culturally special (i.e. Rodanthi, student; 
Tasoula, private sector employee).  
Among those who accepted Greek exceptionalism, it was argued that the difference between 
Greece and other countries economically was that Greece did not have a substantial productive base 
(Aggelos, student; Gerasimos, public servant), had multiple problems simultaneously, while other 
countries had fewer problems (Charis, unemployed), and had particular institutional and structural 
issues (Dionysis, public servant; Eleftheria, private sector employee). Some attributed these 
peculiarities to the historical past, i.e. Ottoman and Balkan heritages (Gerasimos, public servant; 
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Stavros, self-emploeyd). Few asserted that Greece was special only in terms of being the crisis’s first 
‘guinea pig’ in terms of crisis management, making use of this media metaphor (Aris, self-employed; 
Chrysanthos, private sector employee).  
On behalf of those who rejected the idea of Greek exceptionalism, it was argued that debt is not 
exceptional, as many countries have debts (Chrysanthos, private sector employee), and corruption 
and institutional malfunctions exist everywhere (Eleftheria, private sector employee; Neophytos, 
self-employed). The latter view was explained further by saying that the peculiarity in Greece’s 
problems of corruption was that such lawless practices were subjected to legal punishment 
elsewhere, but not in Greece, a feature which made these problems more intense and intractable in 
the case of Greece. Many thought that Greece was not exceptional, because it held many similarities 
with the other Southern-European countries, most notably Italy (Kalliopi, unemployed; Paulos, 
unemployed). 
Finally, there were some participants who resituated the debate of Greece’s exceptionalism within 
Greek society, arguing that ‘we think we are special, but we are not’ (Kalliopi, unemployed), inferring 
that many countries have various issues and Greece’s difficulties are not peculiar. Kyriaki (student) 
speculated that ‘it is us who allowed others to see us as a special case’, suggesting that chronic 
problems, as well as unsuccessful representation by Greek politicians in foreign policy have played 
an adverse role in such exceptionalising representations.  
 
Identity overvaluation: limited overvaluation strategies and returns to devaluation 
 
In previous chapters, it was explained that Greece’s identity was overvalued on the basis of its 
ancient tradition, while during the crisis several positive stereotypes were created, such as those of 
the victim, the rebel, the regime changer and the underdog. Ideational leaders’ interviews revealed 
limited use of these re-evaluating narratives and few strategies of identity overvaluation, such as 
hierarchisation, positive exceptionalisation, relational or antagonistic narcissism. Furthermore, 
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ideational leaders assumed that Greek society largely engages with overvaluation and openly 
expressed criticism against the process of identity overvaluation. Within citizens’ interviews similar 
patterns were observed. There were few attempts to strategically re-evaluate Greek identity as a 
response to negative stereotypes, exhibiting traces of defensive narcissism. Moreover, similar 
criticisms were made regarding identity overvaluation and positive crisis stereotypes were largely 
unused. Altogether, these dynamics showed that identity overvaluation was a less prominent 
feature within the data compared to identity devaluation. The following section will explain further.  
 
Re-evaluation strategies: re-turning to Ulysses and Zorbas  
 
Regarding negative stereotypes, some participants responded to questions of work ethic by 
projecting strategic arguments about the differences between Greek and European work ethics. In 
this respect, some participants, who had worked with other Europeans, believed that Greeks had 
positive attributes, such as resourcefulness and problem-solving skills that other nationals did not 
have to the same extent.  
‘Looking at my professional life, I worked a lot with Italians, English and French people. All 
of them, except the Italians… thought we were lazy and disorganised, so they tried to fix 
us… my own opinion was that they were inflexible, norm-obsessed, not at all productive, 
they maintained their own day schedule… their eight hours were their eight hours… while 
our work extended over our eight hours… a hypocritical situation, like I’m the well-
organised one, who is someone… this is not about the crisis, but about how peoples 
organise their time and work… we are capable of finding solutions where there aren’t, I 
could see that these people when they hit a wall, they’d stay at the wall. Nobody would 
look for alternative ways around it. This is something that even the silliest of us has it, 
he’ll find it somehow…’ (Aristeidis, pensioner) 
 
‘maybe because we never lived in an organised country and the government won’t help 
us… we have some social skills that Northern-Europeans don’t have as much, they have 
them, but not as developed… if there’s a problem, for example, in Sweden I’ve seen it, if 
the work doesn’t progress, they lose it… the Greek has developed a different sense for 
things, he is… not resourceful, but he’ll find a way, maybe it’s not lawful, but maybe it is, 
or maybe it’s just a way that someone who’s accustomed to ready-made protocols hasn’t 
thought of… yes, maybe resourceful, finding things…’ (Kalliopi, unemployed) 
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As exemplified in these similar examples, by means of social comparison, as proclaimed by SIT, 
participants were able to establish self-esteem resources and manage the inflicted identity threat 
and devaluation derived from negative stereotypes. In this sense, unflattering ideas of laziness were 
juxtaposed with positive attributes of resourcefulness and problem-solving. We could understand 
this strategy as a form of defensive narcissism, an identity overvaluation achieved in the defence of 
the scraped collective self-esteem. Furthermore, we could note that these two particular attributes 
constitute reference points to the character of Odysseus (Ulysses) from Homer’s ancient Greek epic 
poem, Odyssey. Correspondingly, tactics of re-evaluation and over-valuation appear to be anchored 
on previously well-known and established positive self-stereotypes, found in Greek culture.  
When participants were asked to discuss what they viewed as positive Greek characteristics, the 
most widely shared representation was that of the ‘good culture of entertainment’. Most 
participants argued that ‘we know how to live’ and ‘have fun’ (i.e. Aristeidis, pensioner; Karolos, 
student; Stavros, self-employed) and on occasion, compared Greek culture of entertainment with 
that of Europe and commented that ‘this is why Europeans are jealous of us’ (i.e. Martha, public 
servant). Some speculated that Europeans probably hate the fact that Greeks are able to ‘have fun’ 
even during the economic crisis. A participant reactively commented the following: 
‘I love the fact that the Greek will return home, will open the bill, it will be 800 euros, he’ll be 
two rents behind, he’ll open five more bills, and in the weekend, he’ll take his girlfriend and go 
on an excursion. I love this very much, I love it… this is a badass reaction. And all these people 
who say ‘oh, look at that, there’s a crisis, and all the people go out’… the people do very well to 
go out, what are they supposed to do? Stay home and die?... it bothers them, especially the 
Germans, to see Greek people go out…’ (Grigoris, private sector employee) 
 
As seen in this example, the participant is referring to media representations of the ‘remorseful 
partying Greeks’, which were presented in chapter four, and strategically re-evaluates Greek identity 
in what could be labelled reactionary narcissism, the projection of positive self-attributes as a 
reaction to perceived identity threat. Similarly to the previous strategy, we can note that this 
representation of the ‘joy of life’ might be drawing its inspiration from the well-known, thus easily 
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accessible, positive national self-stereotype of Zorbas the Greek, the joyful character of Nikos 
Kazantzakis.  
 
Farewell to the ancients? 
 
With reference to the question of ancient Greece, the first observable finding was the absence of 
references to its venerable tradition, which indicates that Greek citizens may not largely seek to 
found collective identity distinction on it, as largely assumed by ideational leaders. Only few 
participants referred to ancient Greece in a positive manner. Furthermore, it was also obvious that 
some felt that establishing collective self-esteem on this tradition was a futile attempt and rejected 
the notion. 
‘I can’t look at this like that, we have a big history and so on, but I don’t think this has 
anything to do with us, how we used to be back then, this is something separate, I can’t tell 
you that we should be proud or something, it was something that existed a long time ago, 
and that’s all…’ (Aggelos, student) 
 
‘[Education] should be less ethnocentric, and more realistic, right? Because, maybe we 
created democracy, or maybe Alexander the Great went as far as China or wherever, but 
this doesn’t help right now, the point is what helps us now, what can help us become 
better as a peoples, what help us help our country, right?’ (Vaggelis, self-employed) 
 
In addition, similarly to ideational leaders’ arguments, several citizens assumed that Greek society is 
largely engaging with such an overvaluation and argued against overvaluing Greek identity on the 
basis of Hellenism and Philhellenism or on the idea of being the ‘chosen people’.  
‘we still say that we gave the lights of civilisation, that the Germans are wrong on this or 
that, that we are the descendants of the ancient Greeks, which we aren’t, so I think that 
arrogance is the only thing the Greek sees within the crisis, to dispense himself of his own 
political choices, so he can say that some evil European or Turkish neighbour is coming to 
take away his land because it’s a great piece of land… we are holy and good and blessed by 
God… exploited by politicians and foreigners… which I don’t believe’ (Nikiforos, self-
employed) 
 
‘I’m very differentiated from what I see socially, that we are these victims of the Germans… 
I can’t demand any solidarity, not even from my brother, let alone a country, and a strong 
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country no less… so this image that we are the targeted nation, done wrong and 
brotherless… we are the mistreated peoples, yet the chosen ones, the worthy ones, those 
who should receive adoration because 3,000 years ago some people said or wrote some 
things… I disagree with this’ (Gerasimos, public servant) 
 
As indicated, this critical assumption was additionally related to questions of responsibility and 
national reflection, whereby Greek citizens are presented as trying to avoid culpability by blaming 
external factors, such as the Germans, and becoming overtly nationalist by expressing overvaluing 
attitudes, i.e. ‘arrogance’ or ‘adoration-seeking’ based on glories of the past. Moreover, these 
arguments appear to relate to representations of conspiracy theories, which are also seen critically. 
 
Conspiracy theories: criticisms and endorsements 
 
As explained in the previous chapter, conspiracy theories can be understood as part of 
representations of victimhood, which as an extension relates to one of the basic identity 
representations of Greece during the crisis, namely that of the ‘victim’. Within citizens’ interviews 
notions of conspiracy and victimhood were variably represented, forming two main narratives. 
According to the first, several participants argued that there were foreign vested interests that 
aimed at exploiting Greece by buying out important public assets and natural resources, such as 
islands, energy or airports. Based on the second, in contrast, an equal number of participants 
contested what they viewed as ‘victim mentality’ and argued that Greek citizens should stop 
projecting such cospirational representations.  
In terms of the first set of representations, some argued the following: 
 
‘the mpampoules of the EU, that’s what it looks like to me… they’re trying to squeeze us, 
which is what they’ve been doing all these years, buying away ports, airports, little by little, 
and now the Troika is ordering around the PM of each country… they put us in the Euro so 
they could dominate us even better, and squeeze us out of all we have, oil, islands, 
everything…’ (Charalampos, unemployed) 
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‘I think they want to get inside our resources, because we have many resources which we 
don’t appropriate properly, natural gas, oil… so they want to control everything… the 
outsiders, the Troika, all of them, we are in a strategic position too, so this is not all for our 
own good! They’re here to take their money back and everything else they can take from 
us’ (Martha, public servant) 
 
‘The EU was only beneficial for Greece in appearances, all these funds we received… were 
the long-term plan we never understood before … they gave us [funds] for the streets, the 
bridges, etc., and we were happy that the Europeans loved us like that, but when someone 
lends you money… they’ll do it in such a way as to exploit you, this is what they did to us. I 
wouldn’t say that all Europeans are like this, but the EU is like this. They did it like that 
because they knew they would exploit everything that’s ours, and take our airports, our 
islands, everything…’ (Krystallia, private sector employee) 
 
As it becomes apparent, the actor who is identified as responsible for what is termed as 
‘exploitation’ is the EU and its derivative schema, the Troika. In these representations, Greece is 
presented as an exploited and exploitable entity that is abundant in resources that external actors 
wish to take away. Simultaneously, these aims are presented as rooted in the past, therefore 
elements of scheming and prior preparation are alluded, which contributes to the conspiratiorial 
narrative. In terms of identity overvaluation, such narratives are able to achieve collective self-
esteem by means of presenting the country as a rich and fecund entity, full of resources, which 
makes it appear desirable, therefore valued. Furthermore, they can be understood as responses to 
media representations that encouraged Greece to sell its islands and monuments to repay its debt, 
which were presented in chapter four. 
In contrast, many participants spoke against conspiracy theories and representations of Greece as 
the ‘victim’. For example, Aristeidis (pensioner) criticised the ‘voices’ of a ‘wounded nation’ that 
thinks that ‘everybody is against us’, Dionysis (public servant) disclaimed that ‘everybody is after us’ 
and Kalliopi (unemployed) disagreed with the view that focuses on ‘what external powers are doing 
to us’. The objection to conspiratorial thinking appears to relate once again to questions of 
responsibility and national reflection. As put, ‘we look at ourselves like victims, and we shouldn’t, 
because it’s time to pay for what we did and accept this’ (Stavros, self-employed).  
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Positive crisis stereotypes? 
 
In terms of positive stereotypes of victimhood, it was apparent that this was not seen as an identity 
opportunity to dispense responsibility or elicit solidarity and sympathy, but was rather seen as a 
route to losing collective dignity. Kalliopi (unemployed), for example, explained how insulted she felt 
when a non-Greek asked her whether ‘Greeks sell their organs’, while Grigoris (private sector 
employee) expressed anger towards being asked by a European whether ‘Greeks eat dogs’. As such, 
representations of ‘humanitarian crisis’ and assumptions of what crisis-stricken people might need 
to do in order to survive were seen as insulting and devastating to the collective self-esteem, rather 
than a victim identity with positive merits, as was presented by some crisis media. Dimosthenis 
(private sector employee) argued that the media were responsible for projecting not only an image 
of a ‘broken nation’, but also of a citizen as a ‘chamalis’ (χαμάλης) 35, a devaluating identity, which 
aimed at ‘depriving you of your dignity’. Finally, Martha (public servant) maintained the following: 
‘I think that the image that exists abroad, and I fear that we’re the ones that created this, 
since beyond the crisis, it’s also about the way we deal with this situation, I think we have 
created this image of a nation that is miserable, trying to stand on its feet… on the other 
hand, one can see a dignified effort by the people… everybody has a crisis, we’re not 
special… it’s just the way that we project this abroad, this is somehow wrong… [in 
contrast] I don’t mind hearing that it’s a difficult time, but people are trying to stand on 
their feet, that’s honourable…’ (Martha, public servant) 
 
As such, it can be understood that several people had an impression of the media and Greek society 
projecting images of Greek victimhood, which they deemed ‘undignified’, thus devaluating, rather 
than overvaluating, or even revaluating. In this sense, the more conventional understanding of the 
‘victim identity’ as devaluating and detrimental to self-esteem was more prevalent, rather than its 
alternative dynamic as overvaluating.  
                                                          
35 ‘Chamalis’ translates as a ‘coolie’, ‘dogsbody’ or ‘heaver’ and stands for someone who does the hard work 
for low payment (Wordreference.com), culturally seen as a humiliated figure due to extreme exploitation. 
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For others, a source of dignity loss was what was perceived as limited public resistance to austerity 
measures and foreign imposition. As put, ‘we don’t have the dignity of our ancestors to resist to 
being dominated’ (Aggeliki, unemployed). In terms of media representations of Greece as a ‘rebel’, 
there was absence of such awareness or endorsement within the data and citizens did not appear to 
entertain such notions. In contrast, the few that touched upon the question of resistance or 
rebellion complained that these are insufficient in Greece during the economic crisis (i.e. Aristeidis, 
pensioner; Eleftheria, private sector employee; Nestoras, pensioner). Furthermore, the same 
participants expressed disappointment with the Indignants’ movement for not being able to deliver 
radical political change. As such, as far as the positive identity stereotype of the ‘rebel against the 
EU’ goes, citizens did not draw from this representational resource when it came to questions of 
resistance.  
Quite the opposite, it was evident that ideas of Greece being a ‘rebel’ were laughable given the 
precarious state of the country. As put, ‘imagine leaving the EU, and what would that make us? The 
Greeks who revolted! Great!’ (Kalliopi, unemployed). Interestingly, citizens drew from disease 
metaphors to speak of resistance during the crisis, albeit not the disease metaphors that were 
prominent within the crisis media. Instead, participants talked about Greek society experiencing a 
‘psychological trauma’ that transforms citizens into ‘docile beings’ (Vaggelis, self-employed) or 
symptoms of ‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ that obstruct agonism and social change (Eleftheria, 
private sector employee). In this respect, one participant even suggested that ‘one thing I can’t 
understand: how come we haven’t revolted yet, this is something to research, in your research too, 
something for the psychologists to research, to explore what’s happening…’ (Nestoras, pensioner).  
As such, similarly to the ‘victim’ representation, the ‘rebel’ and the struggling small ‘underdog’ 
against the powerful EU, were not retrieved as identity resources for the creation of positive self-
esteem. Instead, one could speak of a wider feeling of defeat and dissolution. Regarding the 
representation of the ‘regime changer’ at the European level, either as a democratic agent or a 
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nationalist one, participants appeared to be equally unaware or such representations, as well as 
uninterested in them. The idea of regime change was only discussed with reference to the national 
context and the notion of Greece overcoming its internal problems. This could be attributed to the 
perception of Greece’s diminished power within the EU, and as an extension diminished sense of 
political efficacy, or the greater proximity of national issues compared to EU-related ones. 
Nevertheless, these indications of absences of alternative identities within the crisis may provoke 
questions of identity deficit, which is what the next section shall examine. 
 
Identity deficit: not feeling European at the (dead-)end 
 
In previous chapters, there were several historiographical representations that constructed Greece 
as non-European, thus as experiencing a European identity deficit, from the idea of Greece as a mere 
Western product, rendering Greek identity elusive, to the loneliness and lack of belonging of hybrid 
and ‘exceptional’ entities. In media representations, sovereignty loss was represented as a loss of 
Greece’s international identity, while Grexit was interpreted as a means of losing its European 
identity. Notoriety was additionally understood as an identity emptying. Comparable 
representations of identity deficits were limited in ideational leaders’ interviews and the most vivid 
sense of identity deficit was encountered in Greece’s absence of identity choices, other than the 
European. Sovereignty was contested in ideational leaders’ interviews, but was not presented as an 
identity loss.  
In citizens’ interviews, similar representations of identity deficits as those identified in previous 
chapters, were not present. Although this could be interpreted as a mere absence of such patterns, 
careful analysis revealed that citizens’ identity deficits were present at other registers. These were 
the identification of one’s self as European and a wider sense of ‘deadend perception’ regarding 
Greece’s future identity. The remaining section will elaborate on these themes.  
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Feeling European? 
 
Although there were no identity deficit representations by citizens, the biggest identity deficit that 
was observed was citizens’ inability or unwillingness to feel European, regardless of the fact that 
most participants supported Greece’s EU and Eurozone memberships. There were two kinds of 
European identification, strong and weak. While the first type was expressed unambiguously and 
offered clear arguments for its justification, the second type was more uncertain or entailed 
participants’ explicit clarification that identification was weak for various reasons. Less than one 
third of the participants identified strongly as European, while a few identified weakly as European. 
Within the first group, justifications included having more commonalities with other Europeans as 
compared to North-Americans or Asians (i.e. Aristeidis, pensioner; Karolos, student), sharing 
European experiences, such as free movement and education (i.e. Charis, unemployed; Dionysis, 
public servant), being happy with political representation within the EU by MEPs (i.e. Laurentis, self-
employed; Rodanthi, student), and belonging to the EU by means of EU and Eurozone membership 
(i.e. Martha, public servant).  
In the second group, some participants categorised themselves as European only on geographical 
grounds, rather than political or cultural (i.e Aris, self-employed) or on the basis of ‘random chance’ 
(i.e. Kalliopi, unemployed). Others spoke of European identity as something they would like to feel 
more in the future, but did not feel fully yet, due to Greece’s structural problems (i.e. Eleftheria, 
private sector employee). Some mentioned that European identity was dependent on social 
comparison with other people. As put, ‘if you compare me with third world countries, yes, I feel 
European, but if you compare with European countries, no, I don’t feel European’ (Stavros, self-
employed). This last view reproduces the pattern of hierarchisation, which was observed previously, 
whereby European identities are seen in a hierarchical way. In this respect, it was observed by 
another participant that ‘we are a bit racist towards anything non-European, while anything 
European we view it as superior to us, secretly without admitting it…’ (Nikiforos, self-employed). 
279 
 
Furthermore, it resonates with SIT’s assumptions that all identity is highly relational and 
comparative.  
The majority of the participants did not identify as Europeans. There were four types of arguments 
projected for not feeling European: a) not having certain experiences that were seen as facilitating 
factors, b) preferring another identity, c) having negative views of the EU, and d) simply not feeling 
European. According to the first, some participants explained that they had not travelled abroad, 
therefore could not feel European (i.e. Aggeliki, unemployed; Alkiviadis, pensioner), while others 
argued that they did not have a European level of public services and living standards in Greece, 
which made them feel less European (i.e. Marina, public servant; Nikiforos, self-employed). In terms 
of the second, there were three identities that participants opted for, instead of the European, 
which included the national, cosmopolitan and human identity. The national identity was claimed 
over European identity, regardless of views towards the EU, with both anti-EU (i.e. Krystallia, private 
sector employee) and pro-EU (i.e. Vlassis, student) participants making this choice. The cosmopolitan 
identity was preferred by several participants and at many occasions this appeared to relate to the 
idea of a human identity. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan identity would sometimes include the 
European, but not always, depending of the perceived compatibility between the two.  
‘World peace is what I say! Why can’t we have friends from Afghanistan? Aren’t we all 
humans? What am I supposed to say that I’m European, and you are not European, 
therefore you’re not human or have no human rights? This cannot be’ (Aggeliki, 
unemployed) 
 
‘No, no, not European, what can I tell you, I’m a child of the world, yes…’ (Aggelos, 
student) 
 
‘personally, I’m very happy for everything I have in common with other people, not 
only of Europe, with other people too, humans are the same everywhere, we are 
universal and timeless… [national identities] don’t mean anything to me, because I am 
an internationalist, humans are humans…’ (Aphrodite, public servant) 
 
‘Generally, we should feel like citizens of the world, I don’t feel Greek only, or 
European only, I belong to the whole world… If I were to be locked inside Greece or 
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inside Europe only, I wouldn’t feel interested in what’s happening in America, or I 
wouldn’t be interested in all these wars that are happening on this world… we should 
think more cosmopolitically…’ (Kyriaki, student) 
 
In terms of the third type of arguments against European identity, related to negative views against 
the EU, it was apparent that participants associated the cognitive schema of ‘Europe’ with that of 
the ‘EU’. In this category, participants were either unhappy with the EU’s crisis management and the 
Troika (i.e. Aggeliki, unemployed; Charalampos, unemployed), believed that the EU was overtly 
Germanified (i.e. Grigoris, private sector employee), or were widely unhappy with political 
representation within the EU (i.e. Kyriakos, student). All the participants within this category were 
either young and unemployed, thus heavily affected by the economic crisis, or belonged to the 
radical left, thus ideology and crisis influence may have played a role in their views. In the last 
category, some participants simply stated that they just did not feel European and this was a 
description that they would not use to describe themselves (i.e. Chrysanthos, private sector 
employee; Tasoula, private sector employee). Participants in this category did not exhibit strong 
emotions for any identity, including the Greek one.  
 
Standing at the dead-end 
 
As mentioned earlier, there was a wider sense of identity deficit which existed mostly in the words 
that were not said or the opinions that were not expressed. These absences related to Greece’s 
future identity and trajectory. Participants did not refer to any relevant representations and there 
appeared to be no particular horizon or vision. Furthermore, several expressions which were used by 
participants indicated the existence of a ‘dead-end’ mentality, whether this referred to Greece’s 
limitations of choices, inside or outside the EU, people’s powerlessness to change and impact 
politics, or the fleeting effects of the Indignados movement.  
Simultaneously, requests to return to central questions of direction and aim, specification of desires 
and goals, were sometimes aired, along with the inability to provide answers to these burning issues. 
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Traces of the need to define a society’s wishes and a polity’s plan were implied through the 
interviews. As such, perhaps a latent and intriguing identity deficit could be located in the absence of 
representations regarding the future, rather than the past, and the non-existence of a new ideology 
and stratagem for Greece’s identity.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
This chapter aimed at presenting the results of interviews conducted with Greek citizens in an 
attempt to compare expert and non-expert representations and to establish the states of Greek 
European identities during the crisis. It started by providing an overview of Greek public attitudes 
towards the EU, outlined chronologically so that the evolution of Greek public opinion could be 
illustrated before and after the crisis. The picture painted by this overview tells the story of an 
ambivalent and negative start within the EC, which mellowed down over time to embrace the 
European unifying purpose, most probably on the basis of perceived benefits. Favourable Greek 
public opinion was maintained until the mid-two-thousands, after which Eurosceptic tendencies 
made their appearance. After the start of the economic crisis, most indicators were negative, with 
support for the EU decreasing dramatically, yet support for the Euro increasing. It was subsequently 
argued that these past surveys offered a valuable image of aggregate and long-term patterns, but 
could not decipher the particularities of national European identities. In this respect, the results of 
the present study were presented. 
There was evidence that Greek citizens make reference to the East and West division of Greek 
society, albeit not to the same extend as ideational leaders do, and acknowledge the hybrid nature 
of Greek identity. There were several indications that some participants viewed Eastern elements 
unfavourably and reproduced Orientalist notions, as well as Balkanist attitudes, which in effect 
constructed parts of Greek identity as problematic, reproducing the idea of ‘hybridity as a problem’. 
Others viewed this hybridity as a cultural enrichment and something that needed to be accepted and 
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included in the European prototype. Hybridity was also viewed as a selective one, in a similar 
manner presented by ideational leaders. Similarly to the ideational leaders, citizens were unable to 
produce multiple reasons for Greece being European, as compared to projecting reasons for Greece 
not being European, which were plentiful. The results from both groups approximated each other in 
terms of themes.  
Domestic conflicts and divisions were identified by participants at various different registers, such as 
between political elites and citizens, private sector employees and public servants, among citizens in 
general, and between the left-wing and right-wing supporters. At the European level of conflicts, 
there were indications of vivid sentiments of anti-Germanism and anti-Europeanism, animated by 
references to WWII and stereotypes of Germans as ‘Nazis’. Belligerent metaphors about European 
relations were made through the use of the term ‘ecomomic war’ or ‘threat’ which showed 
continuation from media representations of EU affairs as ‘wars’. A major contradiction appeared to 
be the dominant negative view of the EU, accompanied by the unwillingness to leave it. The 
contradiction appeared to crystallise around what was perceived as desirable, i.e. a different EU, and 
what was deemed implausible, i.e. leaving it. Reasons for staying appeared to relate predominantly 
on perceptions of dependency, insecurity and fear of the unknown. 
In terms of identity devaluation on the basis of negative stereotyping, there were two main 
responses with the one exhibiting moderate attitudes that successfully managed the identity threat 
and neutralised its effects by various rationalisations, and another response that was more 
emotional and endorsed the effects of identity threat. Some participants could recall negative 
experiences with other Europeans, and a few declared that their personal relationships with other 
Europeans were still positive or had no experiences because they did not have contact with other 
Europeans. Multiple actors as creators of stereotypes were recognised, including Greek politicians. 
The question of responsibility appeared to be equally important for citizens as it was for ideational 
leaders, which contradicted the view of the latter than citizens do not engage in a process of 
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national self-reflection and acceptance of Greek culpability. Similar arguments were projected by 
citizens who thought that Greek society is not sufficiently engaging with self-examination. Although 
citizens engaged with all kinds of responsibility outlined by ideational leaders, i.e. collective, 
individual, etc., it appeared that the main axis around which questions of responsibility objectified 
was the relationship between politicians and citizens. Both groups were held variably accountable 
and qualitatively speaking the repertoire of citizens’ indictments was more plentiful and diverse, 
while the politicians’ revolved around a few basic issues, i.e. corruption, clientelism and 
embezzlement.  
In regards to identity overvaluation, there were few overvaluating strategies that were used against 
stereotypes, such as defensive narcissism over work ethic and reactionary narcissism over the 
culture of entertainment. Contrary to what ideational leaders argued with reference to identity 
overvaluation based on the venerable ancient tradition, this did not appear to be used by the 
participants of this study for positive group distinction. Instead, participants criticised national pride 
on this basis, as well as conspiracy theorising. Some conspiracy theories, however, were projected by 
some participants, especially on the possibility of losing valuable resources to the EU. Positive 
stereotypes that were projected in the media were not used by the participants for the purposes of 
collective self-esteem. In terms of the victim stereotype, specifically, the more conventional 
understanding of it as devaluating was endorsed and was felt as a loss of dignity. The rebel identity 
was similarly rejected and pathologising representations were projected regarding the lack of 
resistance.  
With respect to identity deficits, there were no such representations made by this study’s 
participants, which does not deviate much from similar absences in ideational leaders’ accounts. 
Nevertheless, an identity deficit was observable at the register of how European citizens felt, which 
appeared to be low in this study with most of the participants not endorsing a European identity. 
Results were quite varied with some feeling European strongly or weakly, and others rejecting the 
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European identity or opting for alternative identities, such as national, cosmopolitan and human 
identities. Finally, an identity deficit was argued to exist within the words that were not said, the 
absences of future narratives and identity trajectories for Greece.  
Reaching the end of the presentation of empirical data, it can be observed that representations 
between ideational leaders and citizens did not deviate significantly and shared many common 
themes. It appears to be the case that there were more differences between these two groups’ 
constructions and those of the international media in chapter four, while several themes of 
historiographical representations did not appear to be important in citizens’ views. After having 
outlined all the empirical features of this study, the next step is to discuss the results, which shall be 
performed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 7 
Discussing collective identity crises 
 
 
 
‘…a crisis is not a natural event, but a social event, and therefore is always socially 
constructed and highly political’  
(Gamble, 2009: 38) 
 
‘No one can make you feel inferior without your consent’ 
(Eleanor Roosevelt)36 
 
‘I don’t mind, neither Greek, nor European. What matters for me is that people 
feel good in themselves. When you feel good with yourself, whatever you are, you 
are with everybody’ 
(Ramfos, 2014)37 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It was outlined at the beginning of this thesis that its primary problematisation was to investigate 
how large-scale societies and polities, such as nations, are influenced by far-reaching adverse 
phenomena, such as economic crises. Moreover, it was explained that this dynamic would be 
explored by focusing on the case study of Greece during the Greek debt/Eurozone crises within the 
ongoing historical context of European integration. It was hypothesised that since economic crises 
can have intense and long-lasting effects on individuals’ personal identities (Norris, 2016), they 
                                                          
36 A quotation attributed to Eleanor Roosevelt. Although the exact source could not be retrieved, at least three 
quotation websites were consulted in order to triangulate this attribution: Quote Investigator, Brainy Quote, 
and Good Reads. Last accessed 20/09/2016. Found at: 
http://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/03/30/not-inferior/ 
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/quotes/e/eleanorroo161321.html 
http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/11035-no-one-can-make-you-feel-inferior-without-your-consent  
 
37 Quotation from this study’s interview data.  
286 
 
might have a similarly vivid effect on their collective identities, because of the collectively 
experienced character of macro-economic crises. Following a social psychological theoretical 
approach, it was postulated that crises and identities, as well as national and European histories, are 
primarily narrated by specialised professionals, what are called in this study ‘ideational leaders’ 
(Stiller, 2010), whose ideas produce public knowledge about these events and are further dispersed 
in the wider society to become ‘common knowledge’ (Jaspal et al., 2014; Moscovici, 2008). In this 
respect, three research questions were formulated, which were the following: 
 
• What kind of knowledge is produced about the Greek debt/Euro crisis 
(representations) and how is collective identity related to that knowledge?  
 
• How do Greek citizens respond (action) to the knowledge (representation) that 
is produced about the Greek debt/Euro crisis and the role of Greek European 
identity in it? 
 
• Does the Greek debt/Euro crisis constitute an identity crisis of Greek European 
identity? 
 
The first question was methodologically addressed by looking at past Greek historiography and 
contemporary media and expert representations during the crisis, as well as with originally 
generated interview data with Greek ideational leaders, such as politicians, journalists and 
academics. The second question was tackled partially through these interviews with ideational 
leaders, but was predominantly addressed through the analysis of original interview data with Greek 
citizens outside the social sphere of these professions. Finally, the third question was investigated 
through the conceptual lenses of a newly crafted analytical framework on identity destabilisations in 
the form of a typology. This analytical framework was argued to be missing from the literature of 
collective identities or developed in incompatible ways for the study of such identities, hence its 
necessity. This chapter aims to provide answers to these questions, based on the analytical results 
presented in previous chapters. 
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The production of knowledge: representing Greek European identity during crisis 
 
The first question that was posed in this research was what kind of knowledge was produced about 
the Greek debt/Euro crisis and how this knowledge was related to collective identity, more 
specifically the Greek European identity. Was this knowledge marked by representations of identity 
destabilisations? Was Greek European identity constructed as experiencing a collective identity 
crisis? Was that knowledge capable of generating destabilising experiences of identity? What kind of 
identity destabilisations could it prompt? Did it hold continuities to prior forms of knowledge? If so, 
in what ways? As shown in chapter four, public discourse about the role of Greek European identity 
within the economic crisis was full of multiple ‘signs of crisis’. Moreover, these signs appeared to 
spread across the four types of identity destabilisations that were developed in our analytical 
framework. However, in terms of number of themes and diversity of narratives, identity conflict and 
devaluation appeared to be more dominant representations within the sources explored, rather 
than identity overvaluation and deficit.  
As such, at the register of identity conflict, conflict was recorded at both the national and the 
European level, with Greece being represented as a ‘divided nation’ and in conflict with its European 
partners. A particular ‘politics of blaming’ appeared to be at play at both national and European 
levels (Ntampoudi, 2014a; Vasilopoulou et al., 2013), marking the conflict through what was 
previously termed ‘polemic representations’ (Jaspal et al., 2014). At the domestic level, there were 
multiple dynamics of polarisations between elites and citizens, among parties, among MPs, and 
among citizens. Polemic representations were additionally enhanced by metaphors of war and game 
at the European level of political affairs, which objectified European relations as belligerent, rather 
than peaceful and cooperative (Bickes et al., 2014a; Kutter, 2014). Furthermore, conflictual 
representations appeared to crystallise between the two poles of Greece and Germany, constructing 
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the two nations as prototypical of the two economic regions they were made to represent, the 
Northern core and the Southern periphery (Ntampoudi, 2014a).  
Representations of ‘Greek bashing’ in the German press (Bickes et al., 2014b) were matched with 
anti-German sentiments, which were also mildly or vividly expressed by some of the ideational 
leaders of this study. Furthermore, the EU was represented in hostile manners in relation to Greece, 
enacting anti-European representations. As such, we may conclude that within the public discourse 
of the economic crisis, there was an extensive and glowing construction of multiple ‘villains’ both 
nationally and EU-wide, i.e. the Greeks, the Germans, the EU, the South, the North, the ND, SYRIZA, 
and so on, which in itself creates the representational base for multiple corresponding social 
divisions, hence ‘breaks’ of the collective identities of the nation and of Europe or the EU. As such, 
we can conclude that Greek European identity was represented as being in an identity conflict at 
both its national and European identity dimensions. 
Similarly, at the register of identity devaluation, there were multiple ‘opportunities’ for identity 
degradations and destabilisation of collective self-esteem, since Greek European identity was 
objectified negatively through a variety of uncharitable metaphors, such as ‘diseased’, ‘beggar’ or 
‘spoiled child’, among others (Bickes et al., 2014a; Simonetta, 2015). Furthermore, processes of 
culturalisation, exceptionalisation and moralisation (Mylonas, 2012; Ntampoudi, 2014a) of the public 
crisis debate can be said to facilitate not only the possibility of identity devaluation in the form of an 
identity threat, but also in the form of stigma as a ‘heavier’ and more exclusionary type of identity 
devaluation and threat (Biernat & Dovidio, 2003). More specifically, the process of culturalisation, 
that is, the objectification of crisis discourses around the question of ‘culture’ produced several 
negative national stereotypes, i.e. laziness, corruption, profligacy, not only about Greece, but also 
about other ‘programme countries’. As such, this alone creates the possibility for identity threats.  
However, the exceptionalisation of Greece within the crisis invites the question of stigma, since 
‘international society is in part constructed through the stigmatisation of transgressive and norm-
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violating states’ (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 143). It could be argued that the placement of Greece and its 
identity in an exceptionally negative position may constitute a form of stigmatisation because of the 
explicit separation and exclusion this invites (Dovidio et al., 2003). Moreover, suggestions voiced 
during the crisis by political figures, aiming at what were described as ‘punishing tactics’ or ‘public 
shaming’ (Petley, 2013), such as formal sanctions and disqualifications, i.e. from the Eurozone, the 
Schengen Zone, etc., or flags flying at half-mast ‘in shame’ are strategies of stigmatisation, because 
they aim to materialise, formalise and institutionalise what is constructed as ‘unacceptable 
difference’.  
Going back to the original historical use of stigma as a physical mark on the body of criminals, slaves 
or sinners (Goffman, 1963), the example of lowered flags appears as the material mark on the body 
of nations, materialised through its symbol, i.e. the flag. Disqualification from membership also 
constitutes a form of stigmatisation in the sense of exclusion. The normativity that quests for 
punishing and shaming entail also illustrates the intense moralisation of the crisis debate, which was 
articulated in the sphere of economic morality, further constructing the European prototype and as 
an extension its anti-prototype. Although such courses of action were not implemented during the 
crisis, the public discussion of them could be understood as attempts of symbolic stigmatisation, 
rather than outright practices of stigmatisation. Symbolic stigmatisation can lead to informal and 
symbolic ways of exclusion and isolation, as was seen in Southern-European member-states’ tactics 
of symbolic distanciation from the object of ‘Greece’.  
Production of research knowledge about Greek European identity during the economic crisis has 
only focused on negative representations and stereotypes (i.e. Tzogopoulos, 2013). It was attempted 
in this thesis to expose the complexity of stereotyping as both negative and positive and efforts were 
made to illustrate that Greece had not only been stereotyped negatively, but also positively. In this 
respect, it was demonstrated that academic, media and political discourse constructed Greece in 
multiple, yet interrelated, positive representations, such as those of the victim, rebel, regime 
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changer and the underdog. These were made possible through processes of romanticisation and 
universalisation of Greek identity. These representations appeared to be made by particular social 
groups, such as nationalist extreme-right groups (Askanius & Mylonas, 2015) or self-proclaimed 
leftist academics, therefore could be said to be influenced by ideology and political leanings (i.e. 
Mouffe et al., 2012).  
These representations appeared to be constructed as an opposition to the EU and inadvertently 
constructed its identity in negative manners, such as overtly neoliberal, capitalist, Marxist, 
overbearing, oppressive, and so on. In these cases, the production of knowledge about Greek 
European identity is situated within the production of critical knowledge about the EU, whereby the 
category of ‘Greece’ can be strategically exploited for political ends, i.e. criticising the EU, since 
Greece was constructed as being in conflict with it. As such, identity overvaluation opportunities 
were made available within the crisis discourse, albeit within particularised circles, indicating that 
these were not hegemonic representations, but rather emancipated ones, based on SRT’s typology 
(Jaspal et al., 2014).  
Finally, identity deficits were also present within the wider discourse of the crisis, particularly 
objectified around the notion of national sovereignty which was presented as compromised by EU 
intervention (Mitsikopoulou & Lykou, 2015; Mylonas, 2015). The ideational leaders interviewed in 
this study were divided on this matter, with some arguing that this claim was true, and others 
arguing that it was not true or only partially true. The question of Grexit was presented by 
international commentators as a loss of Greece’s European identity (Nixon, 2015), but Greek 
ideational leaders did not refer to or seem to share this representation. This might be attributed to 
attempts to minimise the insecurity caused by the question of Grexit or may indicate a refusal to 
equate the Euro currency with European identity. It was eventually argued that the overexpansion of 
Greece’s identity during the crisis to account for multiple roles (Marconi, 2011) had created an effect 
of disappearance by allowing the category of ‘Greece’ to stand for everything, therefore nothing, 
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that is, turning it into an ‘empty signifier’. As such, there were some available constructions of 
Greece as going through identity deficits or being in danger of undergoing them.  
Conclusively, we can say that representations of multiple destabilisations of Greek European identity 
as being in an ‘identity crisis’ were found in abundance in the public discourse of the economic crisis. 
Still, in order to understand them better, we need to ask whether there were continuities or changes 
to these ideational formations. In this respect, comparing the construction of Greek European 
identity before and after the economic crisis we can see that there were remarkable continuations, 
but also possibly some changes in terms of enrichment and intensification of pre-existing patterns. 
As such, we can see that the dualist assumptions made by the theory of cultural dualism were 
revitalised within the crisis context to account for the crisis origins (Triantafyllidou et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, the ideas of support and resistance for the EU that were developed as features of the 
modernising and underdog culture, respectively, appeared to inform the newly intensified debate 
about the EU in Greece, articulated in the Memorandum versus anti-Memorandum divide and the 
vote for the Referendum in 2015. These new dualisms appeared to fall on top of previous well-
established binaries and to create stereotypical typifications of the two camps (Xenakis, 2013).  
The pre-existing conflicts between Greece and the EU during what was labelled as the ‘populist 
decade’ of Papandreou and history of public discussions regarding Greece’s expulsion from the EU 
appeared to find continuation and intensification within the newly established Grexit debate. 
Furthermore, ideas of historical intervention by the West/Europe in Greek affairs are represented as 
historically continuous through the notion of historical ‘conditional sovereignty’ (Diamandouros, 
1997) and ‘EU conditionality’ during the crisis (Rogers, 2012). The same appeared to be the case with 
Greece’s prior status as the ‘black sheep’ in the EU (Economides, 2005), offering continuation to 
prior exclusions and sources for identity devaluation. The historical representations of Europeans 
being disappointed with the Greeks and Greeks being disappointed with themselves seemed to 
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create a distinctly unitary and dominant narrative spanning the trajectory of Greece from inception 
of the Greek nation-state, to EEC/EU membership, and to EMU membership and Grexit.  
Positive stereotypes additionally provided similar patterns to previous historical ones, such as the 
Philhellenic romanticisation and universalisation of the struggles of the Greeks once upon a time 
against the Ottoman Empire, and now against what was constructed as an ‘EU Empire’ (Behr & 
Stivachtis, 2016). As such, while once upon a time Greek European identity was represented as an 
asset in creating the content of European identity as founded on the ancient Greek political 
tradition, in the Euro crisis context Greek European identity was represented as an asset in 
recreating and changing the EU’s identity from what was perceived as a technocratic and apolitical 
formation to a more democratic and social Europe (Stavrakakis, 2014; Tekin, 2014).  
As such, we could conclude that there was observable continuity from historiographical 
representations to academic, media and political representations of Greek European identity during 
the economic crisis, exhibiting highly similar narratives with continuously similar content, although 
enriching them with new objectifications. For instance, what used to be called ‘underdogs’ and 
‘modernisers’ was objectified around the categories of ‘anti-Memorandum’ (αντι-μνημονιακοί) and 
‘Memorandum supporters’ (μνημονιακοί) or ‘We are all Greek’ slogans resurface based on political 
aspirations, not cultural affinity.  
This tendency towards greater continuity, rather than radical change, can be understood by 
Moscovici’s notion of anchoring (2000), whereby new phenomena are categorised on the basis of 
older categories, past historical events and familiar narratives, so that cognitive certainty and 
ontological security can be resolved. Newly emerged research on European identities after the start 
of the economic crisis (Galpin, 2014) affirms that national European identities show great path 
dependency and reliance on pre-established understandings of national identity, national views of 
the EU, and perceived relations with the EU. In this sense, we can appreciate the seeming 
concreteness of national identity representations and their persistence, as well as the symbolic 
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limitations and structural constraints posed on discursive actors when they attempt to describe new 
phenomena, based on available discursive resources. As such, in a manner quite similar to the 
bricolage method of this thesis, discursive actors ‘out there’ make use of pre-existing discursive 
material to newly (re)-construct (re)-presentations and make disappeared issues (re)-appear once 
more. The originality of these representations rests within the authenticity of their construction, not 
in their ex nihilo conception and creativity. In other words, all knowledge is based on the (re)-
appropriation of prior knowledge.  
 
The co-construction of knowledge: experiencing Greek European identity during crisis 
 
The second question that was posed in this thesis was how Greek citizens themselves experience the 
economic crisis and how they respond to the ways Greek European identity is constructed in the 
production of knowledge. Do Greek citizens endorse negative representations of Greek European 
identity and Greek society as a ‘divided nation’ ‘in conflict’ with its European identity dimension? Do 
they respond with overvaluating strategies to counteract possible identity threats or stigmatisations, 
and do they experience or perceive any absences of identity? As was shown, the production of 
knowledge about the economic crisis and Greek European identity within it was abundant in 
representations of multiple identity destabilisations at all the registers of our typology, although 
with particular emphasis on conflicts and devaluations. Greek citizens’ representations appeared to 
follow a similar pattern.  
Identity conflicts were present in citizens’ views of both their national and European identity 
dimensions. Many non-expert participants projected domestic divisions between public and private 
sector employees, which indicated that representations of culpability of public servants were 
persuasive. Ideational leaders themselves spoke of personal experiences of divides between 
Europeanists and Eurosceptics, which attested to the polarisation of Greek society. Greek ideational 
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leaders also spoke of Greece’s hybrid identity between East and West, anchoring the understanding 
of Greek identity in traditional historiographical representations and ideas of cultural dualism.  
While the hegemonic representation appeared to be that of ‘hybridity as a problem’ and an example 
of self-serving Greek selectivity, some participants argued that hybridity and selectivity were 
desirable, because of the cosmopolitan character of the first and the capacity of the latter to 
combine ‘the best of both worlds’. As such, those who viewed hybridity as a problem projected a 
representation of identity conflict, while those who viewed it as a positive feature projected a 
representation that resolved the identity conflict by ascribing equal value to both identities (Hirsh & 
Kang, 2016). However, a closer look indicated that the features chosen from the Eastern/Oriental 
identity were focused on solely aesthetic criteria, rather political or administrative ones which were 
widely identified with the Western/European identity.  
As such, there might be a question of the equality of value between the respective characteristics of 
the two identities. Citizens appeared to make the same distinctions choosing to identify with Eastern 
cultural features, but not political features. In this respect, there might be issues of hierarchisation of 
the two identities in both supportive and critical camps of the hybridity assumption, placing a lower 
value on Eastern/Oriental identities compared to European ones. Hierarchisation appeared to be 
evident in discussions regarding Greece’s possible future selves (Barone et al., 1997), whereby some 
ideational leaders expressed the concern that Greece could had become a ‘Third World’ country 
without the assistance to the EU or may become such a country in the future, constructing ‘feared 
possible selves’ (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Optimists argued that Greece could become more 
European if it tried and the European prototype was often projected as a ‘desired future self’ 
(Oyserman & James, 2012). Some overvaluing tactics exhibited hierarchisation in terms of Balkan 
identities that were seen as less European by some elites and citizens. All these may indicate a highly 
hierarchical view of nations within Europe and the world on the basis of economic capacity and 
positive evaluation founded on economic success.  
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This hierarchisation and overvaluation of the European prototype may explain the next feature in 
the data. Several ideational leaders and citizens agreed that Greece was largely not a European 
country. Although this might indicate a prevailing negative attitude instilled by the economic failure 
and its glooming aftermath, there might be deeper dynamics at play. Looking at prior 
representations of Greece’s trajectory within the EU, the EU is represented as a vehicle for 
modernisation and economic development (Esaiasson, 1999). The economic fallout appears to 
disrupt this profound investment in these aims, which might be a factor in influencing participants 
on their capacity to define Greece as European, since the European prototype seems to be 
interpreted as economically and politically advanced and Greece is largely viewed as falling short of 
these attributes. As such, we could speak of an implicit and explicit acceptance of negative 
stereotypes of Greece as non-European, as well as stereotypical understandings of the European 
prototype as Western/Northern European, rather than pluralist and diverse.  
Furthermore, we may say that there is large acceptance of the moralising aspect of crisis 
representations, which becomes evident in the discussion of collective responsibility and national 
self-reflection. As put by ideational leaders, ‘we need to look at ourselves’ (Ramfos) and the crisis 
‘can, and must, help us acquire some self-knowledge’ (Triantafyllou). Ideational leaders appeared to 
maintain certain assumptions, such as that national self-reflection was necessary and timely, missing 
and resisted, and should contribute to Greek society recognising its flaws and shortcomings. As such, 
an implicit idea that was projected may concern the need for Greek European identity to undergo 
the destabilisation of ‘identity crisis’ in the service of self-evaluation and repositioning within the 
new circumstances. Several citizens accepted this need for national self-reflections and self-
assessment of accountability for the crisis, which contradicted the ideational leaders’ view that 
citizens do not engage with national self-reflection or do not accept the flaws of their society.  
Strategies to re-establish the wounded collective self-esteem through reevaluation or overvaluation 
were present in the data to a degree, but were not as prominent as devaluating and conflictual self-
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understandings. For instance, several citizens rejected the idea of achieving positive self-esteem on 
the venerable ancient Greek tradition and very few mentioned it as the basis of European identity. 
Furthermore, the positive stereotypes of the crisis discourse were not endorsed. This may be 
explained by the wider acceptance of failure due to the economic bankruptcy and diminished 
collective self-esteem or it might be understood as the product of the national self-reflection that 
projects a critical stance towards national pride, nationalism and related types of identity 
overvaluation. Similarly, identity deficits were not prominent in citizens’ representations. The only 
deficit that was observed was that of not feeling European.  
These results reaffirm those of prior research conducted by Chyssochoou (2000a, 2000b) who 
compared Greek and French participants and showed that the respective groups defined their 
nations and their positions within Europe differently. Although European integration was largely 
justified in both cases, French citizens emphasised interdependence in the service of superordinate 
purposes, such as global competition and balance of power, while Greeks concentrated on 
dependency of Greece on the EU. As put, ‘for the French, the EU is a necessity for all countries 
within a globalised economy, whilst for the Greeks it is a necessity for their national group’s survival’ 
(Chryssochoou, 2000b: 417). Furthermore, although the French could ‘position themselves as the 
model’ of Europeanness, Greeks appeared conscious that their country was ‘economically… not up 
to the standards’, thus ‘unable… to contribute to the primary goal of the Union’ (Chryssochoou, 
2000b: 409-410). Furthermore, Greek participants attempted to ‘justify, even to themselves, their 
inclusion in the EU’, viewed ‘themselves as inadequate and fear[ed] that others might do the same’ 
and ‘their membership might be challenged’ (Chryssochoou, 2000b: 412-417). As a result, Greeks 
respondents largely agreed that their country would have to follow EU rules to keep up with it 
(Chryssochoou, 2000b). Similarly, in this study a continuity and intensification of these trends was 
observed with Greek citizens not recognising Greece as European, hence accepting non-
prototypicality of Greek identity, and supporting EU membership on the basis of dependency. 
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The self-stigmatisation and self-exclusion of Greek European identity might be understood as part of 
a particularly persistent movement of pathologisation of hybrid identities, developing economies, 
and non-Western societies in Greek studies and elsewhere. As was demonstrated in prior chapters, 
Greek European identity was conceptualised as a ‘split identity’ between East and West (Lipowatz, 
1994), tradition and modernisation, Europeanness and lack of it (Diamandouros, 1994; 
Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). However, a closer look at the term ‘split identity’ reveals that it was 
originally used in psychopathology of personality disorders as a synonym for what is today called 
‘dissociative personality disorder’, known in the past as ‘multiple personality disorder’ (Israel & 
Tarver, 1997). The very choice to conceptualise a national identity by ‘diagnosing’ a personality 
disorder is in itself questionable. Furthermore, the widespread use of the term along the absence of 
criticism is puzzling.  
Although the metaphorical function of the term’s usage is not in itself a problem, its uncritical usage 
may as well be for at least two reasons. First, collectivities do not have personalities, persons have 
person-alities. Collectivities are pluralist social formations that contain a multitude of person(alitie)s 
and as such, cannot have a personality disorder. This can only be possible to the degree that one 
postulates that nations have a concrete ‘national character’, a term that is long discredited 
(Diamandouros, 1994; Gendzel, 1997). Diamandouros himself admits to the delegitimation of the 
term and attempts to replace it with the term ‘political culture’, although this does not evade its 
essentialising attributes 38 (Ntampoudi, 2014b). Second, the use of psychological disorders to speak 
of large-scale societies risks pathologising them and presenting them as abnormal and deviant, thus 
potential subjects to exclusion and discrimination.  
The question of ‘normalcy’ further tantalises the study of Greek European identity. The body of work 
on Greece’s Europeanisation struggles with the idea that Greece is ‘not a normal country’, is in need 
of ‘normalisation’ and the EU is a medium to achieve that (Economides, 2005; Magone, 2010), which 
                                                          
38 In recent publications, Diamandouros (2013) attempts to emphasise that he is not referring to ‘political 
culture’ but instead to the ‘relationship between culture and politics’. It is still maintained here that ‘cultural 
dualism’ unavoidably reproduces the image of two political cultures within a culturalist wider argument.  
298 
 
constitutes a set of representations that can further be understood as a pathologising function. This 
abnormalisation on the basis of structural inefficiencies, political culture and organisational matters, 
can only make sense within a teleological, developmental and evolutionary framework. These 
particular assumptions appear to be the central element of the culturally dualist understanding of 
Modern Greece and its more recent trajectory within the EU, which is largely based on 
modernisation theories, which have long been criticised for their assumption of progressive linearity.  
For example, some project the view that the evolutionist character of modernisation theories 
conceals the fact that early industrialisers in Western Europe developed in conditions radically 
different than the ones encountered by later industrialisers, while the difficulty of overcoming a 
dependent and peripheral role in the global economy is often underestimated (Aldcroft, 2006; 
Mouzelis, 1978). Such arguments fall within wider discussions regarding ‘multiple modernities’, 
‘entangled modernities’, ‘varieties of modernity’, and ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Delanty, 2013; 
Eisenstand, 2003; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Schmidt, 2006; Therborn, 2003). According to this stream of 
research, nations follow multiple routes to modernity and need not converge to a single pre-given 
model. Nevertheless, based on the ‘divergence hypothesis’ of modernisation theory those that fail 
to converge economically, politically and culturally are considered ‘divergent’ (Kalogeraki, 2009). The 
very language of European integration on ‘convergence’ (Tumpel-Gugerell & Mooslechner, 2003) 
necessarily constructs its antithesis: the ‘divergent’.  
The pathologising crisis representations of Greece as ‘patient zero’ posing the threat of ‘contagion’, 
a ‘gangrenous limb’ in need of amputation, or a ‘basket case’ deprived of all limbs (Zestos, 2016), 
provided a renewed set of metaphors, but fell upon the fertile ground of a pre-existing pathologising 
set of representations. Expressions such as ‘pathologies’ and ‘normal country’ were sometimes 
present in the expert interviews of this study, but it was more often the narrative of failed 
modernisation that underscored the viewpoints of participants, albeit not all participants. These 
pathologising metaphors, or at least the self-deprecating attitude that accompanies such metaphors, 
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can be said to trickle down to everyday discourse becoming common knowledge: Greek citizens in 
this study believed that Greece has a ‘personality disorder’ (Kalliopi), a ‘clinical problem’ (Dionysis), a 
‘post-traumatic stress disorder’ (Eleftheria) and was in need to be examined by a psychologist 
(Nestoras). This profound dissolution with the national self, appears to be continuous throughout 
Greek historiography, as well as in representations after the beginning of the economic crisis.  
However, it is questionable whether believing in ‘Greek pathology’ can assist society to move 
forward, since positive collective self-esteem could foster collective sense of political efficacy that 
could assist a society to organise itself around collective goals and action, aimed at overcoming 
economic and social adversities. This is a robust reason to argue in favour of a new narrative for 
Greece. There were few occurrences within the data when it was implied that a new narrative was 
needed about Greece and its national European identity. As was put by Panousis, ‘the Greek needs 
to find a new identity’ because as was explained by Papakonstantinou, paraphrasing Gramsci, ‘our 
old self is dying, the new one has not been born yet’. Similarly, one citizen participant in this study 
commented that we become weary of hearing about the same divisions of East and West, North and 
South. This argument in favour of a new narrative appears to have preoccupied Greek intellectuals 
for a while. For instance, it was argued in the past that the academic community has failed to create 
a new narrative and understanding of Greek identity by reproducing the same conceptual 
categories, relations, and argumentations (Tsoukalas, 1999; Triandafyllidou et al., 2013).  
Under this light, the failure of Greek ideational leaders has been said to ‘reside[s] in the continuing 
incapacity of Greek intellectuals to construct a new and internally coherent stereotype’ (Tsoukalas, 
1999: 13). Somehow within this polemic rests the idea that if only a reinvented Greece could be 
imagined by its thinkers, the ideational leaders, then the self-understanding of the country could 
alter and lead to renewed social attitudes and practices. Particularly after the beginning of the 
economic crisis, it has been voiced that there is a need of a new narrative about Greece that has not 
been offered yet, which is why binary oppositions, such as cultural dualisms, re-emerge persistently 
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(Triandafyllidou et al., 2013). Although this quest for a new narrative was not a dominant 
representation within this study’s datasets, there were few allusions to it, which are considered 
noteworthy not only for the purposes of rebranding the negative international identity of Greece 
after the crisis, but also for providing a new stratagem for the country’s future policy and collective 
action. 
 
Conclusion: do economic crises constitute collective identity crises? 
 
It was explained in the introduction that the central problematisation of this thesis was to 
understand whether economic crises may constitute crises of the collective identities of the societies 
they inflict. After this exploration of the case of Greece, which was facilitated by a typology of 
different types of identity destabilisations, in order to understand more deeply the workings of 
identity phenomena, we could infer some suggestions for answering this question.  
Economic crises and bankruptcies are conditions of failure (Featherstone, 2011; Hindmoor & 
McConnell, 2015), and as such, entail a ‘politics of blaming’ not only because the void of leadership 
and governance they may provoke (Hill & Chu, 2001) allows opportunities for power competition, 
but also because the intensity of the experience emotionally and psychologically provokes people to 
ask for accountability, even call for punishment. Within such a context narratives, arguments and 
indictments proliferate (Armony & Armony, 2005). This surplus of ideas and polemics may lower the 
possibility for representations of identity deficits in people’s perceptions, which may explain the 
prevalence of identity conflicts and other destabilisations.  
As conditions of failure, economic crises and bankruptcies entail having to admit defeat, 
powerlessness and inability, which can lead to diminished self-esteem and an identity threat (Smith, 
2014). Furthermore, failure more widely disrupts the construction of desired future selves that both 
individuals and societies hold for themselves. According to this self-schema, a future identity is 
imagined and revered, hoped for and anticipated (Oyserman & James, 2012). In the case of 
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developing economies, societies may become invested in a future national identity that can acquire 
collective self-esteem from its economic success, autonomy and self-sufficiency. It may be often be 
the case that such future national identities are built on the projection of a prototype. In the case of 
Greece, this prototype has been the Western/Northern European advanced and industrialised 
economy. In Argentina’s case, for instance, this prototype was built on North-America’s economic 
success (Armony & Armony, 2005). This may indicate that nations built their desired and anticipated 
identities on the examples offered by powerful neighbours.  
Economic bankruptcy, and the destitution and dependency that follows it, at both state and 
grassroots level, is tantamount to the failure of economic development and lack of self-sufficiency 
and autonomy, especially within the context of a competitive global financial system (Antoniades, 
2013; Narotzky, 2016). Furthermore, the inability to achieve these tasks relates to the failure to 
successfully and fruitfully mobilise internal and external resources, whether natural and material or 
ideational and relational, for the achievement of positive ‘national reputation’ which is directly 
linked to a country’s external image, hence identity (Bond et al., 2003: 375). As Landes (2003: 357-
358), in his seminal book on industrial development in Europe, Unbound Prometheus, has argued:  
‘…economic development is a great drama. It is the puberty of nations, the passage that 
separates the men from the boys. It therefore carries with it, in a world that admires 
power and covets material prosperity, connotations of success and virility… Because of 
the profound implications of this drama for the status of the participants, the 
explanations offered for success or failure are themselves crucial to the self-esteem of 
these societies and their members.’  
 
Consequently, we can appreciate that economic failure is reasonably related to a devalued collective 
self-esteem. Furthermore, the very language of finance can be said to be carrying a symbolically 
detrimental lexicon. For example, countries that face economic problems have to follow currency or 
internal devaluation, that is, lower their value (Tsoukala, 2013). Some openly refer to the experience 
of such devaluations as ‘nationally humiliating’ (Kondeas, 2011: 125). Another example concerns the 
role of rating agencies that evaluate national economies placing them in a hierarchy of financial 
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worthiness, credibility and desirability and use negative terms such as ‘downgrading’ and ‘junk 
status’ (Featherstone, 2011: 194). Within the web of cognitive and discursive associations it is not 
only national bonds that are rated, but nations themselves, while in a competitive global economy 
that is unavoidably hierarchical, it is easy to forget that if someone is the first, someone has to be 
the last. As such, we can appreciate that the often overlooked economic dimension of national 
identity, compared to their civic and cultural ones, is especially important (Bond et al., 2003). As an 
extension, the surplus of identity devaluation that economic crises can impose may explain the 
obliteration of identity overvaluations strategies.  
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Conclusions 
 
 
The present thesis was a socio-psychological study of national European identities in Greece. Its 
principal aim was to investigate whether Greece’s economic crisis, as this was experienced within 
the context of European integration, constituted an identity crisis of Greek European identity. This 
aim was motivated by the wider problematisation regarding to what degree and in what ways 
economic crises may constitute collective identity crises. It was initially argued that phenomena such 
as economic crises are rarely looked at through an identity prism and  that existing theories of 
‘identity crisis’ are not adequately or fittingly developed to account for collective identity 
phenomena under crisis conditions. As such, this thesis’s aim was to contribute to the development 
of an analytical framework of identity destabilisations that could trigger identity crises. For this 
purpose a typology of varied identity destabilisations was analytically developed and operationalised 
for the examination of Greek European identity during the Greek debt/Euro crisis. The typology 
included destabilisations on the basis of identity conflict, identity devaluation, identity overvaluation 
and identity deficit.  
Four main domains were explored in order to understand the phenomenon at hand. At first, 
historiographical representations of Greek European identity were looked at. The division between 
East and West and the perception of hybridity as a ‘problem’ appeared to be dominant schemas. 
Binary oppositions in the form of cultural dualism, as well as trends of vacillations between identities 
devaluations and overvaluations at the internal (i.e. Hellenism) and external (Philhellenism) registers 
of national identities were recognised. Deficits of identity were identified in the idea of Greece a 
Western product and in Greece’s possible expulsion from the EU.  
Academic, media and political representations were looked at next to decipher contemporary 
narratives on Greek European identity and the economic crisis. Revivals of dualisms and 
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polarisations were identified and representations of domestic and European conflicts were found in 
abundance. Negative stereotypes operated at the levels of objectifications through metaphors and 
processes of culturalisation, exceptionalisation and moralisation. Positive stereotypes of Greek 
European identity were also recorded through processes of romanticisation and universalisation, 
while identity deficits were objectified around the questions of sovereignty and Grexit.  
Interviews with Greek ideational leaders reaffirmed the historical understanding of divide between 
East and West and the ‘problem’ of hybridity and the existence of domestic and European conflicts. 
Negative stereotypes were received with quests for national self-reflection, acceptance of Greek 
culpability in the formation of the crisis, and abandonment of overvaluation of identity and 
conspiracy theories. Alternatively, negative stereotypes were received with projections of arguments 
about the strategic framing of Greece for political purposes and criticisms against the EU. The 
question of exceptionalism was variably negotiated, but widely not accepted. Few overvaluating 
strategies were recorded, but were ultimately marginal in this study. Positive stereotypes of Greek 
European identity during the crisis seemed to be present in this study’s ideational leaders, but were 
not widely endorsed. EU membership, and as a consequence, European identity, was largely 
represented as the only option for Greece, which was examined as an identity deficit due to the 
absence of options it entails, while Europe’s identity loss was also discussed.  
Interviews with Greek citizens indicated that their representations did not deviate significantly from 
those of ideational leaders. The divide between East and West and the ‘problem’ of hybridity made 
their appearance, while domestic and European conflicts were presented at various levels. An 
important contradiction in citizens’ opinions was the increased negative perception of the EU 
combined with unwillingness to leave it, which was perceived as an issue of dependency, 
powerlessness and fear of the unknown. Negative stereotypes were received either with 
rationalising and neutralising attitudes that resolved identity threats or with more emotional 
responses that did not challenge the existence of identity threat. Citizens, similarly to ideational 
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leaders, spoke of the need of Greek society to engage in self-reflection and accept Greek 
responsibility, although the divide between citizens and elites rendered the latter more accountable. 
The question of exceptionalism was perplexing for citizens and was not endorsed. Overvaluating 
strategies were not widespread in this study’s participants, although some mild revaluating tactics 
and some conspiracy theories were projected. Positive stereotypes produced during the crisis were 
not known, neither accepted as valid possibilities. The only vivid identity deficit that was recorded in 
the citizens’ interviews was that most of them did not feel European.  
Overall, there appeared to be observable continuities between past and present representations of 
Greek European identity and expert and non-expert knowledge did not seem to deviate greatly. 
While the first may be attributed to the discursive constraints posed by previous representations 
that are reproduced in a path dependency manner, the latter may indicate the influence of expert 
representations and their successful diffusion in the wider society, albeit with minor differences. 
Comparing between the different types of identity destabilisations, across the data from the four 
different sources of empirical data, identity conflict and devaluation appeared to be more prominent 
than identity overvaluation and deficits. It was speculated that this may be attributed to the greater 
sense of failure, disempowerment and dissolution that economic crises can inflict.  
 
Evaluation of theoretical and empirical contribution 
 
This thesis attempted to contribute to emerging knowledge in both theoretical and empirical ways. 
The theoretical contribution comprised of the formation of a typology of identity destabilisations, 
which was used to explore the Greek case’s potential identity crisis. It is evaluated that this model 
served the endeavour adequately for a variety of reasons. First, by acknowledging the 
multidimensionality of crisis phenomena, it was able to illustrate the complexity of identity 
destabilisations that could act as crisis triggers. Second, by doing so, it enriched our understanding of 
identity destabilisation and ‘identity crisis’, a term that is often used in prior literature without 
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theoretical foundation or developed inadequately. Third, following a bricolage approach, the model 
was able to capitalise on the strengths and insights emanating from multiple sources. As a result of 
all of the above, it is argued in this thesis that the typology and the conceptualisation of the 
respective destabilisations contribute to a clearer development of an analytical framework of 
potential triggers of identity crisis. 
In terms of the empirical contribution of this study, as was previously explained, empirical data with 
Greek ideational leaders have been rather scarce in the past and a bibliographical review only 
reveals a handful of studies, while the existing ones focus on proxy sources such as the media or 
foreign policy analysis. This study contributed with original interview data with Greek politicians, 
journalists and academics, adding to the limited stock of qualitative and participatory studies. It was 
further explained that prior studies of citizens’ attitudes towards European integration and 
European identities had focused on survey data from the Eurobarometers, rather than alternative 
qualitative methods. The interviews conducted with citizens in this study contribute a wealth of 
qualitative data, which seemed to be missing from the literature on European identities in Greece 
after the start of the economic crisis.  
Elaborating on the theoretical contribution, as expected, the academic literature is full of 
terminological debates and disagreements over the correct use of words, terms, concepts and 
analytical categories or operationalisation of variables (Downs & Mohr, 1976; Gallie, 1956). In a 
similar fashion, ‘social identity theory’ is sometimes referred to as ‘social identity approach’ that 
incorporates the original social identity theory advanced by Henri Tajfel, as well as the ‘self-
categorisation theory’, developed by Tajfel’s colleague, John C. Turner (Turner et al., 1987). This 
theoretical branch of the social identity approach builds on the cognitivist elements of the approach, 
exploring how people categorise themselves and others. Another example of a sub-theory under the 
social identity approach is ‘identity process theory’ as developed by Glynis M. Breakwell (1986), as 
both Turner and Breakwell were students of Tajfel (Deaux, 2014) and SIT was their starting point of 
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theorisation. With reference to the future development of the present analytical framework of 
identity destabilisations, it is speculated that in a parallel fashion it could potentially be 
accommodated as a sub-theory under the wider umbrella of the ‘social identity approach’ with a 
particular focus on the complex diversity and dynamic multiplicity of identity destabilisations and 
their relation to possible identity crises.  
However, before it can claim to constitute a ‘theory’ as such, there are several facets that would 
need to be further developed and clarified. At its current state, the framework is an analytic one, 
being constituted by a set of analytical categories, proposed for the study of the phenomenon of 
identity destabilisation/crisis. The different categories appear to be useful in disentangling and 
descriptively clarifying the diverse dynamics of identity destabilisation and routes to possible identity 
crises. As such, the framework has a degree of analytical and descriptive value. However, in order for 
it to step closer into the area of theorisation, it would need to be transformed into a fuller 
conceptual framework, defined as ‘a network… of interlinked concepts that together provide a 
comprehensive understanding of a phenomenon or phenomena’ (Jabareen, 2009: 51). In this sense, 
each analytical category of identity destabilisation (conflict, devaluation, overvaluation, and deficit) 
would need to be more comprehensively conceptualised by a set of concepts that correspond to 
factors that characterise the respective types of identity destabilisation. These more elaborate 
conceptual frameworks can then be used as the building blocks for a more generalised theory of 
identity destabilisation/crisis. As explained (List & Valentini, 2016: 531), ‘we use concepts to 
categorise or classify objects and[…] they serve as ingredients in the activity of… theorizing’.  
The difference between analytical and conceptual frameworks and a theory is to be found in the 
latter’s capacity to make statements and propositions about the state of social reality (List & 
Valentini, 2016). Analytical categories and concepts themselves cannot make theoretical claims or 
have propositional content about reality, as theories are meant to do, but they can be useful in 
synthesising theoretical statements (List & Valentini, 2016; Stanley, 2012). As explained (List & 
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Valentini, 2016: 535), ‘only statements in which [concepts] occur can have truth-values’, thus claim 
theoretical validity. That having been said, every theory is a partially true story, since no theory can 
explain the totality of the world. At best, they can illuminate in an adequate, satisfying and 
convincing manner an aspect of the world, which is another way of saying that every explanation 
derived from a theory is necessarily reductionist (Dowding in Stanley, 2012). This is an important 
point to make, because there appears to be a misunderstanding in the literature that theories 
explain the world (Stanley, 2012), when it is more accurately to say that theories try to explain a 
fragment of the world. Instead, it is ideologies that pretend to explain the totality of the world 
(Arendt, 2005), not theories, hence the pitfall is situated in treating our theories in an ideological 
manner.  
Returning to the analytical framework’s potential for theoretical development, expanding and 
specifying its analysis conceptually, would additionally need to connect the dots between different 
analytical categories and concepts within these categories. For example, there would need to be 
further clarity on how different factors, conceptualised as objects of analysis, interact with identity 
destabilisations to either escalate destabilisations into crises or protect social entities from crisis by 
resolving imbalances. This would be necessary for the framework’s transformation into a theory 
since as argued (Dowding in Stanley, 2012), theories should be able to comment on both differences 
and similarities in the objects to which they are supposed to applicable. We may assume that such 
inquiries could also transform existing research questions by refocusing the focus on dynamics of 
resistance to identity crisis and rebalancing acts.  
This could result in reframing research agendas and posing new questions, such as what makes 
societies resilient to collective identity crises during ‘hard times’ (i.e. economic crises)? Furthermore, 
such questionings could lead to introducing new analytical categories, such as the ones of ‘social 
identity resilience’ or ‘balancing capacity’, and so on (see also: Keck & Sakdapolrak’s ‘social 
resilience’ concept and analytical framework of ‘coping, adaptive and transformative capacities’, 
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2013; or Block’s ‘ego-resiliency’ in Marcia, 2009). To be sure, these problematisations would also 
need to be situated in correspondence with the ‘mother’ approach’s SIT theorisations of identity 
threat management strategies in order to be informed by these, but also to inform them back with 
any possible new insights springing from empirical research, or even cross-fertilise them with other 
approaches.  
Furthermore, greater clarity would be necessitated on the relationships between the different 
destabilisations, since questions still remain. For example, under what circumstances do these 
identity destabilisations co-exist and do they have an accumulative effect on identity and its 
potential crisis? In addition, are these four types of identity destabilisations better understood as 
parts of two continuums based on SIT’s two fundamental assumptions of the human psychological 
need for certainty and self-esteem (Hymans, 2002)? To the degree that this could be the case (see 
‘continuum debate’ regarding Marcia’s ‘identity statuses theory’ in Waterman, 1988; also Marcia, 
2009), identity conflict and identity deficit could be understood as two extreme circumstances of 
identity uncertainty triggered by multiple clashing commitments, values or goals in the case of the 
first, and absence of them in the case of the latter. In this respect, it could be hypothesised that too 
many or too little commitments destabilise the sense of identity, while the existence of a minimum 
set of clear enough commitments facilitates the perception of identity balance. The further away the 
perceived distance is situated from this standard, the greater the sense of instability, hence the 
identity destabilisation and potential crisis.  
Similarly, identity devaluations and overvaluation could perhaps be better situated upon a 
continuum of need for ‘self-esteem’ (one’s own self-schema as represented by the individual or the 
group itself) or simply social ‘esteem’ (one’s identity schema in society, as represented by others), 
corresponding to perceived allocations. As prescribed by the analytical framework, on the one end 
of the spectrum there would be ‘low self-esteem/social esteem’ as opposed to the other end’s ‘high 
self-esteem/ social esteem’. Correspondingly, the category/concept of ‘stigma’ would be situated 
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further away from the balanced centre compared to the category/concept of the ‘stereotype’, as 
postulated by the differentiation made in the analytical framework (Biernat & Dovidio, 2003). 
Moreover, the additional clarifications between ‘esteem’ and ‘self-esteem’, ‘stereotype’ and ‘self-
stereotype’, ‘stigma’ and ‘self-stigma’ would better refine the difference between self-generated 
representations and representations made by other social actors, which would facilitate to further 
elucidate the relationship between the individual and society. The question on this relationship 
would then relate back to fundamental social sciences’ questions such as the ones on the 
relationship between agency and structure. Table I and II schematically illustrates the two continua 
on certainty and (self)-esteem.   
 
 
Two foundational SIT identity assumptions: need for certainty and self-esteem 
 
Table I: Continuum on need for certainty 
 
Continuum 1: need for certainty 
 
Identity conflict <------------------------------------I--------------------------------------------> identity deficit 
Uncertainty <------------------<---------------- certainty ---------------------->------------------> uncertainty 
(Multiple <---------------<--------------- (minimum -------------------->----------------> (absence  
clashing                                                clear                                                               of any 
commitments)                                      commitments)                                                 commitments) 
 
 
 
Crisis <----------< destabilisation <------------- < equilibrium >----------------> destabilisation ----------------> crisis 
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Table II: Continuum on need for self-esteem 
 
 
Continuum 2: need for self-esteem 
 
Identity devaluation <------------------------------------I--------------------------------------> identity overvaluation 
Lowest (self-) esteem <---------------------- balanced (self-) esteem --------------------------> highest (self-) esteem 
(self-) stigma <---- (self-) stereotype <---- balanced (self-) esteem ---> (self-) revaluation ----> (self-) narcissism 
 
 
Crisis <----------< destabilisation <------------- < equilibrium >----------------> destabilisation ---------------> crisis 
 
 
 
As with any schematisation of analytical categories/concepts, meant to speak of social phenomena, 
which necessarily operates at some level of abstraction (Mayntz, 2004; Oehrtman on Piaget, 2008), 
there might be both strengths and weaknesses in their operationalisation in research, or otherwise 
put, their ‘scope of applicability’ (Mayntz, 2004: 246). Although the two analytical continua appear 
to be making a useful step towards understanding the connections between the respective identity 
destabilisations/potential crises, there are some pitfalls that could easily be foreseen and 
acknowledged. For instance, one of the major challenges that is bound to arise whenever there is 
talk of ‘balances’ is what could be called the ‘problem of proportionality’. How much stereotyping 
constitutes stigma? How many commitments is too many commitments? How much identity 
revaluation ends up being narcissistic, instead of beneficial for esteem recovery? How much 
uncertainty is too much uncertainty? And ultimately, how much destabilisation would be 
necessitated to legitimately talk of a ‘crisis’? By which standards and criteria could we assess these 
different states? In addition, from a theorising point of view, one could also wonder, how much level 
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of abstraction would be necessitated for a framework to claim theoretical status that might warrant 
any degree of generalisation or transferability among cases? (Wiley, 1988; see also Boudon on 
‘ranges of theories’, 1991).  
Returning to the substantive issues of identity destabilisations themselves, research participants 
themselves could evaluate their own experiences and understandings of the associated phenomena, 
in which case people’s perceptions could provide the required answers. Alternatively, in the absence 
of participants’ input, researchers would need to arbitrarily or normatively make distinctions 
between the different conditions. This last mention of normativity, additionally brings to the fore, 
the question of what kind of theory this potentially developed framework, would aim to be. As 
explained, there are two main areas of theorising, positive and normative theories (List & Valentini, 
2008). In the first case, theories play ‘descriptive, explanatory and predictive’ roles, while in the 
second case, theories play ‘evaluative, prescriptive and normative roles’ (List & Valentini, 2008: 10-
11). An initial assessment would be that a possible theoretical development of the present 
framework should be within the area of the first kind of theories and attempts should be made on 
building the framework’s explanatory potential. In this respect, substantial steps should be made 
towards the aforementioned clarifications, since as argued, an ‘exegetical approach… emphasizes 
logical rigour, terminological precision, and clear exposition’ (List & Valentini, 2016: 525).  
It could be argued that normativity should have a secondary role within this endeavour, if only for 
allowing a more complexified and openly interpreted notion of ‘destabilisation’. For instance, the 
either implicit or explicit normative assumptions made by Eriksonian developmental theory of 
identity crisis that individuals must achieve identity coherence and overcome crises prescribes an all 
too linear, evolutionist progression towards the end goal of ‘identity’, as well as the desirability of 
identity stability. However, instead, people may understand or experience their identity 
destabilisations positively, at least to some degree. For example, as proposed by one of the research 
participants, identity devaluation could be liberating from the demands of achievement (p. 217; 
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present thesis). Moreover, destabilisations of previously stabilised collective identities may be 
understood as highly desirable if they lead to positively perceived social change, as was the case 
with demands made by participants for national self-reflection and self-inflicted critical devaluation 
(chaps 5 and 6; present thesis).  
In this respect, a lesser normative intentionality on behalf of the theoretical endeavour could 
safeguard it from representing ‘identity balance’ as the golden standard of all identity endeavours or 
representing individuals or groups as ‘maladjusted’ (Marcia, 2009: 353). That having been said, this 
‘shying away’ from overt normativity is not to be misunderstood as a claim that social researchers 
should be ‘cool scientists’ (Boulding, 1977: 78) in front of politically loaded social issues such as 
exclusion, stereotyping and stigmatisation. There is most definitely a place for social advocacy within 
social sciences (Becker, 1967; Laue, 1989), provided that cases are well-argued and well-evidenced, 
which primarily necessitates the achievement of analytical, conceptual, and theoretical rigour, as 
well as empirical, participatory research (see also, debate on the sociology of the ‘underdog’ in 
Becker, 1967 and Gouldner, 1968).  
Conclusively, there remains expansive theoretical research, reflection and empirical exploration to 
be made in order to assess whether the analytical framework can fruitfully illuminate identity 
phenomena and complement the existing SIT approach. Nevertheless, its current descriptive and 
analytical value provides some optimism for future explanatory development. Alternatively, it can 
remain an analytical framework and serve analytical purposes. 
 
Limitations and recommendations for future research 
 
This study’s recommendations for future research largely spring from its limitations. The focus of the 
present study was largely analytical, aiming to develop the understanding of ‘identity crisis’, as well 
as predominantly qualitative, aiming to elucidate the diversity of discourses and representations of 
Greek European identity within the economic crisis. Consequently, the results of this study should 
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not be generalised to the Greek population, but instead should be treated as indications of the 
multiplicity of ideas and experiences that circulate within Greek society. As such, in order to 
understand the aggregate aspect of the same phenomena, quantitative studies should be 
conducted.  
Furthermore, this study implemented a single case study research design, which was able to allow 
for detailed analysis of the case of Greece and a more holistic and triangulated approach that 
incorporated a multiplicity of data sources. However, being a single case study design, this research 
could not benefit from the merits of comparing the Greek case with other cases. As such, it is 
proposed that future research could explore national European identities during the Euro crisis 
through comparative research designs that can allow for a greater understanding of similarities and 
differences between cases, as well as specifications regarding factors that facilitate or hinder certain 
outcomes.  
Finally, we may observe that research conducted in a contemporaneous manner is like trying to hit a 
moving target. This thesis attempted to research national and European identities for a single case 
during a particular historical moment, which was defined by temporal conditions, and with reference 
to the event and process of the economic crisis. However, since the beginning of this research, there 
have been several important new political developments and emerging dynamics that may influence 
the state of national and European identities, both in Greece and in Europe.  
In Greece alone, the victory of SYRIZA can be argued to constitute a turning point and new research 
may benefit from examining identities before and after SYRIZA’s rise to power. Some examples with 
EU-wide repercussions include Brexit, terrorist attacks and the ongoing refugee crisis. As such, 
national European identities should be examined in light of these new burning issues.  
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Policy Implications and suggestions for future practice 
 
Given that identity conflict and identity devaluation appeared to be more prominent destabilising 
features of identity both in the internal and the external dimension of the Greek European identity, 
that is, both in the ways Greek citizens understand themselves and construct collective self-
stereotypes and in the ways Greek European identity has been represented outside Greece, we may 
argue that future political initiatives and policies should concentrate on reconstructing Greek 
identity both domestically and internationally.  
Domestically efforts should be made to enhance social cohesion, collective action, and social capital. 
These social assets could prove valuable in rebuilding the shattered economy by encouraging 
collaboration and solidarity among citizens. Most importantly, efforts should be directed by the 
political leadership to rebuild the destroyed relationship between citizens and political elites and 
resituate it on a new direction.  
Internationally, political leadership should concentrate on altering the negative image that was 
created about Greece during the last years. New narratives of Greek identity need to be encouraged, 
accompanied by positive representations of economic recovery. At the European level, diplomacy 
should endeavour to restore broken relationships and redirect Greece’s EU relations to more 
peaceful and fruitful pathways, especially in light of arising and ongoing common European 
problems, such as terrorism and refugee crises. Such large-scale security problems necessitate 
functional and beneficial international relations that foster cooperation and responsibility sharing.  
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Appendix 2: Demographic, cosmopolitan and political characteristics 
of the sample 
 
The citizens’ interviews included a total of 34 participants, one third female (11) and two thirds male 
(23). The youngest participant was 20 years old and the oldest 70 years old. In terms of occupation, 
there were 6 public sector employees, 6 private sector employees, 6 self-employed, 6 unemployed, 
6 students, and 4 pensioners. With reference to education, 10 participants had been to a 
vocational/technical school, 13 had studied or were currently studying in Higher Education (AEI, TEI), 
and 9 held a MA degree. In terms of disability, 2 participants declared a disability. Both belonged to 
the unemployed group.  
In terms of cosmopolitan characteristics, 12 participants spoke one foreign language (English), 13 
spoke two foreign languages, 3 spoke three foreign languages, 2 spoke four foreign languages, and 3 
spoke none. These last three belonged to the pensioners’ group. In terms of living abroad, a majority 
of 23 participants had previously lived in Greece only, 8 individuals had lived in one other European 
country, and 2 had lived in more than two foreign countries. In terms of travelling experience, most 
participants had travelled in Europe (30), 14 extensively (more than 5 countries), and 3 had never 
travelled before. About half of the participants had travelled outside Europe (17). Most participants 
had at least a few friends who were not Greek (23), while the rest (10) had none.  
Regarding political characteristics, 14 participants identified with the left side of the political 
spectrum (6 centre-left, 4 left, 4 extreme left), while only 5 participants identified with the right-
wing spectrum (4 centre-right, 1 extreme right). One participant chose the centre, while 13 
participants declared that they would not position themselves in such a spectrum. Table 1 
summarises electoral choices during the national elections of May/June 2012 and intention to vote 
in the European Parliament elections of May 2014.  
The participants were asked what they voted for in the May/June 2012 elections, as well as what 
they intended to vote for in the European elections of May 2014. The data on Table III table were 
derived from 33 completed questionnaires by 33 out of 34 research participants. Since there were 3 
electoral episodes between the start of the crisis in late 2009 and the time of the fieldwork in 2014, 
this dataset amounts to a total number of 99 ballots that would normally be cast by these 33 
participants. Table III illustrates the distribution of votes across political parties and further includes 
information on invalid votes, abstention, indecision, and ‘none’ answers. The final column at the 
right end summarises the total number of ballots for each electoral choice across these three 
electoral episodes. As can be seen, not one PASOK supporter was encountered within this group of 
participants, reaffirming the electoral downfall of the once dominant party. SYRIZA, DIMAR, ANEL 
and ANTARSYA, as well as other smaller political parties, appeared to be the most represented 
choices within the citizens’ sample. With ANEL being the only right-wing of the four, it appears that 
left-wing parties were more overwhelmingly represented within this group of participants, 
compared to right-wing ones, as is also reaffirmed by the way participants assigned themselves on 
the political spectrum. Beyond party choices, abstention was by far the most distinct feature of the 
data in all three episodes, and a total of 26 ballots was not cast or intended to be cast. Finally, 
indecision regarding the European elections was quite prevalent among respondents, with almost 
one third not knowing what to vote for.  
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Table III: Electoral choices for May/June 2012 and intention to vote for EU elections May 2014 
 
 Greek elections 
May 2012 
Greek elections 
June 2012 
European elections 
May 2014 
SUM of  
ballots 
PASOK 0 0 0 0 
ND 2 1 - 3 
SYRIZA 2 4 4 10 
ANEL 4 2 1 7 
DIMAR 4 4 - 8 
Potami - - 1 1 
ELIA - - 2 2 
LAOS 1 1 - 2 
KKE 2 1 1 4 
Golden Dawn 1 - 2 3 
ANTARSYA 2 2 3 7 
Various small parties 5 3 - 8 
Invalid/void - 1 1 2 
Abstention 7 12 7 26 
Undecided - - 10 10 
Don’t know/ don’t answer 3 2 1 6 
SUM of total ballots 33 33 33 99 
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Appendix 3: Detailed interview guide 
 
Section 1: introductory questions about the crisis 
In the introductory part of the interview, the participants were asked how the crisis had influenced 
them and they were encouraged to think holistically about the issue by adding the suggestion 
‘whether economically, politically, socially or psychologically’. This question was used as an opening 
of the interview because the researcher wanted to discover whether participants would speak of an 
identity threat posed by the crisis on their own initiative, that is, whether they would frame the crisis 
as an identity issue. Furthermore, this question was posed because it was necessary to establish 
from the start how the individual was situated towards the crisis. The participants were then asked 
about their opinion regarding the origins of the crisis in Greece in order to illuminate whether they 
were placing blame on Greece predominantly or whether they blamed other political actors mostly 
or distributed responsibility in mixed ways. This section also wanted to see if Greek citizens widely 
accepted the culturalist interpretation of the economic crisis as springing from the ‘nature’ of the 
Greek national identity, before explicit questions of national identity were posed. The participants 
were also asked what would need to change based on their diagnosis of the crisis causes in order to 
clarify even more their views on the matter. 
 
Section 2: the Greek national identity within the crisis 
In the second section participants were asked about how the Greek national identity was affected 
during the economic crisis and they were asked to comment on that in two ways: how Greeks view 
themselves and how others view them. This was an introductory question on Greek national identity 
within the crisis before moving on the to the more specified questions about the negative 
stereotypes of laziness, profligacy and corruption or the ways that Greece may have been 
represented as a ‘special case’. The participants were asked to talk about these phenomena and 
share their thoughts and feelings about them. At the end of this section participants were asked to 
talk about what they thought was positive about the Greek nation, so that the section could end in a 
more positive tone, but also to address the other side of the phenomenon of national identity. This 
question was also useful to see if participants engaged in strategies of collective self-esteem 
enhancement as proclaimed by the social identity approach.   
 
Section 3: European integration and the European Union 
In the third section of the interview, the respondents were asked to share their opinion on the 
theme of European integration and whether they thought it was a good idea. This question aimed to 
understand the general attitude of the participants towards the European project as developed by 
the European Union. Subsequently, participants were asked to discuss more specifically the role of 
Greece within the EU and to reflect back to the previous decades of EU membership and state 
whether it has been beneficial for Greece. The same was asked regarding Eurozone membership and 
the issue of Grexit was additionally addressed asking participants if they supported a monetary exit 
or even an exit from the EU. The third section widely aimed at addressing the question of EU 
identity, rather than European identity as these have been defined previously in the theoretical 
chapter and comprehend how much and under what terms Greek citizens would like to be, or not 
thereof, part of European integration.  
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Section 4: the European Union as the Troika and the crisis management  
In the fourth part of the interview, the discussion continued around issues of the European Union 
but now themes focused mostly on the management of the crisis. Respondents were asked to talk 
about the Troika and whether this experience had compromised their support for the EU or had 
changed their feelings towards European integration. The participants were also asked about the 
reforms, the austerity measures and the memoranda and whether these were justifiable or unfair.  
 
Section 5: the European identity 
In the final major part of the interview, the concept of ‘European identity’ was tackled with the 
participants who were asked what it was that makes a country European and whether Greece was a 
European country. The respondents were also asked if they themselves felt European and whether 
people could have both identities harmonically or if the two would necessarily have to be in conflict. 
In addition, participants were asked if there is anything that makes Europe unique compared to 
other regions of the world in order to understand their view of the idea of ‘Europe’. Finally, 
participants were asked to construct their own interpretation of the term ‘European identity’. In 
general, this last section attempted to address different dimensions of European identities and 
understand participants’ sense of belonging to Europe, personally and collectively as Greeks.  
 
Section 6: closing questions 
At the end of the interview, the participants were always asked three questions. First, they were 
asked to choose the most important issue that we had talked about during the interview. Second, 
they were asked if they could send messages to other Greek citizens, the Greeks of the diaspora and 
non-Greeks, i.e. other Europeans, what these messages would be. Finally, the participants were 
asked whether there was an issue that was not discussed during the interview which they felt was 
important and should be mentioned.  
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Appendix 4: Research participant information pack 
 
 You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully.  
 
Research Participant Consent Form - Elite 
For the doctoral research project called: 
National and European Identities during the Eurozone Crisis: 
The Case of Greece 
 
 I agree to be interviewed for the purposes of the research project named above.  
 
 The purpose and nature of the research has been explained to me, and I have read the 
information sheets provided by the researcher.  
 
 I was given the opportunity to ask questions about the research project and they have been 
answered by the researcher to my satisfaction. 
 
 The process of the interviewing session has been explained to me fully in advance by the 
researcher, and I understand what to expect.  
 
 I agree that the interviewing session will be electronically recorded for future analysis. 
 
 I understand that the researcher may choose to pursue academic publications based on this 
research project and the data that come out of the interview, which can be available to me 
upon request. 
 
 I have been informed by the researcher that I maintain the right to withdraw from this 
research project at any time, with no further consequences. 
 
 I choose to… (please, circle either a) or b): 
a) Allow the researcher to use or cite my name for the purposes of this research. 
b) Not allow the researcher to use or cite my name for the purposes of this research.  
 
Name of participant: ____________________________________________________________ 
Signature: _____________________________  Date: _________________________________  
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The researcher: 
 
 I have explained the nature of the research project to the participant and the implications of 
his or her involvement in this project.  
 
 I have made every necessary effort to answer the questions that the participant addressed 
to me.  
 
 I believe that the participant is fully informed and has sufficiently understood the nature of 
the research project and the implications of his or her involvement. 
 
 I commit to make every effort to protect the anonymity of the research participant, if he or 
she so desires. 
 
Ioanna Ntampoudi 
PhD Candidate 
UACES Scholar 2014 
School of Languages and Social Sciences 
Politics and International Relations 
Aston Centre for Europe 
Aston University 
Aston Triangle 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
United Kingdom 
Tel. (UK):  
Tel. (GR):  
Email:  
 
 
Signature: _______________________________ Date: _________________________ 
 
If volunteers have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, they 
should contact the Secretary of the University Ethics Committee that initially approved this 
research, on  or telephone  
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 You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully.  
 
Research Participant Consent Form - Citizen 
For the doctoral research project called: 
National and European Identities during the Eurozone Crisis: 
The Case of Greece 
 
 I agree to be interviewed individually or as part of a team for the purposes of the research 
project named above.  
 
 The purpose and nature of the research has been explained to me, and I have read the 
information sheets provided by the researcher.  
 
 I was given the opportunity to ask questions about the research project and they have been 
answered by the researcher to my satisfaction. 
 
 The process of the interviewing session has been explained to me fully by the researcher, 
and I understand what to expect.  
 
 I agree that the interviewing session will be electronically recorded for future analysis. 
 
 All personal information provided by myself will remain confidential and no data that 
identify me will be made publicly available. 
 
 I have been informed by the researcher that I maintain the right to withdraw from this 
research project at any time, with no further consequences. 
  
 I understand that the researcher may choose to pursue academic publications based on this 
research project and the data that come out of the interview, which can be available to me 
upon request. 
 
Name of participant: ____________________________________________________________ 
Signature: _____________________________  Date: _________________________________  
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The researcher: 
 
 I have explained the nature of the research project to the participant and the implications of 
his or her involvement in this project.  
 
 I have made every necessary effort to answer the questions that the participant addressed 
to me.  
 
 I believe that the participant is fully informed and has sufficiently understood the nature of 
the research project and the implications of his or her involvement. 
 
 I commit to make every effort to protect the anonymity of the research participant. 
 
Ioanna Ntampoudi 
PhD Candidate 
UACES Scholar 2014 
School of Languages and Social Sciences 
Politics and International Relations 
Aston Centre for Europe 
Aston University 
Aston Triangle 
Birmingham B4 7ET 
United Kingdom 
Tel. (UK):  
Tel. (GR):  
Email:  
 
 
Signature: _______________________________ Date: _________________________ 
 
If volunteers have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, they 
should contact the Secretary of the University Ethics Committee that initially approved this 
research, on or telephone  
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 You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully.  
 
General Research Information Sheet 
For the doctoral research project called: 
National and European Identities during the Eurozone Crisis: 
The Case of Greece 
 
The researcher and her institution 
The person responsible for the research project named above is Ioanna Ntampoudi, doctoral 
researcher at the Aston Centre for Europe at Aston University in Birmingham, UK. Ioanna has studied 
Sociology and Political Science in the past and is currently conducting social and political research for 
the purposes of her doctoral degree. This research project, and the data collection that you are 
asked to contribute to, form the main body of Ioanna’s doctoral thesis. The Aston Centre for Europe 
is the main research centre at the Politics and International Relations department at Aston 
University and it specialises in European politics. The research project will last until 2015 or 2016. 
The sponsoring bodies 
Ioanna’s research is sponsored by the School of Languages and Social Sciences at Aston University by 
the means of a full studentship that covers both tuition fees and living expenses. In addition, 
Ioanna’s fieldwork and data collection activities are sponsored by a fieldwork scholarship from the 
UACES, the Academic Association for Contemporary European Studies in the UK. Both institutions 
disclose no special interests in how Ioanna conducts her research, other than following good 
practice, completing her thesis and acknowledging their generosity in her publications.  
The research topic  
Ioanna’s research aims to look at the ways the economic crisis in Greece has impacted on Greek 
people’s sense of national identity and the ways they understand their country’s position inside the 
European Union. Ioanna’s goal is to interview various people in Greece and ask them about what 
their thoughts, opinions and feelings are about the above issues. Topics that will be discussed during 
the interviews include the economic crisis, Greece’s trajectory in the EU and the Eurozone area, 
support for European integration, the ‘Grexit’ debate, Greek politics, origins and solutions to the 
crisis, Greek stereotypes, and relations to other Europeans.   
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The participant selection  
Ioanna will be conducting group and individual interviews with people from different socio-
economic groups of Greek society, such as students, unemployed, private sector employees, public 
sector employees, self-employed people, pensioners, and Greeks of the diaspora. This means that if 
you have been approached by Ioanna for the purposes of taking part in this research, you have been 
chosen because you belong to one of the above social groups, as will be explained to you by Ioanna 
herself. The number of people participating in the focus groups is between 70 and 85. 
Ioanna will also be conducting individual interviews with various elites from the political, media and 
academic sectors. As an example, if you are a politician, journalist or university professor, you have 
been approached by Ioanna on the basis of the specialised knowledge you hold. The number of 
people participating in the elite interviews is 30. 
After the interview 
After the completion of the above interviews, the data will be stored safely to secure anonymity of 
the participants. The data will be analysed for the writing up of the present doctoral thesis and of 
journal articles or book chapters, while they will also be presented in conferences and research 
events, where the public will be predominantly academic. If any participant wishes to contact 
Ioanna, her contact details are provided below.  
 
Contact details: 
 
Ioanna Ntampoudi      Address:  
PhD Candidate, UACES Scholar 2014    Aston Triangle, Aston University 
School of Languages and Social Sciences   Main Build, Room MB748 
Politics and International Relations    Birmingham B4 7ET 
Aston Centre for Europe     United Kingdom 
Aston University 
        Tel. (UK):  
Email:     Tel. (GR):  
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Dear (Mr./Mrs/Dr./Prof.) ______________________, 
 
My name is Ioanna Ntampoudi and I am a doctoral researcher at the Aston Centre for 
Europe at Aston University in Birmingham, United Kingdom. I am writing to you based on 
my capacity as a social and political researcher, in order to invite you to take part in my 
research as a respondent in an interview.  
My project concerns the national and European identities of Greece in the context of the 
Greek debt crisis and the wider Eurozone crisis. You have been chosen as a potential 
participant based on the specialised knowledge you hold and your high degree of public 
influence. Part of my research is to interview influential people in Greece from the political, 
media and academic sectors. As such, your contribution would be most valuable for this 
piece of research.  
I have included in the email/envelope an information pack containing information sheets 
that indicate general information about the research project itself, and the topics that 
would be covered during the interview. The pack also includes a consent form that offers 
you the option to participate in this research and maintain your anonymity if you so desire. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or if you need further 
clarifications. My full contact details can be found at the back of this sheet.  
I hope that you will decide to devote an hour of your busy schedule to meet with me and 
discuss Greece’s national identity and position in Europe and the European Union. I would 
be very grateful for your precious contribution.  
Yours sincerely,  
Ioanna Ntampoudi 
 
Ioanna Ntampoudi 
Doctoral Researcher, Aston University  
UACES Scholar 2014  
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Contact details: 
 
Ioanna Ntampoudi      Address:  
Doctoral Researcher, UACES Scholar 2014   Aston Triangle, Aston University 
School of Languages and Social Sciences   Main Build, Room MB748 
Politics and International Relations    Birmingham B4 7ET 
Aston Centre for Europe     United Kingdom 
Aston University 
        Tel. (UK):  
Email:     Tel. (GR):  
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 You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide it is important 
for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please 
take time to read the following information carefully.  
 
Discussion Agenda Information Sheet 
For the doctoral research project called: 
National and European Identities during the Eurozone Crisis: 
The Case of Greece 
 
The present information sheet provides details of the topics that will be 
discussed during the focus groups sessions. These details are provided to the 
participants prior to the group interview to ensure that they know what to 
expect of their interviewing experience. The following list provides an 
indication of the interview structure and themes of discussion:  
 
 Introductions 
 The Greek debt crisis 
 Ideas about the Greek national identity 
 The European Union 
 The crisis and the Troika 
 The European identity 
 Closing remarks 
 
  
379 
 
 
